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Preface
Albert Einstein’s theory of general relativity is perhaps the most significant development
in the history of modern cosmology.  It turned the entire field of cosmology into a
quantitative science.  In it, Einstein described gravity as being a consequence of the
geometry of the universe.  Though this precise point is still unsettled, it is undeniable that
dimensionality plays a role in modern physics and in gravity itself.  Following quickly on
the heels of Einstein’s discovery, physicists attempted to link gravity to the only other
fundamental force of nature known at that time: electromagnetism.  Both Hermann Weyl
(1885-1955) in 1918 and Arthur Stanley Eddington (1888-1944) in 1921 developed field
theories that in essence were early attempts at unification employing the new concept of
the geometrisation of physics.  Also in 1921 the German theoretical physicist Theodor
Kaluza (1885–1954) attempted this by extending Einstein’s field equations to five
dimensions (Kaluza 1921).  Essentially he postulated a five dimensional Riemannian
space by adding to the four known dimensions a fifth one where particles always
followed closed paths.  Both electromagnetism and relativity were contained within this
grand scheme but it did not contain any of the relatively young quantum theory leaving
most physicists to realize it bore no resemblance to reality.  The Swedish theoretical
physicist Oskar Klein (1894–1977) added the quantum aspect to Kaluza’s theory in 1926
(Klein 1926) and similar subsequent theories have been loosely grouped into the category
of Kaluza-Klein Theories.  In Klein’s theory the fifth dimension was unobservable
whereas Kaluza’s was macroscopic in size.  This unobservable dimension’s physical
reality was akin to a quantity that was conjugate to the electrical charge.  In this way
Klein also sought to explain Planck’s quantum of action.  The lack of sufficient
mechanisms for testing such an idea and finding a practical application for the theory
kept Kaluza-Klein theories largely out of the mainstream until their revival in the 1970s.
This did not stop many scientists from studying unification, however.  Einstein
essentially devoted the final thirty years of his life to it while Eddington devoted the last
fifteen.
5Unification today is widely regarded as the Holy Grail of physics.  Physicists have
successfully unified the strong, weak, and electromagnetic forces with special relativity
under the guise of quantum field theory, but any definitive link to gravity or general
relativity remains elusive.  String theory is currently the mainstream theory of choice for
this but remains unproven.  Unifying gravity and quantum theory then must be at the
heart of this quest, and theories of quantum gravity have been at the forefront of research
in physics for nearly forty years.  But attempts at such a unification actually date to at
least 1928, when Paul Adrien Maurice Dirac (1902-1984) derived his relativistic equation
for the electron (Dirac 1928a and 1928b).  Eddington, disappointed that Dirac’s equation
did not appear in tensor form,1 sought to reformulate Dirac’s work in 1929-1930 to put
quantum theory into the language of relativity, i.e. tensor calculus (Eddington 1929).
This led to the development of several theories of cosmology in the 1930s developed
primarily by Eddington, Dirac, and Edward Arthur Milne (1896-1950).  Several
unification theories that did not directly address cosmological questions were also
developed at this time.
Eddington’s work rested on the premise that quantum mechanics and relativity
could be united under a common framework both in the formalism and the philosophy.
He began by analyzing uncertainty and became convinced that its introduction into
physics heralded such a monumental change that every physicist needed to consider its
philosophical implications in their work.  He clearly opposed the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) interpretation saying that any scientist who accepted the idea of hidden
variables as an explanation of indeterminacy “wants shaking up and waking” (Eddington
1935b, p. 84).  He saw this fundamental indeterminacy as the foundation on which to
build a unified theory of physics.
Though his work on uncertainty is clearly debatable in its validity it actually
foreshadowed some later developments in physics, including the need for a quantum-
mechanical standard of length.  This led him to the next major component of his work: an
analysis of The Pauli Exclusion Principle.  He develops exclusion into a richer
framework that serves, in combination with uncertainty, as the basis of later versions of
                                                 
1 Charles Galton Darwin (1887-1962) was the first to note that Dirac’s equation was not in tensor form; see
C.G. Darwin, “The Wave Equation of the Electron,” Proceedings of the Royal Society [A] 118 (1928), 654-
680.
6his complete theory, which held that physical events depend solely on dimensionless
ratios.  Later, this idea was taken up by Dirac in proposing his Large Numbers
Hypothesis (Dirac 1937).
Eddington’s work hinted at some of the underlying principles of modern theories
including some aspects of grand unified theories (GUTs) and string theory.  In fact, as
this monograph discusses, Fundamental Theory, as it was posthumously titled, is a very
early attempt at quantum field theory that quite remarkably predicts future advances in
that field.  It’s greatest relevance to modern science is in its unique interpretation of the
foundational aspects of modern physics and its philosophical implications for the
underlying structure of the physical world.  In fact Eddington’s work has seen somewhat
of a renaissance in recent years and has been studied in greater detail by a growing list of
scholars.
I first discovered this aspect of Eddington’s work when reading a brief account of
his cosmology in Helge Kragh’s Quantum Generations.  I had known of Eddington from
my work in astronomy for his many mainstream accomplishments, but this brief
encounter with his unorthodox worldview turned my research from work on general
problems in cosmology to addressing truly foundational problems in modern physics.
The results of my initial foray into his work on uncertainty, that reveal a deep
distrust of standard measurement techniques and a worldview incorporating uncertainty
into the very fabric of space-time, led naturally to his extension of the Exclusion
Principle.  One of the many amazing insights that continued to fuel my work was the fact
that Eddington modifies the interpretation of this fundamental principle and extracts
results from the new interpretation that point to a deeper philosophical meaning behind
exclusion.  This presented me with several fundamental questions about the nature of
exclusion: could it be more than a relatively straightforward quantum phenomenon; could
it reside in that fundamental area inhabited by the conservation laws, the forces of nature,
and the uncertainty principle, and, if it does, what does this mean for modern physics?
My conclusions in this endeavour have led to several extended pieces of research in
fundamental physics that, in itself, emphasizes the surprising relevance of his work
despite its chequered past.
7Examining these questions is not only important for a complete understanding of
exclusion and Eddington’s unorthodox worldview, but they are also at the heart of the
relationship between science and philosophy.  When analyzed in full compliment with his
work on uncertainty, the whole of his thinking begins to unravel itself.  To say that
Eddington went from being one of the subjects of my dissertation to being the only
subject of my dissertation does not do proper justice to his influence on me.  Delving into
the deep questions of uncertainty and exclusion, particularly in the context of unification
and the nature of the universe itself, his work has led me into many new uncharted areas
and has helped to focus my general research interests onto more fundamental and
foundational questions.  But aside from my personal interest in the subject, Eddington’s
philosophical and even some of his mathematical work is often overlooked by modern
scholars.  Bohm, Fred Hoyle (1915 - 2001), and Hermann Bondi (b. 1919) are well-
known despite their controversial theories making up a large portion of their body of
work, while Eddington, whose diverse work included the first observational verification
of general relativity and the nearly single-handed creation of the field of stellar structure,
tends to be overlooked and even marginalized.2  It was this historical treatment that
contributed to my focus solely on Eddington.
My research concentrated primarily on what comprises the first six chapters of
Fundamental Theory and is often referred to as his statistical theory.  These six chapters
focus their efforts on reinterpreting and applying Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle and
Pauli’s Exclusion Principle.  They form the philosophical and interpretive basis of his
entire program of research.  I analyzed each in detail both philosophically and
mathematically in search of any morsel of truth or potential application to modern
physics.  The formalism of the latter chapters cannot be understood without the
contextual basis the early material provides.  A direct result of his statistical theory was
the derivation of many of the known constants in the universe (hence the derisive label of
numerology) and I analyzed these in detail as well.  Putting all of this together I
examined the impact on unification, particularly from a modern quantum field theoretic
                                                 
2 One slightly elderly physicist who devotes much of his time to the history of physics these days, remarked
to me at a conference once that when he thought of Eddington he always thought of numerology.  Helge
Kragh, a noted historian of modern physics devotes nearly all of his discussion on Eddington in Quantum
Generations: A History of Physics in the 20th Century (Kragh 1999) to Eddington’s cosmology and very
little to his more mainstream, and arguably more influential, works on relativity and stellar structure.
8sense, attempting to determine if Eddington could have been on the right track with
anything.  The portions that do have relevance to the foundations of modern physics I
then examined in depth.  I have three published papers (Durham 2004, 2003a,and 2003b)
on the subject but, other than the most recent, they bear little resemblance to what follows
since my work has matured and evolved over the years as my understanding of physics
itself has done the same.  A robust and lengthy treatment of Eddington’s statistical theory
from Fundamental Theory comprises the nine chapters of this text.
One final note I wish to make is that, despite its title, Clive Kilmister’s 1994 book
Eddington’s Search for a Fundamental Theory: A Key to the Universe is devoted more
fully to an analysis of Eddington’s 1936 book Relativity Theory of Protons and Electrons
that laid the groundwork for Fundamental Theory published a decade later.  Much was
changed in the theory in the final eight years of Eddington’s life and the two years
between then and publication.  Kilmister and B.O.J. Tupper did analyze the statistical
components of Fundamental Theory in the early 1960s (Kilmister and Tupper 1963) but
more from the perspective of their own research that built upon Eddington’s.  It was also
prior to many of the major advances in quantum field theory.  As such, my work is the
only comprehensive study of the statistical portions of Eddington’s Fundamental Theory
that puts it into historical perspective and the only study that compares it to quantum field
theory rather than quantum mechanics and relativistic cosmology.
I wish to thank numerous people in helping me to complete this work.  In addition
to everyone to whom this text is dedicated, I wish to thank my doctoral advisors at St.
Andrews, Prof. Edmund Robertson, FRSE, and Dr. John O’Connor.  During a recent
session on advising for new faculty members at Saint Anselm College where I now teach,
participants were asked about their best and worst advising experiences as students.  I
was the only one whose best experience was with their doctorate.  Edmund and John have
gone well beyond what I expected of them and made this experience a truly pleasurable
one.  I also wish to thank Simmons College in Boston for employing me as a full-time
instructor for the vast majority of my time as a doctoral student.  In addition to providing
my family and I with much-needed financial resources Simmons provided excellent
facilities for building my research and developing my pedagogical style.  As such, thanks
must also go to Saint Anselm College in New Hampshire, where I now reside as a tenure-
9track faculty member.  Saint A’s has offered me a wonderful place to ply my
interdisciplinary trade as a philosopher and historian of physics while also providing me
with a fantastic group of students with whom I can discuss physics at length.
Thanks are also in order for Roger Stuewer for careful editing of one of the papers
that formed part of this treatise, a process in which I learned a great deal; Kate Price for
organizing the most stimulating conference of my professional career, one that actually
had a greater impact on my work than anything else; John Amson, one of the founders of
the Alternative Natural Philosophy Association (ANPA) with Clive Kilmister and a
former Saint Andrews (the other Saint A’s!) professor, for encouraging my interest in
Eddington and welcoming me into his wonderful home on the coast of Scotland to pick
his brain for an afternoon; Meg Weston Smith, the daughter of E.A. Milne, who has
generously provided me with her friendship and hospitality not to mention a treasure-
trove of information relating to her father and his relationship with Eddington (Milne’s
kinematic relativity will be a future project for me); and Alan Boufford for teaching me
the organizational skills I needed to finish this.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the numerous libraries and archives I accessed
along the way including the libraries (including archives and other resources) of the
University of St. Andrews, Simmons College, Saint Anselm College, MIT, the Royal
Society of London, the Royal Astronomical Society, and the American Philosophical
Society.  I also wish to thank the Kennebunk Free Library in Kennebunk, Maine, for a
quiet place to work.  I have four generations of librarians in my family and librarians are
often unsung heroes.
Ian T. Durham
October 2004
Kennebunk, Maine
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II
Eddington’s Life and Worldview
No study of Eddington’s work is complete without a brief description of his life and his
worldview since these were vital in shaping his research.  In particular I will examine
aspects of his life that are directly relevant to the development of Fundamental Theory
and the ideas behind it.  A full account of his life can be found in several texts including
the standard biography of him done by his former student A.V. Douglas in 1956.
Eddington’s Life in a Nutshell
Eddington was born 28 December, 1882, in Kendal, Westmoreland, England.  He was the
second child and only son of Arthur Henry Eddington, who was the headmaster of the
Stramongate School, the Quaker (Society of Friends) school where the chemist John
Dalton (1766–1844) once taught (Douglas 1956, p. 103).  Eddington was a very
intelligent child with a curious intellect and an aptitude for numbers: he attempted to
count the words in the Bible and mastered the 24 x 24 multiplication table before he
could read (Douglas 1956, p. 2 and Plummer 1948).  He obtained a three-inch telescope a
bit later thus launching his lifelong study of the heavens (Smart 1945 and Plummer
1948).  His schooling began at the Brynmelyn School in Weston-super-Mare (1893-
1898), where his family had moved shortly after the untimely death of his father in 1884
from typhoid.  He then attended Owens College, Manchester (1898-1902), managing to
circumvent the rules that prohibited those under the age of 16 from attending.  His
professors at Owens included mathematician Horace Lamb (1849-1934) (see Figure 1.)
and physicist Arthur Schuster (1851-1934).  In 1902 he received his B.S. from Owens
and then moved to Trinity College, Cambridge, on a scholarship, where he studied under
E.T. Whittaker (1873-1956), the person who later compiled Fundamental Theory, A.N.
Whitehead (1861-1947), and E.W. Barnes (1874-1953), all mathematicians. In 1905 in
addition to receiving his M.A., he spent a term working in the Cavendish Laboratory,
then under the direction of J.J. Thomson (1856-1940), where he very nearly made
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Figure 1. Horace Lamb’s headstone in
Ascension burial ground (formerly St.
Giles’ cemetery) in Cambridge, just a
few hundred feet from Eddington’s
(photo by author).
a career for himself in physics.  In 1907,
he was awarded the Smith’s Prize and
elected as a Fellow of Trinity College
(see Figure 2.).  In January of 1906, he
was appointed as Chief Assistant at the
Royal Observatory, Greenwich, to
succeed Sir Frank Dyson (1868-1939)
who moved to Edinburgh to take up the
post of Astronomer Royal for Scotland.
Once there he began working on a
research project that had actually started
in 1900, studying photographic plates of
the minor planet Eros.
Eddington completed the project determining an accurate value for solar parallax.  Much
of his early work at the Observatory has been overlooked but Smith gives a nice detailed
account of much of this in his recent paper (Smith 2004).  Once again, in 1909, he was
tempted by physics but turned down Schuster’s offer of a position at Manchester because,
as he explained in a letter to Schuster, he preferred the observational work associated
with astronomy (Eddington to Schuster 1909).  He returned to physics later in his career
but in the next chapter and beyond I contend that his philosophical outlook was primarily
Figure 2. Neville’s Court, Trinity College, Cambridge,
2004 (photo by author).
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shaped, albeit indirectly and perhaps subconsciously, by his astronomical work.
In 1913 Eddington succeeded Sir George Darwin (1845-1912), son of evolutionist
Charles Darwin (1809-1882), as the Plumian Professor of Astronomy and Experimental
Philosophy at Cambridge.  The following year he also succeeded Sir Robert Ball (1840-
Figure 3. Sir Robert Ball’s headstone is at the
top (his son’s is the lower stone).  This is also in
Ascension burial ground less than twenty feet
from Eddington’s (photo by author)
1913) (see Figure 3.) as Director of the
University Observatory and was elected
a Fellow of the Royal Society.  As
Director of the Observatory he was
given the right to live in the east wing of
the Observatory’s main building.  He
moved in on Lady Day, 1914, with his
sister Winifred (1878-1954) and his
mother Sarah Ann (d.1924). He had
previously been elected to the Royal
Astronomical Society in 1906 (he was
nominated by Whittaker) and served as
its Secretary from 1912 to 1917, as its
President from 1921 to 1923,
and as its Foreign Secretary from 1933 until his death.  He received the Society’s Gold
Medal, its highest honour for achievement in astronomy and geophysics (2 are awarded
each year) in 1924.  In the same year the Astronomical Society of the Pacific awarded
him its Bruce Medal.  The Royal Society (of London) awarded him its Royal Medal in
1928, a medal originally chartered by King George IV.  Shortly thereafter, in 1930, he
was knighted.  His knighthood status was that of Knight Bachelor as he never married.
1938 was once again a pivotal year that saw him made President of the International
Astronomical Union and the recipient of yet another of Britain’s highest honours, the
Order of Merit.
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The Meticulous Man
By 1917 he was fully absorbed in operations at the Observatory, though the ongoing war
on the continent continued to knock on his door (see below).  During this time he
completed the Cambridge Zone Catalogue of Observations using telescopes housed in the
Observatory.  He was well-known within the astronomy community but he was about to
achieve a fame and notoriety that, while not universal like Einstein’s, makes him one of
the pivotal figures in twentieth century science.  In 1919, in part due to an attempt at
deferment from active military duty, he organized and participated in an observation of a
total solar eclipse (in fact, two observations) in an effort to determine if Einstein’s
relatively newly minted theory of general relativity was accurate.  The resulting report
(Eddington 1919) is legendary – it gave scientists as well as the general public physical
evidence that overturned long-held concepts of space and time.  Eddington followed this
up by publishing in 1923 Mathematical Theory of Relativity described by Einstein as the
“finest presentation of the subject in any language” (as quoted in Douglas 1956).  His
major contribution to astrophysics, The Internal Constitution of the Stars, that
summarized his pioneering work on stellar structure, appeared in 1926.  This was
followed two years later by his first book aimed at a non-technical audience: The Nature
of the Physical World based on the Gifford Lectures he had given at the University of
Edinburgh.  He subsequently published four more non-technical books, the impact of
which has been recently discussed by Whitworth (Whitworth 2004).  His attention to
detail is noteworthy.  His lifelong interest in cycling was well-known (see Figure 4.)
Figure 4. Eddington’s Cycling Log at the Wren Library,
Trinity College, Cambridge (photo by author).
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and gives an excellent example of this in the form of his meticulous cycling logs.  His
meticulous nature was not confined to the taking of data:  he was a master at language, in
English as well as the classics.3  He was well versed in literature and wrote poems for his
own amusement that were considered quite good by those lucky enough to steal a
glimpse of them.  He was a fan of P.G. Wodehouse (1881-1975) and mathematician
Charles Dodgson (1832-1898) who was better known by his penname Lewis Carroll.
Eddington often made up grammatically correct sentences in Carroll’s style that made no
sense.  Subramanyan Chandrasekhar (1910-1995) gives an example directly told to him
by Eddington: “To stand by the hedge and sound like a turnip” (Chandrasekhar 1983).
The fact that this sentence is both ridiculous and grammatically correct might serve for
many as an excellent metaphor for Fundamental Theory, which is largely internally
consistent but appears ridiculous to some upon examination (I will show it is not nearly
as ridiculous as it may first appear).
Dodgon’s influence on Eddington extends beyond the literary and into the realm
of mathematics.  He had a penchant for writing mathematical puzzles and his most
famous, the Zoo Puzzle, which still circulates among puzzle enthusiasts, was written in
the style and used the characters of Lewis Carroll (see Appendix A for a detailed
description and solution).  Some of Eddington’s own more light-hearted literary fare was
actually published, for example:
There once was a brainy baboon,
Who always breathed down a bassoon,
For he said, "It appears
That in billions of years
I shall certainly hit on a tune (Eddington 1935b).
Harold Spencer Jones (1890-1960) and Edmund T. Whittaker (1873-1956) recalled his
“retentive memory for the apposite quotation” and his fondness for Shakespeare, having
been a member of The Elizabethans, a small private society devoted to The Bard at
                                                 
3 Though he was a consummate mathematician, he did say “If I sometimes employ pure mathematics, it is
only as a drudge; my devotion is fixed on the physical thought which lies behind the mathematics”
(Eddington 1939, p. 74).
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Greenwich (Spencer Jones and Whittaker 1945).  He was addicted to solving crossword
puzzles in The Times and the New Statesman and Nation and rarely took more than five
minutes per puzzle (Chandrasekhar 1983).  His linguistic skill is well represented in the
five popular books on science and philosophy that he had written.
But in addition to being a gifted writer, Eddington was a careful and concise
mathematician, as I will explore in greater detail in the coming chapters.  In truth, though
Eddington’s work was primarily in astronomy and physics, he was an applied
mathematician.  Evidence of his application of complex mathematics to even seemingly
mundane astronomical problems appears fairly early in his work.  For example, in an
article that appeared in Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society in 1910, he
attempted to fit three-dimensional paraboloids to fuzzy two-dimensional photographs
(Eddington 1910).  The attention to detail required of such a task is immense and is only
one example of his ability to focus intently on certain subjects, sometimes to the
exclusion of others.  His meticulous nature is even apparent in his handwriting, which is
extremely neat and compact, and in his arguments, which attempt to be wholly logical,
though passion and zeal do creep in (see Larmor discussion below).
Meticulous yet Much Maligned
Despite his faith in mathematics, Eddington always searched for physical justifications
for his work, despite its deductive nature.  Moreover, his philosophy of science was far
from unusual at the time, although in his later years his contemporaries often viewed his
views unfavourably.  His work was  - and still is - regarded as heterodoxical, both
philosophically and scientifically (Kragh 1999).  His harshest critic in Britain was the
astrophysicist and philosopher Herbert Dingle, who referred to the theories of Eddington,
Milne, Dirac, and others as the “pseudoscience of invertebrate cosmythology” (as quoted
in Kragh 1999).  Eddington’s mathematics, however, were fairly standard and always
rigorous.  Thus, the charge of heterodoxy can only be applied to his physics.  But his was
hardly the only physical theory before or since that was regarded as heterodoxical.  As I
have mentioned several times, Dirac’s Large Numbers Hypothesis (LNH) was just such a
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theory and even Dirac’s theory of electron-holes, which is still used to teach elementary
quantum mechanics, is fairly heterodoxical to a quantum field theorist.
In fact to Eddington’s credit he employed a number of methods that are in use
today, including Clifford algebras.  A little-known fact is that he introduced chirality to
particle physics.  He also is sometimes credited with an independent discovery of
Majorana spinors (Chandrasekhar 1983), which are often described (somewhat
incorrectly) as the square roots of vectors since the vector representation appears in the
tensor product of two copies of the spinor representation.  A Majorana spinor is actually
the real representation of a non-complexified Clifford algebra (while a Dirac spinor is the
fundamental representation of a complexified Clifford algebra).  Ettore Majorana (1906-
1938) is credited with their invention (Majorana 1937).  Despite appearing in 1937, the
substance of this paper was rumoured to have been written in 1932/33 but confined to a
desk drawer until 1937 (Recami 1999).  Its appearance came about a year before
Majorana disappeared under suspicious circumstances on a boat ride from Naples to
Palermo.  Two letters left behind hint that suicide may have been contemplated, though
kidnapping was also speculated as a possibility as was an intentional disappearance since
he was working for the fascist regime in Italy to develop an atomic weapon (Wikipedia:
The Free Encyclopaedia).4  In any regard, his premature presumed death could have led
to his receiving primary credit for the discovery as a recognition of his achievement of
sorts, particularly considering that Eddington’s professional reputation was beginning to
suffer in the late 1930s as his work on cosmology consumed the majority of his life.
Eddington’s contribution could also have easily been overlooked thanks to his liberal use
of novel notation, derivations, and nomenclature (something that can make reading
Eddington’s technical works difficult).
In other ways Eddington was ahead of his time – and is seldom recognized for it.
He recognized the need for a quantum-mechanical standard of length nearly fifty years
before one was adopted, and he advocated the inseparability of an object and its
                                                 
4 Enrico Fermi said of Majorana: “There are many categories of scientists, people of second and third rank,
who do their best, but do not go very far. There are also people of first class, who make great discoveries,
fundamental for the development of science. But then there are the geniuses, like Galilei and Newton. Well,
Ettore Majorana was one of them...” (Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopaedia).
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environment (not to be confused with the inseparability of the object and its observer), a
philosophical stance that appears in some versions of quantum field theory.  His idea of
linking quantum mechanics and relativity through coordinates compares well with
modern links through topology.  Quite apart from his work on cosmology, however, he
almost single-handedly founded the field of stellar structure (c.f. Chandrasekhar 1983).
About those critics who laughed at Eddington, Einstein5 once said: “Why should they
laugh?  They have never done what he has done!” (Douglas 1956, p. 146).
Figure 5. Einstein and Eddington in the Cambridge
Observatory garden in 1930 (photo by Winifred Eddington,
courtesy Institute of Astronomy, Cambridge).
Formation of the Eddington Worldview
Not even the best science occurs in a vacuum.  After all, scientists are humans and
subject to real human emotions, thoughts, influences, and the like.  Therefore it would be
remiss of me not to spend a bit of time discussing a few key influences in Eddington’s
career, specifically those that helped shape Fundamental Theory.  Since his spirituality
was such an integral part of his life it is important to consider the influences in this area
as well since his spirituality and science are intertwined.  Matthew Stanley recently
completed a PhD dissertation at Harvard University entitled Practical Mystic: Religion
and Science in the Life of A.S. Eddington (Stanley 2004b).  His work discusses many of
these points in much greater detail and I refer readers to that work if they are particularly
interested in Eddington’s spiritual side.
                                                 
5 Einstein visited Eddington in Cambridge in 1930, the year Eddington was knighted.  He is rumoured to
have played violin for Eddington, his sister, and his mother at some point during this visit (see Figure 5.).
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Before venturing into the realm of religion and mysticism, more worldly
influences will be discussed.  Two of the more prominent influences on Eddington were
his association with Sir Ralph Fowler (who eventually became Lord Rutherford’s son-in-
law) and his upbringing in the late Victorian age.  These influences are, in fact, shared by
Milne and Dirac (Durham 2003a).  Fowler influenced Eddington both directly and
indirectly though he was seven years Eddington’s junior.  In particular the two
collaborated on research in super dense matter primarily as it relates to white dwarf stars,
though they never published a joint paper.6  As I show in the final few chapters of this
text this work on super-dense matter was one of the key points in the development of
Fundamental Theory, particularly the statistical aspects.  Fowler’s scientific contribution
here was a general solution to Emden’s equation of state, something Eddington had found
a specific solution to.  It was Fowler who introduced Dirac to quantum mechanics (and to
Werner Heisenberg) and it was Dirac’s paper describing the relativistic theory of the
electron that helped launch Eddington’s work on Fundamental Theory (see Ch. 4).
Fowler was also a Fellow of Trinity College at the same time as Eddington and the two
had frequent contact, though Eddington’s work was primarily at the Cambridge
Observatory while Fowler’s was at the Cavendish Laboratory.  Fowler’s general
influence on Cambridge physics is remarkable – during the period 1922-1939 he
supervised sixty-four students for an average of eleven at any one time.  Fifteen of these
became Fellows of the Royal Society and another three became Nobel Laureates.  Far
from being impossible to locate due to his tremendous commitments, most of his students
found themselves in a close relationship with him.
Like Eddington, Milne, and Dirac, Fowler was also raised in the late Victorian
age.  Two aspects of Victorianism had a direct influence on Eddington’s work.  The first
was the strict social system that had religion at its forefront.  The second was a mystical
fascination with the unknown (Durham 2003a).  Focusing on the latter, the late Victorian
age was particularly relevant to an understanding of Eddington’s formative years.  H.G.
Wells (1866 – 1946), who was one of the original science fiction literaries and who began
writing in the 1890s, pointed out that the major change during the Victorian age was the
                                                 
6 In fact, of Eddington’s 265 published papers, 93 of which appeared before the famous eclipse paper, a
mere 9 list co-authors.
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shift in worldview from mystically religious to more cosmic in nature (Frayter 1997)
incorporating new views of time, space, and evolution.  Time and space began their new
lives starting in 1854 with Bernhard Riemann’s (1826 – 1866) publication of non-
Euclidean geometry and development of hypersurfaces (Eddington was the type who
might have noticed that Wells was born the same year Riemann died).  To explain his
hypersurfaces he created fictional creatures called flatlanders who could only live in two
dimensions but who could experience a third dimension as a force or feeling.  The
concept was introduced to England in 1884 by Dr. Edwin Abbott Abbott (1838 – 1926), a
religious scholar, in his novel Flatland in which flatlanders were one of many
dimensionally limited species.  The novel was hierarchical in that it displayed the caste-
like social system of Victorian England.
The new evolutionary (as well as aspects of the cosmic) views of the Victorian
age began appearing in a series of purely sectarian works on science known collectively
as the Bridgewater Treatises on the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as Manifested
in the Creation. They were published after the death and at the bequest of the 8th Earl of
Bridgewater in 1829.  Paul Frayter describes Wells’ The Island of Dr. Moreau as an anti-
Bridgewater Treatise where the beneficent God was replaced by a vivisectionist (Frayter
1997).  The year 1869 saw the publication of Frances Galton’s (1822 – 1911) Hereditary
Genius in which he first formulated the idea of eugenics or the improvement of the
human species through selected parenthood.  Wells was also inspired by Galton’s work to
write the dark and alien First Men in the Moon.  Galton was a cousin of Charles Darwin
(1809 – 1882) and was directly influenced by his evolutionary work.  Darwin’s son
Horace (1851 – 1928; who is yet another famous scientist buried in the same cemetery as
Eddington – see Appendix B), founder of the Cambridge Scientific Instrument Company,
worked closely with Fowler, in particular, and Darwin’s grandson Charles Galton Darwin
(1887 – 1962) was the first person to notice (publicly) that Dirac’s relativistic theory of
the electron was not in tensor format, a key point of influence in Eddington’s early
musings on Fundamental Theory.  Indeed one could quite possibly write an entire treatise
on the varying influences of the entire Darwin/Galton clan from 1850 to 1950, but what is
important here is the dramatic display of fanciful thinking, much of which was directly or
indirectly inspired by the religious fervour of the time as well as the desire to reconcile
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the new discoveries in science and mathematics with the concept of a deity.  In essence
there was a sense that religious and scientific “seeking” were two parts of the same
whole.  This is a concept that was nearly dogmatised in turn-of-the-century Quaker
reformism, something that impacted Eddington’s life directly.
His family being devout Quakers, Eddington was exposed to Quakerism and its
embodiment of a philosophy of peace (specifically pacifism) and inner harmony, not
unlike some Eastern philosophies, early in life.  Stanley (Stanley 2004a) says that in
keeping the lines of communication with Germany open in difficult times “for him,
Einstein and relativity were his contribution as a Quaker to world peace.”  Reportedly,
several of Einstein’s papers on relativity were smuggled to Eddington via the Dutch
astronomer Willem de Sitter (1872 – 1934).  As Eddington lived during two world wars it
is not unexpected that it became a source of tension for him at times.  For instance,
during the first World War of 1914-1918, conscientious objectors were placed in camps.
Due to their pacifistic creed Quakers usually became conscientious objectors, and
Eddington had friends who were sent to pick potatoes in agricultural camps
(Chandrasekhar 1983).  Most (though not all) authors attribute his success in receiving a
deferment to Dyson.  The actual circumstances, though involving Dyson to some extent,
also involved mathematical physicist Joseph Larmor (1857–1942) who attempted to
utilize contacts at the British Home Office to have Eddington deferred on the grounds
that it was not in the national interest to have a distinguished scientist in the Army.7
Eddington was perfectly willing to go to jail to avoid serving (Stanley 2004a).  Whether
he was in jail, in a camp picking potatoes, or in the field fighting, the scientific
establishment in Britain did not want one of their pre-eminent young members doing
anything but serious science.  Eddington’s pacifist convictions proved too great for him
to ignore and he was compelled to add a postscript to Larmor’s letter to the Home Office,
saying that if he was denied an exemption on the grounds of his usefulness to British
science, he would claim conscientious-objector status.  “Larmor and others were very
much piqued” (Chandrasekhar 1983).  Eddington’s action thus led to a short, heated
exchange of letters with Larmor, who insinuated that conscientious objectors held pro-
                                                 
7  Physicist Henry G. J. Moseley (1887–1915) had been killed at Gallipoli, as Larmor reminded the Home
Office.  Moseley had worked with C.G. Darwin and Ernest Rutherford in Manchester and had used X-ray
spectra to study atomic structure, which laid the groundwork for ordering the elements in the periodic table.
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German views (c.f. Eddington 1916a).  Eddington never begrudged Larmor a thing,
however, and the two became friends in later years (c.f. Eddington 1932).
A similar pattern was repeated with Milne, one of his strongest professional
antagonists, yet one of his closest personal friends.  For example, when Eddington
reviewed one of Milne’s books, he wrote to Milne, saying: “I realise that the review can
scarcely be pleasing to you; but I hope you will recognise that it might have been worse if
(holding the opinion I do) I had let myself go without regard to our friendship”
(Eddington 1935a).  In this way Eddington was able to separate the person from the
opinion, something most of us find supremely difficult.  This ability to divide people
from their opinions is seemingly at odds with Quakerism’s unifying principles.  However,
it is not really a division but simply the ability to look past the opinion and see the person
beyond.  As A. Ruth Fry describes in A Quaker Adventure there is in Quakerism a “belief
in the potentiality of the divine in all men – the Inner Light, as we call it, which is in
every man, no matter how hidden or darkened it may be” (Fry 1926).
It is the unifying aspect in Quakerism that promoted values that provided
Eddington with a unifying approach to the world around him and the people in it.  In this
way it was impossible for Eddington to completely separate science and religion.  Quaker
reformers at the turn of the century promoted the idea that the “scientific spirit could, and
should, be combined with a religious outlook.” (Stanley 2004a).  Similarly J. Rendal
Harris, a Cambridge palaeographer and Quaker reformer said in 1896, “This theory of the
detachment of science and religion from one another never has been a working theory of
the universe; the two areas must overlap and blend, or we are lost” (Report 1896).  In
fact, Eddington found at least one overt way in which science and religion agreed: “The
scientist and the religious teacher may well be content to agree that the value of any
hypothesis extends just so far as it is verified by actual experience” (Eddington 1925a,
222).  It was on this piece of overt agreement that his scientific worldview took shape.
Despite the purely deductive nature of his later works his reliance on matching theory to
experiment (experience) remained a central theme in his search for a fundamental theory.
Experience was one of the primary values promoted by modern Quakerism.  The
so-called “third way” of the Quaker renaissance maintained that religion should sprout
from the individual experience of what was called the “Inward Light” and not from
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dogma (Stanley 2004a).  He maintained that, in fact, that science is unable to
quantitatively measure every aspect of human experience, specifically consciousness, yet
it is just as real as the portions of human experience science can measure (similar ideas
are explored by Bohm – see Bohm 1980 – and these similarities are discussed in Ch. 3).
As Stanley puts it, “The proof of science was in empirical measurement; the proof of
religion was in empirical experience” (Stanley 2004a, p. 49).  Thus, scientifically, not
everything is certain since science can’t measure everything.  Once again, the Quaker
outlook provides guidance: “one should not try to find complete certainty because this
leads to stagnation and a refusal to accept new ideas” (Stanley 2004a, p. 50).  As a
scientific principle and working philosophy, Eddington found this view embodied in
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle that served as one of the foundations for his attempt
to apply his unifying worldview to modern physics.  This, along with the Pauli Exclusion
Principle, formed the backbone of his theory.  Essentially he reinterpreted the uncertainty
and exclusion principles on relativistic grounds and utilized the combination as the
foundation on which to build a self-consistent theory of quantum mechanics that was
fully compatible with relativity – basically a theory of quantum gravity though, as I will
show, it turned out to be more like quantum field theory and his motivation had its roots
in his work on stellar structure and stellar motion.  In order to better understand what he
did it is necessary first to exam his work philosophically as well as examine the history of
modern physics leading up to the development of Fundamental Theory, including the
contributions he personally made.  But first, a philosophical examination of his work is in
order.
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III
A Philosophical Analysis of Eddington’s Work
Eddington’s philosophy actually manifests itself both explicitly and implicitly, and
differently in each respect.  Explicitly he quickly adopted the concept of uncertainty, as
embodied in Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, as a cornerstone of his work.  Implicitly
he worked from the notion that a truly comprehensive theory of the universe would need
to be derivable purely from first principles.  In essence he felt deductive reasoning was
the only path that would lead to a truly objective description of the world.  His
philosophy is most fully developed in the Philosophy of Physical Science, an expanded
version of the Tarner lectures he delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge in the spring of
1938, and in The Nature of the Physical World, an expanded version of the Gifford
lectures he delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1927 as well as portions of New
Pathways in Science, an expanded version of the Messenger lectures delivered at Cornell
University in 1934.  However the substance of these books implicitly announces its
presence in all his major works since it is the substance that comprises his working
philosophy.  I shall look specifically at a few key points from these treatises before
analyzing Eddington’s work from my own philosophical viewpoint.  Along the way I will
occasionally contrast these.  I also continue to discuss Eddington’s philosophy throughout
this monograph as I discuss specific details of Fundamental Theory.
The New Quantum Theory
In the Nature of the Physical World Eddington was riding the crest of the new quantum
theory mostly developed in the 1920s with so many important breakthroughs being made
in 1926, the year he delivered the Gifford lectures that would later become Nature.
Indeed he writes that he was preparing these lectures a mere twelve months following
Heisenberg’s groundbreaking paper on uncertainty.
The seeds sown early in his career by statistics are evident throughout.  He says
we “must not think about space and time in connection with an individual quantum; and
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the extension of a quantum in space has no real meaning” (Eddington 1927 [1958], p.
201).  This is because it is rather an ensemble of quanta gathered to form a “quorum” that
produce statistical properties that ultimately give rise to observable quantities.  Note that
though he is talking about photons in this case (he is discussing one of his favourite
subjects: the star Sirius) he uses the term “quanta” which we would just as likely apply to
any particle, unfortunately sometimes including particles of extended size.  This perhaps
unintentional slip should be checked and quanta should be applied only to elementary
particles that theoretically have no size (e.g. electrons).  In this sense it is meaningless to
speak of the extension of a quantum in space though one should note that Eddington was
speaking about a specific example (Sirius) that was not well understood at the time.
Nonetheless he is clearly speaking in statistical terms.  In such terms considerably
less certainty is given to specific claims or observations – even whole models: “One must
not expect too much from a model…” (Eddington 1927 [1958], p. 205).  Similarly he
expresses scepticism of the predictions made by the relatively new Bose-Einstein
statistics in relation to wave theory saying “at least that seems to be the physical
interpretation of the highly abstract mathematics of their theory” (Eddington 1927 [1958],
p. 203).  Though it seems odd that abstract mathematics would turn him off in light of his
own mathematical ramblings in Fundamental Theory, his scepticism is in line with his
general expressions of uncertainty.
He also finds in these new developments limitations on the measurements to be
made in science.  Ironically he suggests that there might be a limit to the application of
numerical results to portions of scientific theory, specifically citing Dirac.  Of course
Eddington later perceived the numerical predictions of his theory to be one of its great
triumphs.  But in 1927 he was searching for a deeper interpretation of the new quantum
theory regardless of its source.  In Dirac’s work of 1926 and early 1927 he found what
Eddington termed a “non-arithmetical” calculus for the governing laws of the universe
providing a purely symbolic beginning to the new quantum theory where the symbolism
was unrelated to specific arithmetical operations.
To be clear there is a difference here between the numerical results Eddington is
speaking of and the numerical results he later predicted in his theory.  The latter were
25
derived directly from the theory while the former were directly measured.  Eddington
found the latter expressed in Dirac’s work.  In summary,
The fascinating point is that as the development proceeds
actual numbers are exuded  from the symbols.  Thus
although p  and q  individually have no arithmetical
interpretation, the combination qp – pq has the arithmetical
interpretation expressed by the formula … [qp  – pq  =
ih/2π].  By furnishing numbers, thought itself non-
numerical, such a theory can well be the basis for the
measure-numbers studied in exact science.  The measure-
numbers, which are all that we glean from a physical
survey of the world, cannot be the whole world; they may
not even be so much of it as to constitute a self-governing
unit (Eddington 1927 [1958], p. 210).
The symbolic interpretation was no less physical.  In fact it is here that we see
Eddington’s continuing use of an aether-like quantity of which I will discuss more in
coming chapters.  At this point Eddington refers to it as a sub-aether and describes quanta
as oscillations in this sub-aether.  But he asks the very pointed question, what exactly is
oscillating?  He makes it clear that it is not the sub-aether itself, rather it is something in
the sub-aether denoted ψ.  He gives it the classical interpretation of a probability that
provides a distribution function describing the probable location of the corresponding
quanta.  The physical interpretation is then couched firmly in statistical considerations.
But Eddington’s interest should not be construed as support.  In general he
disapproved of wave theory, calling Schrödinger’s work “a dodge – and a very good
dodge too.
The fact is that the almost universal applicability of this
wave-mechanics spoils all chance of our taking it seriously
as a physical theory.  A delightful illustration of this occurs
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incidentally in the work of Dirac.  In one of the problems
… it is found that solutions only exit for a series of special
values of the frequency… In Dirac’s problem the series
turns out to be the series of integers… [w]e are not likely to
be persuaded that the true explanation of why we count in
integers is afforded by a system of waves (Eddington 1927
[1958], pp. 219-220).
Subsequent to these developments and following his delivery of the Gifford
lectures, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle arrived on the scene, in time for its inclusion
in The Nature of the Physical World.  Immediately Eddington placed this principle on par
with the principle of relativity.  In fact there is a clear link here between the two
principles.  Since relativity demonstrates that distances must be defined by certain
operations of measurement rather than in reference to the space between points, there
appeared to be no limit to the accuracy of measurements.  Similar operations can be
performed for momentum.  In particular a derivative of position can provide an
instantaneous velocity.  Mathematically there is no limit to the accuracy of numerical
results but it is not clear that this is true physically.  As physicists delved deeper into
atoms the accuracy of measurements began to come into question.  The uncertainty
principle provided the limit to this accuracy.  In essence indeterminacy, as Eddington
called it, puts a lower limit on relativity.
More fundamentally indeterminacy is epistemological reminding us that the
universe is observed from within and we cannot profess to know it in a truly objective
light.  As such it is difficult to say what a complete scientific description of the world
would look like.  It cannot include items that are not causally connected with our
experience yet should not be limited to our immediate observations that are clearly
incomplete.  As Eddington describes,
The description should include nothing that is unobservable
but a great deal that is actually unobserved.  Virtually we
postulate an infinite army of watchers and measurers.
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From moment to moment they survey everything that can
be measured by methods which we ourselves might
conceivably employ.  Everything they measure goes down
as part of the complete description of the scientific world
(Eddington 1927 [1958], p. 226).
Such was the state of Eddington’s thoughts as the new quantum theory began to reveal
itself as the ‘roaring twenties’ neared their end.  We find his belief rooted in the idea that
the quantum action is the only way we can interact with the outside world and
“knowledge of it can reach our minds.
A quantum action may be the means of revealing to us
some fact about Nature, but simultaneously a fresh
unknown is implanted in the womb of Time.  An addition
to knowledge is won at the expense of an addition to
ignorance.  It is hard to empty the well of Truth with a
leaky bucket (Eddington 1927 [1958], p. 229).
A New Epistemology
We find Eddington little more than a decade later questioning the very veracity of
knowledge itself: “I have said that I do not regard the term ‘knowledge’ as implying
assurance of truth” (Eddington 1938 [1958], p. 2).  Still recognizing the impossibility of
making truly objective observations but faced with the undeniable interference of the
observer, Eddington advocates for a ‘selective subjectivism.’  This is rooted in the
introduction of epistemological analysis to modern physics.  In fact the epistemologist, as
it were, is responsible for observing the observers.  This is not far from the truth of
today’s physics where philosophers of physics provide the cheque and balance for the
physicists.  As quantum information, Bose-Einstein condensates, and other formerly
fringe aspects of physics find contemplation of practical applicability this cheque is
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becoming increasingly important and we find the lines between physicist and philosopher
blurring.
Eddington refers to selective subjectivism as providing a priori knowledge of the
universe while empirical science provides a posteriori knowledge of the universe (see the
discussion of a priori probability below).  His justification is that a priori knowledge in
some cases has later been reconciled with a posteriori knowledge.  This philosophy
embodies the entire purpose behind his pursuit of a fundamental theory: the ability to
derive data from first principles that otherwise has only been known through
experimentation.  Experimentation clearly plays an important role and should not be
abandoned but selective subjectivism provides the a priori cheque on the a posteriori
data.  The latter requires careful consideration: it often does not directly provide the
desired observable data but rather provides ancillary or even undesired data that leads, by
process of elimination, to the desired result.  In Eddington’s terms the desired result is
then referred to as an ‘unobservable.’  But an unobservable is not proven as such purely
by observation (or lack thereof).  There must additionally be some logical flaw
discovered through the scrutiny of the very definition of the unobservable.  This would
constitute a priori knowledge.
Selective subjectivism finds its application in the epistemological transition from
classical to quantum systems.  When classical methods are applied to microscopic
transitions equations are derived that link positions, momenta, etc. at one instant to
positions, momenta, etc. at another instant.  When quantum methods are applied in the
same situation the equations link knowledge of positions, momenta, etc. at one instant to
knowledge of positions, momenta, etc. at another instant.  The knowledge in the latter
case is necessarily inexact.  Ironically the latter, though seemingly less exact, provides a
more correct (I hesitate to use the word ‘accurate’) description of the phenomena.  This is
due in part to the mathematical symbolism and the associated methodology used in the
description.  Probabilistic methods actually provide an exact specification of just how
inexact our knowledge is.  As such, though we may be limited in how much knowledge
we may have about a given transition, we nonetheless can specify exactly how limited we
are.  This is a powerful example of selective subjectivism: a priori knowledge supplies
specific limitations on a posteriori knowledge.  Wave mechanics witnesses the
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application of these ideas to unobservables: the best observation, though unable to
provide a precise quantity, will narrow the range of possible values.
Epistemology then tells us that in the quantum world our knowledge is limited to
probabilities.  In the relativistic world our knowledge is limited to relations.  The
combination of these two form the foundation of Fundamental Theory as the bulk of this
treatise will show.
Probability and Uncertainty: Classical versus Quantum
Traditionally statistics takes different forms in classical and quantum situations.  If we
imagine the roll of a pair of dice – label them A and B – classical statistics tells us that
there are two possible ways of rolling a three and a two on a single roll: A could produce
a three while B produces a two or A could produce the two while B produces the three.
Quantum statistics, however, tells us that there is only a single way a three and a two can
come up on a single roll because it does not recognize the difference between the two
dice.  Probability and uncertainty then have different interpretations in classical and
quantum situations.  Eddington, as I will show, tends to blur this distinction a bit
particularly in his application of uncertainty to measurement.
One problem with probability is that it is often viewed as the “antithesis of fact”
as Eddington puts it when, in fact, it can be a far more accurate predictor of events than
other methods.  Eddington expands the interpretation of quantum theory from simply the
observation of probabilities to the “synthesis of knowledge which constitutes theoretical
physics is connected with observation by an irreversible relation of the formal type
familiar to us in the concept of probability” (Eddington 1938 [1958], p. 92).  What does
Eddington mean by irreversibility in this case?  He gives the following example: imagine
two bags, A and B.  A contains two white balls and one red ball while B contains two red
balls and one white.  If we randomly draw a white ball from a bag the chances are 2 to 1
we will have drawn the ball from bag A.  Now let’s say we’re actually handed this bag
which we’re told has a 2 to 1 chance of being A.  What will be the result of drawing a
ball?  If the entire process was reversible we would have to draw a white ball since if we
drew a red ball the chances would be 2 to 1 that the bag was B even though we were just
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told it was more likely to be A.  Now obviously in real life we could easily pick a red ball
by random chance, ruling out reversibility.  In fact, in reality, given the knowledge that
the bag is likely A, the chances are 5 to 4 the ball we draw will be white.  Probability is
thus an irreversible process and, of course, lies at the heart of thermodynamics that is
often, more appropriately, called statistical mechanics.  To clarify, in modern physics
rather than determining whether or not an observation is true, we determine whether its
degree of probability matches what we expect from it.  That nature of this process is
irreversible at its core.  However, experimentally, we often test an apparatus by
submitting observations with probabilities so high they are almost certain.  In such cases
macroscopic events can appear reversible but the meaning is simply that the sheer
numbers involved in the process wash out the scatter.  For instance, let's consider the act
of removing a book from a bookshelf.  Clearly this act is reversible in its most basic sense
(you can put the book back).  But is everything about the book and the shelf unchanged
when you return it?  If you perform this act literally thousands of times, eventually the
book and perhaps the shelf will begin to exhibit some wear and tear.  This is because the
underlying microscopic effects are irreversible and not absolutely everything remains the
same when you put the book back.  This relates directly to the concept of multiplicity that
is discussed in greater depth in chapter six.  Of immediate importance is the fact that the
multiplicity is directly related to probability: probabilities are ratios of multiplicities.
Now, in general probability in physics is used in a strictly statistical manner, that
is to say it is defined to be a frequency in a certain class of events (thus we see directly
that multiplicity must relate to the number of events in some way).  In order to be used in
an actual scientific statement it must be used in this manner.  However, in its more
colloquial form it still may be used to qualify the statement as a whole.  As such it really
has two meanings in physics.  Somewhat similarly uncertainty can have two meanings.
In modern physics the meaning is determined by the uncertainty principle while
classically it is a statistical quantity related to the inaccuracy of a measurement.  This is
an important distinction that is blurred by Eddington in several places in Fundamental
Theory as I will show.  It is a statistical quantity in both instances, but is applied in
different ways.  Classically we usually think of the uncertainty in measurement as being a
result of the inability to make repeated measurements to 100% accuracy (ultimately this
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goes back to the reversibility concept I just described).  In many cases this is inherently
understood since measurements may be idealized depending on the degree of accuracy
that is desired.  So, for instance, when a doctor measures a person’s weight during an
annual physical he or she does not usually care about changes of a pound (or even a few
pounds for most full-grown adults) since body weights fluctuate on a daily cycle
depending on such factors as water retention, food consumed, etc.  As such these
measurements are often idealized in the sense that the person is usually fully clothed each
time but rarely wears exactly the same outfit year after year.  In this instance there is a
natural uncertainty in the measurement of plus or minus a few pounds.  This is a
statistical and classical interpretation of uncertainty that has no overt relation to the
uncertainty principle.
Quantum mechanically uncertainty also takes on a statistical meaning and in both
cases uncertainty is a limiting factor.  However, in quantum mechanics uncertainty is a
result of the fact that it is principally impossible to make simultaneously exact
measurements of certain conjugate variables.  In essence there is a Gaussian spread to the
measurement of each variable.  Without opening a Pandora’s Box, I should say there are
really two ways of understanding this.  In one sense if one is not measuring something
that requires a specific unit a single measurement could, theoretically, be ‘exact.’  For
example in a standard two slit (or even one slit) experiment a single particle will land on
a definite spot on the screen (though asking which slit it passed through is another
question entirely).  However, repeated measurements will show the locations of the
aggregate of particles on the screen is a distribution (i.e. they don’t always land in the
same spot).  This distribution is usually Gaussian and represents the fact that repeating
the measurements won’t always guarantee the same results.  But what about the location
of any single particle among the aggregate?  If the screen is graph paper, how accurately
can we assign coordinate locations to a single particle?  This is another problem entirely.
We’re no longer speaking about the statistical distribution of an aggregate of events but
rather the accuracy of the measurement of a single event.  The measurement depends on
several points including the accuracy of the measuring device, the possible interference
of the observer in the entire process (i.e. did the act of making the measurement change
the outcome from what it would have been if the measurement had not been made), and
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the potential spread in the measured object itself (i.e. is it extended in space and, if so, by
just how much?).
Eddington considers all of these applications of uncertainty including the classical
method and often blurs the distinction between them.  To be clear, including both
classical and quantum conceptions, there are really two broad interpretations of
uncertainty that have subtle variations within themselves: the uncertainty related to the
aggregate behaviour of a number of particles or events, and the uncertainty related to the
measurement of a single particle or event.  It is vital to keep these concepts clear in one’s
mind while reading the description of Eddington’s work in order to understand just how
he blurs the distinctions.
Explicit Probability
Probability was so ingrained in Eddington’s worldview it even appears in his more
fanciful writing including the light-hearted limerick quoted on page 14: the bassoon-
playing baboon is banking on the laws of probability to assure him that he will eventually
“hit on a tune.”  Eddington’s exposure to probability and statistics as a means for carrying
out the scientific method came early when he began work at the Royal Observatory in
Greenwich.  One of Eddington’s first assignments at the Royal Observatory was to
investigate possible sources of error in a Cookson Floating Zenith-Telescope on loan
from the Cambridge Observatory.  As Smith says “Such investigations were fully in line
with one of Greenwich’s central goals over its long history: the improvement of the
accuracy of observations…” (Smith 2004, p. 23).
One of Eddington’s major influences in these earlier years was the work of the
Dutch astronomer J.C. (Jacob Cornelius) Kapteyn (1851 – 1922).  One of Kapteyn’s chief
goals was to chart the distribution and motions of the stars in our galaxy (other galaxies
were, of course, unknown until nearly a decade after Kapteyn’s death).  Kapteyn argued
that the motions of the stars are not actually random as many astronomers believed.  In
1906, not long after he arrived at Greenwich, Eddington took to testing Kapteyn’s theory.
His method involved no new observations.  In fact it was a purely statistical endeavour as
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was Kapteyn’s8.  In Kapteyn’s own words from a letter to George Ellery Hale (1868 –
1938): “My studies have made me more and more of a statistician and for statistics we
must have great masses of data, of course.” (Kapteyn to Hale 1915).  But, Kapteyn was
clearly convinced that this work had nothing to do with logical or proper reasoning.  In
other letters he exchanged with Hale he “warned against putting deduction ahead of
induction as a means of making progress in stellar studies.” (Smith 2004).
Eddington’s view of the role played by data and statistics was completely
different.  As Stanley has stated in reference to Eddington’s Quakerism “one should not
try to find complete certainty because this leads to stagnation and a refusal to accept new
ideas.” (Stanley 2004a, p. 50).  Eddington’s outlook embodied this view.  For instance,
the germination of his ideas on how to construct a unified theory are stated in his first
book, Stellar Movements and the Structure of the Universe: “There can be no harm in
building hypotheses, and weaving explanations which seem best fitted to our present
partial knowledge.  These are not idle speculations if they help us, even temporarily, to
grasp the relations of scattered facts, and to organise our knowledge.” (Eddington 1914,
p. v).  In the context of this quote, Fundamental Theory could have been seen by
Eddington as nothing more than a continual work-in-progress that provided new insights
every few years in the form of some published paper and it begs the question: if he had
lived longer, would he had ever attempted to publish the entire manuscript himself – or if
he did, would he have published a completely altered version years later?  Many striking
changes can be seen in the various manuscripts leading up to the final version (see Slater
1957 for a detailed analysis of these manuscripts).
The statistical work he was performing with the large data sets also was at least
one reason he began thinking about the structure of the universe as a whole.  As he stated
in his obituary of Karl Schwarzschild (1873 – 1916), the “task of determining accurate
data for a large number of stars inevitably leads the mind to consider the great problems
of the structure of the stellar universe” (Eddington 1916b).  He was speaking of
Schwarzschild (and in the next sentence draws a comparison to Kapteyn), but the idea is
clearly his own.  His mention of ‘structure’ here presages his ‘subjective structuralism’
which is related to the ‘selective subjectivism’ I discussed above and was what French
                                                 
8 Kapteyn was at the poorly funded University of Gröningen and actually did not even have a telescope!
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has referred to as “a metaphysics for the quantum age.” (French 2004, p.117).  French
also finds a link in Eddington’s ideas between uncertainty as manifested in the
‘unevenness’ of gravity (matter) and the structuralism that was the building block of
Fundamental Theory: “By matter as the putative cause of irregularities in the field, …
this construction is seen as eliminating substance from our ontology in favour of
relational structures.” (French 2003, p. 228).  Here I disagree with French.  As it will
become apparent as I dissemble and reconstruct Fundamental Theory the unevenness was
present in a more fundamental combination of both the gravitational and electromagnetic
fields and thus is more than just matter.
But the extension of probabilistic methods to gravity did not come until
Eddington led the famous eclipse expeditions in 1919 in an effort to prove Einstein’s
general theory of relativity correct.  Here, Eddington’s observations as well as those
made by the companion team, required statistical analysis and an understanding that the
results could only be accurate to a certain point (as long as that point was enough to
essentially prove – or at the very least, show how probable it was – that Einstein was
right).  This is a classic inductive argument where the conclusions to be supported are
probable or probably true (Copi 1986, p. 404 and see next section).  The expedition report
was, in fact, one of the last articles he published dealing directly with a specific
observation or statistical data set.  However, he often referenced actual data even in
Fundamental Theory, for as Batten says, “he did not turn his back on observation, but he
did maintain that understanding came only when there was a theory to explain the
observations.” (Batten 2004, p. 169).  Essentially, he went from believing observation
should prove theory to be correct, to believing that theory should prove observation to be
correct.
Inductive reasoning was therefore an integral part of his early work simply
because it is the method by which all experimental science is carried out and Eddington’s
observations and statistical research were nothing more than experimental science.  Thus
it seems that inductive reasoning and statistical methods of analysis go hand-in-hand.
Probability is a direct outgrowth of statistics and is a fundamental part of experimental
science.  However, in the non-aggregate form of probability discussed above there is a
history of deductivism including Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle which arose from
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critical thinking and not experiment.  Though Eddington’s work appears to turn more
toward deductivism in his later career I will, in fact, show that experimental results
played a large role in shaping his subsequent ideas largely due to the uncertainty principle
which is probabilistic in nature.
But what exactly is it that we mean when we say probability?  I have discussed
probability in depth in relation to statistics but have assumed some familiarity on the part
of the reader.  It is often useful to return to the most basic definitions and even the history
of a concept when attempting to fully understand its application in a given situation.
Probability is usually thought to have begun with a series of letters exchanged between
Blaise Pascal (1623 – 1662) and Pierre de Fermat (1608 – 1665) in which they argued
about the proper way to divide the stakes in an interrupted game of chance.  Still another
possibility is that it began with Pascal’s advice to seventeenth-century gambler Chevalier
de Mere on how to wager in a game of dice.  There also exists a study published in 1662
by Captain John Graunt (1620 – 1674) where he discusses the mortality records
maintained in London since 1592 (Copi 1986).  Copi suggests that the result of this
“mixed ancestry” gives probability two different interpretations.  The first, often referred
to as the a priori view regards probability in its classical sense as measuring the degree of
rational belief (recall my discussion of a priori and a posteriori knowledge above).  In
practice this simply means being able to predict the likelihood of various outcomes of an
event given that these outcomes are limited in number.  The alternative view to this
regards probability as simply a measure of relative frequency of outcomes.  The latter is
often associated with statistical investigations and is thus the sense in which Eddington
was first acquainted with it professionally.  But Eddington recognized that one of the
many goals of science is not simply to describe the world but also to be able to make
reliable predictions of outcomes of events.  Thus, when combined with a belief in
deductive reasoning, which is essentially just “rational belief” as Copi puts it, he switches
to the a priori interpretation.  The importance of this point cannot be understated as it
allowed him to maintain probability as the basis of his work while moving to a
deductivist approach which is sometimes seen as incompatible with the concept of
probability.  In fact it may not be incompatible with the a priori interpretation since in the
a priori interpretation one can deduce exact likelihoods based on specific limitations in
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the antecedent conditions which themselves could theoretically be derived from first
principles.  This is precisely what Eddington did.
This switch by Eddington begs the question of whether or not it was a conscious
decision on his part.  He certainly was aware of the history of probability theory.  In New
Pathways in Science he refers numerous times to Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827),
who was clearly a deductivist since his work in mathematics, including probability
theory, was based on logical reasoning.  But, once again, probability theory is often
associated with inductive pursuits which are often quite apart from logical reasoning
(though not necessarily logic itself).  Laplace, though a Frenchman, is actually tied up in
the history of probability theory in Britain.  He was at the centre of a heated debate in
Britain in the 1820s when an attempt was made to introduce the teaching of probability
theory into the curriculum of the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford.  At the time both
were still sectarian (in contrast to the secular University of London).  In particular,
several religiously fervent dons at Cambridge, including William Whewell (1794–1866),
argued against the introduction of probability theory to the curriculum on the grounds
that it sought to answer questions better left to the Divine.  Specifically the opposition
singled out the teachings of Continental deductivists such as Laplace, Jean D’Alambert
(1717-1783), Alexis Claude Clairault (1713-1765), Joseph-Louis Lagrange (1736-1813),
and Leonhard Euler (1707-1783).  Whewell favoured inductive science, and being
experimental in nature was thus supposedly more supportive of religious beliefs;
deductive science was apparently too mechanistic.  Joan Richards has noted that “a
religion that rested on evidence attested to by personal experience and conviction had no
standing in probabilistic discourse” (Richards 1997).  But isn’t the act of taking a
measurement or making an observation simply another form of personal experience?  So
in one sense, religion’s standing in probabilistic discourse is a matter of interpretation
but, as I’ve shown, so is the very definition of probability.  Whewell’s support of
inductive science would suggest a recognition on his part of the inherently statistical
nature of measurement, but, on the other hand, the truly difficult nature of measurement
theory was not well understood in Whewell’s day.  Before the Uncertainty Principle and
the true nature of quantum mechanics were discovered, perfectly exact measurements
were thought to be possible (there is still debate regarding hidden variables – despite
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Bell’s Theorem, spatiotemporal non-locality has been observed in experiments).  So
Whewell’s understanding of inductive science was built around the notion that it was in
fact an exact science in every sense of the word.  In that sense he could have potentially
been persuaded to accept the a priori interpretation of probability on the grounds that the
antecedent conditions could be known exactly (perhaps even from Divine guidance) and
the outcomes were specifically constrained.
Eddington was much the same way in his seemingly inconsistent application of
probability within the bounds of deductive science.  In fact it could be said that they held
the same view – probability was really the realm of deductive science and not inductive
science and this view could be interpreted as arising from the fact that they recognized,
primarily, the a priori definition of probability.
Eddington, however, clearly had knowledge of the “relative frequency” definition
since he utilized these techniques in his work as an observational astronomer.  Since he
was a consummate mathematician, early on he was driven by a desire to formulate exact
mathematical descriptions of astronomical observations not recognizing the inherent
inexactitude in the observations themselves.  For example he attempted to fit three-
dimensional paraboloids to the envelopes of Comet Morehouse from fuzzy, two-
dimensional photographic plates, finding considerable room for error (Eddington 1910).
Similarly, in the eclipse expedition it turned out that only one of the numerous
observations was good enough to support Einstein’s theory, and only within a statistically
valid error range (Eddington 1919).  So, while applying the “relative frequency” form of
probability through inductive science he was left with too wide a margin of error, so to
speak.  Note that the Comet Morehouse example is a relative frequency definition only if
one considers the aggregate behaviour of the photons on the photographic plate.
Otherwise it is a measurement problem analogous to the accurate assignment of specific
coordinates to a single photon on a detection screen, i.e. the statistical distribution of all
of the photons on the photographic plates is not overall Gaussian since, if it were, the
photograph wouldn’t look like a comet.  In this sense, Eddington was more interested in
the coordinate positions of all of the photons in order that he might find a mathematical
distribution or form to match the photograph.
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In any case, the introduction of the Uncertainty Principle gave Eddington the
philosophical foundation for maintaining probability as a mathematical basis for
understanding the universe, reinforcing the impossibility of exactitude that he had been
observing in his analyses.  But, by moving to deductive reasoning and the a priori
interpretation of probability, he was able to put deducible limitations on any antecedent
conditions thus leading to well-defined probable outcomes and limiting the randomness a
bit.  This is again better understood in the context of Batten’s quote (see page 34).  The
change in his scientific approach was perhaps not as dramatic as some historians (this one
included) may have previously thought.  It was simply Eddington following his own rule
of not being too dogmatic (see Eddington’s quote on page 33) and adjusting existing
methods accordingly.
By constraining the antecedent conditions he was free to extend Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle, which he just recognized as a natural limit placed on mathematical
probability, from microscopic (quantum) to macroscopic phenomena (see chapter three
for a description of the causal nature of this principle).  This is an important point:
Eddington’s view of the uncertainty principle was not necessarily one of a purely
quantum phenomenon but rather simply as a limiting case of our usual classical inability
to take repeatedly accurate measurements.  This is where Eddington blurs the distinctions
between all of the various interpretations of uncertainty and probability.  The quantum
case was, to him, simply a limit of the classical case and the individual measurement
problem (e.g. the location of a single photon on a screen) is really a result of aggregate
behaviour since devising a coordinate system in the first place requires at least one other
object for comparison.
In any case, as Batten has said, he did not forget about observation.  Being the
primary way in which we interact with the universe any complete theory needs to
incorporate it.  The root of our interaction with the universe is essentially through the
process of measurement and so he developed deductive methods that worked within the
parameters of a priori probability to define standards of measurement like the meter.
Eddington thus seemingly made the dramatic switch from inductive to deductive
science, yet a careful examination of the approach he used clearly shows that he really
was simply changing the way in which he dealt with probability.  Probability and
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statistics had been the mathematical foundation of his analyses from the very beginning.
In an interesting and quirky little twist on all this, Whewell’s inductivism incorporated
what he called “fundamental ideas” (could Whittaker have gotten the title of
Fundamental Theory from Whewell?) that were supported by observation but were found
by “thinking properly.”  Perhaps Whewell was closer to an acceptance of probability than
he himself realized.
Implicit Reasoning
Eddington was very explicit about his use of probability and the concept of uncertainty as
I have shown.  He was less explicit about his movement to deductive reasoning later in
his career that I have just shown corresponds to a change in his use of probability.  The
deductivist nature of Eddington’s later works is no secret and plenty of writers have
discussed or analyzed this aspect of his method (for example see Kragh 1999).  But the
details of his incorporation of deductivism is much more subtle and really more implicit
in its application, particularly in Fundamental Theory.  I have already discussed inductive
reasoning from a probabilistic standpoint, but a precise definition will be of greater use in
understanding deductive reasoning.  The definitions of inductive and deductive reasoning
as given in Warriner’s English Grammar and Composition are straightforward enough
definitions to give an initial flavour of their similarities and differences (Warriner 1986).
Inductive reasoning starts from a set of observations and draws a generalization
from them.  Deductive reasoning starts with a generalization and draws conclusions from
it.  As I have shown probability can be interpreted as being either, though in early
Victorian science it was thought to be more deductive in nature since its conclusions were
derived from mathematical first principles and did not rely on experimental evidence (this
is really a priori probability and not “relative frequency” probability).  Experimental
science, by contrast, has usually been described as a form of inductive reasoning (see for
example Richards 1997 and Copi 1986).  Eddington found that inductivism did not
produce the most accurate answers (within the bounds of probability theory) as he felt
were possible and so he turned to deductivism.  But deductivism entails a definite
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problem, particularly in relation to science.  As Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) wrote in
his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy:
Since all terms that are defined are defined by means of
other terms, it is clear that human knowledge must always
be content to accept some terms as intelligible without
definition, in order to have a starting-point for definition.  It
is not clear that there must be terms which are incapable of
definition:  it is possible that, however far back we go in
defining, we always might go further still (Russell 1919,
pp. 3-4).
If everything is deducible from first principles, where did the first principles come from?
Could they ultimately be derived themselves?  But, if so, from what?  Eddington
approached the problem from a different tack: what caused uncertainty?  His answer:
uncertainty arose because there was never a suitably defined starting point in
measurement.  So uncertainty’s very existence was due to the inability to suitably
produce purely objective first principles in any deductive argument.  So it really solved
two problems for him: it required him to use probability theory in the context of
deductive reasoning and explained the problem of finding truly objective first principles
in any such argument.
Here Eddington’s deductivism also finds a parallel in another passage in Russell
where he notes that Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) “first succeeded in ‘logicising’
mathematics, i.e. in reducing to logic the arithmetical notions which his predecessors had
shown to be sufficient for mathematics” (Russell 1919, p. 7).  Eddington attempted to do
the same for physics by reducing it to a logical set of arithmetical notions that had been
shown to be sufficient for physics (or by reducing physics to mathematics in those cases
where mathematics can be applied in physics).  Frege was bothered by statements of
identity, such as ‘a = b’ which led him to develop a new theory of semantics (Copi 1986).
Statements such as ‘a = a’ hold a priori and are analytic in nature (Copi 1986).  But
statements such as ‘a = b’ could be true or false depending on knowledge not contained
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within the statement itself and thus cannot hold a priori.  Eddington was similarly
bothered by physical problems of identity, in particular the identities of indistinguishable
particles (a topic still at the forefront of the fundamentals of modern physics and one I
discuss in depth in several future chapters).  Eddington went a step further, though,
holding that in some physical senses even ‘a = a’ could not hold a priori but required
prior knowledge.  I will discuss the details of this in depth when discussing his treatment
of the exclusion principle, but the origin of his thinking in that regard clearly came out of
his attempt to ‘logicise’ physics.
Any attempt to logicise physics then must deal with definitions and Eddington
dealt not only with definitions of objects but also with definitions of measurements.
Deductivism, however, did emerge in other ways early on in his work.  In 1916, for
example, he began attempting to answer the age-old question: what exactly are stars and
what makes them shine?  As Stanley has pointed out his approach was deductive: “start
from completely valid premises and the conclusion is certain to be true, but without total
certainty in one’s premises, one has nothing” (Stanley 2004a, p. 50).  He was still focused
on inductive science at that time and combined this deductive approach with the
inductive method of gathering data on stellar masses and brightnesses and combining it
with mathematical analyses to examine the various patterns that emerged.  Stanley,
however, gets at the heart of why the inductive method ultimately proved unsatisfactory
in Eddington’s mind: it runs the risk of being disproved by new evidence or observations
(Stanley 2004a, p. 51).  Eddington’s deductivism was supposed to be as objective a
process as humanly possible and ultimately impervious to disproval.  The irony in all this
is that Eddington viewed Subramanyan Chandrasekhar’s (1910 – 1995) work on white
dwarf stars as being ‘mindlessly deductive’ (Stanley 2004a, p. 53).
But, Eddington’s method, though deductive, was ultimately designed to be
practical while simultaneously above speculation.  In this his observational background
clearly played a role.  Chandrasekhar was a pure theorist.  Eddington was both a theorist
and an observationalist.  Relativity was a key player in all of this since he was both the
first person to really disseminate Einstein’s theory in the English language as well as the
first person to produce experimental evidence supporting it.  But relativity plays a very
important role in any attempt at a purely objective analysis of the universe.  This is
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because relativity implies that there is no universally preferred reference frame.  A strong
interpretation of this concept would imply the impossibility of objectivity since
objectivity would either imply a single, preferred reference frame or the same view from
every reference frame.
Structuralism
Just how does Eddington, then, walk this fine line between truth and progress?  Defining
a purely objective point of view forces one to consider exactly how the universe is
structured.  Thomas A. Moore in his outstanding six-part textbook Six Ideas That Shaped
Physics essentially reduces physics to two things: particles and their interactions (Moore
2003a).  In the Standard Model, however, the four fundamental interactions (gravity,
electromagnetism, strong nuclear, weak nuclear) are really represented by more particles,
the carrier particles of each interaction – i.e. the particles that mediate the interaction by
delivering information from one particle to another.  So, ultimately, the universe is
nothing but particles.  But what are particles?  Are they simply packets of energy?  What
gives them motion?  Their direction ultimately depends on how (or if) they interact with
their neighbours, but what produces them to begin with and ultimately serves as the seed
of motion?  Eddington has referred to them as simply being conceptual carriers of a set of
variables (he used the term ‘variates’ – Eddington 1946, p. 30).  Everything basically
reduces to mathematics, then.  Structure in Eddington’s mind, in relativistic language,
consisted of events with intervals linking the events.  Point events would be relata while
the intervals would be the relations or, in Moore’s interpretation, the relata would be
particles and the relations would be the interactions, which are simply carrier particles.
As French points out, the only problem with this is a classic ‘chicken and egg’ issue:
which came first?  This is particularly troubling if the relations are simply more relata
and, as I will show in chapter six, indistinguishable from the original relata according to
Eddington.  But as French says,
… we can think of both the relata and the relations as
equally derivative in the sense that both can be
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conceptually ‘pulled out’ of the package as a whole (French
2003, p. 232).
Thus Eddington took the universe and its constituents to be an indivisible whole.  In his
own words, “The relations unite the relata; the relata are the meeting point of the
relations.  The one is unthinkable apart from the other.” (Eddington 1928, pp. 230-231).
The variates Eddington was talking about include such things as mass, charge,
and spin.  Einstein showed that in a relativistic sense mass is really just energy.
Eddington, as I will show in subsequent chapters, attempted to apply the same relativistic
reasoning to show that charge and spin were also frame-dependant quantities and show
that all particles were indistinguishable (e.g. a proton is indistinguishable from an
electron) since they were just packets of energy.  The wholeness of the universe would
then just be energy.  There are subtle arguments about the nature of indistinguishability
that will be worked out in greater depth as we study their applications.
Another view might be to interpret everything more fundamentally as momentum
(or rather four-momentum which is a relativistic unification of energy and momentum).
Moore has said that mass is simply a measure of how a particle reacts to changes in
momentum (Moore 2003a).  In some sense charge and spin could be related in a similar
manner since, ultimately, mass’ response to momentum is only through certain
fundamental interactions.  Any electromagnetic interaction (which technically includes
all macroscopic contact interactions) ultimately is mass-independent (see Coulomb’s and
the Lorenz Force Laws) but is dependent on charge.  So ultimately, momentum
conservation at this level in such an interaction depends on charge and not mass, even
though macroscopically it appears to depend on mass (even in the four-momentum case).
A similar argument can be made for spin, particularly in the context of angular
momentum, though this is a more complicated situation.  In one sense this is true since
the quantum field theoretic interpretation of charge is that it is a measure of how the W
and Z bosons propagate and so a relation to momentum is natural, though that is a bit of a
simplistic interpretation.  As for spin, any relation to momentum may well get at the root
of the exclusion principle as I will discuss in the closing chapters.
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In a modern sense, much of this could be attributed to the field concept and,
indeed, the field concept has been highly successful in predicting the results of particle
physics experiments.  But fields, or in the twenty-first century perhaps strings, are not as
dogmatic a construct as is sometimes viewed.  As French says “we have good reason to
expect our current favoured ontology – quantum fields, strings, whatever – to … come to
be replaced” (French 2004, p. 120).  Despite those who search for a theory of everything,
French’s statement is not wholly unbelievable.  The simple act of relative motion actually
creates macroscopic phenomena such as magnetism that do not exist apart from the
relative motion (or, perhaps more correctly, they reduce to a more familiar form without
relative motion).  The elegance of reducing everything via fairly simple relativistic
arguments to momentum, which is essentially just motion, then is perhaps, by virtue of
Ockham’s Razor, a better solution than the complexities of modern theories.910  Even
Henri Poincaré (1854 – 1912) in 1905 in Science and Hypothesis indicates that
knowledge of motion is ultimately at the root of many ‘non-mechanical’ problems:
only the something, which we then called motion, we now
call electric current.  But these are merely the names of the
images we substituted for the real objects which Nature
will hide for ever from our eyes.  The true relations
between these real objects are the only reality we can
attain. (Poincaré 1905, p. 162).
Eddington was thus sceptical of man-made units since for the most part they were so
arbitrary.  In fact, Eddington viewed the fragmentation of the universe as being
manifested in the multitude of units present in science.  I will discuss the details of
measurement in several later chapters, but for now I want to focus on how this leads to a
philosophical bypass, so-to-speak.
                                                 
9 Since field theories often make use of Lagrangians, action integral, and propagators one could argue that
field theories already have reduced everything to relative motion.
10 To debunk conspiracy theories it is often useful to make use of a variation on this known as Hanlon’s
Razor: “Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity.” (see
http://catb.org/~esr/jargon/html/H/Hanlons-Razor.html).
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Eddington saw a way around this by using a system of natural units and
investigating unitless ratios which is essentially investigating the large-scale structure of
space-time by comparing different aspects of the whole.  This idea actually has some
merit, though philosophically speaking its merit may rest on an interpretation of the
nature of mathematics and numbers.  But, ignoring that quagmire for a moment, it is
well-known that in Euclidean geometry, which recent experiments have proven is the
overall geometry of the universe as a whole (de Bernardis, et. al. 2000), the ratio of the
circumference of a circle to its diameter is always the number π.  This apparently
observed ‘truth’ is the source of the natural measure of an angle: the radian.  Technically,
in fact, a radian is, of course, not a real unit at all.  We just treat it as one in order to better
keep track of what we’re doing.  The idea is that whenever a circle is wholly traversed
circumferentially the change in the angle is always a set multiple of π – or, in fact, a
unitless ratio of the arc length to the radius.  So, again, it is just a comparison of different
aspects of the whole circle.  Eddington’s technique, then, is a direct application of
relativity by making all objectively describable entities in the universe simply relations
between different aspects of the whole.  As I quoted earlier, French says of Eddington’s
position, “By matter as the putative cause of irregularities in the field, … this
construction is seen as eliminating substance from our ontology in favour of relational
structures.” (French 2003, p. 228) – basically structure was formed from a relativistic
worldview.  The technique of employing relational structures is extended in the creation
of his concept of comparison particles that will be discussed at length in the latter half of
this text.  The philosophical quandary Eddington gets into, though, is how to compare or
relate seemingly indistinguishable particles, especially if relativity itself seems to indicate
all particles are indistinguishable from each other (see chapter six).
Again, this brings up the ugly possibility of having to analyze the nature of
mathematics and numbers.  Primarily it begs the question of whether or not mathematics
and number exist apart from our mental construct of it (if a tree falls in a forest and no
one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?).  Eddington’s implied view is this:
mathematics is inherent and not constructed.  The symbols we use for representation are
our translation of mathematics, which is simply the language of nature.  But the
underlying truths mathematics provides are existent apart from the language we use to
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interpret them.  How, then, is mathematics applied to the description or observation of a
particle, especially if the observation is direct and not deduced from some experimental
apparatus?  Eddington, as I stated previously, described particles as merely conceptual
carriers of a set of variates.  French puts this in more general terms by saying that group
theory “enters as a way of expressing the relationships between relations and the
important point is that whatever the nature of the entities, the use of group theory allows
us to abstract away the ‘pattern’ or structure of relations between them” (French 2003, p.
239).  In some sense, based on Cassirer’s conception (see above), French says that this
reduces an object to “nothing more than a node in the structure” (French 2004, p. 123).
Cassirer has argued that quantum mechanics really had nothing to do with indeterminacy
(and the related limitations on measurement) but really with how we conceived of
objects.  As I mentioned previously Eddington considered particles to simply be carriers
of sets of variates.  This is what he termed ‘Principle of the Blank Sheet:’
The Principle of the Blank Sheet requires that at the start
we should recognise no intrinsic distribution between the
particles which we contemplate, in order that we may trace
to their very source the origin of those distinctions which
we recognise in practical observation.  The fundamental
dynamics is the dynamics of indistinguishable particles; the
dynamics of distinguishable particles is a practical
application to be used when we do not wish to analyze the
phenomena so deeply (Eddington 1936, 287).
As I will demonstrate in my technical analysis the method he employs to accomplish this
is to treat particles as merely fluctuations in a uniform background.  Through purely
relativistic reasoning utilizing the framework of space-time, he shows that all particles
(regardless of type) are indistinguishable from all other particles, which is the physical
‘blank sheet’ he started building everything else with.  The advantage of this is that the
manifestation of physical properties like mass, charge, and spin and thus the observed
differences in particles could be introduced as a consequence of frame of reference or
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derived from the blank sheet, rather than assumed as initial conditions.  He essentially
treats distinguishability as a mere practical convenience for certain problems but not as a
requirement.  Mathematically, this translates as the “part [being a structural concept] is a
symbol having no properties except as a constituent of the group-structure of a set of
parts” (Eddington 1939, p. 145).  The details go well beyond the initial analysis presented
here, but, of relevance is the employment of group theory.
In a very modern sense, the group theoretic approach has led to many advances in
quantum field theory.  As A. Zee describes in his recent textbook Quantum Field Theory:
In A Nutshell, the physics contained in a simple field theory can be interpreted as a source
in some region of space-time “that sends out a ‘disturbance in the field,’ which is later
absorbed by a sink” in some other region of space-time where the disturbance is referred
to by experimentalists as a particle of some given mass, m (Zee 2003, p. 24).
Eddington’s ‘Principle of the Blank Sheet’ and his idea that particles are simply
fluctuations in the background, look very modern, then, when set against Zee’s
description of standard quantum field theory: all of existence, as represented by particles
(including force carrier particles), can be simply reduced to fluctuations in a uniform
background or field.  To be more specific, Eddington’s particles, which are nothing more
than carriers of sets of variables, are mathematical entities set in matrix or tensor form.
Transformations including rotations, translations (spatial and temporal), and permutations
are achieved in many cases in Fundamental Theory through the application of group
theory.  The same is true in quantum field theory where the introduction of group theory
actually helped lead to profound discoveries.  In Eddington’s case group theory was used
most liberally in Relativity Theory of Electrons and Protons but, particularly in the first
six chapters of Fundamental Theory, not as much.  Perhaps some of this stems from the
debate he had with Braithwaite regarding his use of group theory in the former as well as
in the Philosophy of Physical Science (see Eddington 1936 and 1940).  In any case, group
theory is not a major component of the statistical portion of Fundamental Theory.  It
saves its grand entrance here until his discussion of E-number theory near the end.
Deducing the Structure
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There are two problems here in both perceiving the structure of the universe as well as
deducing it from first principles.  The two problems are intertwined and it is difficult to
say which is the causal result of the other.  The logical problem with Eddington’s
reasoning here is that in assuming that uncertainty permeates absolutely everything, then
if all of structure – and not only its mathematical description – is deducible from first
principles, how can one deduce a definite conclusion from an indefinite starting point?
Related to the logical problem then is the epistemological problem of our ability to even
gain objective knowledge about the universe.  If we cannot separate the observer
(ourselves) from the observed, is it possible to deduce any truth?
Russell has said: “In one sense it must be admitted that we can never prove the
existence of things other than ourselves and our experiences” (Russell 1952 as quoted in
Feinberg 1986, p.193).  Russell’s idea is that the difficulty arises if we perceive
everything as sense-data – data that is relayed to our brain through our five senses –
which, in effect, is all data.  But is all data merely a set of sense-data?  Do things exist
apart from our senses – i.e. do they exist while not being observed?  Eddington side-
stepped this by flat-out rejecting the atomistic view of sensation by saying that a single
sensation really doesn’t provide any useful information about the world at all and by
requiring a group-theoretic structure that applied to both the universe and the mind.  This
addresses the Mind-Body Problem and was a point Russell actually made in 1919 in his
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy and again in following up his statement above
by saying that although the inability to prove the existence of anything other than
ourselves and our experiences “is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatsoever
to suppose that it is true” (Russell 1952).  Technically in one sense, particularly in his
earlier work, he was referring to cardinality.  This poses a problem since it reduces nearly
everything to number and set theory.  As the mathematician M.H.A. Newman (1897 –
1984) pointed out, this structuralist ‘ontology,’ as it were, admits that “nothing can be
known that is not logically deducible from the mere fact of existence, except
(‘theoretically’) the number of constituting objects” (Newman 1928, p. 144).  This meant
that knowing only the structure of the universe was useless information.  Notably
Eddington did derive the number of particles in the universe, i.e. the “number of
constituting objects” in the structure and Fundamental Theory is built on purely
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mathematical analyses of an aggregate of particles.  So in some sense ‘number’ is
fundamental here.  But the problem is that Eddington derived this number from the
structure and not the other way around which is: a.) why his application is wholly
different from Russell’s since for Russell the number was the structure, and b.) why
Newman’s criticism still fits and leaves open the question of the truth of any observation
(except, perhaps in Newman’s view, the number of constituent objects in some structure
unless the nature of pure number is called into question – yet another quagmire).
Eddington recognized that the separability of observer and observed is the major
problem with inductivism since inductive science relies on observed data.  But he does
not seem to realize that this is a problem for deductivism as well, missing the point that
the mental constructions of a theory are built on pre-existing sense-data already stored in
the brain:  with absolutely no knowledge of any aspect of our universe whatsoever
(ignoring, for a moment, any multiple-universe theories), its structure – even its mere
existence – could not be derived.  This is the essence of Newman’s argument.  Eddington
appeared on the verge of this realization as early as 1920: “the distinction of substance
and emptiness is the mind’s own contribution, depending on the kind of pattern it is
interested in recognising” (Eddington 1920, p. 420).  Everything Eddington does employ
given factual knowledge not just about the universe but also about mathematics, physics,
astronomy, etc. all of which are parts of the universe and known through sense-data (see
the discussion on stabilization in chapter six).
This all falls under the larger question of certainty.  Can we really be certain of
anything, including end points and boundary conditions?  The uncertainty principle itself
seems to imply we can’t and Eddington even extended this principle to include
uncertainty in the actual reference frame of observation (see chapter five).  And yet
Eddington reaches definite conclusions in his work.  How can he reach definite
conclusions beginning with an indefinite starting point?  Even his introduction of the
‘Blank Sheet’ is not necessarily logically consistent with this idea since, even though
physical differences (and thus initial conditions) of particles are derivable from the
‘Sheet,’ the sheet itself, according to Eddington, contains some uncertainty.  It would be
more logically consistent to say that, rather than assuming that particles take on very
well-defined properties that clearly separate them into various groups, they have the
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probability of taking on any property whatsoever (e.g. there exists the small but finite
probability that a fundamental particle with a mass of 1 kg could come into being).  This
appears to be inconsistent with observation, however it is worth keeping this in mind
when we encounter Eddington’s use of multiplicity since multiplicity is simply a ratio of
probabilities.
In the context of group theory and the underlying mathematics, French points out
(interpreting R.B. Braithwaite) how this manifests itself:
It is only by specifying the group relation, or mode of
combination, that we actually have a group to begin with.
But such a specification introduces a non-structural element
into our structuralism, because we have to have some
ground – which clearly cannot be structural itself – for
selecting one combination over another (French 2004, p.
129).
In extending this to relations between groups (for instance, let us say all electrons are one
group and all protons are a second group), the groups become the relata and the relevant
transformations (rotations, permutations, etc.) become the relations that, by Eddington’s
own admission, cannot be considered apart from one another.  The relations between the
groups (for instance the ratio of the masses of the proton and the electron), then, are
essentially non-structural content since they are supplied by the mathematician or
physicist, according to Braithwaite (French 2004 and 2003).
Eddington may have recognized part of this limitation since he responded directly
to Braithwaite’s criticism by pointing out that group theory is simply used in physics as a
tool for expressing the relationships between various relations (which, in the Standard
Model, might be viewed simply as more relata) thereby bringing out the underlying
structure or pattern – perhaps a bit like a litmus test or hidden ink (Eddington 1940).  In
fact Eddington referred to the group structure as simply the “pattern of interweaving” or
the “interrelatedness of relations” and insisted that pure structure is only attainable by
considering these (Eddington 1939).  French points out that the error in Braithwaite’s
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argument is the separation of the relations from the group elements that are the original
relata.  Eddington’s point was that one could not have one without the other.  This is in
fact true in the modern sense if the relations are simply other particles, which
immediately puts them into the same category as the group elements themselves that are
particles (or particle properties).  Once again Braithwaite is trapped by fragmentation by
assuming that content produces the structure while Eddington takes the reverse tack and
assumes structure actually produces content.  Any supposed non-structural components
are really just caused by the mind being led astray.  Such non-structural components
could include initial conditions such as values for mass, charge, and spin.  But this
argument does not properly provide a mathematically consistent way to deduce these
values within the context of uncertainty and Eddington himself could not find a proper
way to do this.
As such he introduced the concept of stabilization by assuming or taking for
granted certain quantities (like the mass and charge of the electron), but, again, where do
these values come from?  How can one assume these quantities have any particular
values?  The values are merely sense-data again or averages of sense-data and he is back
to inductivism that he was attempting to shun.  In fact the circular nature of all of this can
be demonstrated when considering the masses of sub-atomic particles, for example,
which are often found through experiments that include the uncertainty principle in their
analysis.  Eddington’s half-hearted attempt at getting around this is noted in New
Pathways in Science: “we have been concerned to show that probability is always relative
to knowledge (actual or presumed) and that there is no a priori probability of things in a
metaphysical sense, i.e. a probability relative to complete ignorance” (Eddington 1935b,
p. 133).  He basically attempted to put a limit on probability by making it relative but was
unable to do so in a logically consistent way despite the fact that uncertainty is consistent
with special relativity (see chapter three).  This, then, is the biggest flaw in Eddington’s
philosophical reasoning: his assumption that a proper theory of quantum gravity could be
deduced from logical reasoning alone if the theory itself implied that there could be no
definite or certain starting point for logical reasoning.
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IV
The Roaring Twenties: Dawn of the New Quantum Theory
As if deducing the structure wasn’t difficult enough, Eddington firmly latched onto the
uncertainty principle, a foundation of the ‘new’ quantum theory, as a defining philosophy
making deduction even more difficult as I have just shown.  On the surface this appears
to be a contradiction – how can certain results be derived from uncertain first principles?
A detailed look at uncertainty and Eddington’s mathematical treatment of it (see chapter
five) is necessary to fully understand his reasoning and to ultimately determine if that
reasoning is valid.  In analyzing uncertainty and Eddington’s interpretation of it, we must
do what Eddington did and shed any preconceived notions we might have regarding the
implications of uncertainty or even the principle itself.  In particular, as I will show, it
will be most helpful to shed the preconception that uncertainty is what ultimately leads to
the particulate nature of matter.  But other preconceived notions surrounding uncertainty
are also a hindrance in some instances particularly when we begin to deal with it in
relation to structuralism.  I will discuss these as they arise, though some of them can be
dispensed with simply by looking at the historical development of the principle itself.  In
addition it is necessary to then extend this to include a historical analysis of the exclusion
principle, which is intimately intertwined with uncertainty.  Related, again, to both is the
history of the development of wave and matrix mechanics, of which I will have
something to say.
The Origins of Uncertainty
There are countless histories of the development of Werner Heisenberg’s (1901 – 1976)
Uncertainty Principle from single articles to entire texts.  For a basic historical treatment
Helge Kragh’s Quantum Generations: A History of Physics in the Twentieth Century
shows its relation to the rest of modern physics.  Max Jammer’s comprehensive text The
Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics contains a more technical account,
particularly in relation to the Copenhagen Interpretation.  However, a radical reanalysis
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of the history of the Copenhagen Interpretation that profoundly alters the view of the
context within which many of the original points were made, was recently put forth by
Mara Beller and bears close scrutiny (Beller 1999).  Another classic critical analysis of
Bohr’s work is The Philosophy of Niels Bohr: The Framework of Complementarity by H.
Folse.  In addition Walter Moore’s Schrödinger: Life and Thought provides a new
perspective on the impact of Schrödinger’s wave mechanics on the development of
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle.
The roots of the mathematical aspect of uncertainty – the uncertainty relations
themselves – date to the mid 1920s and ultimately Max Born’s (1882 – 1970)
probabilistic interpretation of the wave function.  The germination of the general concept
of uncertainty in physics has its roots in philosophy.  Jammer has argued that Heisenberg
was influenced early on by philosophy
having first come into contact with
atomic theory through Plato and was
later influenced by the writings of
Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) and
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951) (see
Figure 6.).  But, perhaps even more
philosophically influential, was
Einstein’s concept of an observable
relativistic time that brought with it the
very important rejection of the absolute
simultaneity of events as indefinable
(Jammer 1966).  This first put the
emphasis on the concept of observable
quantities in relation to quantum
mechanics. Heisenberg even confided
this latter point to Einstein in 1926
Figure 6. Wittgenstein’s headstone – yet another
person appearing in this narrative buried less
than fifty feet from Eddington.  Note the
reference to ‘Wittgenstein’s Ladder’.  More
curious were the hundreds of pennies (difficult to
see in the photo) near the ladder end of the
headstone.  No one in Cambridge (nor any
visiting philosophers I ran into) had any
explanation for this (photo by author).
saying “the idea of observable quantities was actually taken from his [Einstein’s]
relativity” (Archive 1963 as quoted in Jammer 1966, p. 198).  Jammer’s points can be
contrasted with the views of Beller, who maintains the germination of Heisenberg’s ideas
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grew out of dialogues he had with certain scientists including Bohr, Schrödinger, Pauli,
Dirac, and Jordan (Beller 1999, pp. 65-102), and with Moore, who points to debates
about causality and determinism in the early 1920s as appearing to “foreshadow the much
more cogent attack on causality derived from quantum mechanics by Werner Heisenberg
in his indeterminacy principle of 1927” (Moore 1989, p. 154).  These debates included
the likes of Schrödinger, Franz Exner, and Georg Hamel.
Heisenberg also employed Niels Bohr’s (1885 – 1962) Correspondence Principle
in a unique way.  This principle’s versatility alone implied a non-rigid formulation of
quantum theory.  But Heisenberg used it to formulate a new mathematical approach to be
used in a new theory of mechanics.  The idea was to make correspondence a root
foundation of the new theory so that the mathematics could be built upon that.  In 1925
Heisenberg set about developing a solution for an anharmonic oscillator that was built
around correspondence and utilized the notion of observable quantities.  The resulting
paper was sent to Wolfgang Pauli (1900 – 1958) whose encouraging comments prompted
Heisenberg to give the paper to Born in July of 1925.  The unique solution included the
use of matrices and complex numbers, though the matrix multiplication he used was not
immediately obvious to Born.  Matrices had been rarely used by physicists prior to this
point (what physicist could imagine living without them now?) with minor exceptions
including Born’s own work on the lattice theory of crystals.  In 1924, just prior to
Heisenberg’s paper, Richard Courant (1888 – 1972), armed with the lecture notes of
David Hilbert (1862 – 1943), published the remarkable volume Methods of Mathematical
Physics which just happened to contain exactly those parts of algebra and analysis that
would later serve as the basis for quantum mechanics.  As Jammer notes: “it seems
almost uncanny how mathematics … prepared itself for its future service to quantum
mechanics” (Jammer 1966, p. 207).
Born took on the task, then, of putting Heisenberg’s new matrix mechanics in a
more logically consistent framework.  Originally his assistant in this endeavour was to be
Pauli, but ironically, Pauli, whom shall cross our path again later in this chapter, turned
down Born’s offer.  In a particularly providential scenario, Born was on a train to
Hanover discussing his work with a colleague from Göttingen.  He mentioned the
problems he was having with the matrix calculations and was overheard by the twenty-
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three year-old Pascual Jordan (1902 – 1980) who just happened to be sitting in the same
compartment.  Jordan and Born did not know one another, but upon arrival at Hanover
Jordan introduced himself to Born being certain to point out his experience with matrix
algebra and offered his assistance.  By September of 1925 Born and Jordan submitted
their paper (Born and Jordan 1925) for publication.  It was the first rigorous development
and formulation of the new matrix mechanics.
The Commutation Relation and Born’s Matrix Mechanics
This paper utilized classical Hamiltonian methods combined with matrix mechanics in
the manner now standard in both classical as well as quantum mechanics (see Goldstein
1980) to show that finding the extrema of the trace of the Lagrangian
 L = p q −H(pq)
leads to the canonical equations:
 q = ∂H / ∂p  p = ∂H / ∂q .
Rather than using only q as Heisenberg did, Born and Jordan used both q and p as
independent matrices to write for the first time what is now known as the commutation
relation in quantum mechanics:
pq − qp = h
2πi
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1 (4.1)
where 1 is the unit matrix.  Their derivation was based on the correspondence principle
thus planting the seed of uncertainty through the non-rigid, versatile nature of the
principle (see above).
In November a sequel to this paper appeared with Heisenberg as a co-author with
Born and Jordan and it was in this famous paper that a logically consistent method for
solving quantum mechanical problems was developed (Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan
1925).  The commutation relation itself led to several important results including Dirac’s
discovery that it led directly to Bohr’s relation that connected the frequencies of atomic
vibrations with the differences in atomic energy levels.  Thus it paved the way for a more
complete understanding of atomic radiation.  In an interesting twist that is only a tiny
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morsel of the vast amount of evidence supporting the idea that Dirac was a genius, he
developed the same theory without using or even knowing about matrices – and he was
only twenty-three (Kragh 1999).
De Broglie, Schrödinger, and the Dawn of Wave Mechanics
Simultaneous to this was the development of the wave model of light and matter.  The
wave-particle debate for light dates to the seventeenth century and the works of Isaac
Newton (1642 – 1727), who was a proponent of the particle nature of light, and
Christiaan Huygens (1629 – 1695) who was a proponent of the wave nature of light.  The
breakthrough in this debate was Louis de Broglie’s (1892 – 1987) discovery of the wave
nature of matter in his doctoral thesis research in 1923 (his thesis was presented in 1924
(de Broglie 1924) but several papers had already been published on the subject).  The key
result of de Broglie’s work was what is known as the ‘de Broglie relationship’ linking the
effective wavelength of the wavefunction of a beam of quantum particles with their
corresponding classical momentum: λ = h / p   where p is the momentum.  This led
several physicists to develop a new theory of wave mechanics where the kinematics of
particles could be described by treating them as waves rather than particles.  De Broglie’s
work laid the foundation for Erwin Schrödinger (1887 – 1961) to derive what is now
popularly known as the Schrödinger time-independent wave equation, nearly at precisely
the same time as Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan were first developing matrix mechanics.
The irony, of course, is that Born was really wrapped up in the development of both
theories since his probabilistic interpretation of the wave equation was a foundation piece
of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (see Beller 1999).  In any case, Schrödinger began
with the standard Hamiltonian equation for energy:
H q, ∂S
∂q
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= E
and replaced the separable function S by K logψ :
H q, K
ψ
∂ψ
∂q
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= E .
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In simple cases involving only ψ and its first derivatives this can be easily written as a
quadratic equation.  As Jammer explains:
Schrödinger then replaced the quantum conditions by the
following postulate: ψ has to be a real, single-valued, twice
continuously differentiable function for which the integral
of the just-mentioned quadratic form over the whole
configuration space (q space) is an extremum.  The Euler-
Lagrange equation, corresponding to this variational
integral, is the wave equation (Jammer 1966, p. 259).
Schrödinger applied this to a hydrogen atom with the potential energy −e2 / r  to produce
the following familiar form of the wave equation:
Δψ + 2m
K 2
E + e
2
r2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ψ = 0 . (4.2)
Schrödinger then applied his new theory to a linear harmonic oscillator, a rigid rotator
with both fixed and free axes, and a vibrational rotator that was equivalent to a diatomic
molecule (see his general result below which, when combined with the de Broglie
relation, matches the Born-Heisenberg-Jordan result precisely). Schrödinger’s results
were thus in complete agreement with Heisenberg’s matrix mechanical results (Jammer
1966).
The importance of the this entire process cannot be understated both in its
relevance to Eddington’s formulation of his theory and its standing in the history of
modern physics.  To underscore this fact I will now present a somewhat simpler
derivation of the wave equation.  This will also serve to demonstrate the pivotal nature of
the de Broglie relation in the development of modern quantum mechanics.
A Simple Derivation of the Time-Independent Schrödinger Equation
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The primary application of the Schrödinger equations is to find the energy eigenfunctions
in the Hamiltonian equation for energy.  Prior to the 1920s Newtonian mechanics was the
only method used to study non-relativistic particles.  Since Newtonian mechanics is still
applicable in many situations it must be recoverable from any subsequently broader
theory such as relativity (in fact it is not entirely recoverable from quantum mechanics, a
point that still haunts physicists and philosophers).  But let’s at least attempt to compare a
Newtonian particle with a quantum particle and see what happens.
Assume we have some classical particle with some energy E moving in a straight
line in some direction such that as it moves it slows down.  Thus the potential energy of
whatever interaction is causing it to slow down is increasing while the kinetic energy of
the particle itself is decreasing.  Basically the particle transfers its kinetic energy to the
potential energy of the interaction that, by the Standard Model, is itself a particle –
essential one could interpret this as the carrier particle gaining some kinetic energy that
manifests itself to an observer as potential energy.  The original particle’s kinetic energy
is given as K = E −V (x) .  If the particle is nonrelativistic, its kinetic energy is:
K = 1
2
mv2 = (mv)
2
2m
=
p2
2m
where p is the particle’s momentum (Moore 2003b, p. 176).  The particle’s momentum is
then p = 2mK .  Obviously this implies that as the kinetic energy decreases, so does the
momentum.  This is where the previously mentioned de Broglie relationship becomes
useful since it includes the classical momentum: λ = h / p .  The implication here is that if
the particle’s classical momentum is decreasing its wavelength should be getting longer.
The problem here, of course, is that the wavelength is now not a constant – it is
changing in time.  But initially, we’re only interested in handling the time-independent
wave equation so we would like to ‘freeze’ the particle at a specific point (ignoring, for a
moment, the problem of uncertainty here).  This allows us to define something Moore
refers to as the ‘local wavelength.’  Through simple calculus applied to a simple sine-
wave with a changing wavelength, Moore shows that this is:
λ(x)[ ]2 = −4π
2 f (x)
d 2 f / dx2
     or     
1
λ(x)[ ]2
=
−d 2 f / dx2
4π 2 f (x)
(4.3)
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where d2f/dx2 locate the extrema of f(x) (Moore 2003b, p. 179).  Thus we now have a
means of calculating the wavelength of some function at some point x even if the
wavelength is also dependent on x since the function and its second derivative can be
evaluated at any x-position (simply find the second derivative and plug an x-value into
this and the original function!).
Once again ignoring problems with uncertainty for a moment, we now have a way
of finding the wavelength of some decelerating particle at a given position and by the de
Broglie relation we know that this is related to the particle’s classical momentum.
Mathematically this involves combining equation (4.3) with the de Broglie relation
beginning with:
h
p
= λ        or      h
λ
= p = 2mK .
We can isolate the kinetic energy on the right side by squaring both sides and dividing by
2m:
h2
2m
1
λ2
= K = E −V (x) .
The inverse of the square of the local wavelength we determined was:
1
λ2
=
−d 2ψ E / dx
2
4π 2ψ E (x)
.
Substituting this into the previous equation and recognizing that   ≡ h / 2π  we find the
time-independent Schrödinger equation:
 
−2
2m
d 2ψ E
dx2
− E −V (x)[ ]ψ E (x) = 0
which is simply a slightly rearranged version of Schrödinger’s original equation:
Δψ + 2m
K 2
E + e
2
r2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ψ = 0 .
Note that in Schrödinger’s form he has simply given the potential energy the value
−e2 / r .  In fact Schrödinger himself deduced a more general form using the de Broglie
relations:
Δψ + 8π
2m
h2
(E −U )ψ = 0 . (4.4)
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The beauty in this derivation is that it demonstrates the link between classically
measurable quantities such as momentum and energy, and the more typically quantum
quantity of wavelength.  It is quite simply found by combining ordinary calculus,
classical energy conservation, and the de Broglie relation.  It is clear from this just how
pivotal a discovery the de Broglie relation was.
The Time-Dependent Schrödinger Equation
Schrödinger, of course, recognized that the energy eigenvalue E varies from position to
position as the particle decelerates (or accelerates).  In a time-dependent wave equation,
then, it would be most useful to find some way to eliminate E.  The wavefunction in four
dimensions is defined as Ψ ≡ψ (x, y, z,t) .  Schrödinger was able to eliminate E by setting
Ψ =ψ (q)exp 2πi(E / h)t[ ]  which is simply the full equation combining the real and
imaginary parts of a sinusoidal wave travelling in time (one-dimension relativistically
speaking) with kq = 0 and ω = 2πi E
h
.  Substituting this into his more general form of the
time-independent wave equation he produced the Schrödinger time-dependent wave
equation:
−
h2
8π 2m
ΔΨ +UΨ = h
2πi
∂Ψ
∂t
. (4.5)
I will leave it in the form presented here since some of the combinations of constants
present in this form became integral parts of Eddington’s work.
Once again, the simplicity of the derivation is beautiful.  Simple pre-calculus level
mathematics describing sinusoidal curves combined with the already fairly simple time-
independent wave equation produced one of the bedrock equations of modern physics.
Often the complexity of the broader subject overshadows the simplicity of the basic
assumptions and derivations.
A New Interpretation of the Wave Function
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Let me return for a moment to 1926 and Schrödinger’s attempt to interpret his own work.
He ascribed to ψ electromagnetic physical attributes and defined ψψ* as something he
called the ‘weight function’ of this charge distribution.  This is a term borrowed much
later by Eddington and adapted to somewhat different purposes (see equation 8.7).  But it
is worth remembering this particular interpretation of this term.  Schrödinger used it to
draw a relationship between microscopic phenomena and macroscopic phenomena
showing that the macroscopic behaviour of a linear harmonic oscillator can be described
using microscopic wave packets.  Unfortunately this led to several erroneous results on
his part.  His first flaw was assuming that the wave packets did not spread out in space.
In addition he incorrectly proposed that ψ was a cause of some radiation phenomena.
Ultimately, everything hinged on the question of how a particle could remain stable in
wave dispersion phenomena if it was simply a bunch of waves.  A new interpretation of
the wave function was needed to bridge the gap between matrix and wave mechanics.
It was Born who picked up the yoke on this task as I mentioned briefly above.  He
was studying quantum mechanical scattering processes, specifically those between free
particles and atoms.  He was actually employing Schrödinger’s wave mechanics in this
work, rather than his own matrix mechanics.  Given an electron with an energy of
E = h2 / 2mλ2  that approaches an atom whose unperturbed eigenfunctions are ψ n
0 (q) , he
assigned it the following eigenfunction: ψ nE
0 (q, z) =ψ n
0 (q)sin(2π z / λ)  (assuming it was
approaching from some positive direction, z).  He then assigned a potential energy to the
interaction between the two particles and applied perturbation theory to obtain the
following expression for a scattered wave a great distance from the centre of scattering:
ψ nE
(1) (x, y, z,q) = dωψ nm
(E ) (α,β,γ )sin knm
(E ) (αx + βy + γ z + δ )ψ m
0 (q)∫∫
m
∑  where dω is an
element of solid angle in the direction of the unit vector with the components α, β, and γ.
This expression also contains the wave function that determines the differential or
scattering cross-section for this direction.  Born said that if this equation allowed for the
particle interpretation of matter then there is only one possibility here.  Originally Born
said this possibility was ψ nm
(E ) .  After reading galley proofs of his paper he changed this
to ψ nm
(E ) 2  which measures the probability that the electron is scattered in the direction
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defined in the scattering expression (Jammer 1966).  To emphasize the significance of
this result in the history of quantum mechanics here are Born’s own words: “The motion
of particles conforms to the laws of probability, but the probability itself is propagated in
accordance with the law of causality” (Born 1926, p. 804).  Probability had found its
home deep in the heart of quantum theory, though still imbued with the spirit of causality
(thereby minimizing the heart palpitations of strict causal proponents such as Einstein).
Born’s result restricted classical, macroscopic phenomena to a limiting case of the new
interpretation giving fundamental forces new meaning while still allowing them to
predict results, as they had done successfully for centuries, consistent with the classical
framework.
This, of course, was something Eddington wholeheartedly adopted as the core of
his philosophy.  In fact, the root of his ability to be both a strident relativist and a
proponent of uncertainty is found right there in Born’s statement.  The preservation of
causality satisfied his relativistic (classical) sensibilities, but the use of probability
brought in a mathematical tool he could employ to deal with the problems that arose in
measurement theory (see chapter five).
There is still a bit of related history that could be told here including the use of
matrix mechanics to develop the transformation theory.  The importance of the
development of transformation theory by Jordan and, from a different point of view by
Dirac and Fritz London (1900 – 1954), is that it generalized Born’s interpretation and
brought all the previous formalisms of quantum mechanics together in a single
formulation (Jammer 1966).  Both Jordan and Dirac’s formalism utilized the idea of
probability amplitudes and suggested that the correspondence principle might be
irrelevant as a foundational principle in quantum mechanics to be replaced instead by
statistical considerations.  The full story of this stage in the development of quantum
mechanics also includes, then, the story of the work of the mathematician David Hilbert
(1862 – 1943) who, again in 1926 and continuing into 1927, together with his assistants
Lothar Wolfgang Nordheim (1899 – 1985) and John (Johann, János, or Jancsi) von
Neumann (1903 – 1957), elaborated in a purely mathematical way on the transformation
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work of Jordan and introduced the mathematical concept of Hilbert spaces to quantum
mechanics.11
Subsequent to his work with Hilbert and Nordheim on transformation theory, von
Neumann tackled the as-yet unsolved problem of fully merging matrix mechanics and
wave mechanics.  The major epistemological problem was that matrix theory consisted of
a space of discrete variables while wave mechanics consisted of a space of continuous
variables.  Von Neumann contended that unifying the two theories required transforming
a differential operator into an integral operator using ‘improper’ functions such as Dirac’s
δ-function that in 1927 was considered mathematically illegitimate (it still is if it is
considered an ordinary function).  As such, von Neumann rejected the idea of unifying
these two spaces and developed a completely new mathematical framework for quantum
mechanics between 1927 and 1929, based on Hilbert’s work on linear integral equations.
Von Neumann’s formalism is particularly suitable to nonrelativistic mechanics and its
offshoots including relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory.  In
developing it he contended that the set of all sequences in the discrete space of matrix
theory, called the sequence space where the sum of all the probability amplitudes is equal
to one, is essentially identical to the set of all summable and square-integrable complex-
valued functions in the continuous space of wave mechanics.  Essentially he took
advantage of the fact that integrals are simply summations.  The discrete space is Hilbert
space.  He first presented these ideas in May of 1927.  His formalism, though new,
simply recognized the meeting point of matrix mechanics and wave mechanics.  He did
not propose any new physical or epistemological assumptions (beyond those proposed by
Dirac and Jordan in their transformation theories).  This is largely since the uncertainty
relations had only just been proposed in March and hadn’t played any role in his early
work.  But they would have a profound impact on the later expansion of his theory and on
his work in measurement, the latter a point he shared with Eddington.
The Birth of the Uncertainty Relations
                                                 
11 For a brief description of Hilbert spaces see Liboff 1998, pp. 101-106.  For a more thorough description
see van Fraassen 1991, pp. 144-146 and Introduction to Hilbert Space and the Theory of Spectral
Multiplicity by Paul R. Halmos (1957).
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The introduction of probabilistic methods to quantum mechanics brought in the now
familiar idea of expectation values – rather than knowing quantities with certainty, the
theory merely predicted what a quantity was expected to be.  Mathematically the
expectation value can be represented in modern notation as:
C = CP(C)dC∫
where P(C)dC is the probability of finding the observable C in the interval C, C +dC.
The integration is over all values of C.  Born used expectation values in his probabilistic
interpretation of the wave function, but no direct links between this idea and actual
measurements had yet been developed, even though Bohr’s frequency relation was
actually part of the formalism and there was agreement with spectroscopic observations.
There was still much left to interpret, in particular the meat of the formalism itself.  As
Jammer points out:
This unusual state of affairs was due, of course, to the
peculiar development of the formalism which at first was
dominated by the correspondence principle but later
detached from it (Jammer 1966, p. 323).
From an interpretational standpoint there were also problems with the very
quantities and their linguistic representation in the theory.  These problems were
exacerbated by the many languages within which the theory was developed.  From a
purely mathematical standpoint, however, there was one crystal clear implication: the
basic commutation relation pq – qp = h/2πi required that these quantities could not be
solely defined by their classical meanings.
These problems were hardly an afterthought.  They reared their ugly head right
from the beginning reaching an early crescendo during Schrödinger’s 1926 visit to Bohr’s
institute in Copenhagen where the clash between Schrödinger’s continuous interpretation
and Bohr’s discrete interpretation stimulated extensive discussions in Copenhagen long
after Schrödinger returned to Germany (Jammer 1966).  It was nearly a miniature
preview of the great Einstein-Bohr debate that was still a decade away.  Ironically
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perhaps, the person who was able to see through the dogmatic adherence of both sides to
their opinion (for that was all it was at the time) and realize that the root of the conflict
was the lack of a definite interpretation of the actual formalism, was Heisenberg.  Once
again Heisenberg looked to relativity for guidance.  He was inspired by the thought of
what would have happened if the Lorentz transformations in relativity had been
combined with the descriptions of space and time prior to Einstein’s developments.
Einstein had to completely reinterpret space and time in order to make his theory work
and did so by turning the tables a bit: rather than describe nature by mathematics which is
a top-down scheme of taking known mathematics and forcing it to apply to the real-
world, assume, rather, that mathematics is the language of nature and we merely need to
learn to interpret it.
With that in mind, Heisenberg sought the ways in which nature has its voice in
quantum mechanics and found that it was through the observables p and q (basically
nature speaks to us through the things we can observe via our senses – see chapter three
for a full discussion – and ultimately the interpretation of those observations involves
mathematics at the most fundamental level).  So, he simply assumed there was only the
possibility of having  ΔpiΔq ≥ h / 2π  as the relationship between these two observables.
If that was true, could it make a consistent statement?  Could experiment prove it to be
true?  These questions were retrospectively asked by Heisenberg himself (Jammer 1966).
He reasoned that the formalism of quantum mechanics does not allow for classical
descriptions of space and time nor does it completely preserve causality.  Rather than
develop a new conceptual framework, Heisenberg maintained the classical ideas but
restricted their applicability to limiting cases.
In late October of 1926 Heisenberg first stated the principle in ordinary language
in a letter to Pauli.  In it he states that the basic commutation relation clearly shows that it
is “meaningless to speak of the place of a particle with a definite velocity” (Heisenberg in
Fierz and Weisskopf 1960, p. 42).  In February of 1927 Heisenberg, after much thought,
sent another letter to Pauli who encouraged him to elaborate.  Pauli then passed on the
elaboration to Bohr who recommended a few changes.  At the end of March the paper
was submitted to Zeitschrift für Physik.  It was not the first realization that p and q cannot
be simultaneously known – both Dirac and Jordan made statements to that affect
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(Jammer 1966).  The difference was that Heisenberg performed a mathematical
investigation into the relationship between the distributions of p and q.  His line of
reasoning began with the transformation theory and assumed that the dependence of q
was described by a Gaussian error curve12.  Heisenberg’s conclusion was that the product
of the uncertainties δq and δp was h/2π.  This is a “direct intuitive interpretation” of the
basic commutation relation (quoted in Jammer 1966, p. 328).  As early as 1924 his mind
had been preoccupied by a thought experiment with a γ-ray microscope.  Notably, in
1923, Wilhelm Wien (1864 – 1928) asked Heisenberg about the resolving power of such
a microscope at Heisenberg’s oral PhD defence; Heisenberg was unable to answer the
question.  He used some of the knowledge he gained from this experience while thinking
about uncertainty, though when actually discussing the experiment he did not account for
the angular aperture of the objective lens (something Bohr soon corrected).
The thought experiment consisted of illuminating an electron with radiation of a
reasonably short wavelength and then observing it under a microscope.  However, the
Compton effect immediately means that the impact of the light (quanta) used to observe
the electron changes its (the electron’s) momentum dramatically (this is also one of the
first descriptions of the idea that an observer has no choice but to interfere with the
observable in order to make the observation).  The electron’s momentum cannot be
completely determined, however, since the angle of the scattered photon cannot be
determined by the microscope (within the range provided by the wave packets entering
the microscope).  But the electron’s position, however, is now known definitely.
Quantitatively, if an identical observation is made on an electron multiple times to locate
its position, even if the experimental setup is identical each time, the results will not
always be the same.
Heisenberg also applied this reasoning to a Stern-Gerlach experiment (which will
be discussed in the next section) and found that the faster an atom crossed the deviating
field, the less precise was the measurement of its energy:  δEiδt  h .  As such he
concluded that any two canonically conjugate quantities observed simultaneously carry
with them some level of uncertainty.  Introducing one of the most fundamental
interpretations in all of quantum mechanics, he held that a classical notion such as a path
                                                 
12 Eddington relied heavily on Gaussian distributions as will become apparent in subsequent chapters.
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or trajectory could be retained since “the path comes into existence only when we
observe it” (Heisenberg 1927, p. 185).  This also presents the idea that the wave and
particle natures of particles are not simultaneously observable using the exact same
apparatus for when a quanta (photon, electron, etc.) exists in a well-defined spatial
location it acts like a particle whereas if it is not confined to a well-defined spatial
location its momentum can be defined more precisely and it behaves like a wave (Liboff
1998).  A simple thought experiment that I use when first presenting this idea to my
students, though not entirely accurate, at least gives the flavour of the problem: imagine
you have a videotape of a ball falling to the ground next to a ruler.  In order to measure
the momentum one needs velocity which requires several measurements (several frames
of the film) since velocity is defined as a change in position during a given time interval
(instantaneous velocity is simply a limit here) so there is no single position.  Conversely,
if you want to see the ball at a specific point along the ruler you must pause the tape at
the point and the ball has no velocity – it’s frozen in place for the purposes of your
measuring its position.
Returning for a moment to the idea that this relationship holds for any two
canonically conjugate quantities a generalized version of the uncertainty relations can be
written.  Suppose that two observables Aˆ  and Bˆ  anticommute:
Aˆ, Bˆ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Cˆ ≠ 0 (4.6)
then if the measurement of A is uncertain in some state the measurement of B will also be
uncertain such that:
 
ΔAiΔB ≥ 1
2
C (4.7)
It will also be helpful to note the relationship between this and probability since the two
are inextricably linked.  As Liboff explains:
If Aˆ  and Bˆ  do not commute, then the eigenstate ϕa  of Aˆ
which the system goes into on measurement of A  is not
necessarily an eigenstate of Bˆ .  Subsequent measurements
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of B will give any spectrum of eigenvalues of Bˆ  with a
corresponding probability distribution P(b) (Liboff 1998, p.
146).
The probability amplitude (i.e. the probability of some measurement of B occurring) is
P(b) = ϕb ϕa
2
.  This generalization of the uncertainty relations, appearing here in
more modern notation, is the result of work by Schrödinger who improved upon the
results of H.P. Robertson (1903 – 1961) and Edward Condon (1902 – 1974) (Jammer
1966).
A particle such as an electron, then, is represented by a wave packet in
configuration space that is composed of the eigenfunctions of a collection of states.  Its
size is determined by the precision of the position measurement.  In Heisenberg’s thought
experiment with the microscope this precision, and thus its size, is determined by the
wavelength of the light illuminating the electron.  The packet can describe an orbit if the
electron is bound to an atom just like a classical particle except that the packet spreads
out with time.  Each consecutive observation of the packet essentially shows a smaller
and smaller packet.  This is basically a temporal sequence of the locations of the wave
packet (or, rather, where it was observed) and it produces the orbit.  Heisenberg utilized
these results in reaching several conclusions that have tremendous philosophical
implications.  The first is that quantum theory, despite employing statistics, is not limited
to only statistical conclusions.  He pointed to the experiments of Hans Geiger (1882 –
1945) and Walther Bothe (1891 – 1957) as examples of this.  The second is that the
problem with causality in quantum theory is not the inability to predict the future from
knowledge of present events, but rather the inability to actually have a full and complete
knowledge of the present (this is the origin of the completeness debate in quantum
mechanics).  In a rather titillating hint of things to come he says:
it may be suggested that behind the statistical universe of
perception there lies hidden a ‘real’ world … ruled by
causality.  Such speculations seem to us – and this we stress
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with emphasis – useless and meaningless.  For physics has
to confine itself to the formal description of the relations
among perceptions (Heisenberg 1927, p. 197).
In this statement he clearly eschews interpretive work such as complementarity as outside
the scope of physics.  Conversely, as Folse points out, Bohr viewed complementarity and
the uncertainty principle as consequences of the quantum postulate where his was “the
consequence for the conceptual framework …, while Heisenberg’s discovery was its
formal, mathematical consequence” (Folse 1985, p. 128).  The influence of Bohr and
Heisenberg on Eddington is less direct since Eddington reinterpreted the new quantum
theory in his own unique way.
Interpretations of Uncertainty and Bohr’s Complementarity
The philosophical implications of uncertainty were not of immediate importance in 1927.
Physicists were focusing on the definability and measurability of the various aspects of
quantum mechanics.  Approaches to the quandaries of the theory primarily involved
practical laboratory results that could be obtained from their proper consideration.
Heisenberg’s paper had plenty to say on these subjects apart from its statements on the
philosophical nature of quantum mechanics.  Of particular relevance to Eddington’s
treatment of the theory is Heisenberg’s view that something is defined if it is measurable.
So, to Heisenberg, objects that could not be measured were useless since they couldn’t be
defined.  In addition Heisenberg’s use of light as both a measuring tool and an object to
be measured refocused the attention of physics to the importance of measurement,
something Eddington treats in depth.
Philosophically it took some time for his conclusions about causality to be fully
appreciated.  Even in the philosophy community, upon which Heisenberg’s conclusions
had huge effects, didn’t realize initially what had happened and, when they did, they were
essentially taken by surprise (Jammer 1966).  E.H. (Earle Hesse) Kennard (b. 1885) who
happened to be visiting Copenhagen at the time of Heisenberg’s discovery was, apart
from Bohr and Pauli who proof-read Heisenberg’s manuscripts, the only person who
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really understood the implications of Heisenberg’s work calling the uncertainty relations
“the core of the new theory” (Kennard 1927 quoted in Jammer 1966, p. 333).  Hermann
Weyl’s (1885 – 1955) Theory of Groups and Quantum Mechanics that first appeared in
1928 was the first text on the subject that gave the uncertainty relations a central role in
the theory.13  The relations were criticized for a time (for instance the philosopher Karl
Popper (1902 – 1994) remarked that Heisenberg has tried “to give a causal explanation
why causal explanations are impossible” (Popper 1935, p. 184)), but that did not stop
continued work on them by the likes of Kennard and Arthur E. Ruark (b. 1899), who
focused on the experimental aspects, and Robertson and Condon whose mathematical
work was discussed above.
As we have already seen, related to the uncertainty relations was Bohr’s idea of
complementarity – the fact that two mutually exclusive descriptions of the world, one
discrete (particle) and the other continuous (wave), are not only allowed but required by
the laws of quantum mechanics.  Though Bohr’s work was partially aimed at
Heisenberg’s principle, Folse maintains that Bohr never intended it to be limited to only
the uncertainty principle (Folse 1985).  Since he viewed both his and Heisenberg’s work
as consequences of the quantum postulate it is natural to assume he felt his work stood
well on its own not to mention the fact that it was Bohr himself who proposed the
quantum postulate in the first place (to explain the stability of atoms).  In this light
complementarity appears to logically precede uncertainty and, in fact, Heisenberg began
his work on uncertainty on the somewhat isolated island of Helgoland after an intense
visit with Bohr (Beller 1999).
Jammer maintains that complementarity in Bohr’s mind originated in his final
acceptance of the wave-particle duality of quanta.  Experimentally there seemed to be no
explanation for the apparently paradoxical behaviour of quanta under differing conditions
– why would an electron behave like a particle in one experiment and yet behave like a
wave in another, even if it was the same exact electron in both experiments?  Bohr was
originally opposed to Einstein’s idea that light also came in packets or quanta (photons).
But the Bothe-Geiger experiments provided overwhelming evidence in support of
                                                 
13 Another connection in the complex web of relations among physicists is that Weyl’s text was first
translated into English by Robertson in 1931.
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Einstein.  Jammer maintains that the first evidence that truly supports Bohr’s move to
acceptance of wave-particle duality appeared in the postscript of a 1925 paper of his
where he discusses the reconciliation of the Bothe-Geiger experiments with work
performed by himself, Hendrick Anton (Hans) Kramers (1894 – 1952), and John C.
Slater (1900 – 1976).  In it he says that “one should not be surprised if the required
extension of classical electrodynamics leads to a far-reaching revolution of the
conceptions on which the description of nature has been based so far” (Bohr 1925 as
quoted in Jammer 1966, p. 346).  Beyond this the true germination of his ideas is difficult
to track.  But it is clear that during the time between this comment and his first
presentation of complementarity in 1927 he struggled primarily with the logic that was
underneath the formalism itself.  For instance, both the equation for the energy of a
photon, E = hν , and the equation relating the momentum of a photon to wave number,
p = hk , contain particle and wave elements.  Simply glancing at these two equations
should reveal that the answer must relate in some way to Planck’s constant.
Bohr found no answer to this quandary in existing logical conjectures and thus
determined that a new logical framework was required to make sense of these results.  He
called his logical framework ‘complementarity’ in reference to the fact that two different
descriptions of phenomena that are mutually exclusive are nonetheless required for a full
description of the situation.  The uncertainty relations simply provided him with a
concrete measure of what had to be sacrificed in violating the normally rigorous
exclusion of conceptual ideas.  However, they also provided him with a mathematical
assurance that complementarity wouldn’t lead to a logical contradiction since if one
quantity is measured to a great degree of accuracy the other complementary one would be
nearly immeasurable – no physical situation can simultaneously and rigorously display
both complementary quantities.
I have always personally had trouble with the solidity of the logical foundation
upon which Bohr’s idea rests – it almost seemed like a bit of a cop out to me, though I
have never gone so far as to support a theory involving hidden variables.  Bell’s Theorem
and subsequent supporting experiments such as those performed by Alain Aspect (based
on an idea originally put forth by Bohm) at Orsay in the early 1980s seem to offer
unquestionable support for the notion that uncertainty is inherent in the fabric of the
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universe and that complementarity correctly interprets the wave-particle duality and so I
am cautious in my criticism.  But at the time Bohr argued that the reason it works is due
to our inability to truly define what we mean by ‘observation’ because the observation
itself interferes with the object under observation (see Heisenberg’s thought experiment
with the γ-ray microscope discussed previously).  In essence, this presents the problem of
truly objective observation as I discussed in the preceding chapter: our subject view may
be behind wave-particle duality.  Eddington may, in fact, have been dissatisfied with
Bohr’s idea as well and was subsequently inspired to search for a completely objective
way to observe the universe.
Exclusion and Spin
Parallel to these developments in uncertainty and the new mechanics there was quite a bit
of work being done in spectroscopic and particle beam analyses.  In the early 1920s one
of the major experimental problems that was at the forefront of physics research was
finding a full physical explanation for the fine-structure of spectral lines.  In late 1921
Otto Stern (1888 – 1969) and Walther Gerlach (1889 – 1979) used evaporation in a
heated oven to produce a beam of silver atoms that was directed through a nearly perfect
(high) vacuum through collimating slits that were situated along the gradient of the
magnetic field at the sharp edge of the pole piece of what is known as a DuBois
electromagnet.  Through a series of similar experiments they were able to show that the
atomic beam split into two ‘beamlets’ in the presence of a magnetic field.  Classically the
resulting distribution of atoms on the collecting glass should have been Gaussian since
classical mechanics implies a continuum of possible results including atoms that would
have not been affected by the magnetic field at all.14  However, Stern and Gerlach’s result
displayed no atoms unaffected by the magnetic field – all the atoms appeared in one of
two locations on the glass, a clear indication of the quantization of space.  Additionally
they were able to show that the atoms all had a magnetic moment aligned with the field
direction.  In and of itself these results were actually not unexpected.  Arnold
                                                 
14 This experiment is an excellent demonstration of the different meanings given to probability in classical
and quantum situations (see chapter three).
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Sommerfeld (1868 – 1951) and Alfred Landé (1888 – 1976) developed what is often
referred to as the ‘magnetic-core hypothesis’ between 1921 and 1923 in which the
nucleus and inner (nonoptical) electrons (often referred to collectively as the atomic core)
possessed an angular momentum that was some multiple of h/2π along with a magnetic
moment (the connection between the two was tenuous at that time – see below).  Thus the
angular momentum vector of the optical electron can only assume discrete inclinations
with respect to the axis of the core.  The assignment of angular momentum to the
electron, which was considered by many to be a point particle, was not universally
accepted.  Pauli, as I will show, did not actually use this exact concept when initially
developing the exclusion principle.  Regardless of the truth of the Sommerfeld – Landé
theory, the Stern-Gerlach experiment did raise some important questions.  What
mechanism produced the two beamlets found by Stern and Gerlach and was it related to
magnetic moments or, in the ‘magnetic-core hypothesis,’ the angular momenta?
The ‘magnetic-core hypothesis’ or Sommerfeld – Landé theory, developed in part
to explain the anomalous Zeeman effect in multiplet spectral lines, had earlier that year
provided a theoretical framework that apparently fit the Stern – Gerlach results perfectly,
another example of theory running ahead of experiment.  But there was one nagging
problem that was not answered by either the theory or the experiment and was first
pointed out by Einstein and Paul Ehrenfest (1888 – 1933) – just how do the atoms orient
themselves in the field?  Since the field was in a high vacuum collisions could be ruled
out as a possible explanation.  The same could be said for radiative energy exchanges
since they require a considerably longer timespan than was observed in the alignment.
That left only two solutions: either the atoms never assume states in which they are not
completely quantized (i.e. they’re quantized to begin with) or states could occur during
rapid changes that violate normal quantum rules.  Einstein and Ehrenfest showed that
either assumption leads to conceptual problems.
In a somewhat providential circumstance, Pauli completed his PhD in 1921 under
Sommerfeld and was thus directly exposed to the early development of the Sommerfeld –
Landé theory.  In the winter of 1921/22 he was in Göttingen as an assistant to Born.  It
was there that he met Bohr who was giving a series of guest lectures on his research on
the periodic ‘system’ (table) of elements.  In the fall of that year Bohr invited Pauli to
74
Copenhagen to assist him in the German edition of his works.  It was then that Pauli first
undertook to explain the anomalous Zeeman effect.15  In two papers, the first one written
in Copenhagen and the second in Hamburg where he accepted a position in 1923, he
attempted to generalize some of the results produced by Sommerfeld regarding the
Zeeman effect in alkali and alkaline-earth spectra.  Without any theoretical justification at
all he directly associated magnetic moments with angular momenta and fully traced the
splitting.  This was the first instance of this association and helped explain some of the
results of the Sommerfeld – Landé theory.  But Pauli felt his work was unfinished since
he had been unable to explain why electron shells in atoms became filled or closed – why
couldn’t any number of electrons exist in a given shell?  In the fall of 1924 Pauli, in fact,
showed that the ‘magnetic-core’ hypothesis as proposed by Sommerfeld and Landé was
actually inconsistent with experimental results (this is perhaps why he initially resisted
the idea of assigning rotational quantities directly to an electron).
Based on these results, both theoretical and experimental, Pauli assumed that
closed shells must have an overall angular momentum of zero and an overall magnetic
moment of zero – i.e. in Sommerfeld – Landé theory if any of the electrons in them had
angular momenta and magnetic moments, they all must cancel in order to preserve the
balance of the shell.  As such, Pauli concluded that, at least for alkali atoms, the
outermost shell or valence electron must be the only part of the atom that contributes to
its angular momentum and its energy changes in external magnetic fields.  But, Pauli did
not recognize the fact that the angular momentum here really belonged to the electron.
Since it was assumed to be a point particle in this instance, angular momentum was a
meaningless concept.  It definitely affected the core’s angular momentum, but exactly
how was not yet known.  Here yet again the theory of relativity played a role in the
furthering of quantum theory: Pauli was an expert on the subject since he had written an
article on it for an encyclopaedia at the age of twenty and it was a theory he ardently
supported and believed in.  This led him to actually reject the Sommerfeld – Landé
‘magnetic core’ hypothesis and opened the door to spin (Jammer 1966).
                                                 
15 In an oft quoted comment, Pauli said in 1945 while addressing the Institute for Advanced Study in
Princeton, “A colleague who met me strolling rather aimlessly in the beautiful streets of Copenhagen said
to me in a friendly manner, ‘You look very unhappy’; whereupon I answered fiercely, ‘How can one look
happy when he is thinking about the anomalous Zeeman effect?” (Pauli 1946).
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By this time (the fall of 1924) an acceptable description of the periodic system of
elements had been devised largely by Bohr building on the ideas of Walther Kossel (1888
– 1956).  He had proposed a basic scheme by 1921 and subsequently developed more
detailed schemes over the next few years.  This work deviated slightly from experimental
progress made around the same time by de Broglie and Alexandre Dauvillier (1892 –
1979).  But, in the fall of 1924, Edmund Stoner (1899 – 1968) succeeded in merging the
experimental results with the theory, mostly provided by Bohr but including some of
Landé’s 1922 suggestions such as the idea of assigning three quantum numbers to each
sublevel (Stoner 1924).
Stoner’s article proved to be tremendously influential on Pauli in his further
deliberations on the subject.  Stoner’s scheme has been shown to be the correct scheme
quantum mechanically, but well before that it was still considered an improvement over
the work of Bohr (and Landé whose theory, though a solid foundation for these
subsequent studies, did not enjoy the wide-spread popularity of Bohr’s).  The primary
difference between Stoner’s scheme and Bohr’s is that in Stoner’s there is a greater
concentration of electrons in the outer sublevels.  Six months earlier chemist J.D. Main
Smith (dates unknown) found results consistent with Stoner’s from purely chemical
considerations.16  Stoner’s paper, however, connected the distribution of the electrons
with the problem of multiplet structure.  So, now the stage was set for Pauli to put
everything together – angular momentum, magnetic moment, multiplet structure, and
electron shell restrictions.
Pauli added one component to Stoner’s work (and thus the work of Main Smith,
Bohr and Landé) – a fourth quantum number to represent the component of angular
momentum of the atom (and not yet the electron – really this represented how much the
electron supposedly contributed to the atom’s overall angular momentum) that is in the
direction of an external magnetic field applied to the atom.  Pauli then realized that the
shell structure of atoms is perfectly explained if each possible orbit or state is assigned a
                                                 
16 Main Smith wrote a letter in response to Stoner’s publication claiming priority.  Subsequent papers in
both the physics and chemistry community often refer to both Stoner and Main Smith as the correct
modifiers of Bohr’s scheme.
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set of four quantum numbers and only one electron is allowed to occupy each of these
states.17
There was still one unsolved problem.  Bohr had asked why don’t all the electrons
occupy the innermost shell when the atom is in the ground state?  Pauli suggested that his
solution of one electron per state (or orbit) could be interpreted as a principle.  In essence
it explained the shells and the resulting periodic system of elements because it excluded
more than one electron from occupying a state or orbit.  Pauli found a simple test for the
principle was the case of triplet s terms for two essentially equivalent electrons (same n
and l values) in an alkaline-earth atom.  In this case both electrons would have to share
the same exact set of quantum numbers.  Pauli’s principle supposedly excluded this from
happening so the fact that cases of these electrons do not appear in nature seemingly
vindicates the principle.  Since the exact meaning of the third quantum number was not
established at the time Pauli could only show that the principle worked in the presence of
strong external magnetic fields, but he was able to employ thermodynamics to show that
at least the number of states didn’t change when transitioning to a weaker field.  As such
the principle was validated generally, if not specifically.
In that spectacular year of 1926, while the formalism of quantum mechanics and
the philosophy of uncertainty were just coming together, Heisenberg , Dirac, and Pauli,
among their many other accomplishments, were able to extend the essence of the
principle to include the requirement that all state functions (including spin) of a system of
similar particles, assuming they are fermions (meaning they obey Fermi-Dirac statistics
which was in the process of being developed that very year in relation to the
transformation theories discussed above), must be antisymmetric with respect to the
particle exchange – i.e. the particles must be dissimilar in some respect.  As such
exclusion became a root principle by which other physical laws were generated and its
applications are wide.  In 1921 Compton had concluded “that the electron itself, spinning
like a tiny gyroscope, is probably the ultimate magnetic particle” (Compton 1921, p. 155)
                                                 
17 The four quantum numbers are, in modern notation: n, for the energy level, l, for the number of angular
cycles of the wavefunction around the atom (also the number of bumps in the squared wavefunction), m,
for the number of possible orientations of the wavefunction in space, and mS, for the spin orientation (see
Moore 2003b, p. 163).  The physical meaning of m was not well-defined when Pauli was first developing
the exclusion principle and the spin was only associated with the electron later in 1926 by Goudsmit and
Uhlenbeck.
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but wasn’t certain if it was a highly important or completely useless conjecture.  Spin was
proposed in 1925 by Samuel Goudsmit (1902 – 1978) and George Uhlenbeck (1900 –
1988) based on spectroscopic evidence as well as Pauli’s development of the exclusion
principle.  Primarily, however, they had pondered Pauli’s work and found they could only
understand his additional quantum number (for spin angular momentum) if the electron
were not a point particle but rather a small, rotating sphere.  Unfortunately, in this
scenario they found that the rotational velocity at the surface of the electron exceeded the
speed of light several times over.  But, if the electron held the rotational properties of a
sphere yet had no size, being a point particle, one needn’t worry about this issue since
there would be no surface for which to calculate this rotational velocity.  Their paper,
published in 1925 only on the insistence of Ehrenfest, suggested that the angular
momentum of the atom was really the angular momentum of the valence electron that
imposed a stress on the atomic core enabling it to assume two orientations, like the
electron itself, rather than one (Kragh 1999 and Jammer 1966).  The speed of light
problem was mentioned briefly in a footnote.
Classical electrodynamics shows that magnetic fields arise from changing electric
fields, thus the rotation of the electron is what produces the magnetic moment that thus
forces the electrons to align with an external field.  In retrospect, then, the principle also
explained the Stern – Gerlach results – the atomic beam split because half the atoms had
valence electrons that aligned with the field direction while the other half antialigned
with the field direction.  For instance, think of a compass needle.  It always aligns itself
with a magnetic field line with the south pole of the magnet being attracted to the north
magnetic pole of the earth and the north pole of the magnet being attracted to the south
magnetic pole of the earth.18  In the Stern-Gerlach experiment there was no telling which
way the valence electron was spinning and thus which direction (by the old right-hand
rule) the magnetic moment was pointing (i.e. which end of the electron was north or
south as it entered the magnetic field).  As it turns out, statistical calculations of the
multiplicities show that it’s about half and half.
                                                 
18 This is a common misconception about the Earth – the north geographic pole is actually the south
magnetic pole so when a compass points north that end of the compass really is the north pole of the
compass needle.
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So, from about 1921 to 1926, it was established that valence electrons account for
the quantum properties of the atoms they are in and that they spin on an axis.  Since they
represent charge and thus have an electric field, this rotation produced a magnetic field
whose direction was given by simply applying the right-hand rule.  When subjected to an
external magnetic field, then, they would line up their magnetic fields with the external
field – the north pole of the electron would be attracted to the south pole of the field and
vice-versa.  Pauli was finally convinced in late 1926 after L.H. (Llewellen Hilleth)
Thomas (1903 – 1992) corrected an error of a factor of two in the calculation of the
doublet separations, a result subsequently verified by Yakov (Iakov or Jakov) Frenkel
(1894 – 1952).  Pauli’s opposition stemmed from the view that rotation (spin) was a
wholly classical phenomena and so could not be represented by a quantum number.  His
eventual acceptance of spin, however, would lead him in 1927 to develop, in
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, a consistent theory of spin for the electron utilizing
his now famous spin matrices.  In doing so he reinterpreted spin to be a wholly quantum
mechanical property.  In modern notation, the projection of the spin angular momentum
on the z-axis for any quanton (atom, electron, etc.) is:
 SZ = s,(s −1),...,−s where s = 0,
1
2
,1, 3
2
,...
and, quantities containing  are quantized, so spin indeed is a quantum mechanical
property.
The Merger of Uncertainty and Exclusion
I have just traced, then, the early history of the uncertainty principle and the exclusion
principle (along with the related development of the new mechanics) up to about 1928.
Both were separate threads but often explored by the same people.  As such it was natural
for someone to attempt to find a link between the two quantum phenomena.  This
happens to be where Eddington fully enters the picture.
In 1928 Dirac had published a generalization of the Schrödinger equation that
consisted of a set of four simultaneous first order partial differential equations (Dirac
1928a) that is now known as the Dirac equation.  In 1926-27 Oskar Klein (1894 – 1977)
79
and Walter Gordon (1893 – 1939) independently attempted to construct a relativistic
wave equation (as had Schrödinger himself privately).  The Klein-Gordon equation, as it
is now known, had two problems, however.  It did not correctly predict the fine structure
of hydrogen (it is still useful for spin-0 particles).  In, what appeared to be a separate
problem at the time, it also could not be combined with Pauli’s 1927 theory of spin.  Of
course we now know that these two problems are, in fact, two faces of the same single
problem since fine structure is related to spin.  Dirac’s follow-up to Klein-Gordon in
1928, despite not directly introducing the idea of a spinning electron, actually contained
the correct spin in the result (Kragh 1999).  His paper contained a generalization of the
Schrödinger equation that consisted of a set of four simultaneous first order partial
differential equations (Dirac 1928a) that is now known collectively as the Dirac
equation.19
Spin turned out to be a monumental discovery on par with the de Broglie relation,
particularly in relation to Eddington’s work since it led directly to the exclusion principle
that was the second pillar of his theory (uncertainty being the first).  I have already shown
that spin was considered a fundamental part of quantum mechanics fairly soon after its
discovery.  As such any further work in the field needed to account for it.  As I previously
stated the Klein-Gordon equation, which was the first relativistic attempt at a wave
equation, did not account for spin, but Dirac’s equation did.  In fact, Pauli’s spin matrix
development of 1927 turned out to be a nonrelativistic limit of Dirac’s equation.  Since
Dirac’s equation was a form of the wave equation, spin, which is so vital to the core of
the exclusion principle, was merged with the core of wave mechanics that held as a basic
tenet the uncertainty principle.  The uncertainty principle was derived from the basic
commutation relation that corresponded to the time-independent wave equation.  Dirac’s
relativistic wave equation was described by Bohm as
a first-order relativistic wave equation [containing] four
complex wave functions.  The extra wave functions
correspond to additional variables, which can be related to
                                                 
19 Dirac’s paper was communicated to the Proceedings of the Royal Society of London by none other than
Ralph Fowler (see chapter two).
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the spin and charge of the electron.  In this way, he is able
to obtain conserved probabilities, as well as an accurate
description of many of the relativistic properties of the
electron, not treated correctly by any other theory (Bohm
1951 [1979], p. 90).
Schrödinger’s wave equation was thus a nonrelativistic limit of Dirac’s equation.  This
link between uncertainty and exclusion is tenuous in this form, however.  It would be
better to find a direct link between the two principles and, indeed, one does exist – a
rather simple one, in fact.
Pauli’s spin matrices
σ x =
0 1
1 0
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
σ y =
0 −i
i 0
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
σ z =
1 0
0 −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
are simply a way of representing the coefficients in front of    in matrix form in the
general equation for the components (axis projections) of spin angular momentum,
generalized here for any direction:  Sn = s,(s −1),...,−s .  S here is actually an operator
and the components satisfy the following commutation relation:
 
Sx ,Sy⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = iSz .
The Pauli matrices also satisfy a commutation relation:
σ x ,σ y⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = 2iσ z
(see Gasiorowicz 1996, p. 242).  Both S and σ satisfy equations (4.6) and (4.7) and thus
obey the uncertainty principle.  Experimentally this can be confirmed by a standard
experiment utilizing a Stern-Gerlach device (see Moore 2003b for a simple
demonstration of such a device) and is something quantum physicists nowadays take for
granted.
The year following these developments Heisenberg and Jordon incorporated spin
into quantum mechanics to correctly derive hydrogen’s fine structure as well as explain
the anomalous Zeeman effect.
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Enter Eddington, Structuralism in Tow
Eddington was actually present in these developments from the very beginning.  Like
Heisenberg he was influenced by relativity, but to a much greater extent.  In fact in
general the history of the development of quantum mechanics rests partially on the
shoulders of relativity.  Some of this development actually arose from early attempts at a
unification of fundamental forces, something Eddington was active in from the start.
One of the earliest attempts to unite gravity and electromagnetism using a field
theoretic approach was proposed by Hermann Weyl (1885 – 1955) in 1918.  Some three
years later Weyl’s trail was picked up by Eddington who published a generalization of
Weyl’s theory (Eddington 1921).  As Eddington explains in the beginning of his article,
Weyl
has shown that, on removing a rather artificial restriction in
Riemann’s geometry, the expression for the metric includes
terms that are identified with the four potentials of the
electromagnetic field (Eddington 1921, p. 104).
Eddington felt, however, that Weyl’s approach was still too restrictive and worked to
elaborate on it.  In doing so he began to contemplate the structure of the universe in a
more concrete way.  This paper could be interpreted as Eddington’s first mathematical
attempt at describing a universal structure.  In Eddington’s own words:
The natural geometry of the world … is the geometry of
Riemann and Einstein, not Weyl’s generalised geometry or
mine.  What we have sought is not the geometry of actual
space and time, but the geometry of world-structure, which
is the common basis of space and time and things
(Eddington 1921, p. 121).
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This foreshadows his concept of a universal background (uranoid) upon which everything
is built and gave him the freedom to make uncertainty inherent in the fabric of space-time
itself (see chapter five).  It establishes his view of the unity and continuous nature of the
universe through geometry and structure and develops a link between the very large
(gravity) and the very small (electromagnetism) that was to be a cornerstone of his
Fundamental Theory.  In a letter to Bohr in 1923, Einstein remarked “I have finally
understood the connection between electricity and gravitation.  Eddington has come
closer to the truth than Weyl” (Einstein 1923, reprinted in French 1979).
It is to be remembered that relativity here is essentially a classical theory and
Einstein a classical thinker who put his faith in strict causality over probability.  As he
wrote to Born in the following year “I find the idea quite intolerable that an electron
exposed to radiation should choose of its own free will, not only its moment to jump off
[the atom], but also its direction” (Einstein 1924, quoted in French 1979).  Einstein’s
endorsement of Eddington’s attempt at unification appears to put Eddington in the mould
of a classical thinker.  As I will show, one of Eddington’s most unique qualities was his
ability to transcend classical and quantum labels.  Whether he was successful or not is
immaterial; it was simply his ability to not be dogmatically trapped by a single ideology
that is admirable.
This early attempt at unification followed on the heels of a few investigations he
had performed into the astronomical applications of electricity (Eddington 1917 and
1918a).  However in generalizing Weyl’s theory he crept dangerously close to
considering, for the first time, microscopic phenomena.  Up to this point in Eddington’s
career he had been entirely concerned with macroscopic phenomena, especially on
astronomical scales.  Thus, with these ideas firmly planted in his mind, already teetering
on the edge of the microscopic world, he began investigating electrons themselves in
astronomical situations (see for example Eddington 1923a and 1925b).  Simultaneous to
this he began studying rotational motion in primarily stellar situations (see for example
Eddington 1923b and 1925c).  In 1926 he considered a solely microscopic phenomena for
the first time by merging his two lines of thinking: electrons and rotational motion.  The
result was a letter to Nature simply titled “Spinning Electrons” (Eddington 1926).  This
followed on the heels of Goudsmit and Uhlenbeck’s initial description of spin in 1925
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and actually preceded Pauli’s 1927 theory of spin (perhaps he was inspired by Compton’s
conjecture of 1921 or by Goudsmit and Uhlenbeck – see above).  The fact that
Eddington’s work is not remembered speaks for itself, but it really is the first paper he
wrote on a quantum mechanical topic.
The following year Eddington published his second paper on quantum mechanics
(this one memorable enough to deserve mention in some histories on the subject – see
Jammer 1966).  It was an integral part of the scientific debate on the problem of the
completeness of the eigenfunctions in Schrödinger’s wave equations.  It was a problem
Schrödinger himself had recognized.  Schrödinger employed the use of the Laplace
transformation to find the solution of the radial equation in the standard Kepler problem
of radial orbits.  This solution, however, says nothing about the completeness of the
eigenfunctions.
Eddington was able to show that the radial equation actually can be solved in a
much more elementary way and that the solution was actually implicitly contained in
several other standard treatises on the subject (Eddington 1927 and Jammer 1966).
Eddington specifically mentions the work of Edmund Whittaker (1873 – 1956) who is
precisely the person who assembled Fundamental Theory from Eddington’s notes after
his death.  Whittaker and George Watson (1886 – 1965) had published the book Modern
Analysis whose fourth edition appeared in 1927 and included what is now known as the
‘Whittaker integral’ (Eddington referred to it as the ‘Whittaker function’).  It was a
generalization of various special functions (i.e. the special functions were special cases of
this integral) and resulted from work he performed on partial differential equations that
also produced a new solution for the wave equation and a general solution of the Laplace
equation that included Eddington’s solution to the radial equation in the Kepler problem.
Eddington Out of the Twenties
In the beginning, then, Eddington latched onto Schrödinger’s wave mechanics rather than
Born’s matrix mechanics. This was a pivotal moment for Eddington.  Considering the
heavy influence relativity had on him and his strong mathematical background he was
naturally disturbed by the fact that Dirac’s relativistic wave equation was not presented in
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tensor calculus form.20  But he was equally influenced by wave mechanics.  He
immediately produced a sort of rebuttal to Dirac and began the process of creating a
‘wave-tensor’ calculus that took the merger of matrix and wave mechanics to another
level by using tensors rather than vectors that are the basic components of matrices
(Eddington 1928).  This is often considered the first paper in the development of his
‘Fundamental’ theory or ‘fundamentalism’ as Kragh puts it (Kragh 1999) and will be
elaborated upon in chapter five.
So by 1928 wave mechanics, matrix mechanics, the uncertainty relation, and the
exclusion principle (via spin) had all been related and could all be found either directly
in, or by taking some sort of limit on, Dirac’s relativistic wave equation.  As I have
already hinted, this was a watershed moment for Eddington: the paper in which Dirac
formally proposed his equation was perhaps the single most influential moment in
Eddington’s career as it put him on the path of his ardent ‘fundamentalism,’ something
that would change his life and his stature among physicists.
                                                 
20 In fact, Charles Galton Darwin (1887 – 1962), grandson of the evolutionist and collaborator with Ralph
Fowler (see chapter two), was the first to officially note that Dirac’s work was not in tensor form (Darwin
1928).
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V
Probability Leads to Uncertainty
Dirac’s paper took on the challenge of obtaining a “wave equation … which shall be
invariant under a Lorentz transformation and shall be equivalent to [the Klein-Gordon
equation] in the limit of large quantum numbers” (Dirac 1928a).  The most general form
in which Dirac presented his equation was
p0 +
e
c
A0 + ρ1 σ ,p +
e
c
A⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ ρ3mc
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
ψ = 0 . (5.1)
Eddington was particularly bothered by the fact that this equation was not in tensor
calculus form, though as I have noted before, Darwin was the first to notice this
(Eddington credits Darwin with this point at the beginning of his paper).  Darwin,
however, did not take steps to rectify the apparent problem:
here we have a system invariant in fact but not in form.
Should it not be possible to give it formal invariance as
well … ?  It is so possible, but it is not hard to show that it
requires no less than 16 quantities to do it … and even so
each will have a real and imaginary part, so that we may
say that 32 quantities are required! … it is rather
disconcerting to find … that physical quantities exist which
would be … very artificial and inconvenient to express as
tensors (Darwin 1928, p. 657).
He had assumed that these physical quantities simply could not be expressed in tensor
form.  Eddington, on the other hand, was determined to find a way around this difficulty.
In his follow-up to Dirac’s work Eddington presents the following modification.
He begins with a tensor containing five components that are regarded as the
coordinates in a 5-space.  By doing this he is essentially employing the methods of
Kaluza and Klein less than a decade after their introduction of a fifth dimension in order
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to more easily incorporate the complicated terms.  He calls the 5-space, t-space since he
is working with a hypothetical tensor T.  The original 4-space we are all familiar with is
referred to as ψ-space.  The additional dimension accounts for a rotation of the 4-space
itself.  This latter point is an important one to keep in mind when considering just how he
incorporated uncertainty into his theory: he has essentially treated the standard, intuitive,
and purely observable (and classical) 4-space as a singular unit and imbued it with its
own property (the ability to rotate).  This requires the fifth dimension, though
Eddington’s interpretation is purely mathematical.  This foreshadows his use of the
standard 4-space reference frame as a singular unit in Fundamental Theory that he
imbues with uncertainty.
He the uses T to transform ψ-space as Tµ
νψ ν =ψ µ  which is valid for any linear
transformation of the ψ’s.  By utilizing the second-order equation and assuming that the
required form of the first order equation is Tψ = 0 , he arrives at the following tensor
calculus form of the relativistic wave equation, (5.1):
Tψ = ihgrad + (e / c)V( ) E1,E2 ,E3,−iE4( ) + mcE5{ } = 0 (5.2)
(Eddington 1928).  The E’s are associated with various combinations of coordinates or
matrix values that satisfy the invariant condition and are, thus, easily assignable to the 16
quantities described above by Darwin.  The only requirement is that they are mutually
perpendicular – no actual physical phenomena depend on the choice of what quantity to
assign to what E value.  The advantage is that the E’s present a symmetrical method
while Dirac’s original formalism does not.  The disadvantage is a common one with
much of Eddington’s later work – the formalism was unusual, complex, and, perhaps, a
bit inaccessible even to clever physicists.  However, he did prove that his solution was
equivalent to Dirac’s.
The important historical aspect of this is that he employed an essentially
geometric approach utilizing coordinate dimensions to present the Dirac equation in a
tensor form.  This also served as the seed paper for his development of E-numbers within
the context of Fundamental Theory and his treatment of standard 4-space as an
independent object with its own properties.  But the coordinate dimensional form served
as the basis for uniting relativity and quantum mechanics under a single framework.
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This makes sense when considering the history I have developed so far:
Heisenberg and Pauli’s admitted reference to relativity.  Coordinates are simply a
mathematical way of defining a point-of-view.  Relativity was – and still is – the ultimate
declaration on points-of-view.  As such it makes sense to utilize coordinates in a
fundamental way since they are a natural aspect of relativity and since they had already
served as a foundation for two of the most fundamental principles governing quantum
processes.
The seeds of Eddington’s interpretation of the exclusion principle are also
contained in this formulation.  As I will show, Eddington’s form of exclusion ultimately
made no distinction between any type of particle (regardless of spin, charge, or mass)
since all particle properties were frame-dependent in Eddington’s interpretation.  I will
discuss this in greater depth in seven through nine.  For now I will use this discussion of
coordinates as an introduction to the final version of Fundamental Theory as it
posthumously appeared in 1946.
Introducing Fundamental Theory Through Coordinates
The historical development of quantum mechanics up to Eddington’s 1928 paper
responding to Dirac is of great importance to understanding the larger framework in
which he worked.  Many of these highlights leave an indelible impression on
Fundamental Theory in its form, order, and philosophy.  Eddington’s own development
of the theory, however, is not necessarily to be looked at purely chronologically.
Important early drafts will be discussed as they find relevance to the discussion at hand,
but this is not an historical analysis.  Rather it is a technical analysis of an historical
document, particularly in relation to modern quantum field theory since the similarities
are striking at time.  With that said, coordinates served as the first stone on which
Fundamental Theory was built.
In relativity coordinates serve as a way of locating objects in reference frames.  In
quantum mechanics, their role is similar, though the constraint of the uncertainty
principle is an added limitation.  In fact, one view is that quantum mechanics doesn’t (or
shouldn’t) change relativity at all – it simply clarifies it by putting limitations on what
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sets of coordinates can be effectively used in concert.  It also makes the point that
coordinates are simply one observable quantity among many.  So, in that sense, quantum
mechanics should be a generalization of relativity.  Eddington actually took the opposite
view – all observables are reducible to coordinates via relativity and so, with the
exception of the inherent nature of uncertainty, relativity should be a generalization of
quantum mechanics.  Either way the marriage of relativity and quantum mechanics
through coordinates seems natural.
To be rigorous with the definition of coordinates, due to the Principle of
Equivalence, which ultimately implies that there is no global inertial reference frame, the
assumption is made that a reference frame is equal to a coordinate system or a set of
observables since a coordinate is simply an observable.  Relativity’s condition for
observability begins with a denial of absolute motion such that all observables are
necessarily measured relative to another observable (technically they should at least come
in pairs, then).  In quantum mechanics the condition for observability is the uncertainty
principle meaning an object cannot be precisely located in a geometrical frame or as a
world-line in 4-space (Eddington 1946).  Regarding the view of a set of observables as a
coordinate system, in general relativity it also can be equivalent to a manifold that is an
m-dimensional ‘hyperplane’ in n-dimensional Euclidean space (m ≤ n).  Basically, a
manifold is any set that can be continuously parameterised where the number of
independent parameters is the number of dimensions and the parameters themselves are
coordinates.  Metrics are often introduced onto manifolds in order to carry information.
In current language we often relate a manifold to a quantum field, which is a collection of
position dependent operators (often modelled as simple harmonic oscillators), where the
field matches the manifold point-for-point.
Eddington thus sought a more general form of the uncertainty principle that would
incorporate both observability conditions – the relative point-of-view that requires a
minimum of two observables (ignoring just for the moment the relation between observer
and observed) and the quantum requirement that observations of certain pairs of
observables have a certain limit in accuracy.  Eddington’s combined principle states that
“a coordinate ξ is observable only if it is a relative coordinate of two entities both of
which have uncertainty of position and momentum in the geometrical frame” (Eddington
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1946, p. 1, Eddington’s emphasis).  So, for instance, let’s say we wish to observe the
position of an object.  The obvious question is: its position relative to what?  If you assign
an object specific coordinate values x and y, what you’re also doing is specifying the
location of the origin since each coordinate is really a displacement vector (the concept of
a vector is key to this illustration).  Thus it is impossible to specify any location without
specifying at least one other location (usually the origin).  So the displacement is in fact
the observable quantity here, not the actual coordinates of the two objects.  However,
assuming that these two objects are measured by observables that obey a commutation
relation in the form of equation (4.6), they will also have some uncertainty in the form of
equation (4.7).  What I will show is that Eddington, by assuming that every observable is
frame-dependent, demonstrates that like variables (such as two position variables) obey a
commutation relation (though he is not explicit in his derivation of this point).
From the point of view of statistics, an observable is actually a statistic based on a
double probability distribution (one for each of the ‘end-points,’ if you will, of the
observable).  This means that an observable coordinate is not measured in reference to
some abstract, observer imposed mathematical origin, but rather from something that is
physically intrinsic to the measurement (of the coordinate) itself i.e. the origin must have
a physical nature.  Since the reference here is not some mathematical origin but an actual
physically real secondary object (so to speak), it must obey the uncertainty principle as
well.  As such, Eddington lays down the rule that there must be two origins – one
physical, as just described, and one geometrical as imposed by the observer.  The latter
should be eliminated from “observationally verifiable results; being therefore aloof from
the rough-and-tumble of observational inquisition, it has a sharpness of definition which
contrasts with the blurring of all physical landmarks by probability scatter” (Eddington
1946, p. 2).  Essentially, given a geometrical origin applied by the observer, the physical
origin that it corresponds to fluctuates.  Eddington then applies this principle to wave
mechanics by stating that the coordinates in wave-mechanical equations must be
measured from a physical origin since both they and their conjugate momenta are
observables and not mathematical constructs.  This presents a problem: what is this
supposed origin and what sort of distribution function does it have?
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This idea can be potentially rectified with standard quantum measurement theory.
In such a situation the observer interacts with the object under observation and thus the
Hamiltonian operator consist of two pieces: one for the object and one for the observer
(Bohm instead refers to the observing ‘apparatus’, see Bohm 1951).  Once the
observation begins, there is an interaction between the observer and the object and, since
interactions are nothing more than a different type of object (see chapter three), the
interaction must also contribute to the Hamiltonian of the entire process (Bohm 1951).  It
is possible to associate the observer (apparatus) in Bohm’s example with the physical
origin in Eddington’s example.  Then, as Bohm explains, during the instant of
observation itself (which is interaction corresponding to the act of making the
observation), the Hamiltonians of the observer and observable produce such negligible
changes in the wavefunction that they can be ignored.  As such the only contributing
portion of the Hamiltonian for this situation is from the interaction (Bohm 1951).  In
Eddington’s formulation, then, the observable coordinate, which is a relative coordinate,
corresponds to the interaction in Bohm’s example and represents the act of making an
observation or taking a measurement.
Bohm makes the point, however, that in order to make a measurement (called an
‘impulsive measurement’) short enough to only include the interaction’s Hamiltonian, a
large interaction energy is needed (Bohm 1951).  Bohm shows that it is possible to
account (or correct) for changes in the observed quantity introduced by the process of
interaction itself.  He also shows that by including the apparatus coordinates (the physical
origin in Eddington’s language) it is possible to turn this into a completely objective
measurement entirely free of human interaction (see Bohm 1951, pp. 606-607).  This is
precisely the point of Eddington’s formulation.  Once again, it appears that Bohm’s
presentation borrows a bit from Eddington, though, in the case presented here, Bohm’s
ideas are a standard treatment of the subject.21
Eddington’s description of the physical origin corresponds to either an actual
particle included simply for the sake of measurement, or the centroid of a set of particles.
                                                 
21 Ironically, in this 1951 treatise (Quantum Theory), Bohm presents an argument against hidden variables
(Bohm 1951, p. 622).  Just a few years after the publication of this book Bohm’s theories had begun
crossing the line into the realm of hidden variables.  Now, Bohm’s theories, though clearly based on hidden
variables, are often viewed as a third alternative to traditional Copenhagen versus hidden variable theories
since they allow for unknowable quantities.
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The centroid here, though not a physical object, is nonetheless, frame-independent in that
it’s location relative to the constituent particles is set regardless of any geometrically
imposed coordinate system (you can’t shift a centroid around without also shifting the
mass distribution).  But, since it isn’t actually a real particle it can be simply treated as a
geometrical origin as well.  As such the use of the centroid provides us with a way of
transforming between physical and geometrical coordinates.  In this way Eddington has
answered half his question: the physical origin is a centroid of a system of particles.  But
what is its spatio-temporal distribution function if it’s not a real particle?  Statistically,
the centroid of a large number of particles is always Gaussian regardless of the
distributions of the individual particles (this is an important step in moving from
microscopic to macroscopic objects and phenomena).  Given this a priori knowledge of
the geometrical distribution of coordinates (and neglecting one supposedly disposable
constant in the Gaussian – Eddington gives no valid reason for this), the physical origin
then has, in three dimensions, the distribution function:
f x0 , y0 , z0( ) = 2πσ 2( )−
3
2 e− x0
2 + y0
2 + z0
2( )/2σ 2 (5.3)
The standard deviation, σ, is referred to by Eddington as the ‘uncertainty constant’ and
here is applied to the physical reference frame.
The origin of Eddington’s thinking on this matter clearly has its roots in his
statistical astronomy work from early in his career.  The particles in question will be
considered to be the particles in the universe (or could be the galaxies – or stars if
considering something in relation to a single galaxy) and are assumed to be spherically
symmetric.  The centroid of this distribution is then essentially the centroid of the
universe (this obviously clashes with the standard cosmological presumption that there is
no centre to the universe which really says that the universe has no preferential axis,
though there have been recent attempts to calculate the birefringence of the universe and
thus produce a preferential axis) and this corresponds to the physical origin for all
measurements.  The particles will later become the standard background environment
Eddington refers to as the ‘uranoid’ of any small system to be studied.  The uranoid itself
will be explored in coming chapters.
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Eddington does admit that the rest of his theory which is derived from this
physical frame could very possibly be wrong since quantum theory leaves its ultimate
frame-of-reference (master frame, perhaps) undefined and thus it is impossible to know if
his physical frame is the physical frame for quantum mechanics.  He offers this
qualification:
The reader interested in logical rigour should bear in mind
that the development of the theory turns partly on strict
deduction and partly on ultimate saving of labour.  The
former part requires proof, the latter part success
(Eddington 1946, p. 4).
Certainly, the validity of his theory, then, would rely partly on its predictions of
experimental results (though that in itself is not a proof of its actuality – see Ockham’s
Razor for clarification).  He does offer an argument reductio ad absurdum showing that
quantum theory must be based on a physical origin associated with such a centroid in
order to validate his attempt, but the argument is simply an expansion of the ideas already
presented, specifically as compared to Bohm’s description of measurement, and is
somewhat circular.  His physical argument in support of the transformation from
geometrical to physical origins hinges on the standard deviation, σ, being used to ‘put the
scale into’ the physical frame (and thus everything constructed in it).
Physical Interpretation of the Standard Deviation
To find a physical interpretation of the standard deviation, then, begin with a very large
number of particles N all having the same coordinate probability distribution and assume
a large number of them exist in a volume V0 that is fixed in some geometrical (i.e.
mathematical and non-physical) frame.  Each particle has some probability p of being in
V0 and the expectation value (mean number in V0 in Eddington’s terminology) is n0 = pN.
The actual number in V0 is n = n0 + y where y is some fluctuation in one coordinate axis.
Note that y (and x and z as well) is not a coordinate length in this instance since the
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argument of the exponent in equation 5.3 must be unitless.  Since the square of the
standard deviation would be σ 2 = n0 1− n0 / N( )  by Eddington’s definition and is
unitless, y must also be unitless.  In essence, since number (in particular, particle counts)
is the root of probability and statistics, and is in some senses the simplest of
measurements to make (aren’t all measurements really just ways of counting something?)
it makes sense for Eddington to reduce everything to this basic idea (see my discussion of
Russell in chapter three).
In any case substituting Eddington’s definitions into equation (5.3) with x and z
set to zero yields:
fN (y) = 2πn0 1− n0 / N( ){ }−
1
2 e− y
2 /2n0 (1−n0 /N ) (5.4)
Assuming that N / n0 →∞ , the fluctuation y (i.e. the difference between the number of
particles actually in the volume at a given time and the expected or mean value) has the
distribution law:
f∞ (y) = (2πn0 )
−
1
2 e− y
2 /2n0 . (5.5)
Both equations (5.4) and (5.5) are Gaussian distributions and thus equation (5.4) is
actually equation (5.5) compounded with:
fe(y) = (2πn0
2 / N )
−
1
2 e−Ny
2 /2n0
2
. (5.6)
Now define a new coordinate ζ = y / n0  such that n = n0 (1+ζ ) .  The distribution of ζ is
then:
ge(ζ ) = (2π / N )
−
1
2 e
−
1
2
Nζ 2
. (5.7)
This effectively resolves equation (5.4) into two completely independent distributions or,
as Eddington calls them, fluctuations.  He calls (5.6) the ‘ordinary’ fluctuation that is a
result of the finiteness of n0 and (5.7) the ‘extraordinary’ fluctuation that is a result of the
finiteness of N (Eddington 1946).  The latter is a negative fluctuation meaning it is
subtracted from the ordinary fluctuation.  The ordinary fluctuation is the standard
distribution of an expectation value (or mean) and is thus given no further clarification by
Eddington.  However, the extraordinary fluctuation must be considered in spherical space
for the following reason: according to relativity theory the only distribution of matter that
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can be in self-equilibrium is a uniform one that fills some spherical space.  This is known
as an Einstein universe and requires a cosmological constant in its description.  This
space has a finite volume, which means that N/n0 is finite.  In a Euclidean space
N / n0 →∞  and the extraordinary fluctuation vanishes from equation (5.4) producing
equation (5.5).22  As such the introduction of curvature gives rise to the extraordinary
fluctuation.  Thus, in utilizing the Einstein universe as a basis for reasoning, Eddington
seems to have attached himself to a static interpretation of the universe that appears odd
more than fifteen years after Edwin Hubble’s (1889 – 1953) discovery that the universe is
expanding.  But, as I will show shortly, this is far from the truth.  It is simply yet another
case of Eddington straddling the line – he applied the basic tenets of a static universe to
an expanding one just as he took a middle-of-the-road stance on the basic interpretation
of quantum theory.  Note that it was recently proven that the large-scale geometry of the
universe is Euclidean (de Bernardis, et. al. 2000) while, at the same time, the
cosmological constant has returned as the preferred explanation of the source of the
mysterious dark energy that is accelerating the universe’s expansion.  If Eddington’s only
reason for utilizing an Einstein universe was the ease with which it explained curvature,
he may have been delighted to discover it might not have been necessary.  In fact, it turns
out that he utilizes Minkowski (flat) space-time (derived from a transformation)
throughout Fundamental Theory and derives a cosmological constant, making his work at
least hypothetically consistent with factual data.  As such this entire line of reasoning
might be amenable to simplification.
Returning to a discussion of the extraordinary fluctuation, the above arguments
imply that there is a certain level of uncertainty in the number of particles contained in
the volume.  The particle density s = n/V0 can be equivalently defined as n0/V where V is
now a fluctuating or uncertain volume and the number of particles is held constant and is
defined as:V = V0 / (1+ ε)
3  and the uncertainty is now contained in the linear scale factor
1+ε.
At this point it is instructive to recall that (5.6) and (5.7) are distribution functions
with discrete values since they are based on a Bernoulli distribution (Eddington 1946).
                                                 
22 This also implies that p is zero indicating that, in Euclidean space, objects would have a zero probability
of occupying a specific volume.
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The distribution in the volume scale factor ε is continuous so some transformation
between continuous and discrete is required.  Eddington derives this as:
(1+ζ )2 = (1+ ε)4 (5.8)
for equation (5.7) where the values of ζ that have what he calls ‘sensible’ probabilities
are on the order of N-1/2 making them extremely small (he uses the value 1039 for N giving
N-1/2 a value on the order of 10-20 – 1039 is half of the number of particles, 1078, that he
derives as inhabiting the universe as a whole).  Equation (5.8) can then be approximated
(“amply” in Eddington’s description) as ζ = 2ε .  Equation (5.7) gives the standard
deviation of ζ as N-1/2 meaning the standard deviation of ε is:
σε =
1
2
N . (5.9)
The ultimate point of the above derivation is that the extraordinary fluctuation of the
particle density is represented as a scale fluctuation with a standard deviation given by
(5.9).  Basically, since N is now taken to be an exact number, the uncertainty is
transferred to the volume, meaning it manifests itself in an uncertainty of the scale of
measurement.  If the volume is spherical, the only uncertainty is in the scale of
measurement of r.
In summary, if considering a point some distance r from the origin, the difference
between its physical and geometrical coordinates consists of a fluctuation with a standard
deviation of σ in all directions that is due to the uncertainty of the position of the physical
origin, and a fluctuation with a standard deviation of σεr in the radial direction due to the
uncertainty in the scale of measurement of r.  The extraordinary fluctuation it represented
by the latter while the ordinary fluctuation is represented by the former.  As such the total
standard deviation consists of both radial and transverse components:
σ radial = σ
2 − σε
2r2 (5.10)
σ transverse = σ . (5.11)
Equations (5.10) and (5.11) are referred to as the ‘local uncertainty’ of the physical
reference frame.  It is essentially the uncertainty of a local physical origin relative to a
local geometrical origin.  If the difference between the physical and geometrical origins,
r, is small (and it stands to reason it would be almost immeasurably small since it would
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be ridiculous to have geometrical coordinates assigned to an object that was nowhere
near it!), then both (5.10) and (5.11) are simply σ which is the original value of the
standard deviation for the physical coordinate frame.  Eddington concludes,
“Independently of coordinate systems, the local uncertainty in a given direction defines
an extension which might be adopted as the unit for measuring lengths in that direction
in that locality” (Eddington 1946, p. 6 his emphasis).  This is then referred to as the σ-
system of defining lengths, or the ‘σ-metric.’
Finally, Eddington derives the length of a line-element in the σ-metric as:
ds2 = dr
2
1− σε
2 /σ 2( )r2 + r
2dθ 2 + r2 sin2θdϕ 2 (5.12)
which is the standard line-element in a spherical space with a radius of R0 = σ /σε  (note
that in this definition R0 is a dimensionless quantity).  Here he employs equations (5.10)
and (5.11) to find the proportionality constants for (5.12).  The radius of spherical space
can then be combined with (5.9) to find the following simplified equation for the standard
deviation:
σ = R0 / 2 N . (5.13)
This gives a direct relation between the uncertainty in an observable coordinate
measurement and the two cosmological numbers R0 and N.
Pausing for a moment to consider the significance of the preceding, rather
lengthy, derivation, Eddington has connected the microscopic measurement problem with
the macroscopic cosmological problem.  What he is assuming is that the cosmological
parameters are measurable quantities that, due to their enormous scale, minimize
uncertainty in their own measurement (i.e. Eddington interpreted this as the fact that the
uncertainty principle rarely plays a role in any large-scale measurement, blurring the
distinction between classical and quantum uncertainty – see below).  But, what this
provides is a way of finding the microscopic uncertainty (the standard deviation) from
macroscopic measurements – large-scale phenomena provide information about small-
scale phenomena.  In addition it makes the uncertainty a measurable quantity (at least for
a given or measured value of N).
97
The standard deviation, then, plays multiple roles in the formulation of the
complete theory.  First, it links the macroscopic to the microscopic.  Second, it provides a
way of measuring the uncertainty (perhaps even eliminating, for a specific N) since it is
known to be negligible for macroscopic quantities.  Third, it provides a potential unit of
length measure in a given direction.  Fourth, it has the added effect of transferring
uncertainty to geometrical coordinates (i.e. if r is small the physical and geometrical
origins essentially coincide meaning that, even if the geometrical coordinates are
supposed to be set without error by the observer, if they are equivalent to the physical
coordinates then they equivalently have some uncertainty).  And, finally, it associates the
extraordinary fluctuation with the curvature of space and, since the extraordinary
fluctuation can be reduced or eliminated in many cases, so can the curvature of space (at
least locally – note that this is how he approximates Minkowski space).
Notice here Eddington’s blurring of the concept of uncertainty (see chapter three).
He uses the term ‘uncertainty’ in several places here but in these cases they clearly imply
a classical notion since they are simply various statistical quantities.  But it is not clear
that Eddington really recognizes a difference between classical and quantum notions of
uncertainty.  It appears from his continuous application of the underlying philosophical
principle developed by Heisenberg that quantum uncertainty was simply a limiting case
of classical uncertainty.  He draws no clear distinction in his application of Heisenberg’s
principle between microscopic and macroscopic situations.  In fact he uses them to
indisputably (in his mind) link microscopic (quantum) and macroscopic (classical)
phenomena.  In fact Eddington would rather refer to macroscopic and microscopic
phenomena than to classical and quantum.  In this way there is no clear distinction in
Fundamental Theory between classical and quantum situations since macroscopic
(classical) blends into microscopic (quantum) as multiplicities decrease (see chapter six).
Quantum phenomena then become a limiting case of classical phenomena.  The trouble
with this is that it does not account for the fact that complementarity (or some
comparable explanation) is required in quantum cases while it is not in classical cases,
i.e. there is no clear and purely statistical explanation for complementarity.
Regardless, Eddington proceeds with this blurring of classical and quantum
regimes and argues for a radical change in measurement in general.  This leads to his
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requirement of a standardised unit of length that was his best attempt at eliminating units
entirely.  Once again the derivation originates in the standard deviation.
A Standard for Length
Focusing on the third role the standard deviation plays as a potential unit for measuring
length brings to the surface one of Eddington’s deepest troubles with mid-twentieth
century science.  With the increasingly microscopic measurements that were being
obtained in physics, the limitations of the standard units of measurement became
increasingly apparent.  Eddington had a particular interest in finding a proper definition
for length, calling it “the most urgent requirement of all; for when we come to examine
what is actually measured in any kind of experiment, it is nearly always a length or a
spatial measure – the length of a thread of mercury in a thermometer, the shift of a bright
spot on a galvanometer scale, the displacement of a dark line in a spectrogram, etc.”
(Eddington 1939, p. 71).  Prior to 1960 the standard measure of length was the Paris
Metre that was, quite literally, a bar of metal in Paris that was defined to be a meter in
length.  The history of the Paris Metre dates to 1790 when Talleyrand (Charles Maurice
de Talleyrand Perigord, 1754 – 1838) recommended reform in France and the National
Assembly ordered the Académie to create a commission on the subject of standardizing
measures.  Two probabilists already mentioned in chapter three were on the commission:
Laplace and the Marquis de Condorcet.  Despite what appears to be the arbitrariness of
any measurement unit, in 1791 the commission gave three possibilities for a scientific
basis of any new measuring system: “the length of a pendulum, a quadrant of the circle of
the equator, finally a quadrant of the earth’s meridian” (quoted in Linklater 2002, p. 122).
An excellent and sometimes humorous look at measurement in history is Andro
Linklater’s Measuring America (2002) where he describes how the commission chose
from the three options.  They “frivolously” chose the last option in what Linklater
describes as an almost “capricious fashion” (Linklater 2002, p. 123)23.  Thus, the meter
was defined to be one ten-millionth of a quadrant of the earth’s meridian.
                                                 
23 Linklater’s assertion has been strongly disputed by E.F. Robertson (Robertson 2004).
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The arbitrariness with which the commission chose the unit of length is, perhaps,
not all that surprising considering two probabilists were on it.  After all, how could
someone who helped father the mathematics of inexactitude be expected to commit to a
scientifically reasonable description for an exact measure?  In essence, what difference
did it really make at the time since all measure would be inherently inexact in some
cases?  On the other hand, they did their best to maximize the certainty by which they
measured the meridian so as to obtain as accurate a result as possible.  Nonetheless this
still left the problem of duplication.  Certainly, in order to accurately duplicate the meter,
one could simply retake the measurements performed by the French, but the arduous task
was not simple from a logistical point of view, nor was it easy from the point of
measurement technique.  The only other option was to attempt to copy the metal bar
directly, which is what was most often done, but the possibilities for error are obvious.
This was the state of affairs during Eddington’s entire lifetime and it is not
difficult to see how problematic this becomes when attempting to carry out microscopic
measurements.  For instance, if the uncertainty between the original meter and some
duplicate somewhere was a centimetre, it would be wholly unrealistic to measure
anything at the millimetre level without introducing a great deal of uncertainty.  Since
physicists were working many, many orders of magnitude smaller than that by the 1930s,
there obviously was a problem.24  In the absence of anything better, Eddington defined
his standard of length by the standard deviation described above.  Alternatively he
described it in terms of the periods of light waves and the amplitudes of vibrations of
crystal lattices, finding, as a consequence, that the speed of light was a constant (this was
universally accepted from the mid-twentieth century until only recently when varying
speed of light (VSL) theories legitimately entered the mainstream accompanied by
supporting astronomical evidence – see Magueijo 2004).
                                                 
24 In 1960 an atomic standard was adopted based on the wavelength of a particular red-orange spectral line
emitted by krypton-86 in a gas discharge tube.  Even here, however, the reproducibility of krypton-86
limited the accuracy.  This standard was replaced in 1983 by the current one, which defines one meter as
the length of the path travelled by light in a vacuum during 1/299,792,458 second.  This implies that the
speed of light is known exactly and that the second is well-defined.  This is a quantum-mechanical
definition of just the type that Eddington wanted.
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There is a branch of physics known as metrology that is devoted to the study and
improvement of measuring techniques that actually predates relativity (which brought
many of these problems to the fore).  In any definition of length the most crucial part is
the existence (or creation) of a standard that is readily available for comparison anywhere
at any time.  Regarding the Paris Metre itself as a standard, he says “Metrologists do not
look upon a particular bar of metal, such as the Paris metre, as an ultimate standard; the
mere fact that they feel anxiety as to its permanence shows that they have in mind a more
ideal standard with which it might be compared” (Eddington 1939, p. 74).  Eddington
says that some physical structure that is not necessarily permanent but is unique and
reproducible is what is required to truly define some length.  He gives as an example a
calcite crystal that has a certain number of lattice intervals – nature requires this
particular type of crystal to be the same everywhere (otherwise it’s actually something
else entirely).  Ultimately this suggests requiring some type of measure for length that is
actually unitless – the number of lattice intervals is simply that – a pure number.  Thus
any structure that is easily reproducible from some quantum specification can properly
serve as a standard.  Finally, all “such standards are equivalent, being definite numerical
ratios to the unit of length h/mc which appears in the fundamental equations of quantum
theory” (Eddington 1939, p. 75).  The standard of time (or time-extension in Eddington’s
terms) is similarly defined as a time-periodicity of the same structure that provides the
standard for length.
The standard of length, however, prior to Eddington’s writing, comes from
relativity.  But relativity appeals to theories external to itself in order to define length.
Eddington, here, enumerates another crucial requirement for his view of a unifying theory
– it must be completely self-contained such that the theory itself produces its own
standard, i.e. the standard is derivable from the theory itself.  In this regard I will show
that Eddington was unsuccessful.  However, he recognized that since certain processes
were only representable in a relativistic quantum theory, relativity and quantum
mechanics cannot be considered separately and thus must have the same standard of
length (Eddington 1939).  Furthermore, through an examination of a changing velocity of
light in a vacuum in relation to a hydrogen atom, he concludes that “either the ratio of the
period of the emitted light to the time-period intrinsic in the emitting atom varies with
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time, or the ratio of the length of the emitted waves to the spatial scale of structure of the
emitting atom varies in time” (Eddington 1939, p. 78).  This makes little sense.  In order
for the former ratio to vary, the period – and thus the frequency – of the emitted light
must be changing, or the intrinsic time-period in the atom must be changing.  But these
quantities are linked – a different intrinsic time-period should produce a correspondingly
different frequency.  In the case of the latter ratio a similar principle holds true: if the
spatial size of the emitting object were to change the emitted wavelength should have to
change.  Modern VSL theories are certainly rigorous and may even be partial truths, but
the state of affairs in 1946 was not nearly as advanced as it is now (however, hindsight is
always 20/20): since atomic transitions were seen as the only way to emit a photon, if the
value of the constants changed it would imply that there was no link between the photon
and its source which is absurd.
The natural extension here then is to consider a quantum-specified standard,
which is what we essentially have in place today (Eddington clearly had excellent
foresight).  However, he recognized two limitations in such a standard.  The first is that
the standard is not fully reproducible in very strong electric and magnetic fields.  What
this means is that if the standard is based on the properties of a photon, say in a field-free
situation, that photon most likely will have different properties while in a field since the
field can affect the photon.  In view of the fact that a photon is the carrier particle for the
electromagnetic interaction itself, the information carried by the photon will vary
depending on the nature of the interaction.  In addition, subsequent to Eddington’s work,
electromagnetism was united with the weak nuclear interaction in electroweak theory and
would need to be reconciled with the W and Z bosons that are the carrier particles for the
weak interaction.  As such, a standard of this nature would also be artificial when
measuring in a gravitational or strong interaction – gravitons and quarks would then need
to be brought into the fold.  Obviously, a fully unified theory might be able to accomplish
this, but, at least from Eddington’s point-of-view, this is a serious limitation (quantum
field theorists and string theorists can ponder this ad infinitum should they wish).
Eddington even points out that “at least a dozen different ‘unified theories’ of the
gravitational and electromagnetic fields have been put forward each implying a slightly
different definition of length” (Eddington 1939, p. 80).
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The second limitation on the standard is that it must be short.  Eddington gives the
following example to demonstrate why:
Suppose we try to measure the diameter of the earth with a
long crystal standard stuck through it like a knitting needle
through an orange.  It is well known that the earth is
strained out of shape by the tide-raising forces of the sun
and moon; the long crystal will likewise be strained … We
cannot always remove the bodies that are causing the strain
… Thus, in general, we have to be content with short
standards which are proportionately less affected by strain
(Eddington 1939, p. 82).
I briefly mentioned another example earlier in this section: imagine one wishes to
measure something on a millimetre scale but the standard by which one is measuring is
only accurate to the centimetre scale.  Measurements in millimetres could be small
enough that they are less than the actual uncertainty in the standard – it’s like attempting
to measure something on the millimetre (or smaller) scale with a wooden meter-stick (or
yard-stick) like one might find in a fabric store (a micrometer would be far more useful in
this situation).
Eddington points out that measuring large distances or lengths is simply
accomplished by integrating the short distances assuming that they are unambiguous.  As
such, it could be argued that the meter is an inadequate length measure in physics,
particularly since such a standard could undergo length contraction in even fairly simple
situations.  As Eddington points out, “the failure to define long distances observationally,
or in mathematical language the non-integrability of displacement, is the foundation of
Einstein’s theory of gravitation” (Eddington 1939, p. 83 my emphasis).  Eddington’s
conclusion, then, is that since the length and time intervals “are the basis of nearly all
other physical definitions [to] avoid circular definitions it is essential that the standards of
length and time interval should be the extensions of structures completely specified by
pure numbers” (Eddington 1939, p. 84).  The standard deviation resulting from
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uncertainty fits this profile even though equation (5.12) contains R0 – from equation
(5.13) we know that it is dimensionless and, thus, so is σ (see 5.13).  Eddington continues
by specifying that the general specification of physical structures by pure numbers (e.g.
numbers of elementary particles in states defined by quantum numbers) is developed in
quantum mechanics meaning that the standard of length must be quantum-mechanical in
nature.  Again, σ fits the bill, though the latter point needs to be proven.  It can be proven
if any single quantum-specified extension can be shown to have a fixed ratio to σ (the
local uncertainty).  This is the primary point of Fundamental Theory – investigating ways
in which extensions of various structures can be related to σ.  In essence, the entire
treatise is a justification of the use of σ as a standard for measure.
Problems in Measurement Theory
The standard deviation also plays the role of providing a value for the uncertainty in any
measure (this is one of the standard definitions of it).  The mere fact that there exists
uncertainty in measurements, particularly in quantum mechanics, raises a host of issues to
be resolved.  In quantum mechanics a measurement is usually referred to as an
observation.  As early as 1932 Von Neumann felt the problem of observation and
measurement was not being properly considered (Jammer 1966).  His explanation rested
on the notion that every quantum mechanical measurement process involves some aspect
that can’t be analyzed.  This aspect involves the interference of the observer in the
measuring process.  He suggested that in addition to the continuous causal propagation of
the wave function by the usual wave equation, the function also experiences a
discontinuous, noncausal, and instantaneous change due to the intervention of the
observer.  A similar situation was proposed by Heisenberg in relation to the γ-ray
microscope thought experiment he used in his derivation of the uncertainty principle (see
chapter four).  But in Heisenberg’s case the interference of the observer was entirely
causal (as I mentioned earlier the uncertainty principle is completely causal in nature).
Von Neumann’s idea was based on irreversibility (the second law of thermodynamics
reminding once again us that there is no fountain of youth) in that given some statistical
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operator U, a measurement of an observable R containing a set of orthonormal
eigenfunctions ϕ1, ϕ2, etc. alters U as follows:
′U = ϕn ,Uϕn( )P[ϕn ]∑ (5.14)
where P represents the probability and, thus, irreversibility of the process (Jammer 1966).
There is a corresponding causal, continuous, and reversible change as well.  Given a state
ψ = anψ n∑  that is expanded in the eigenfunctions of R25, measuring R reduces ψ to a
specific eigenstate ψk whose eigenvalue is the result of the measurement.  So the act of
measuring an eigenvalue reduces the general state to a specific state not allowing the
observer to have full knowledge of the general state ψ.  This is known alternately as the
‘reduction of state,’ ‘reduction of the wave packet,’ or, in more modern terms,
‘wavefunction collapse.’
The last description provides a simpler physical explanation for what von
Neumann was postulating: given a probability distribution of possible values for some
measurement, the act of taking the measurement collapses the wavefunction to
correspond to the single measured value.  Von Neumann’s analysis attacks the doubly
difficult problem of proving whether statistical quantum mechanics is logically self-
consistent or whether it could be completely and deterministically described using hidden
variables.  He concluded that statistical quantum mechanics would have to be false if any
other explanation were introduced.  Another way of looking at this is via the Schrödinger
Cat analogy.  In 1935 Schrödinger proposed the following thought experiment: imagine a
cat locked inside a box containing a Geiger counter which itself contains a small amount
of radioactive material that, in one hour, has an equal probability of decaying and not
decaying (Schrödinger 1935).  If it decays, the counter tube discharges and, through some
form of relay system, triggers a hammer that smashes a bottle of hydrochloric acid, thus
poisoning the cat.  An observer can have no knowledge of anything inside the box until it
is opened.  Thus, before opening the box the cat could be said to be alive or dead.  In fact
the wavefunction for the entire system, since it’s an exponential, can easily be broken
into superposable pieces; it’s a superposition of two states: one in which the cat is alive,
and one in which it is dead.  The reality is that prior to observation, the cat is described as
                                                 
25 The ψ’s are the eigenstates of the eigenfunctions (the ϕ’s).
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both alive and dead, simultaneously.  On a macroscopic level this appears contradictory,
though it has been repeatedly verified on a quantum level.  Schrödinger’s idea is similar
(and most likely based on) Von Neumann’s idea that homogenous (ensemble) states
cannot be eliminated from consideration simply by resolving them into a mixture of
various substates each of which would have a set of hidden variables, where the
homogenous state is an average of the substates, since this is contrary to the definition of
homogenous states (Jammer 1966).  Essentially he proved that it is impossible to
construct a deterministic description of physical processes with the existing formalism of
quantum mechanics.
Von Neumann’s conclusion has served as the foundation for many additional
arguments both in favour of and opposed to hidden variables.  Experiments in quantum
non-locality originally based on the theoretical work of Bohm and John Bell (1928 –
1990) have sparked renewed interest in hidden variable theories.  Thus, for a slightly
alternative (though still acceptable) interpretation of the measurement problem, I turn
back to Bohm (recalling that Bohm’s 1951 work actually precedes his research in hidden
variables).  Earlier in this chapter I described Bohm’s splitting of the Hamiltonian in any
observation into three pieces – one for the observer (or observing apparatus), one for the
object under observation, and one for the interaction between the object and the observer.
In this formulation Bohm was able to show that the interaction always multiplies each
part of the wave function that corresponds to a measured value, by a random phase factor
eiαa  (Bohm 1951).  All wavepackets are really a superposition of waves that interfere
both constructively and destructively.  Introduction of this phase factor destroys the
interference and is analogous to the wave collapsing.
Observational Uncertainty
Once again the physical problem here is the fact that an observation actually interferes
with the object under consideration.  This is often interpreted as introducing uncertainty
into the measurement.  Related to this is the fact that objects have wave-particle duality,
behaving as one or the other based on the type of observation that is made.  In addition,
prior to measurement an object or a system (such as Schrödinger’s Cat) can exhibit wave-
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like properties that are reduced to particle like properties by the measurement process
(see above).  So the interference of the observer with the object collapses the
wavefunction and produces an uncertainty that is related to the possible states the
wavefunction could have assumed before the measurement.  This relationship is
demonstrated in the general equation for uncertainty (4.7).  By defining a standard of
length as a dimensionless ratio based on uncertainty itself Eddington sought to
circumvent this problem.  Conversely, Bohr proposed the idea of complementarity saying
that two mutually exclusive interpretations were required.  This is a fragmented view of
the universe in the sense that it automatically requires a division of the universe into a
minimum of two things – waves and particles.  This, then, ties in directly to Eddington’s
view that the fragmentation of the universe was manifested in the various units of
measure (meters, seconds, Coulombs, etc.).  Going further still, this can be reconciled
with Heisenberg’s original causal interpretation of the uncertainty principle: the
uncertainty is in our knowledge of the present (are there hidden variables or not?) rather
than the future and this, perhaps, is a result of our fragmentation of the present as
represented in a multitude of units of measure.  Eddington’s approach was rooted in his
Quakerism which is very Eastern-like in its world-view (see chapter two) and he found
division not in religion but in measure: “the division of the external world into a material
world and a spiritual world is superficial … the deep line of cleavage is [actually]
between the metrical and non-metrical aspects of the world” (Eddington 1925a, p. 204).
He thus advocates a purely deductive theory based on pure numbers or dimensionless
ratios of fundamental constants.  He believed that there “was an entire realm of human
experience that could not be measured or quantified – the realm of consciousness – and
this was just as real” (Stanley 2004a, p. 48).
Eddington expresses his theory well in his popular books in addition to his
technical books.  As Whitworth says “he anticipates the opinions of people who trust in
the evidence of the senses, who trust in the reliability of measuring devices, and who trust
in standard measures” (Whitworth 2004, p. 70).  In Eddington’s own words he professes
the view that reality is basically subjective: “because this real world is undetectable we
do not as a rule attempt to describe it.  Not merely in everyday life, but in scientific
measurements also, we describe the world of appearance” (Eddington 1918b, p. 16).  In
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perhaps his clearest statement of the basis for his entire line of reasoning, he says later in
the same treatise that “the theory of relativity offers not an ‘explanation of gravitation,’
but ‘an explanation of the real nature of our measures’” (Eddington 1918b, p. 36 and
Whitworth 2004, p. 74).
In one final note on this subject, Eddington played his own devil’s advocate
regarding objective measurement as demonstrated in the following syllogism he
constructed (Eddington, et. al. 1937, p. 1000 and Batten 2004, p. 166):
a. It is impossible to have a priori knowledge of an objective universe.
b. The mass-ratio [of the proton to the electron] has been found by an a priori
method.
c. Knowledge of the mass-ratio is not knowledge of an objective universe.
He obviously, as suggested by this syllogism, struggled with the dichotomy of a need for
objective knowledge and the impossibility of gaining that knowledge a priori (see
chapter three on probability).
Applying σ  in Physical Coordinates
Now that the foundations of Eddington’s system of physical coordinates have been
established with a length standard given by the standard deviation of the probability
distribution of the given coordinates, a simple application can be developed.  Consider
two particles very close together such as two protons (or neutrons) in a nucleus or two
protons involved in a scattering experiment.  Assume they have physical coordinates ξr
and ξs respectively.  Since the only physically relevant position is a coordinate difference,
their positions can be described by ξrs = ξs − ξr  in reference to some geometrical origin.
So, in this case the coordinate difference is measured relative to a geometrical origin that
is separate from the two objects under consideration.  One can also measure the
coordinate difference directly without reference to any origin (which basically
corresponds to placing the origin at one of the object) and this measure is given by ′ξrs .
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Both coordinate differences are observables that obviously have the same mean value
(since they measure the same relative position, just in different coordinate systems).
However, they have different probability distributions.  Since ξrs  is in reference to a
geometrical origin (which is essentially a third point, versus the two points used in a
direct measure) the probability spread is larger.  Basically, using the formalism developed
earlier in relation to the separation of the geometrical and physical origins which, for the
sake of keeping the notation straight, will be called d for the time being (it was r in the
previous formulation but that is confusing for obvious reasons since I am sticking with
Eddington’s notation for the two particles, r and s), the result is that if d is large, we use
ξrs ; if d is small, we use ′ξrs .
In first considering measurements made in reference to the geometrical origin (but
assuming, based on previous arguments, that this origin must have an uncertainty
(probability distribution) to it since it needs to be assigned a physical meaning), a
measurement of ξr provides a distance from some point in the probability distribution of
particle r to some point in the probability distribution of the origin.  Similarly, if ξs is
measured, it provides a distance from some point in the probability distribution of particle
s to some point in the probability distribution of the origin that is not necessarily the same
point as that measured for r.  As such, ξrs  includes two random points in the probability
distribution of the origin.  Any two random points can be given a Gaussian probability
distribution with the standard deviation of σ 2 .  This is the scatter introduced when
using a geometrical origin that is apart from either particle (corresponding to a large d)
and is an error that should be reduced or eliminated.  By taking the direct measurement
′ξrs  this error can be eliminated.  Mathematically this is written as:
ξrs = ′ξrs ±σ 2 . (5.15)
To be completely rigorous a distance between two particles in three dimensions must
explicitly state whether it is in reference to the physical origin and is thus a direct
measure from one particle to another, or whether it is in reference to the geometrical
origin and would then include the extra error in (5.15).  Specifically, either
r12 = ξ12
2 +η12
2 +ζ12
2( )2      or     ′r12 = ′ξ122 + ′η122 + ′ζ122( )2 .
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The Range Constant of Nuclear Forces
So in considering two particles very close together in a nucleus or a scattering
experiment, nuclear forces are of particular interest and the range of their action is
required for detailed calculations (recalling that in the early 1940s the strong and weak
nuclear forces were not fully developed and the electromagnetic force was still
considered the primary force acting on a nuclear level)26.  To be rigorous in the analysis,
the investigator must specify r12 or r/12 as the range.  Since the ideas presented here are
unique to Eddington’s analysis, quantum theorists obviously were using r12.  As such
something such as the electrical potential would be proportional to what Eddington refers
to as the Coulomb energy, q2 / r12 .  He refers to the non-Coulombian energy as a singular
energy corresponding to ′r12 = 0  which occurs when the particles actually collide,
entangle, or occupy the same position (see chapter six for a full discussion of the
exclusion principle).  The full electrical energy is then given as e2 / r12 + Bδ ( ′r12 )  where δ
is the Dirac delta function and e = q.  In this case, then, the second term only exists when
the two particles coincide (collide, entangle, etc.).  Since ′r12 = 0 , the individual
coordinates will be zero, ′ξ12 , ′η12 , ′ζ12 = 0 , which by (5.15) implies that
ξ12 ,η12 ,ζ12 = ±σ 2 .  Thus, even though ′r12 = 0 , it has a Gaussian probability distribution
with a standard deviation of σ 2 .  Essentially, this is, once again, the transference of the
physical uncertainty to the geometrical coordinate system as described above.  When the
two particles coincide, even though there is technically no separation between them, there
is a probability distribution for their separation due to uncertainty (i.e. they may look like
they’re in the same place, but they may be slightly separated).
The non-Coulombian energy term, Bδ ( ′r12 ) , that I analyze in greater depth in
chapter nine, then must be transformable into some form that will produce a Gaussian
probability distribution.  The development of quantum mechanics outlined in chapter
four, provides the solution.  Born’s formulation of a scattered wave far from the centre of
                                                 
26 Hideki Yukawa’s (1907 – 1981) meson theory was just being considered in Western circles in late 1937
and it was not until the early 1960s that real progress was made in understanding nuclear forces despite the
ability to harness them for energy.  Yukawa and his theory are discussed below.
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scattering (4.6) indicates that a Gaussian probability distribution can be obtained from the
exponential for the time-dependent wave equation (4.5).  It is convenient to then assign to
Bδ ( ′r12 )  the form Ae
−r12
2 /k2  where 
 
k = 2 i σ 2( ) = 2σ .  By (5.13) this gives
k = 2σ = R0 / N  and is referred to as the ‘range constant’ of nuclear forces and is
interpreted by Eddington simply as being the effect of the uncertainty of the reference
frame that turns what normally would be a singularity, ′r12 = 0 , into a Gaussian
distribution of r12 .  But k is an actual experimentally available value independent of
Eddington’s interpretation (or derivation) of it.
Historically, the first value for k, or what can be considered equivalent to k, was
given in 1930 by George Gamow (1904-1968) in what is perhaps the earliest suggestion
of the liquid drop model of the nucleus (Gamow 1930).27  In a bit of notational confusion,
he refers to Eddington’s k as R0, though it is clearly the same quantity as k and is
completely unrelated to Eddington’s R0.  In order to maintain consistency and minimize
confusion, I will continue to refer to it as k.
Gamow gave the following definition for k:
k = Am
h2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1/(n−3)
(5.16)
where A is a constant.  Gamow, however, explicitly states that k is not calculable since
the nature of nuclear forces was not well-known (essentially A is unknown).  He thus
assumes a value gained from several previous investigations (Gamow 1930).28  The value
he uses is k = 2 ×10−13cm .  Eddington uses the similar value k = 1.9 ×10−13cm  with the
same justification.  This begs the question of whether Gamow and Eddington were
actually talking about the same thing.  Gamow’s definition (5.16) is derived from what he
refers to as the Debye formula for surface tension which is then given as being equivalent
to the inside pressure (of the ‘liquid drop’ nucleus).  The resulting equation for the radius
of the nucleus includes the constant given by (5.16) as a multiplier for the number of α-
particles in the nucleus.  Thus k needs to have units of length since N is simply a number.
                                                 
27 For a full discussion of this model, see Roger H. Stuewer, “The Origin of the Liquid-Drop Model and the
Interpretation of Nuclear Fission, Perspectives on Science 2 (1994), 76-129, especially 78-87.
28 The investigations he references include work by Bieler in 1924, Hardmeier in 1927, and Gamow himself
in 1928.  See Gamow 1930, p. 635 for details.
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In addition, since it defines the size of the nucleus, the constant governs the range of
whatever forces hold the nucleus together.  Eddington’s definition, k = 2σ = R0 / N ,
also has units of length and governs the range of the forces holding the nucleus together
or governing a strong collision interaction.  It stands to reason that Gamow and
Eddington were both referring to the same thing (i.e. the range of nuclear forces).
Eddington, however, as is his penchant, takes this a few steps further and again
attempts to make a link between microscopic and macroscopic phenomena by showing
that the microscopic value, k, can be defined in terms of the cosmological (macroscopic)
values R0 and N.  This is a result of his application of σ to spherical space in (5.12).
Since σ is a general quantity that is independent of scale, it can be equally well applied to
the very large or the very small.  As such it is really σ that serves as the link between the
microscopic and macroscopic through the following relation:
σ = k
2
= R0 / 2 N . (5.17)
Thus, Eddington has shown that the standard deviation, if employed as a standardized
quantity (unit of length), is a powerful tool for linking quantum mechanics and relativity.
Empirical Evidence
Finally it was left to Eddington to show that when actual values were introduced into
(5.17) it yielded consistent results.  For example, anyone could come up with a strange
enough theory such that they found the masses of the electron and proton to be equal, me
= mp but every student of basic science knows from empirical evidence that this is not
true.  Since the value for k has already been stated as being given by experiment,
Eddington gives the equation for the mass M of an Einstein universe:
κM / c2 = 1
2
πR0
where κ is the constant of gravitation (we know this as G).  Since the universe is almost
entirely composed of hydrogen, say M = 1
2
Nmh , where mh is the mass of a hydrogen
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atom and N is the total number of all protons and electrons in the universe (hence the
factor of 1/2).  Combining this with Einstein’s equation gives:
R0 / N =κmh /πc
2 = 3.95 ×10−53cm . (5.18)
Since the value for k = 1.9 ×10−13cm = R0 / N , this result can be combined with (5.18)
in a system of two linear equations with two unknowns to give R0 = 9.14 ×10
26cm
(which is 296 MPc) and N = 2.31×1079 .  In contrast, currently accepted values give
R0 = 1.3×10
28cm  and (though this is a very rough estimate)  N  1079 .  Obviously
Eddington’s value for the radius of the universe is incorrect, but his value for the number
of electrons and protons in the universe is tantalizingly close.  In one final comment that
shows he was at least aware of Yukawa’s work (see footnote 28) and the existing debate
over its validity (see Kragh 1999, pp. 201-202), he says that since observational data
implies that ′r12 = 0 , the non-Coulombian energy is definitely associated with a
singularity (again, see chapter nine).
Thus we need not hesitate to reject the ‘meson-field’
hypothesis altogether.  It is in any case quite unnecessary in
genuinely relativistic quantum theory.  It is not an
alternative way of taking into account the uncertainty of the
origin, because it gives an energy distribution
Ae−λr12 instead of Ae−r12
2 /k2  (Eddington 1946, p. 10).
In a footnote Eddington noted that it was his hope that the shape of the non-Coulombian
potential well would be found experimentally thus validating either his or Yukawa’s
theory.  Yukawa’s theory was one of the first to suggest that forces are mediated by
carrier (exchange) particles (see Kragh 1999, p. 201).  So while Eddington interpreted k
as arising from the spreading of the combined wave packet of the interacting nucleons
(protons and neutrons), i.e. it roughly defined the physical limits of the probability
distribution, Yukawa, interpreted k as the furthest distance a carrier particle could travel.
Discovery of such a particle would serve as fairly irrefutable proof of Yukawa’s theory.
Discovery of the pion (π-meson), as it is now known, came in 1937, though Yukawa’s
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theory was proposed several years earlier (Kragh 1999).  As it turns out there are several
mesons and other heavy particles that play similar roles.  Understanding how this fully
relates to Eddington’s theory requires an explanation of the basic mechanism governing
Yukawa’s particles.
The Range of Fundamental Interactions
The range limit imposed on carrier particles is due to their need to transfer their
information and return ‘home’ before they are ‘missed,’ so to speak, i.e. the carrier
particles are, in fact, a fundamental part of the interacting particles and in order not to
fundamentally change the character or nature of the interacting particles, the carrier
particles have to have a round-trip time small enough that the parent particle isn’t altered
in any way.  Essentially they have to have an independent lifetime that is short enough
that no one really notices they exist.  What would a logical estimate be for such a
lifetime?  The uncertainty principle in combination with Einstein’s famous equation for
the rest energy of a particle gives us the answer.
Recall that the time-energy version of the uncertainty principle is given as:
 
ΔEiΔt ≥ 
2
. (5.19)
Einstein’s equation for rest energy is, of course, E = mc2 .  Quantum mechanically a
particle can only raise its energy in discrete amounts and so ΔE  is limited to mc2 .  Thus:
 
ΔEiΔt ≈ mc2Δt > 
2
. (5.20)
Ultimately we’re interested in the range rather than the particle lifetime since that is what
Eddington calculated.  It makes sense then to isolate cΔt  which has units of length,
where the roundtrip time (lifetime) for the carrier particle is Δt , and call it the range of
the interaction.  Note that these particles must sneak in and out based on the uncertainty
principle (i.e. there is some non-zero probability that they actually didn’t sneak out which
keeps the parent particle happy or their lifetimes are so short they may or may not have
existed) and thus they are referred to as virtual particles since their entire existence falls
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under the restrictions imposed by uncertainty.  Rearranging (5.20) and making use of
Eddington’s notation of k for the range, we can write:
 
k ≈ cΔt ≈ 
2mc
. (5.21)
It is thus a simple matter to calculate the range of the four fundamental interactions.
Since the photon is considered massless (see any quantum field theory text for the caveat
to this) k is obviously infinite for the electromagnetic force, which makes sense since the
interaction equation (Coulomb’s law) follows an inverse-square law.  The graviton has
never been observed, but since Newton’s Law of Gravitation is also an inverse-square
law, k must be infinite here as well implying that the graviton is also massless.  Now,
since the masses of the W and Z bosons are known from empirical evidence, the range
can be directly calculated for the weak interaction and it turns out to be on the order of
10-15 cm.  That leaves us to calculate the strong interaction, which is the interaction of
primary interest in the present discussion (recalling, however, that the true nature of the
strong interaction was unknown at that time – it was popularly thought that the
electromagnetic interaction governed nuclear processes and it was even thought that
electrons existed inside the nucleus – see Kragh 1999).
Strong interactions at the most fundamental level occur between quarks, with the
carrier particle being the gluon (here this interaction is often called the ‘colour’ force).
However, since quarks and gluons are bound tightly inside nucleons (protons and
neutrons) it turns out that the minimum emission from a nucleon is a quark-anti-quark
pair.  The positively charged pion, which is the meson Yukawa originally predicted, is
composed of a quark-antiquark pair.  It is not a stretch, then, to use the pion as the carrier
particle for the strong force between nucleons.  Note that this is only a minimum
requirement.  Thus more massive particles actually exist that carry information about the
strong interaction between nucleons.  Since the pion is the smallest possible emission
from a nucleon, equation (5.21) implies it would have the longest range of any strong
carrier particle between nucleons.  Yukawa estimated a theoretical value of 2 ×10−13cm
which is in the range of one fermi.  The actual value for the pion is 0.73×10−13cm  so
Yukawa’s prediction was fairly accurate and netted him the Nobel Prize in 1949.
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Clearly Yukawa’s theory was correct (though incomplete), but the root of his
reasoning was the same as Eddington’s – the uncertainty principle.  The difference
simply was the way (and the form) in which it was applied.  While Eddington used the
position-momentum interpretation of the uncertainty principle, Yukawa’s theory
employed the time-energy interpretation.  In light of this realization it is conceivable that
Eddington’s application is also correct, though incomplete in its lack of a heavy carrier
particle.  But in Eddington’s formalism, a heavy carrier particle would go unnoticed
anyway since it would be completely hidden in the overlapping probability distributions
of the interacting particles.  As such, at least in extremely short range situations where
′r12 = 0 , the two descriptions are complementary (though both are incomplete).  The
trouble comes when ′r12  is closer to its maximum range of 10-13 cm.  In this case a third
probability distribution would need to be introduced in Eddington’s theory to represent
the carrier particle and the calculations become a bit laborious.  But they might be worth
pursuing, even for purely historical reasons, since the basic reasoning makes sense.
This comparison to Yukawa’s work serves to demonstrate every aspect of
Eddington’s basic thoughts on uncertainty and its implications for measurement theory.
It is a clear application of one of the very first statements he made in Fundamental
Theory on the relativity of measure (see quote p. 82).  It is also a demonstration of his
commitment to the application of basic probabilistic methods to both quantum mechanics
and relativity, a commitment derived from the philosophical stance that a good theory of
measurement must strive to be as objective as possible by specifying new units of
measure and holding fast to the notion that an observer fundamentally alters the result of
an observation simply by making it.  With these basic ideas in mind it will now serve best
to investigate some of the ancillary aspects of applying uncertainty in measurement and
how these extensions lead to a fundamentally new interpretation of the exclusion
principle.  Beyond that I will investigate how Eddington was able to make some
remarkably accurate predictions (and other not-so accurate ones) and how his theory
compares to modern quantum field theory.  In any case these first few pieces of the
puzzle are now in place.
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VI
Filling in the Gaps
In the last chapter the exact point of intersection between the microscopic and
macroscopic came when Eddington found the equation for a line element in terms of the
standard deviation, (5.12).  His assumption was that if the line element for the
microscopic σ-metric was the same as the line element for the macroscopic universe,
assuming both are globally flat, then one can substitute R0 for σε /σ  in the metric.  But
obviously there is local curvature to the universe and that must be accounted for
particularly since observational analyses (based on our relative view of the universe) can,
and often are, carried out in spherical space.  On a microscopic level, the nucleus was
considered at the time to be roughly spherical as well, so an application of the coordinate
system transformation (physical to geometrical) needs to be applied to a spherical space.
Projecting Uncertainty into Spherical Space
Eddington’s method of accomplishing this is to project the points of a spherical space
orthogonally onto a flat space tangent at the origin.  It is vital to remember here that
Eddington was working in four-dimensional space and not our usual three-dimensions
that can be visualized easily.  Eddington’s reason for doing this was a result of the fact
that he found curvature and the extraordinary fluctuation to be the same.  So, in essence,
to him curvature was simply a result of natural background fluctuations and, were there
no fluctuations, the universe would be flat (it’s the same thing as saying that if there was
no matter in the universe it would be entirely flat).
Geometrically, then, a theoretical (mathematical) sphere (call it a hypersphere) is
used to represent some phenomena that is more easily analyzed in a spherical situation.
In the usual flat space there is a geometrical origin, P.  Consider, then, a particle at a
point T that has the coordinates xr, yr, and zr.  Representing the extraordinary fluctuation
by curvature does not alter these three coordinates, but it does add the coordinate ur that
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represents the displacement of the particle from T to S, which is on the hypersphere.  The
origin, P, then must also be displaced to the geometrical origin of the sphere, O.
Obviously this displacement is equal to the radius of the sphere, R0 since the flat space is
tangential to the hypersphere.  The hypersphere then has the equation:
x2 + y2 + z2 = R0
2 .
However, the particle that has been displaced from T to S is actually represented by a
probability distribution.  So it’s mean values in all coordinate directions are
xr
2 = yr
2 = zr
2 = ur
2 =
1
4
R0
2 .
The standard deviation, then, of any one coordinate of the particle from its mean value on
the hypersphere is 1
2
R0 .
Let’s now assume there are N particles on the hypersphere.  Denote the centroid
of these particles as ′O .  The standard deviation of the centroid then is
 
1
2
R0 i
1
N
= R0 / 2 N = σ .  ′O  is simply a projection of the physical origin ′P  just as O
is a projection of the geometrical origin P.  From the discussion in chapter five regarding
the range of nuclear forces, if both the geometrical and physical origins are represented
by particles, they cannot be more than 10-13cm apart.  Thus ′P  is close enough to P that it
can be approximated as being tangent to the hypersphere just as P is (so it is a point both
on the sphere and on the flat space tangential to the sphere).  Since ′P  is on the tangent
flat space, there is no need to represent it with a u coordinate (this coordinate
displacement is zero, essentially, since the point lies in both spaces).  As such the
definition of the physical origin as the centroid of N particles can be extended to spherical
space by ignoring the u coordinate.  The coordinate differences between O and ′O  can
then be represented by x0, y0, and z0 that can also be used to describe the coordinate
difference (and thus position) of the physical origin ′P .  Any u0 that might exist is said to
be the scale fluctuation.  As such, a direct ratio of the line between the physical origins
and the line between the geometrical origins is given by:
′O ′P
OP
=
(R0 − u0 )
R0
. (6.1)
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The scale fluctuation, u0, is simply the standard deviation, σ.  As such, (6.1) can be
rewritten as
′O ′P
OP
=
R0 − σ
R0
=
σ /σε − σ
σ /σε
= 1− σε . (6.2)
This essentially serves as a proof of the substitution he makes in (5.12) and implies his
reasoning at least is mathematically correct.  Physically some extended reasoning is
required.
Physical Justification for Linking Microscopic and Macroscopic
In The Nature of the Physical World Eddington points out that it has usually been taken
for granted that the usual theory of knowledge applied to macroscopic or large-scale
surveys of the universe can equally be applied to microscopic situations and therein lies
the problem.  But there still must be a link between the two if the description of the
universe is to be self-consistent.  Again he appeals to general relativity where local
irregularities that produce local curvature are simply superposed on the hypersphere that
represents the universe.  But can this appeal have any true physical meaning when using
it to connect macroscopic to microscopic phenomena?  Eddington’s solution is to find a
situation where general relativity and quantum mechanics actually agree (which is a rare
find indeed).  Such a situation is provided by a steady distribution or an Einstein universe
(Eddington 1946).  Eddington’s interpretation of quantisation is that it is a “complication
which arises from uniformity and symmetry” (Eddington 1946, p.12).  Slight non-
uniformities in quantum theory were often treated in Eddington’s day (and still today in
many situations) as perturbations.  There is a subtle interplay here in the mathematics
since quantum theory consists of dynamical integrals that produce the quantisation (most
often describing angular momenta).  When the non-uniformities are introduced they do
not alter the integrals, though they do reduce the time that they persist.  So a continual
increase in non-uniformities in quantum theory reduces the time of persistence of the
dynamic integrals thus reducing the quantisation.  Since particles are non-uniformities in
an empty universe (or new particles are non-uniformities in a steady distribution) the
more particles that are present in an aggregate the less quantisation has any relevant
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effect.  This is Eddington’s explanation for the lack of quantum behaviour at macroscopic
sizes – objects such as buildings, people, planets, etc. are huge aggregates of particles and
thus the dynamical integrals of the individual particles act over such short periods that
quantisation is small enough to go unnoticed.
Of course the stability of matter was not proven until 1967 by Freeman Dyson (b.
1923) of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and Andrew Lenard (b. unknown)
of Indiana University (as legend has it, driven by the offer of a bottle of wine to anyone
who could prove matter’s inherent stability).  Dyson and Lenard’s proof was later
simplified by Elliott Lieb (b. unknown) of Princeton University and Walter Thirring (b.
unknown) of the University of Vienna.  The basis of the proofs lay in the exclusion
principle that was first applied to the problem by Ehrenfest in 1931.  Fully developed
quantum statistics is more subtle – and beautifully simple in its almost Bohmian physical
features (the simplicity of the mathematics, I suppose, is relative to one’s mathematical
acumen).  It is a subject upon which much of the rest of this monograph is built, though
from a distinctly Eddingtonian view.  Ultimately it holds that all elementary particles and
thus all atoms are absolutely identical to and therefore indistinguishable from one
another.  Quantum field theory explains this quite elegantly as the fact that particles are
simply fluctuations in universal fields.  For instance, every electron in the universe is
simply a fluctuation in the same electron field, ψ , often called a psi-field (Zee 2003).
(There is a subtle interplay in actual quantum field theory between the statistics of the
field and the spin that gives rise to the various fundamental interactions.)  What is
striking is that Eddington’s development, as I will show, presages many of these points,
as well as others, in quantum field theory.
For example, consider Eddington’s treatment of fundamental interactions.  Since
Eddington did not hold to the Yukawa interpretation of exchange or carrier particles
acting as mediators for the transmission of forces, he was forced to find another way to
explain how force information could be transmitted.  He imagined an atom in a
gravitational field where the non-uniformity was the gravitational field itself.  In standard
quantum mechanics the non-uniformity would treated as a perturbation that would not
change the eigenstates of the atom but, rather, would induce transitions between them.
The eigenstates are contained in a wave equation which, when represented in tensor form
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(see chapter five), contain gµν .  The eigenstates, however, are the same regardless of the
presence of the non-uniformity.  That means that the wave equation and thus the
coefficients gµν  are also unaffected by the perturbation.  The inherent problem here is
that general relativity modifies gµν  in order to represent the gravitational field.
Eddington needed a different interpretation, then, in order to properly represent the
gravitational field in the wave equation.  As such he viewed any attempt at extending
Dirac’s wave equation to general relativity as being misguided since the principle of
equivalence does not apply here.  Building on his interpretation of quantisation at
macroscopic levels, he assumes that the gµν  used in extensive structures is considerably
different from the gµν  used in the wave equation.  The wide deviation in gµν  then implies
frequent transitions between the eigenstates which makes the wave analysis useless just
like reducing the time of persistence of the dynamic integrals can reduce the effect of
quantisation.  Thus any problem involving gµν  likely involves structures extensive
enough to ignore wave-like or quantized effects (Eddington 1946).  But, since Eddington
introduced curvature via the extraordinary fluctuation rather than the presence of matter,
he suggests a third form of relativity be conceived known as ‘intermediate’ relativity.
Whereas special relativity deals with flat space-time and general relativity deals with
non-uniform curvature, intermediate relativity would deal with uniform curvature.
The Uranoid
In a letter to Schrödinger in November of 1937 Eddington says
I have sometimes thought of using the term uranoid instead
of “universe” – corresponding to the geoid in … geodesy.
The actual universe is irrelevant, because the experimental
measurement is understood to be carried out in conditions
represented by the uranoid; and the experiments will apply
any corrections necessitated by the actual irregularities or
disturbing conditions present (Eddington 1937).
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Once again Eddington returns to the problem of observer and environment that is so
much a part of quantum theory.  As I will show this has a remarkable effect on the so-
called ‘intermediate’ relativity he speaks of.
He takes a decidedly non-Bohmian view in dividing the universe into two parts
called the ‘object-system’ and the ‘environment.’  The terms object-system, object-
particle, object-field, etc. will refer to the object under immediate study while the
environment is everything else (including things that might not just surround the object-
system, but could also permeate it).  Eddington suggests that it could be referred to as the
‘background’ though that term does not have the force of connotation that Eddington’s
uranoid does.  Any object-system under consideration cannot be considered apart from its
environment.  Eddington’s reasoning here is clearly based on relativity where “we do not
recognise the concept of an atom as a thing complete in itself” (Eddington 1946, p. 13).
Simple object-systems include elementary particles, simple atoms, etc. while simple
environments include specific idealizations such as uniform, electrically neutral, etc.
Eddington gives the name ‘uranoid’ to these simple environments.  So far, the uranoid I
have discussed in the greatest detail is a uniform probability distribution of particles or an
Einstein universe occupying a hyperspherical space.  A further clarification can be made
if it is referred to as a ‘zero-temperature’ uranoid such that the particles are all nearly at
exact rest.  By limiting the environment to an effective zero-temperature radiation is
eliminated from the consideration and only matter is present (this would obviously be
unsuitable as a uranoid for considering the early universe).  This uranoid is also
electrically neutral so that any introduction of an electromagnetic field must accompany
the object-system itself.  This standard uranoid is the entire universe as a whole and is
included in every problem.  Eddington rationalizes this since dividing the universe into
pieces would require calculating boundary conditions on the edges of the pieces.
Previously the σ-metric served as the connection between macroscopic and
microscopic where a large-scale system determined the uncertainty in the physical
reference frame that then determined the scale of the various small-scale structures in that
frame (including microscopic structures).  In the present discussion the connection
appears to be one of mechanics where the physical interactions of the particles in the
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assemblage need to be considered.  The former is a metrical effect since it involves
measurement while the latter is a mechanical effect.  But Einstein already united metrical
and mechanical aspects of the universe by uniting geometry and mechanics in relativity
theory.  Here Eddington takes a decidedly geometric interpretation of the structure of the
universe that implies it is, indeed, whole and continuous.  Both the metrical and
mechanical aspects are contained in the field of gµν  and it can thus either influence the
measured characteristics of the object-system through a perturbation or disturbance, or
determine the standard of measurement used for reference in a measurement.
In a final nod to Newton, the field of gµν  is usually just called the gravitational
field but sometimes is known (not so much anymore, but certainly moreso sixty years
ago) as the inertial-gravitational field.  In this context the standard uranoid provides the
inertial part of the field whereas the gravitational part arises from some disturbance or
perturbation that is described as a deviation from the standard uranoid.  The gravitational
part obviously does not affect individual particles that much, particularly when they are
simply interacting with each other.  However, inertial considerations can be important in
this instance.  Einstein, of course, had assumed that inertial and gravitational affects were
identical (principle of equivalence) and, though tests of this fact continue to this day, no
experiment has proven otherwise.  But, in attempting to adjust one’s thinking to coincide
with Eddington, it seems that he is making, here, a distinction between special and
general relativity where special relativity plays the inertial role in these considerations
and general relativity plays the gravitational role.  As such, he is completely correct in
assuming that inertial (special relativistic) considerations are important on the
microscopic level but, as I will discuss in the coming chapters, he appears to abandon the
equivalence principle as a result of this interpretation.
As for Eddington’s precise views about the existence of an aether chapters eight
and nine discuss this in greater depth, but suffice it to say he certainly assumed that space
had some definite structure apart from the pure vacuum.  Perhaps the earliest indication
of this appears in a 1932 letter to Sir Joseph Larmor (1857 – 1942) where he asked
Larmor to examine some calculations he had made on an enclosed sheet of paper
describing the radiation emitted by a rotating ring of n electrons.  He asked Larmor what
would happen if one electron were removed from the ring.  The ring would then become
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discontinuous as would the emitted radiation since the “propagation of a discontinuity is
a discontinuous process” (Eddington 1932).  He introduced a vector he called the “aether
displacement” to describe the discontinuity that linked the electron to the aether so that
any measurement on the electron also required consideration of the aether.  One can
clearly see the basis of the uranoid concept in this.  He also extended this idea to
instantaneous states such as the present instant, “now”: the “world-wide instant ‘now’ is
created by ourselves and has no existence apart from our geocentric outlook.…”
(Eddington 1922, p. 17).  In a tie once again to uncertainty, a four-dimensional world
view removes such instantaneous states (see the discussion of spherical space above).
Thus, uncertainty is inherent in space-time because the reference frame cannot be
separated from the object under observation as I’ve previously shown.  He did make the
point that the aether was not a field.  In an early draft of Fundamental Theory he asserted
that to use the term “field” in place of “aether” was “ill-advised” (Slater 1957, p. 72).
The strictly mechanical properties described both by second-rank tensors and wave
mechanics allowed matter to look more like a field but was simply a way of describing its
behaviour.  As for the aether itself, a further discussion begins in chapter nine.
Beating Around the Bush
As the puzzle continues to be filled in, the idea of the uranoid releases again the nasty
problem of the interconnectedness of observer, environment, and object all manifested in
the painful act of measurement.  Thus we return once again to the question of objectivity.
Eddington is forced now to finally consider what to do about the plethora of units floating
around in the fragmented universe.  Ideally there should be one measurable unit that
corresponds to the standard deviation, σ (see chapter five) but which unit?  Is it not
somewhat of an arbitrary choice particularly since the standard deviation as used by
Eddington is unitless?  If it truly is arbitrary then it loses its objectivity.  Eddington
addresses this issue by adopting a system of natural units.
Eddington adopts the standard practice of setting c = 1.  Now rather than adopting
the standard   = 1  and stopping (thereby relating all the needed units), or perhaps
adopting another semi-standard, G = 1, he puts the two together in an unusual way by
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defining  8πG
2 = 1 .  Eddington’s rationale for doing this can be demonstrated  by
writing the fundamental equations for the energy tensor and momentum vector:
−8πGTµν = Gµν − 12 gµνG      and      pµ = −i∂ ∂xµ .
8πGTµν  is a spherical curvature that can be represented by the inverse square of a length
(see (4.5) for the origin of 8π).  As such it has the same dimensions as 
 
pµ / ( )2 .  With
Eddington’s system of natural units Tµν  has the same units as pµ
2  or pµ pν .  Therefore,
“An energy tensor is, both dimensionally and tensorially, the product of two momentum
vectors” (Eddington 1946, p. 15).  This, of course, is a key point in the derivation of four-
momentum which is the relativistic union of energy and Newtonian momentum.  In
addition, Eddington’s system is designed to define a particle density (number of particles
in a unit volume or the corresponding probability of a particle in such a volume) as a
momentum vector, once again linking relativity and quantum mechanics.
As with the usual system of natural units it leaves a single measurement (with a
single unit) to be taken, be it a length, mass, density, etc.  Each physical quantity has,
then, what Eddington refers to as a “dimension-index” that shows how the physical
quantity varies with the unit of the single measurement (Eddington 1946).  So, for
example, if the single unit, called the extraneous standard, is a length, the dimension-
index shows how various physical quantities vary with length.
Once again in statements that presage Bohm’s idea of fragmentation, Eddington
holds that the internal structure of a system can still be entirely described by ratios of
whole numbers, but in order to take a measurement at least one standard is necessary.
This is perhaps a nod to the impossibility of a truly objective universe.29  He recognizes
that the an ideal system would be the whole universe that would make an outside
standard unnecessary.  But, as Eddington says, “the analytical method of physics divides
the universe into simple systems of various types which are studied one by one”
(Eddington 1946, p. 15).
                                                 
29 Bohm’s holographic universe is an attempt at a truly objective viewpoint and has gained support in
recent decades.  It remains to be seen which view is correct or even if we can make a choice – lots of
philosophical pitfalls here.
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So, working with a standard of length (k, R0, etc. measured in cm) as was
developed in chapter five, any standard will have an associated uncertainty since the
extraordinary fluctuation can be represented as a fluctuation in the scale with an
accompanying standard deviation, σε.  Since every observable is referred to in this
reference frame, they must be measured with an extraneous standard that has a standard
deviation, σε.  For instance, rather than assigning an extraneous standard the value of 1
cm, we would assign it 1±σεcm .  Using the system of natural units as defined (and
assuming we’re still working with our example where the extraneous standard is a
length), since any physical quantity would have dimensions (length)y it would be
assigned a ‘scale uncertainty’ (transformation to length units) of 1± yσε .  This indicates
that some form of scale-free physics would be most useful.
The standard uranoid consists of two linear characteristics σ and R0 that are
assumed, for the purposes here, to be independent.  Scale-free physics would consist of a
system that is completely unconcerned with these two characteristics.  In such a system
structures can be adjusted to any scale meaning there really is no difference between
macroscopic and microscopic unless they are directly compared.  Ultimately, many
practical applications can be simplified to scale-free physics by letting σ approach zero or
R0 approach infinity.  Ultimately this presents three distinct branches (fragments) in
physics: scale-free involving neither σ nor R0, cosmological (“cosmical”) physics
involving only R0, and quantum (“quantal”) physics involving only σ.  Obviously, there
are a few areas that involve both as I have already outlined, but much (though clearly not
all) of Eddington’s emphasis in Fundamental Theory is on developing a relativistic
version of quantum mechanics through scale-free methods.  As such he refers to quantum
(“quantal”) physics as being scale-fixed in order to better compare it to the scale-free
theory.  Really quantal physics only includes those parts of quantum physics that involve
quantisation and discrete eigenstates.  Eddington’s formal statement on scale-free physics
is as follows:
If we specify the characteristics of a system in terms of an
extraneous standard, and consider the series of systems
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formed by varying the standard but keeping the
specification the same, then (for a scale-free system), if one
system of the series in physically possible, all are possible
(Eddington 1946, p. 17).
Wavefunctions and Observables in Eddington’s Theory
In standard quantum mechanics corresponding here to scale-fixed theory, wavefunctions
are discrete and self-normalising in the sense that they are built on what Moore calls the
state vector rule: “The state of a quanton [electron, photon, etc.] at a given time is
described by using a normalized state vector ψ  having a certain number of complex
components” (Moore 2003b, p. 101).  Every possible numerical value an observable
might have will be associated with a normalized state vector that is called that value’s
eigenvector.  A function ψ (q)  can be built out of a generalized state vector ψ  and an
observable, q, by setting ψ (qi ) ≡ψ i = qi ψ .  This function is interpreted by performing
a measurement to determine the value of q.  If such a measurement is carried out the
probability that the measurement of the quanton in state ψ  will give the value qi is:
Pr(qi ) = qi ψ
2
= ψ (qi )
2
. (6.3)
One major problem with (6.3) is that as dq→ 0  (where dq is the step size) the
probability that a measurement q will be made also decreases to zero.  One way around
this problem is to define a rescaled function as:
ψ (q) ≡ ψ (q)
dq
. (6.4)
If this rescaled function describes a quanton’s state it is referred to as the wavefunction.
If it describes an eigenvector it is called an eigenfunction.  The probability that a
measurement of the quanton will yield a value qn is then:
Pr(qn ) = ψ (qn )
2 = ψ (qn ) dq
2
= ψ (qn )
2 dq . (6.5)
The probability of being within a range of values is given by:
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Pr(qn−1 ≤ q ≤ qn+1) = ψ (q)
2 dq
qn−1
qn+1
∫ . (6.6)
Normalization means that as dq→ 0
1 = ψ ψ = ψ (q) 2 dq
−∞
+∞
∫ (6.7)
which simply means that the probability of finding a value somewhere between -∞ and
+∞ is 1 (i.e. a measurement is guaranteed to yield a value – maybe not the expected
value, but some value of some sort).  Now any measurement to determine q will collapse
its wavefunction to an eigenfunction before a result is given (this is wavefunction
collapse as described in the section on measurement).  This is a result of the interference
of the observer (or apparatus) in the measurement.  So, to some extent, the value is
predetermined (this point is debatable among physicists) by the nature of the interference.
In addition, the eigenfunctions of real observables involve h making them discrete.
Another way of describing the above discrete wavefunction is as a particle density
that “rapidly decreases outwards so that the integral over space converges” (Eddington
1946, p. 17).  Being normalized it is then said to correspond to “unit occupation.”  Each
eigenfunction is assigned an occupation factor j that has an associated density.  The
occupation factor gives either the number of particles in the given state or the probability
that there is a particle in that state.  Sometimes the occupation factor is written as an
operator, J, that reduces to an eigenvalue when there is definitely an integral number of
particles in the given state.
Eddington draws a distinction between this relatively standard description of
wavefunctions and what he refers to as pseudo-discrete wavefunctions.  He associates the
latter with the infinite plane waves commonly associated with elementary wave
mechanics.  This is not the same thing as a psi-field in quantum field theory since
Eddington describes these infinite waves as not truly infinite – they are large when
compared with σ but small when compared with R0 allowing both quantities to be ignored
making the wavefunctions scale-free.  A particle said to occupy a pseudo-discrete state
represented by a pseudo-discrete wavefunction is said to be an “unidentified member of a
large assemblage” (Eddington 1946, p. 17).
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Part of the problem with wavefunctions is that they contain a phase factor that
contributes to the interference properties of two interacting waves.  This means that rather
than replace a series of distribution functions for discrete values of some parameter with a
single continuous distribution function, we replace it with a single wave function with the
domain of the parameter being divided into small ranges each with an associated wave
function.  The latter are the pseudo-discrete wavefunctions just described.  One way to
interpret this is by saying that if the entire occupation is concentrated in one of these
small ranges the system is nearly exact (e.g. a system, perhaps, nearly at rest).
The observables of wavefunctions are the eigenvalues.  The eigenvalues
correspond to various characteristics that can either be scale-fixed or scale-free.  For
instance, the proper mass of an elementary particle is obviously a fixed characteristic
(theoretically there shouldn’t be any variation in these characteristics but that is a
debatable topic).  Proper density, however, can be varied by varying the volume over
which the density’s distribution function extends (see the previous discussion on the
physical interpretation of the standard deviation for an example of this).  In general terms
the energy tensor (and any associated particles) is scale-free and the momentum vector
(and any associated particles) is scale-fixed.  Once again Eddington draws a link between
the macroscopic and the microscopic by representing the energy tensor as a wavefunction
made up of pseudo-discrete wavefunctions as described above where the pseudo-discrete
wavefunctions represent the particles of the larger assemblage (that is represented by the
energy tensor).  Each pseudo-discrete wavefunction can be thought to represent a small
portion of the overall energy tensor labelled ΔTµν .  This is a bit analogous to the
superposition of wavefunctions in the usual sense.
In summary each particle has a wavefunction that is really a probability
distribution.  All of these wavefunctions are part of a single collective wavefunction.  The
particle wave functions are pseudo-discrete.  We can only know the probability of each
particle being in various states which means the occupation factors of the pseudo-discrete
states are interpreted as probabilities of an individual particle or, alternatively,
frequencies in the assemblage.  So, for instance, even though masses are not scale-free
quantities, a ratio of masses is equivalent to a ratio of densities where density, as
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described above, is not a fixed characteristic (and thus is scale-free).  This will become
useful in an analysis of the ratio of the masses of the proton to the electron.
It may help to pause here to digest this rather complicated discussion.  Eddington
himself offers some words that may help smooth out the rough edges a bit.  In an early
fragment described in Slater (1957), Eddington notes that in wave mechanics an
observable is described by a product of two functions, while in relativity an observable is
a relationship between two or more bodies (an observation point and observed object, or
a reference point for a measurement between two observed objects).  The problem is that
in either case the observable properties really belong to the relationship.  There must be
some way to transfer the observable properties to the individual bodies themselves.  In
quantum mechanics, the self-properties of two observables together with their conjugates,
 ϕ
*ϕ  and  ψ
*ψ , are observationally equivalent to  ϕ
*ψ .  Thus, if the observation is made
and  ϕ
*ψ  is measured, ψ is given directly while ϕ is found by noting that its complex
conjugate is ϕ∗ .  If a wave function represents the definite momentum of a particle, its
position is entirely uncertain.  In relativity these self-properties are represented by the
stress-energy tensor Tµν .  The goal is to derive the eigenvalues for the observable that
also gives a value for ΔTµν .  In essence one can build the universe up from the smallest
parts by building Tµν.  In analyzing the problem from the quantum mechanical point-of-
view, one sees that in essence the wavefunctions of the interacting particles are
essentially correlated through coordinates.  For example a distance between the two can
be given by coordinate (vector) differences.  A more physical example is given by
Eddington: consider a box containing a proton and an electron.  Each has a distribution
function such that, if they are unobserved, they are equally likely to be anywhere in the
box.  At some point they will combine to form a hydrogen atom, thus emitting a photon.
They are still equally likely to be anywhere in the box since neither has been directly
observed.  But their probability distributions and thus their coordinates are now
correlated in a single function.  As such an atomic wavefunction (e.g. for the hydrogen
atom) is a correlation wavefunction in coordinates as opposed to a distribution wave
function that describes a single particle’s probability distribution.  This description
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parallels that first employed by Schrödinger in his first paper on wave mechanics
(Schrödinger 1926).
In one final comment on scale-free versus scale-fixed theory, quantisation appears
only in the scale-fixed theory and is considered by Eddington to be a wholly electrical
phenomenon since  is simply the “electrical unit” e2/c multiplied by a factor of 137 (see
chapter nine for a full discussion).  Eddington thus describes scale-free theory as
“mechanical” (Eddington 1946, p. 19).
A Problem with Observables
There still is a problem with observables.  From a theoretical standpoint an observer is
rarely confronted with an object or system that is wholly foreign and presents absolutely
no prior knowledge.  For instance the mass and charge of the electron are now considered
known quantities thanks to immense amounts of experimental data.  These values are
considered to be essentially free information by Eddington.  However, mass is frequently
experimentally derived from experiments employing conservation of momentum –
indeed, Moore (2003) has described mass as a way of gauging a particle’s reaction to
momentum shifts since velocity is both relative and can be held approximately constant
in elastic situations.  Momentum in this instance, though, is governed by the uncertainty
principle and thus its exact value – and, by inference, the exact value of mass – can be
unknowable in such situations.  Holding the velocity approximately constant in these
situations can reduce the uncertainty but not eliminate it entirely.
A truly objective observer really can’t obtain free information, then, since if they
were presented with an unknown particle they would have to perform experiments
relying on the uncertainty principle to infer what the particle’s characteristics are (and
thus infer what type of particle it is).  Once again Eddington is blurring the distinction
between classical and quantum uncertainty and is thus forced to beat around the bush a
bit since there doesn’t seem to be any way around this paradox.  Thus any free or tabular
information such as the mass or charge of an electron is called a ‘stabilised
characteristic.’  Stabilised characteristics are really not observables since they have exact
tabular values with no uncertainty or probability distribution (some tables will give
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standard errors, though, which could be considered the same thing).  The act of
stabilising the characteristics of a particle or system has the effect of reducing its degrees
of freedom since any characteristic that is stabilised is no longer a variable.  A note of
caution, however: stabilising the components of a vector or tensor forces the
abandonment of tensor transformation properties.  However, stabilisation can be applied
to invariant conditions that must be satisfied by the tensor as a whole, e.g. impose the
condition on a second rank tensor that it is antisymmetrical, that it is the outer product of
two vectors, or that it is the outer square of two vectors.  Such conditions are invariant for
tensor transformations.  In addition they reduce the number of independent variables
needed to specify the tensor, thus reducing the number of dimensions in the probability
distribution.
Introducing Fields
In taking the above a step further Eddington very nearly reproposes Yukawa’s meson-
field theory, which he had previously dismissed, when discussing a particle’s interaction
with the environment.  Particles (object-particles in Eddington-speak) disturb the
distribution of surrounding particles through fundamental interactions (as I have
previously mentioned, Eddington studies the only two interactions known with certainty
at that time: electromagnetism and gravity).  As such the surrounding environment cannot
have the simple specification of the standard uranoid.  Eddington treats the disturbed
environment as the sum of a uniform environment such as the standard uranoid and a
disturbance.  As such the universe, for Eddington, consisted of particles, disturbances,
and the standard uranoid.30  In relativity theory the disturbance is considered part of the
environment (it’s an actual curvature of space-time) and is called, then, a field theory.  In
wave mechanics the disturbance is part of the particle (object-particle) itself as
represented in its wave-nature.  As such, Eddington refers to the disturbance in this
                                                 
30 I say ‘disturbances’ while, in actuality, Eddington uses the singular, ‘disturbance’ – as if he intended
there to be only a single disturbance in the universe.  I have mulled this over in my mind and I have
concluded that he, in fact, meant the plural.  However, if he had meant the singular it would imply that all
localized disturbances – interactions – are really different manifestations of some overall ‘disturbance field’
so-to-speak.  Since he does not elaborate on this latter point I suspect he is using it much like one might use
‘trouble’ in places of ‘troubles.’
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instance as the “object-field” and prefers to work entirely with this representation of
disturbances, leaving the standard uranoid as the background.
It is worth contrasting these ideas with those considered current.  In the words of
Zee:
We thus interpret physics contained in [a] … simple field
theory as follows:  In region 1 in space-time there exists a
source that sends out a “disturbance in the field,” which is
later absorbed by a sink in region 2 in space-time (Zee
2003, p. 24).
In current jargon experimentalists refer to the disturbance in the field as a particle.  This
goes back to Yukawa’s original idea that the meson mediated the force between two
nucleons that was analogous to the photon in electromagnetic fields (non-quantum fields,
of course, being a nineteenth century construct).  There are two universal fields, then:
gravity and electromagnetism.  There are also limited range fields associated with the
strong and weak interactions.  In any case, Zee describes the field as a sort of mattress (as
on a bed).  Lumps in the mattress are particles and standing on the mattress induces a
disturbance that causes the lumps to move toward one another (it’s worth trying this at
home if for no other reason than an excuse to jump on the bed).  The disturbance, then,
produces an attractive interaction between the particles (represented here by lumps)31
(Zee 2003).  The lumps here are the source and sink described by Zee and the attractive
interaction is the exchange or carrier particle.
Before 1959 quantum field theory generally considered space-time to be
continuous on the microscopic level.  The idea of ‘quantizing the field’ had not yet been
born.  But at a conference in Kiev that year, Soviet physicist Lev Landau (1908 – 1968)
proposed replacing the conventional theory with one based on observables and “equally
                                                 
31 The astute reader will note that like charges repel.  In calculating the photon propagation terms one finds
that it is necessary to perform an integration by parts that flips one of the signs in the equation for the path
integral (really in the equation for the action).  As with nearly every sign-flip in physics, this indicates a
change in direction – the photons cease to propagate toward another charge and instead propagate away
from it.  The mechanism that drives this ultimately turns out to be spin.  See Zee 2003, pp. 31-35 for a
fuller discussion.
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elementary compound particles” (Kragh 1999, p. 337).  Landau’s suggestion was driven
by the inability to extend the field-like properties of quantum electrodynamics to the
strong and weak interactions.  Present quantum field theory includes a mix of pre- and
post-1959 (Landau) interpretations – continuous or continuous-like fields that are
quantized (there is still some philosophical debate about whether the fields are truly
continuous – advocates for both sides can be vociferous).  Eddington clearly held the pre-
Landau interpretation of a continuous space-time.
Another problem that presented itself early in the development of quantum field
theory is the fact that particles interact with their own fields.  Alternatively one could say
they interact with the psi-field (of which they are a part), for instance, immediately
surrounding themselves regardless of the presence of other particles.  Quantum field
theories, then, must account for such self-interaction.  The problem goes back to the first
attempts to formulate a quantum theory of the electromagnetic field.  Both Dirac and
Jordan independently developed the first theories of quantum electrodynamics (QED) in
1927.  Two year later Pauli and Heisenberg developed a version of QED that was
relativistically invariant and quantized radiation as well as matter waves (Kragh 1999).
The trouble was that the self-energy of the electron, which is the energy associated with
the electron due to its own electromagnetic field, was infinite.  As QED developed in the
late 1930s more infinities crept out of the woodwork.  The meson-field theories born
largely out of Yukawa’s work turned out to have their own diverging results.  The
problems were not resolved until well after Eddington’s death.
But Eddington’s formulation of object-fields partially addresses these issues,
though obviously not necessarily in an accurate way.  For instance, he defines two types
of object-fields: extraneous and complementary.  An extraneous field is a field external to
the object under study, perhaps introduced intentionally for the sake of studying certain
behaviour.  The complementary field accounts for the readjustment of the environment
due to the object’s presence – essentially it’s a self-energy-type field, though it is handled
in a slightly different manner.  As an example, if the object has some charge the
complementary electromagnetic field represents the induced charge in the particle’s
surroundings (i.e. the presence of charge of one type must induce the presence of an
opposite charge in the surroundings if one does not already exist since charge is
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conserved32).  Conversely, it could also represent any substitutions made in the equations
in order to neglect induction effects in the environment.  The latter representation is
simply a mathematical difference between the disturbed and undisturbed environments
measured either through energy tensors or momentum vectors.  In this sense it follows on
Eddington’s idea of ideally measuring locations via coordinate differences directly
between objects (i.e. with the origin essentially at one of the particles)33.  Since the
difference is measured through tensors or vectors it follows that the field has the same
variables (energy, momentum, etc.) as a distribution of particles.  Eddington
acknowledges the description of a field in terms of potentials (something any second-
semester physics students should be familiar with) but only employs this version when
grouping the disturbance with the environment as in relativity (Eddington 1946).34
Particles, then, would carry two bits of information.  For instance, they would
have both a particle energy tensor that is associated with their fundamental properties as
well as a complementary energy tensor that is associated with the energy they have as a
result of their disturbance of the surrounding environment (i.e. their interaction with their
own disturbance in the field).  Eddington’s use of the term ‘environment’ here indicates
the strange way in which he divided up the universe.  It acts as a middle layer, in a way,
between the object-fields (particles) and the standard uranoid (zero-temperature Einstein
universe).  True fields in Eddington’s sense, particularly quantum ones, can be associated
with any of his three parts of the universe since fields are merely associated with the
average characteristics of an ensemble of particles rather than with the characteristics of
the individual particles themselves.  Complementary fields (or self-energy fields in
modern terms) are, of course, object-fields.  Eddington felt that they had been ignored by
                                                 
32 There really is only one fundamental conservation law in this sense: the conservation of four-momentum.
The conservation of momentum and energy are explicitly contained within this single law while the
conservation of charge is implicitly contained within the conservation of energy.  Since mass is the
magnitude of the four-momentum vector in some sense conservation of mass is the most fundamental.
33 This was developed at the beginning of chapter five.  It very loosely resembles the Green’s function
portion of a path integral in the sense that, for example, a Green’s function G(x1,x2) does not depend on x1
and x2 separately but rather on the difference between them, x1 – x2.
34 In an historical ‘missed-it-by-that-much’ event, in 1948, just four years after Eddington’s death, Hendrik
Casimir (1909 – 2000) proposed disturbing the vacuum such that there would be a shift in its energy
density.  While the energy density itself is not observable, its shift should be since the method of disturbing
the vacuum is controllable.  This shift leads to a small force (since experimentally discovered) known as
the Casimir force.  In this case the disturbance was grouped with the environment – in fact it was in the
environment.  Had Eddington lived a bit longer he likely would have made extensive use of the Casimir
effect.
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quantum physics (Eddington 1946, p. 23).  Though QED was dealing with a plague of
self-energy issues in the late 1930s these issues were directly linked to unwanted
infinities which was not something Eddington had encountered in his self-energy fields.
Working with Fields
In beginning his work with fields Eddington considers the treatment of gravitational
fields in quantum theory where the movement (or even complete removal) of particles
doesn’t alter gµν .  The field in this case is then referred to as a rigid field.  As such
eigenstates can then be specified while the occupation can be assigned later.  Since the
occupation is flexible it allows physical change to be represented as the transitions
between eigenstates with the field remaining unchanged.  The method is only an
approximation, however, with the condition that “the field must be stationary for small
changes of the occupation factors of the eigenstates” (Eddington 1946, p. 24).  Of interest
is the fact that Eddington makes a distinction between quantum particles and ‘relativity’
particles.  The former are the usual particles treated in standard physics while the latter
are singularities.  Singularities are not discussed much in Fundamental Theory,
particularly in the early chapters, for a variety of reasons including the prevailing notion
at that time that they were simply ugly infinities that needed to be eliminated.  But
perhaps the clearest reason is simply that it didn’t fit the theme of Eddington’s theory.
Quite simply, rigid fields serve as the foundation for further development of his theory
and singularities arise from a non-rigid field (since any movement or removal obviously
changes gµν ).
As described above, the field acquires its own characteristics including its own
energy separate from the particle energy.  In modern interpretations there are several
ways of looking at this (without getting overly philosophical) – either the particle is
simply a fluctuation in the field and so is a subset of the whole field energy, or the
particle’s energy is produced separate from any one individual field and is produced by
interacting fields.  The trouble with all of this comes when considering the graviton.  All
fields and particles “live” in space-time but the graviton is the quantization of space-time.
The graviton had not been formally postulated by the time Eddington had died, though
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quantizing space-time is an idea that had been bantered about (though very informally)
since the beginning of quantum theory.
Eddington separates out the particle energies by discrete eigenstates where each
state is assigned an occupation factor.  Changes in the system are manifested by changes
to the occupation states that are represented as generalized coordinates or momenta.  The
total energy of the system is then a function of the occupation factors, H 0 ( j1, j2 , j3,...) .
H0 is not necessarily a linear function.  The energy of a particle in a given state is given
as:
Er = ∂H
0 ∂jr . (6.8)
Eddington’s rationale for this is that any change in the energy of the system must be
wholly accounted for by the particles if the field is to be rigid – i.e. the field’s energy
does not change.  Presumably this makes the calculations simpler since the field assumes
a role analogous to the uranoid by remaining stable through various system transitions.
The collective energy of all the particles is then given by:
E0 = jrEr = jr ∂H
0 ∂jr∑∑ . (6.9)
The field energy is then the difference W0 = H0 – E0.  If the total energy of the system is a
homogenous function of the nth degree then:
E0 = nH 0 ,     W 0 = 1− n( )H 0 . (6.10)
In this analysis Eddington has outlined the treatment of energy.  A similar process
can be performed for other characteristics that are additive such as energy-density,
momentum, pressure, angular momentum, and even, presumably mass, though the
interpretation of the latter could be tricky.  Such a process, however, assumes the system
is an unidentified member of a large assemblage and that the majority of other systems in
the assemblage are in some initial state.
When this process is applied to a scale-free system, however, a complication
arises in that the eigenstates are no longer discrete meaning they no longer are specified
by quantum numbers.  As such Eddington develops a generalized characteristic Xα (α =
1,2,…,n) where any such characteristic will always have the same physical dimensions
with an associated extraneous standard.  For instance Xα could be a set of coordinates in
some n-dimensional ‘representation space’ (Eddington 1946).  Points in this space don’t
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necessarily correspond to possible states (so it’s not simply the location of particles in
some assemblage as described above).  What actually is specified is some relation
between the characteristics Xα.  Again, this simply builds on the idea developed earlier
that it is really relational coordinates (or properties) that have physical meaning – i.e. you
always have to have some reference object.  The actual number of possible states, k, will
be less that than the number of dimensions in representation space, n; in essence the
possible states for a k-dimensional locus in the representation space that is referred to as
the phase space of the system.  The number of dimensions k is referred to here as the
‘multiplicity factor’ (Eddington 1946).  I will have more to say regarding multiplicity
factors in the next section.  For now it will serve as a useful tool in adopting the previous
formalism to scale-free systems.
Phase space is, of course, a term culled from classical mechanics where each
dimension of the space corresponds to an independent state variable of a system
(position, velocity, momentum, etc.).  It is a purely mathematical concept that simply
provides a tool for better analyzing a system.  In the present discussion it serves as a tool
for making scale transformations such that Xα → λXα  transforms some k-dimensional
element of a volume dτ  into a new element of volume λ kdτ .  The discrete occupation
factors are now replaced by a continuous occupation factor that is a function of the
coordinates.  As such equations (6.8), (6.9), and (6.10) can be rewritten by replacing
summations with integrations and ordinary differentiation with respect to jr with
Hamiltonian differentiation with respect to j(X) – i.e. differentiation with respect to a
function rather than a variable.  Equation (6.10) becomes:
W 0 = − l + k
l
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
E0 ,     H 0 = − k
l
E0 (6.11)
where l is the dimension-index of H0.  As described above, the scale-free condition makes
H0 a homogenous function, in this case of degree –l/k, of the pseudo-discrete occupation
factors.  If l = 1 then (6.11) becomes:
W 0 = −(k +1)E0 ,     H 0 = −kE0 . (6.12)
As an example, the energy tensor is a scale-free characteristic and thus the
simplest kind of scale-free particle will only have the energy tensor as a characteristic.
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The components of the energy tensor are then the Xα.  For such particles, the total energy
H0 is the energy tensor:
Wµν = −(k +1)Eµν ,     Tµν = −kEµν . (6.13)
where k (the multiplicity factor) is the number of independent components of Tµν.  The
value of k can be reduced by introducing stabilized characteristics thus altering the
numerical division of (6.13).  Through a redefinition of the energy tensor he is able, once
again, to make a direct link between the quantum (discrete) world and the relativistic
(continuous) world: a relativity particle is formally a quantum particle with a multiplicity
of –1.  In order to understand this result a bit better a deeper look at multiplicity is
required.
Multiplicity
Multiplicity is most often defined in relation to Einstein solids and monotomic ideal
gases though it can be applied to virtually anything where the multiplicity of a macrostate
is the number of possible microstates for that macrostate.  Eddington’s use is fairly
standard in that k in both cases is the number of possible states (microstates) in some
larger system or space (macrostate).  Multiplicity can be described as being a function of
both the total energy of the state (system) and the number of particles (units) in the state
(system).35  An Einstein solid, for example, can be modelled as a system of 3N
independent oscillators where N is the number of atoms36.  Since the factor 3 is due to the
dimensionality of the space (degrees of freedom) this could be altered in Eddington’s
theory since he does make alterations to the total number of dimensions in space-time.
But, for the time being I will continue to assume a three-dimensional space-time.
The total energy in an Einstein solid, U, is an integer multiple of some basic
energy unit ε.  The total number of energy units in the solid are defined as q ≡U / ε .  In
Eddington’s theory, rather than dealing with a solid, one would simply deal with a large
assemblage of particles.  In any case, the multiplicity of an Einstein solid’s macrostate, in
                                                 
35 For an indepth discussion of multiplicity and how it can be fully derived in numerous situations see
Schroeder (1999).
36 This is similar to Zee’s description of quantum fields (Zee 2003).
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modern notation (dropping Eddington’s use of k for reasons that will shortly become
obvious), is given by:
Ω(N ,U ) = (q + 3N −1)!
q!(3N −1)!
(6.14)
(Moore 2003c, p. 66).  In Eddington’s theory the factor of 3 would obviously be different
as would the exact value of q.  But the basic idea holds: multiplicity is the number of
possible states in a system.
There is an additional macroscopic step that can be taken with Einstein solids.  If
two such solids are in contact there is a total energy to the system made up of the energies
of the two solids.  The total energy of the system can be partitioned by multiples of the
basic energy unit in a number of ways that are not necessarily confined by the solids
themselves.  The total multiplicity of the system, then, is the product of the multiplicities
of the two solids.  In adapting this to Eddington’s theory, one could macropartition some
larger system like the universe into smaller macroscopic systems in order to find the
multiplicity of some larger system.  Since we’re dealing with exponentials at the
fundamental level here this makes sense.  As long as the total energy U remains fixed the
combined system of two solids (or subsystems) can (and will) randomly shift between
different microstates.  This is actually known as the ‘fundamental assumption’ of
statistical mechanics and is formally stated as: “All of a system’s accessible microstates
are equally likely in the long run” (Moore 2003c, p. 68).  The term ‘accessible’ basically
means that the microstates must shift such that U remains constant.  This is the same idea
as Eddington’s description of the electron and proton in a box: at some point they will
join to form hydrogen thus correlating their wavefunctions but both still have a non-zero
probability of being anywhere in the box.
Some implications of (6.14) that can easily be transferred to Eddington’s theory
without knowing q or the multiple of N include the fact that larger systems will have huge
multiplicities – in fact ridiculously huge multiplicities (see Moore 2003c, p. 78) – as well
as the fact that the shape of the macropartition distribution becomes less and less
Gaussian as the system gets larger to the point where the probability distribution is
essentially an infinitesimally narrow spike.  Moore concludes for Einstein solids that 1.)
if the system is not in the most probable macropartition to begin with it will fairly rapidly
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move toward that macropartition and 2.) it will stay at that macropartition regardless of
random exchanges in microstates between the solids.  This is simply a statistical way of
pointing out that systems tend to move toward equilibrium, which is just the Second Law
of Thermodynamics.  As such there’s no reason this can’t be applied to a situation such
as Eddington’s – in fact it’s fundamentally required.  In standard statistical mechanics
this is simply interpreted as the fact that random and/or quantum processes even out on a
macroscopic level (hence the reason Newtonian mechanics works fine as a predictive tool
for macroscopic objects).
One final definition that theoretically could be extended to Eddington’s theory
(though more research would be needed to determine the appropriateness of the use of
Boltzmann’s constant) is the following relationship between entropy and multiplicity for
a macrostate, where kB is Boltzmann’s constant (not to be confused with Eddington’s
notation for multiplicity, k):
S ≡ kB lnΩ . (6.15)
Again, since the fact that the entropy of an isolated system never decreases is merely a
restatement of the second law, it follows logically that this can be applied to Eddington’s
situation.  In a frequently misleading interpretation, entropy is often deemed a measure of
disorder in a system.  In reality, the basic meaning of entropy is multiplicity and not
disorder as is commonly held (Moore 2003c).  In Eddington’s theory multiplicity is
interpreted in three different ways: the number of degrees of freedom of the system, the
number of phase-space dimensions, and the number of components in the energy tensor.
All three interpretations are equivalent.
Probability in Statistical Mechanics
Obviously the mere name ‘statistical mechanics’ implies that probability has a formal
role in any such development.  But probability actually has a direct measurable
relationship with multiplicity in a way consistent with Eddington’s philosophy of whole-
number ratios.  It is a direct application of equation (6.15) and leads to what is known as
the Boltzmann factor.
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Consider, then, a small system with two quantum states having energies E0 and E1
where E1 > E0 .  If, for instance, the lower energy corresponded to the vacuum energy and
the higher energy corresponded to the ground state of some particle, in a highly
simplified (and incomplete) way this situation could be interpreted to be the probability
that a particle exists at all in some region.  Fundamental statistical mechanics states that
the ratio of the probabilities is equal to the ratio of the system’s multiplicities in each
case:
Pr(E1)
Pr(E0 )
=
Ω1
Ω0
. (6.16)
From (6.15) we get:
Pr(E1)
Pr(E0 )
=
eS1 /kB
eS0 /kB
= e(S1 −S0 )/kB = eΔS /kB . (6.17)
In reality the change in entropy here is for a reservoir that supplies the small system with
a theoretically inexhaustible supply of energy.  But the combined system of the reservoir
and the small system together must conserve energy if it is isolated.  Thus whatever
energy is lost by the reservoir must be gained by the small system, ΔU = (E1 − E0 ) .
Since 1 T = ∂S ∂U , for the reservoir ΔS ≈ ΔU T  as long as T remains approximately
constant.  This is the well-known definition for change in entropy that is given in most
standard introductory physics texts.  The assumption that T will remain approximately
constant is fitting for Eddington’s theory since he assumes in most cases an unchanging
environment (and/or uranoid).  Equation (6.17) can then be written as:
Pr(E1)
Pr(E0 )
= eΔU /kBT = e−(E1 −E0 )/kBT = e
−E1 /kBT
e−E0 /kBT
(6.18)
where the minus-sign is a result of determining the values for the reservoir rather than the
small system.  This relationship must hold true for all pairs of small-system quantum
states meaning that the probability that a small system in contact with a reservoir will be
in a quantum state with energy E is:
Pr(E) = 1
Z
e−E /kBT . (6.19)
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The proportionality constant 1/Z must be the same for all the quantum states of the small
system.  The value of this constant follows from the knowledge that the total probability
of the system being in some quantum state must be 1.  Thus:
1 = Pr(Ei )
all
∑ = 1Z e
−Ei /kBT =
1
Z
e−Ei /kBT
all
∑
all
∑ . (6.20)
Leading to the following value for Z:
Z = e−Ei /kBT
all
∑ . (6.21)
Equation (6.19) then becomes:
Pr(E) = e
−E /kBT
e−Ei /kBT
all
∑
(6.22)
where e−E /kBT  is known as the Boltzmann factor (Moore 2003c).
Interpreting this in terms of Eddington’s theory, the argument is very similar to
the reasoning that follows from equations (6.9) and (6.10), though from a probabilistic
standpoint.  The denominator (the assemblage) in (6.22) is an averaged sum over the field
that acts as the reservoir in this case and the numerator acts as the particle (system).  This
is a bit like Zee’s source and sink description of fields.  The equation obeys Eddington’s
two rules: 1.) the system under consideration is an unidentified member of a large
assemblage and 2.) most of the other systems in the assemblage remain in their initial
state.  The multiplicity tells us the number of possible microstates (vacuum fluctuations,
particle masses, etc.) in a given macrostate (environment, uranoid, etc.) and (6.22) tells us
the probability that a system will be in one of these microstates (a quantum state) with a
given energy relative the macrostate’s energy.  In terms of observables like momentum,
these probabilities must account for the differences in physical and geometrical
coordinates.  In fact, the probability of a physical momentum is actually the combined
probability of the geometrical momentum of the particle and an opposite (recoil)
momentum of the physical origin.  As such “the distribution of geometrical momenta is
turned into a distribution of physical momenta by weighing the ranges dp” with a
statistical weight function (Eddington 1946, p. 76).  We’ve basically pulled the field and
particle energies apart probabilistically, though this is a simplification.  True QFT gets
much more sophisticated than this (as does true quantum mechanics), but the gist here is
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to understand that Eddington’s thinking, despite the unusual notation and nomenclature,
is remarkably modern in many ways.
One final note on the use of multiplicities is the consideration of quantum
particles that have (reverting to Eddington’s notation for multiplicity) multiplicities of k1
and k2.  The relation between their masses is:
m1
m2
=
k2
k1
. (6.23)
The application of this to protons and electrons will be presented in chapter eight but it is
worth mentioning here since a relation could be drawn between (6.23) and (6.14) (and
extended to include (6.22)) such that multiplicities, and thus probabilities, can be used to
determine mass ratios.
Coordinates in Rigid Fields
The above arguments make it clear that the field energy is fairly large from an ordinary
point of view, but Eddington points out that, for instance, gravitational fields can be
obtained by a transformation of coordinates and that this is how such large field strengths
are reached when working with rigid fields.  A set of ‘rigid coordinates’ is then
introduced that must satisfy the condition that the field remains stationary for small
changes of the occupation factors.  The relation between Galilean coordinates (unprimed)
and rigid coordinates (primed) are:
′x = x ,    ′y = y ,    ′z = z ,    ′t = −kt . (6.24)
Since ′gµν  have Galilean values,
g44 = k
2 ,    −g = −k . (6.25)
The spatial coordinates here remain unchanged so the number of particles per unit
coordinate remain unchanged.  As such the only energy-momentum coordinate that
changes is the temporal one,
p4 = −k ′p4 .
37
                                                 
37 In four-momentum this is the energy component so Eddington is talking about a system change without a
change in Newtonian momentum.
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Eddington gives this as the reason the momentum vector in wave mechanics is a
covariant expression  pµ = −i∂ ∂xµ [sic] (rigid representation) while in relativity it is a
contravariant expression pµ = mdxµ ds [sic] (non-rigid representation).  He also gives
this as the reason that the velocity of a particle in wave mechanics is really the group
velocity of the waves rather than the wave velocity.  Creating a gravitational field
through a coordinate transformation, then, satisfies (6.13) (Eddington 1946).
The minus sign here is less problematic than it appears since it is accounted for in
the i as in normal quantum mechanics.  But an unrecognized problem takes its place – the
constants measured by experimentalists are not, in fact, the ‘true’ values but are distorted
by our non-objective view.  The ‘true’ values can only be obtained by a coordinate
transformation such as the one just described.
Energy Issues
Since k introduces a minus sign the particle energy always has the opposite sign of the
total energy.  Eddington is clearly advocating in favour of Dirac’s hole theory that
suggests there is a ‘sea’ of negative energy states that are almost entirely filled (see fuller
discussion in chapters seven through nine).  Eddington’s application of this to gravitation
means that by inserting a particle with a mass m at some point P the energy in the region
containing P is increased by the amount m (employing natural units, of course).  Gravity,
though, is treated as a potential well and particles in its presence have a small amount of
negative energy.  So the introduction of the particle introduces a small gravitational
potential that supplies a negative amount of energy from all the particles in this
environment.  It is conceivable that the addition of the energy m from the addition of the
particle is actually more than counteracted by the negative energy arising from all the
surrounding particles due to the new gravitational potential – i.e. adding a particle seems
to decrease the net energy.  Thus to increase the net energy one would have to add a
particle with a negative mass.  In a classical sense this poses a serious problem but from
the point of view of wave mechanics, the positive and negative energies are merely
superposed uniform distributions (Eddington 1946).  There may also be a link here to the
somewhat artificial separation of energy and momentum in non-relativistic situations
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where in four-momentum the sign convention is opposite for energy and momentum (if
one is positive, the other is negative).
How is a particle of negative mass (energy) introduced?  Given a particle with
mass m it must have an associated field energy of –2m so that the total rest energy is –m
thus satisfying the need for a particle with a negative energy (mass).  Now put this
particle in motion such that it gains some kinetic energy.  Since the field is rigid the
kinetic energy is only added to the particle’s energy.  What happens if we simply flip the
signs here?  The kinetic energy is now − 12 mv
2  and the total rest energy is now m.  The
whole energy, including both rest and kinetic portions, is m − 12 mv
2 .  To avoid what
Eddington refers to as a dynamical paradox (how can something have a negative amount
of kinetic energy?) this needs to be rewritten as m + 12 m(iv)
2 .  So the particle in a rigid
field has a velocity i times the classical velocity and thus a momentum i times the
classical momentum.  This is Eddington’s explanation for the presence of i in quantum
theory, basically through an argument involving particle self-energies and the separation
of field and particle energies.  A physical explanation can be found in the Ahronov-Bohm
effect where a quantum wave-like particle is split into two partial waves that then pass on
either side of a region of a magnetic field.  The recombination must involve a phase shift
and introduces the need for complex algebra.  But this effect was not discovered until
nearly a decade after Eddington’s death.
This all presents one significant problem that should be evident by now
considering everything I’ve introduced about Eddington’s theory so far – how is any of
this measurable, particularly since the measured quantities are really relative values
between a particle and some reference particle (see discussion of measurement theory
above)?  Really any measurement made determines characteristics that belong both to the
particle under consideration and some reference particle jointly.  So consider an object-
particle (the one under observation) and a reference particle that will be called the
‘comparison particle’ (Eddington 1946).  Their momentum vectors are pµ  and ′pµ
respectively.  The so-called ‘mutual’ energy tensor that describes the two as a single
system is of the form:
M µν = 12C pµ ′pν + ′pµ pν( ) . (6.26)
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The self-energy tensors for each take the form:
Tµν = Apµ pν ,    ′Tµν = ′A ′pµ ′pν . (6.27)
Here C, A, and ′A  are dimensionless constants.  For particles nearly at rest the three
energy tensors reduce to densities where the densities of the two particles sum to the
mutual density:
ρm = Cm ′m ,    ρ = Am
2 ,    ′ρ = ′A ′m 2
⇒     Am2 + ′A ′m 2 = Cm ′m . (6.28)
Values for the constants will be explored in chapter nine while comparison particles will
be discussed in chapter seven.  The important point here is to recognize the relationship
between the measured quantities (representing mutual quantities) and actual desired
quantities (representing the object particle related to a comparison particle).  Basically
Eddington is making the point that one of the reasons measured values are never exact
and always contain some amount of uncertainty is because they have not been properly
corrected to account for the field.
Adding spin to the mix can make the problems more difficult since spin is not
only a measurable quantity but it is also a purely quantum quantity in the sense that it has
no real classical analogue (it’s not really just angular motion in the classical sense).  The
Riemann tensor in (3+1)-dimensional space-time has 256 independent components from
16 indices (the “energy tensor is both dimensionally and tensorially the product of two
momentum vectors” – see Eddington 1946, p.15), though this number can be reduced to
20.  The complete energy tensor has 136 independent components when including spin
and only 10 without it.  Eddington calls a particle that carries only a complete energy
tensor a standard carrier.  If a particle carries an additional ‘permutation variate’ it will
have 137 dimensions in phase space.  This additional variate adds energy to the system
via the idea of interchange, which will be identified with the Coulomb energy (see
chapter seven).  As such it adds a degree of freedom to the system.  There is also a non-
Coulomb energy that is an adjustment of any initial energy in the system that allows it to
be reduced from four particles to two.
Scale as a Variable
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Since Eddington has equated the uncertainty of the scale with curvature through the
extraordinary fluctuation, by dealing directly with the scale uncertainty curvature is
automatically considered.  As such all equations can be treated in a flat space so that local
curvature is simply overlaid via the scale uncertainty.  The scale is now treated as a
separate observable with a probability distribution that is specified by the momenta and
coordinates.  The variables in probability distributions occur in conjugate pairs so the
scale must have a conjugate.  The conjugate of scale is called the ‘phase’ (Eddington
1946).  If scale reduces to an eigenvalue it is considered a momentum while the phase
would be considered a coordinate.  This phase coordinate is now considered the fifth
dimension normal to space-time.  This makes the scale and phase invariant for rotations
and transformations (including Lorentz).  Incidentally the gravitational potential between
two particles in (n + 3 + 1)-dimensional space follows a 1 r1+n  dependence assuming that
 r  R  where R is the scale associated with any extra coordinates.  This gives rise to the
possibility of ‘large’ (at least on a particle physics scale) extra dimensions (Zee 2003).
The graviton, in this situation, is actually a fluctuation throughout all dimensions rather
than just the (3 +1) we’re familiar with.  This makes the graviton special since it is the
only particle we know of that exists in more than four dimensions.
The scale uncertainty, as stated before, is primarily a fluctuation in the extraneous
standard that is reflected in the measured characteristics of the system.  This fact
compares rather well with the Casimir Effect (see footnote 37) where the shift in the
energy density could be interpreted as a fluctuation in the extraneous standard.  In the
Casimir Effect the measured characteristics all come from the shift in the energy density
since the energy density itself is unmeasurable.  As I will show in chapter seven, the
extraneous standard (among other quantities) is represented by a ‘comparison particle,’ a
description not unlike the modern particle physics representations of nearly everything,
including forces, as particles (this is rather ironic since Eddington disavowed Yukawa’s
meson-field theory – see chapter five).  The scale and phase dimension are equivalent to
this use of comparison particles and is introduced first in my presentation in order to
maintain the cohesive field-theoretic argument to this point.
Curvature as represented in the extraordinary fluctuation makes its measurable
appearance through something known as the scale momentum that must be given a
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Gaussian probability distribution with a standard deviation of σε .  In many cases this is a
stabilised characteristic.  If it is destabilised it opens a new series of investigations to us.
As an example, consider a scale momentum that is an angular momentum.  The phase
coordinate in this case is an angle since scale and phase are conjugate.  For angular
coordinates with a uniform probability distribution between 0 and 2π there is an infinite
uncertainty, i.e. as the uncertainty in the angular momentum decreases, the angle “tends
toward a uniform distribution over the range 2π” (Eddington 1946, p. 47).  Or, another
way of looking at it is by assuming that an exact scale is extended to a slightly fluctuating
scale “by spreading the distribution uniformly over a thickness 2π in an extra phase
dimension” (Eddington 1946, p. 47).  Eddington calls this the ‘widening factor.’
What we have then is two equivalent ways of representing curvature.  The first is
the familiar way of having a stabilised scale in spherical space.  The second is as a
fluctuating scale in flat space.  The widening factor is used in a comparison of the two
approaches.  For example, consider a spherical space with volume V = 2π 2R0
3 .  This can
be reconsidered as a volume V3 = πR0
3  in three-dimensional space with a thickness of 2π
in an extra phase dimension.  A flat (Euclidean) sphere has a volume V4 = 43πR0
3 .
Comparing these two gives V3 = 34V4  but since in (Eddington’s) natural units the inverse
of a volume is a mass, this gives:
m3 = 43 m4 . (6.29)
This is an example of the comparison of masses and multiplicities given by equation
(6.23) where V3 is stabilised (exact) and V4 is destabilised, thus giving it an extra degree
of freedom (multiplicity).  This is, in fact, just Eddington-speak for saying that adding
extra dimensions adds degrees of freedom (1:1) and the multiplicity is just a measure of
the degrees of freedom of a system which is perfectly consistent with our standard
treatment.
Fundamental Theory Redux
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Before moving on to discussions of the exclusion principle and calculations of the
fundamental constants in Fundamental Theory, I will pause for a moment to summarize
what we have learned so far in Eddington’s theory.  Despite its often abstruse formalism,
the basic ideas are fairly simple.  Eddington builds quite simply on the idea that
everything – all particles – can be represented by Gaussian probability distributions.
Relativity then requires that no particular point anywhere in the universe is special so the
only relevant measurement is between particles (probability distributions).  Since at least
one of the particles involved in a measurement must be considered the reference body (at
least in terms of placement of a coordinate origin), there are actually two locations of this
point: the particle, which is subject to the uncertainty principle, has a probability
distribution associated with its location, while the observer then places a geometrical
coordinate origin as near as possible to the mean for this distribution.  The geometrical
origin, though, being limited by the ability of the observer (among other problems) has its
own probability distribution.  There is a small difference between the location of the
physical origin and the location of the geometrical origin.  There is also a standard
deviation to the physical origin’s probability distribution and this is used to furnish a
measuring standard in the hope of developing a truly objective theory.  This standard
deviation becomes a standard unit for measuring length.  There is also an uncertainty in
the scale of measurement called the scale uncertainty that is due to the inaccuracies of
standard measurement techniques.  It is associated, once again, with the idea that no
observation can be truly objective and, despite the use of natural units, at least one unit
must be specified – called an extraneous standard – and will contain this scale uncertainty
(since the extraneous standard is a scale).  Specifying values of observables then becomes
known as stabilisation.  It is possible to define a scale-free form of physics by not
referring to either the extraneous standard (standard deviation) or the radius of spherical
space (i.e. working somewhere in between).
Fields are introduced then since no particle exists purely in and of itself (at the
very least it has its own self-energy producing fields) – i.e. particles cannot be considered
apart from their environment (particles are the fields or field sources, as it were).  In
order to simplify calculations situations must be arranged such that the fields stay
relatively unchanged for any transitions in them and, thus, the concept of a rigid field is
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created.  It becomes necessary, then, to separate the field and particle energies so one can
be sure the calculations are being performed on the particles alone.  It also becomes
necessary to define a set of rigid coordinates to apply to the rigid field.  In performing
these two operations (separating the energies and supplying the coordinates) the true
depth of the interaction of the field and particle energies must be considered along with
any energy contributed to the system from any reference particle.
All of this introduces the idea of scale being a measurable quantity meaning in
wave mechanics it must have a conjugate which Eddington calls the phase.  In
considering these issues in relation to tensor quantities one finds that there is an
additional degree of freedom in electrical problems.  As such there are also both
Coulomb and non-Coulomb energies associated with such systems, the latter arising from
the reduction of a system to a two-particle system (including comparison particles which
will be discussed in the next chapter).
With fields and particle-field interactions taken care of, the next logical step is to
address that thorny issue of measurement again from the point of view of reference
bodies.  This will lead directly to the exclusion principle.
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VII
Uniqueness
It is somewhat ironic that one of the primary purposes of quantum field theory is to
explain individual particles making QFT the particle physicist’s primary mode of
analysis.  As such a discussion of fields frequently appears to break down into a
discussion of particles once again, but with a different formalism than that we’re used to
from quantum mechanics.  This new formalism is the result of QFT.  The same thought
process is evident in Fundamental Theory where the discussion of fields breaks down
into a discussion of particles.  In truth, Eddington simply seeks to eliminate surrounding
fields by including them in the environment or background – to some extent they are a
nuisance, but they cannot be ignored since a particle can’t be completely removed from
its surroundings.
Having considered primarily how particles can be measured individually in
chapter five and how they then individually interact with fields in the previous chapter, it
is now time to consider in greater depth how particles interact with each other and how
they can best be measured.  Ultimately this leads directly to the exclusion principle and
Eddington’s somewhat unusual (and rather modern) interpretation of it.
Carrying Information: A How-to Guide
In the previous chapter I introduced the concept of the ‘standard carrier.’  To reiterate,
Eddington’s view of particles was that they were nothing more than conceptual carriers
of a set of variates.  The standard carrier is the simplest type of carrier in scale-free theory
and, again as I’ve stated before, carries a complete energy tensor including spin and
nothing more.  As such they have 136 independent components and are referred to as V136
particles.  What we’re really describing here is a mathematical form – a blank sheet as I
described in chapter three – on which various characteristics and properties can be
superimposed.  Basically one starts with a complete energy tensor whose components are
empty.  How the components are filled determines what type of particle it becomes.  This
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definition does not simply apply to elementary particles (why should it?) but also to
composite particles such as atoms and, perhaps, even molecules (in fact the definition
could be extended to organisms, theoretically, but the components would be so
phenomenally complex it would likely be impossible to write them down!).  Eddington,
though, recognizing the difficulty with more complex combinations, refers to anything
beyond simple combinations as systems and does not extend the definition to include
these.
Eddington’s conception of the standard carrier as an empty mathematical tool able
to be filled in any number of ways in order to describe various phenomena, indicates his
belief that there likely were more particles than were known in the early 1940s (and we
know this has been proven true), but that, theoretically, there are many more particles
than are even known today.  As he describes:
We shall freely invent particles to carry the sets of variates
that our form of analysis groups together.  The provision of
a carrier is not so much a necessity of thought as a
necessity of language (Eddington 1946, p. 31).
Eddington finds that the necessity of language may indicate that it is
desirable to distinguish the ‘mathematical fictions’ from the
‘actual particles’; but it is difficult to find any logical basis
for such a distinction [since] ‘[d]iscovering’ a particle
means observing certain effects which are accepted as
proof of its existence; but it seems to be a matter of fashion
or convention that one sort of effect rather than another is
accepted as critical for this purpose (Eddington 1946, p.
31).
He gives the discovery of the companion of the star Sirius as an example of the last point.
The companion’s existence had been inferred fairly early from the elliptic motion of the
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star itself, but it was not ‘confirmed’ until it was actually seen visually in 1862.  But, he
asks, why is the visual confirmation better than the gravitational?  The visual observation
is mediated by radiation or, more clearly, the electromagnetic interaction.  The
gravitational observation is mediated by the gravitational interaction.  Both observation
systems have their own intricate levels of analysis between the actual fundamental
interaction itself and the processing of the result by the brain.  Certainly, if the visual
observation is made without the use of CCD cameras (i.e. with the naked eye), then there
is less of this analysis, but still, what makes gravitational evidence better than
electromagnetic?  As Eddington explains, experimental tests, regardless of their type, are
concerned not with the conceptual carrier itself (the fundamental particle of the
interaction) but rather with the information it carries.  Thus, trusting the photon’s
information over the graviton’s appears completely arbitrary (although we have never
observed gravitons while we observe photons every day).  This foreshadows Eddington’s
interpretation of the exclusion principle where he doesn’t distinguish between particles of
any type – a particle is a particle is a particle.  This is also the reasoning behind the
choice of a standard carrier.  By substituting different values in the complete energy
tensor the carrier can manifest itself as different particles.  It’s as if each particle in the
universe is simply a different set of clothes for a single mathematical function.
A subset of the standard carrier is the ‘vector carrier’ which is a particle specified
not by a complete energy tensor but rather by a complete momentum vector (including
angular momentum and thus spin).  As such it only has 10 independent components and
is referred to as a V10 particle.  Vector carriers can be derived from standard carriers by
making a standard carrier the outer square of a complete vector.  This is a stabilising
characteristic meaning it reduces the degrees of freedom (multiplicity), k, (from 136 to
10) and is somewhat subjective (see the discussion on stabilisation in chapter six).
However, Eddington makes the point that such particles are in fact observable in nature
(any spin-0 particle could theoretically be represented this way).  He concludes that V136
and V10 particles are what might be called ‘actual particles’ while the V3 and V4 spinless
particles don’t have the possibility of including spin, which is a very real effect.  Thus
these particles must be simplified mathematical fictions.
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Relatively Speaking
In chapters five and six I introduced the idea that measurements only really make sense
when there is a reference body present for comparison (e.g. I could say that a particle has
15 acks – well, what’s an ack and what (and where) is the ack?).  In most experiments a
measurement is taken and then compared to a reference object that in all likelihood was
itself derived from another reference object, and so on, all the way back to the original
definition of the particular unit of measurement under investigation (which is likely
arbitrary to begin with; see again chapter five).  This is a rather long chain of connections
and each link in this chain will include its own probability distribution.  As such, the
longer the chain, the greater the standard error in the final measurement.  The ideal
situation, then, would be to make a direct comparison between the object under
investigation and the standard of measurement for a particular unit or quantity (e.g. the
Paris Metre).  Since this is impractical an idealised experiment would be one in which the
standards of measurement were embodied in a particle that the object under investigation
could directly interact with.  In fact this is, to some extent, precisely what spectroscopy
has always done and is similar to Heisenberg’s thought experiment with the γ-ray
microscope.  Granted, wavelengths, spectral line widths, frequencies, and other features
are often represented by comparison to a length, inverse time, etc. that is not part of the
problem, but ratio comparisons are always possible since the method of measurement is
through a photon for which the same quantities can be determined.  So, for instance, a
more accurate length measurement might really be a dimensionless ratio of the length of
the object under investigation and the wavelength of the photon detecting the object.
Spectroscopy may not always perform this mathematical method, but a comparison is
often made with the wavelength (frequency, etc.) of the light involved in the experiment
thus partially eliminating the propagation of error.
The idea, then, of having some standard that actually interacts with particles as
they do with one another is given form in the idea of ‘comparison particles.’  A
comparison particle is simply a carrier that includes the standard of measurement and
interacts directly with the object under investigation.  Specifically, the comparison
particle carries the extraneous standard and is thus outside the object-system.  However,
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in order to make a truly objective measurement the comparison particle needs to be
included in the object-system and thus the object-system is expanded to include it.
Eddington refers to this extended object-system somewhat optimistically as the ‘perfect
object-system’ in that it is self-contained:  the standard for measuring the system is
actually within the system itself.
Once inside the object-system, the comparison particle is set to carry only a single
variate, specifically the scale variate, meaning that all other possible variates are
stabilised (recall that scale is now a measurable variable on par with momentum and
energy).  Eddington is careful to point out that the stabilised characteristics of the
comparison particle must be chosen so that they do not affect the measurement of the
desired quantity at all.  But, this means that the only inexact (non-stabilised) quantity in
the comparison particle is then the scale used for comparison, which appears paradoxical.
However, his point is that the stabilised characteristics are imposed by the observer (and
are thus subjective) while the scale, though inexact, is measurable.  Again, this is similar
to the example I gave above regarding spectroscopy.  Via the use of natural units
extraneous standards have fixed relations to the fundamental scale uncertainty of the
physical reference frame (which is embodied in the comparison particle anyway).  By
embodying the scale in a particle (a comparison particle representing the scale) we also
embody the scale uncertainty.
There is another important property of comparison particles that will soon become
useful.  If the comparison particle is outside of the object-system then it is a mean
(average) particle meaning its attributes are based on the collective distribution of all the
particles in the uranoid (essentially they are average quantities).  Since we know that the
larger an assemblage of particles we have, the smaller the effect of the uncertainty
principle or probability in general (i.e. large data sets are always better since they
minimize error), then the uncertainty or fluctuation in an external comparison particle
must be fairly small.  In fact it is σε .
However, if the comparison particle is inside the object-system its attributes are
no longer averages of a large assemblage; it is an individual and thus has an uncertainty
or scale fluctuation on the order of N  times σε  by (5.13) and the fact that R0 = σ /σε .
This seems to indicate comparison particles would have a ridiculously large uncertainty
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in any of their characteristics.  According to Eddington this problem is apparently
overcome by replacing the continuous probability distribution of the scale (internal to the
system) with distribution that is over what he calls ‘eigenscales’ (Eddington 1946, p. 45).
A discrete eigenscale is simply a convention by which the scale for each resulting
(measured) eigenstate is exact.  The scale uncertainty is manifested as an uncertainty in
the state of the system as a whole unless it is stabilised to exist in a particular eigenstate.
By that token, measuring the mass of a comparison particle will not serve as a
standard for measuring other masses that are not in the object-system, but when it is
employed as a standard within the object-system its measured mass is assumed to be the
same as the measurement that would be obtained if it were to trade places and be treated
as the object-particle itself, rather than the comparison particle – i.e. the measurements
for a particle are assumed to be the same regardless of whether it is treated as an object-
particle in one instance and a comparison particle in a different instance.  As such the
comparison particle is, like everything else, just some modification on the standard
carrier meaning that it begins life as an unspecialised element of the uranoid’s energy
tensor.
Eddington assumes that all particles are essentially identical in their most basic
form and relativity simply makes them appear different.  As such in any object-system
there really only needs to be a single comparison particle regardless of how many object-
particles there are.  This is how Eddington analyses atoms, then, by considering one of
the elementary particles in the atom to be the comparison particle while the other (or
others) is the object-particle(s).  In fact, much of this is simply complicated jargon –
Eddington-speak, if you will – and all he is really saying is that the most effective
measurements, particularly in atomic situations, are ratios between like characteristics of
the constituting particles.  For example, rather than measuring a mass for the electron or
the proton by comparing it to some standard kilogram, why not simply compare the
electron and proton to each other?  Could such a measurement be as instructive?
Certainly; imagine comparing these masses to each other as in a hydrogen atom.  Now,
how would we know whether the lighter mass, for example, had any comparison to
anything outside of the atom if we’re not measuring it in reference to anything outside the
atom?  If we’re simply measuring a ratio, who’s to say (assuming, for a moment, we are
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ignorant of the periodic system) there isn’t some other potential two-particle atom with
the same exact ratio but different individual masses?  The logical thing to do in this case
is to then compare the ratios of the masses of the two atoms under consideration.  If this
ratio is unity they have the same total mass meaning the constituent particles must be the
same.  When working with particles that appear to be isolated (e.g. observing a lone
electron in interstellar space) the comparison particle could be the photon (or other carrier
or exchange particle) used to make the observation.  Rather than measuring in terms of
mass, natural units and Einstein’s brilliance allows us to equivalently measure in terms of
energies making the fact that the photon, gluon, and graviton are massless, of little
concern; a ratio of energies would be taken rather than a ratio of masses with the resulting
energy for the isolated particle being resolved into a rest mass.  It is a rather elegant
system of measurement, in my humble opinion, that will be explored further in chapter
eight.
Interchange and Fermi-Dirac Statistics
I will present here Eddington’s interpretation of interchange.  There are subtleties
inherent in the concept that I do not discuss until the next section, specifically the notion
of permutation invariance.  Since Eddington blurred the distinction between quantum and
classical applications of statistics it is best to look at his theory on interchange as a whole
before looking at recent work in permutation invariance that was not influential to
Eddington.  Its subsequent analysis it does bring Eddington’s ideas into a new light.  But
first, Eddington’s version of interchange is presented.
By measuring all positions (and thus velocities) as being relative, observable
coordinates and momenta must involve two physical entities.  In the standard method of
experimental science, measurements actually involve four quantities – two involving the
objects and two involving the comparison.  For example, a length measurement involves
the two end-points of the physical distance between two points as well as the two end-
points of the comparison distance on the yard-stick (tape-measure, ruler, etc.) used to take
the measurement.  Eddington early on made the point that true observables are relative
measurements such as this.  So when measuring the mass of the proton, say, as a ratio to
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the mass of the electron the observed quantity is really the ratio here.  In order to make
sense of this number a comparison ratio must be provided (much like I described in the
previous section regarding measuring quantities for the hydrogen atom).  The true
measurable, to be distinguished from an observable, is the combination of the two ratios.
A measurable, then, is a characteristic that arises from a set of four entities each of which
must, of course, have a probability distribution.  The overall error then grows larger as
the system gets more complex which seems to contradict the notion that errors grow
smaller the larger an assemblage becomes since they average out.  Eddington attempts to
sidestep this problem by taking one or more of the four entities out of the overall object-
system, which I have previously shown reduces their variance, and makes it Gaussian,
which, if it is not negligible, can be accounted for with simple corrections.
His goal here is to reduce systems to a maximum of two probability distributions.
My example with the two hydrogen atoms is another way of stating this.  By measuring
the ratio of the masses of the two particles in both atoms, one deals with only two entities
(not four since it’s a ratio), each of which has a probability distribution.  So by
performing a ratio operation rather than a direct comparison measurement, a maximum of
two probability distributions is all that one encounters.  When comparing to another
hydrogen atom, the atoms are treated as single entities each having a probability
distribution, or, the values for the mass ratios each follow some probability distribution
and it is really these that one is initially comparing.  Either way you still have only two
probability distributions.  The danger is the possibility of losing important correlations by
averaging too soon (analogous to a rounding error caused by excessive rounding in
successive calculations).
Looking at the hydrogen problem yet another way, imagine a hydrogen atom
initially under consideration that includes the two entities A1 and A2 representing the
proton and the electron respectively.  A comparison hydrogen atom would have two
entities ′A1  and ′A2  for its proton and electron respectively.  A true measurable (not
observable) could be written as A1 ′A1A2 ′A2[ ]  where each particle from the first atom is
compared to a similar particle in the second atom (electron to electron, proton to proton).
One can perform the following transformation
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A1 ′A1A2 ′A2[ ]→ A1 ′A2A2 ′A1[ ] (7.1)
where the first proton is now compared to the second electron and first electron is
compared to the second proton.  This process is called ‘interchange’ and, again, builds on
the assumption that all particles are ultimately the same in their basic form.
The idea of interchange arises from Fermi-Dirac statistics (that describe
fermions).  In Relativity Theory of Protons and Electrons (the prelude to Fundamental
Theory) Eddington makes the argument that there is no real difference between the
Coulomb (electromagnetic) interaction and Fermi-Dirac statistics (presumably he would
have had to modify this statement to include the colour (strong) force between quarks in
the same category if he had known of its existence).  Both describe an interaction
meaning they assign to the fermions a probability distribution for position, momentum,
and spin that are different than those for non-interacting particles.  In Fermi-Dirac
statistics symmetrical wave functions have zero probability thus preventing two electrons
from sharing the same set of quantum numbers.  Conversely the Coulomb force modifies
the wave functions such that they satisfy a modified wave equation that is also
asymmetrical (it contains an extra term called the Coulomb energy).  This these two
mechanisms explain the same interaction.  Eddington concluded that it
cannot be seriously maintained that the Coulomb force,
which prevents two slow moving electrons from
approaching one another, is an altogether distinct
phenomenon from the exclusion principle (contained in
Fermi-Dirac statistics) which achieves the same result by
forbidding them to occupy the same phase cell (Eddington
1936, p. 282).
He does not mention how to reconcile this with fast moving electrons which can collide,
thus overcoming the Coulomb force, yet still obey Fermi-Dirac statistics.  The discovery
of bosonic charge clearly refutes Eddington’s claim.  In another example, which is a
demonstration of quantum non-locality (the non-existence of any objective local theory)
and was first experimentally proven in 1982 by Alain Aspect, colliding electrons
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exchange portions of their wavefunctions such that after the collision, regardless of their
separation distance, they cannot be considered as individual particles but rather as a
system.  As such, for example, if one is spin up then the other must be spin down in order
for them to obey the exclusion principle.  This actually implies that these particles are
observationally distinguishable since they are forced to have at least one quantum
property that is different.  Particles in large ensembles cannot be truly considered to be
individuals based on Aspect’s experiment (which was an idealization of Bohm’s
modification (found in his book Quantum Theory) of the famous Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) thought experiment) since they share common properties.  This fits
Eddington’s requirement that particles, unless directly under observation, must be
unidentified members of a large assemblage – they’re ultimately indistinguishable.
The philosophical implications and arguments resulting from Aspect’s experiment
run the gamut from those that believe the experiment (or rather experiments – there were
multiple runs) indicate a flat-out denial of any possibility of hidden variables in physics
(this seems to at least be true locally) to those that have found the peculiar behaviour of
the entangled electrons at great distances (seemingly at odd with special relativity) to be
disconcerting enough to possibly believe in hidden variables (string theory with its 11
dimensions may ultimately resolve this problem in favour of the indeterminate subjective
view that denies the existence of hidden variables).  Since these experiments and even
Bell’s inequalities occurred long after Eddington was gone, he was thus unaware
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen were wrong (especially in 1936, just one year after their
paper was published).
In any case there is now sufficient evidence to support the fact that the Coulomb
force and Fermi-Dirac statistics were not necessarily the same thing since the Coulomb
force could be overcome while Fermi-Dirac statistics could not.  But in 1936 the situation
was considerably different and, though he does not explicitly say as much, Eddington
must have assumed that the relativistic situations that could overcome the Coulomb force
must also have overcome Fermi-Dirac statistics in the process since he considered the
two equivalent.  What happened to the neutron which had ‘won’ its independence, so to
speak (from the electron-proton composite view) by Eddington’s death?  Since charge
was a relativistic phenomenon our perception of Coulomb repulsion (i.e. the inverse
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square law every elementary physics student is familiar with) was purely relativistic and
the exclusion principle itself was the true origin of the force.  In his own words:
This separation of the interaction of electrons into two
effects strongly resembles the separation of gravitation and
inertia in Newtonian mechanics.  The latter taught that a
body tends to move uniformly in a straight line by its
inertia, but is pulled into a different path by the
gravitational field.  Similarly today quantum physics
teaches that electrons tend to take up the probability
distribution corresponding to Fermi-Dirac statistics, but are
forced into a different distribution by their electrical
repulsions.  There is need for the same kind of treatment
that has proved so successful in the unification of
gravitation and inertia (Eddington 1936, p. 282).
Since Fermi-Dirac statistics arose, in Eddington’s view, from the indistinguishability of
the fermions involved in a given process, then the Coulomb force, if it is indeed simply
another manifestation of the same fundamental interaction, must also arise from the
indistinguishability of the fermions involved in that same process.  As I have mentioned
before one reason fermions are indistinguishable is that they are all fluctuations in the
same universal field – so they are not separate objects, necessarily, rather they are like
different wrinkles on the same sheet.  Eddington goes on to show that this
indistinguishability produces the extra Coulomb energy term in the wave equation.
The fundamental idea enumerated above then indicates that, since all fermions
(protons, electrons, etc.) are indistinguishable from one another, they can be interchanged
and any equations applied to the system must be invariant for the interchange of
indistinguishable particles.  Since invariance in this sense (as Eddington applies it) refers
to Lorentz transformations, it is a purely relativistic phenomenon – interchange is simply
a new type of relativity transformation viewed as a rotation of the system (e.g. a
transition could change a mass value).  Interchange involves the transfer of probabilities
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from one object to another and can be carried out gradually via a ‘permutation
coordinate’ that has a conjugate momentum known as the ‘interchange energy’ which is
really the Coulomb energy term in the wave equation (Eddington 1936).  Here Eddington
pauses in a somewhat uncharacteristic display of frustration at his colleagues.  He
laments:
Now that interchange energy is regularly used in practical
problems, it is difficult to see why the author’s theory of
the Coulomb energy of electric charges is still looked upon
as a dubious excrescence on wave mechanics.  In the
equations in current use the identity of interchange energy
and Coulomb energy is accepted (Eddington 1936, p. 283).
He then directly quotes from Dirac’s Quantum Mechanics:
The interchange energy is given as 12Vrs 1+ σ r ,σ s( ){ } ,
whose eigenvalue is the Coulomb energy Vrs.  The unitary
matrix factor depends on the circumstances of the problem
to be treated, and does not affect the identification (Dirac,
1935, 2nd edition, p. 228 as quoted in Eddington 1936, p.
283).
Permutation Invariance and the Indistinguishability Postulate
All of this is very suggestive of modern quantum field theory and one of the major
hallmarks of both QFT and Eddington’s theory is summed up by Zee who says it “should
be recognized as a triumph of quantum field theory that it is able to explain absolute
identity and indistinguishability easily and naturally” (Zee 2003, p. 117).  Eddington’s
theory obviously has numerous holes but it at least shares this fact with QFT.
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However the problem of indistinguishability is not nearly as simple as Zee implies
and has been studied in great depth by a number of current philosophers of physics who
have concluded that particles formerly thought to be indistinguishable might actually not
be in their entirety.  The subject strikes deep at the heart of quantum statistics and
ultimately begins with the notion of permutation invariance (PI).  The basic idea “is that
dynamical laws depend only on the distribution of states, not on which ‘individual’
possesses which state” (Huggett 1999, p. 326).  If permutations are considered invariant it
means that they are undetectable by any measurement whereas transformations are
usually covariant meaning they are only indistinguishable to observers that are likewise
transformed.  The origin of PI is in a paper by Messiah and Greenberg  where they
explained that “dynamical states represented by vectors which differ only by a
permutation of identical particles cannot be distinguished by any observation at any time”
(Messiah and Greenberg 1964, p. 248).  A basic definition and lemma for PI is given by
van Fraassen:
P  is symmetric on set S of events if and only if, for all
members E1, …, En (n = 1, 2, 3, …), the probability of the
sequence [E1, …, E n] is invariant under permutation of
indexes; i.e., P([E1, …, En]) = P([Et1, …, Etn]) for any
permutation t of {1, …, n}.
Lemma: If P and P´ are symmetric on S, so is their mixture
  cP + (1 – c)P´ with 0 ≤ c ≤ 1
(van Fraassen 1991, p. 62).
This is essentially known as De Finetti’s theorem.  Van Fraassen gives a more concise
definition as follows:
Given a sequence of exchangeable random variables f(i),
we can represent their individual distributions P([f(i) < r])
as all produced by integration on a set of distributions
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deriving from probability measures for which these
variables are independent (that is, measures p such that
p([f(i) < r] ∩ ([f(i) < q]) = p([f(i) < r]) p([f(i) < q])) (van
Fraassen 1991, pp. 64-65).
In equation (7.1) Eddington essentially permutes the indices of the variables involved.  In
this case the variables are four particles – two electrons and two protons (an extra for
each for comparison).  Clearly Eddington intends for electrons and protons to be
interchangeable with one another and this arises from his Principle of the Blank Sheet –
all particles are variations on a single mathematical form known as the standard carrier.
Does this imply indistinguishability?  Not necessarily.  All atoms exhibit PI in relation to
exchanges of their electrons (i.e. if two electrons in a sodium atom swapped places no
one would know the difference) but can be individuated by other properties such as
momentum.  So the sodium atoms of my example might be identical (in one sense) but
not necessarily indistinguishable.  This is an important distinction: indistinguishable
particles are all particles in the same quantum state.  Identical particles might be all free
electrons moving at 2/5c but with some other differing property (i.e. they must have
different quantum states even if every other attribute appears to be the same).
There is now another distinction that needs to be made.  There are actually three
types of quantum statistics: Bose-Einstein (BE), Fermi-Dirac (FD), and parastatistics (for
particles that are neither BE or FD).  In Bose’s original work the identity of particles was
ignored; each possible assignment of occupation numbers to the different energy levels
was equiprobable.  Fermi-Dirac statistics, on the other hand, does not assign equal
probabilities to all occupation numbers with the most glaring example being spin states –
if an electron with a given spin state exists in an orbital there is zero probability that
another electron will exist in that orbital with the same spin state.  By contrast, Maxwell-
Boltzmann (MB) statistics are used in classical situations and make a full distinction
between all particles in an ensemble (see van Fraassen 1991, p. 378 for a comparison of
MB with BE).
Let us apply all three statistics, MB, BE, and FD, to a specific example, that of
two dice.  If the exclusion principle holds, then on a given roll the dice cannot have the
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same value in FD.  This reduces the possible outcomes from 36 to 30 and the maximum
possible value becomes 11.  For MB the exclusion principle does not hold so as van
Fraassen puts it, a gambler (who would perhaps unknowingly use MB) would assign a
probability of 1/18 to a roll of 11.  But assuming exclusion applies to both BE and FD but
in different ways, FD gives the probability of 1/15 to a roll of 11 while BE gives the same
roll a probability of 1/21.  What’s the difference between FD and BE?  FD favours
combinations of distinct numbers while BE favours doubles.  So, for example, the
probability in FD of a roll of 12 is 0 while in MB it is 1/36 and in BE it is 1/21.  Thus in
the case of a roll of 11, BE < MB < FD, while in the case of a roll of 12, FD < MB < BE.
It should be clear from this description and Eddington’s definition of interchange
that Eddington reduced FD to BE.  For example, since Eddington insisted that particles
come in pairs (a particle and its comparison since all measurements must be relative), his
statistics favour doubles in a sense similar to BE.  This is actually consistent since pairs
of fermions actually obey BE and single isolated particles were irrelevant (or, better,
uninteresting) to Eddington.  There is also a way to bridge the gap between quantum and
classical statistics here.  As van Fraassen says, BE is the “natural probability function, for
a perfectly simple and natural combination of ignorance and chance” (van Fraassen 1991,
p. 417) and in the case of maximal ignorance agrees with MB.  The case of maximal
ignorance corresponds to a uniform statistical distribution and represents the sole point of
contact between quantum and classical models.
To put a more intuitive spin on this idea we might say that bosons tend to
aggregate in the same cells (we’ll see this is at the heart of Eddington’s version of the
exclusion principle) while fermions tend to aggregate in different cells.  Distinguishable
(classical) particles show no tendency either way (van Fraassen 1991).  However, a word
of caution is in order.  There are other possible aggregations for the various particle types
and the preceding is simply meant as a mental aide in understanding the most basic
difference between FD and BE.
We can clearly see from this intuitive example, however incomplete, that
fermions clearly exhibit individual identity.  In addition bosons clearly exhibit some
sense of identity in pairs, though not as individuals per se.  So is there really such a thing
as indistinguishability?  Again we must be certain to mark the difference between
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indistinguishability and identity.  In the discussion of the various types of statistics
particle attributes were generally limited to the usual quantum numbers.  Clearly,
however, spatial location should be included in any consideration of indistinguishability,
i.e. it is obvious that a blue car parked in your driveway is distinguishable from a blue car
driving simultaneously by your house because they are spatially separate.  In regard to
permutation invariance, a strong version of PI would exclude properties of spatial
location (making it easier to say particles are indistinguishable) while a weak version
would include them (French and Redhead 1988).  Since relativity reminds us that time is
just another dimension, what can we say about temporally separated particles?  Your car
in your driveway now versus two hours from now seems to clearly be the same car.  But
if time and space are of the same basic structure why is one case different from the other?
The answer requires knowledge of where an object obtains its attributes.  The statistics I
introduced above don’t exactly answer that question but they do acknowledge a
difference for different types of particles.  But even in the case of BE where particles
seemingly appear to have little or no individuality it is still clear that they are different
particles, i.e. how can we speak of multiple particles if they don’t have some sense of
individuality?  We might as well be speaking of just a single particle.  This is an
argument that has been used in some PI discussions regarding fermionic states.  To better
understand this, let us return briefly to quantum statistics and consider a two-particle
system.  Following French and Redhead, suppose there are four possible states:
(1) Both particles are in the state |ar>
(2) Both particles are in the state |as>
(3) Particle 1 is in state |ar> and particle 2 in state |as>
(4) Particle 1 is in state |as> and particle 2 in state |ar>
The exclusion principle corresponds to the fact that the first two arrangements are not
allowed for fermions.  For quantum particles, if they are individuals then it is clear that
(3) and (4) are not identical.  But these states aren’t really the ones we use to discuss
quantum statistics.  The relevant states for quantum statistics really are:
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(5) |ar> ⊗ |as>
(6) |as> ⊗ |ar>
(7) (1/√2)(|ar> ⊗ |as> + |as> ⊗ |ar>)
(8) (1/√2)(|ar> ⊗ |as> - |as> ⊗ |ar>)
These four states are mutually orthogonal and span the same subspace as the first four
states but they are chosen so that (5), (6), and (7) are symmetric under an exchange of
particles labels, i.e. they satisfy PI.  (5) and (6) are really the same states as (1) and (2).
The difference is really between (3) and (4) and (7) and (8).  Of these four states all are
symmetric except (8).  So bosons are restricted to the three possible symmetric states
while fermions are restricted to the antisymmetric states of which there is only one – (8)!
Huggett likens this to the imposition of something akin to a boundary condition (Huggett
1999).  As French and Redhead say, states without the correct symmetry are “eliminated
because they are not accessible to the joint quantum system, not because there are no
such states!” (French and Redhead 1988, p. 237).  Recall here that we are speaking of a
joint quantum system meaning two fermions or two bosons.
But what do these states represent?  Well, at some point if we wish to avoid
mindless mental exercises there ought to be something practical at the end and in
quantum mechanics that is usually an observable.  I can now introduce the
Indistinguishability Postulate (IP) in quantum mechanics:
       (9)  <Pφ|Q|Pφ> = <φ|Q|φ>,  ∀Q,  ∀φ
where |φ> is an arbitrary N-particle state and Q is a possible observable (French and
Redhead 1988).  What (9) does is restrict the possible states for the N-particle system.  In
fact it limits it to only the fermion or boson possibilities.  However, it could be
interpreted as a restriction on the number of possible observables for the N-particle
system.  This has the effect of reducing the accessibility of the states rather than their
existence.  But how does that affect the individuality of the given particles?
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Take (8), for instance.  In this case the particles are not in separate states.  Rather
they both exist partially in both states |ar> and |as>.  This is the situation entangled
particles encounter.  They do not have an identity unto themselves because they are in
fact a mixture of two states.  For example, imagine a can of white paint and a can of
black paint.  Let us say they interact such that in the end we still have two cans of paint,
but each can has an equal amount of both black and white paint.  This is a superposition
of states.  But, if Q is our measured observable standard interpretations of quantum
mechanics refer to Q1 and Q2 as expectation values in accordance with statistical
probabilities and not as values actually possessed by the corresponding particles.
However, French and Redhead have clearly shown that PI can be violated in such a
situation (French and Redhead 1988).  If these particles – or, rather, the observables
corresponding to the measurement of these particles – are not invariant to permutations
meaning that we can tell if they are suddenly switched, then even though they consist of a
mixture of states, they can be discerned as individuals.  The simplest way to do this
harkens back to Eddington as we’ll see: spatio-temporal separation.  If nothing else, these
particles are spatio-temporally different.
Fermi-Dirac Statistics and the Coulomb Force in Fundamental Theory
Let’s return, then, to Eddington’s claim that the Coulomb force and the exclusion
principle, which results from Fermi-Dirac statistics, indicates that there must be some
relation between spin and electrical charge.  I present two arguments here.  The first is
related to the above discussion of permutation invariance and indistinguishability while
the second is more heuristic.
Eddington essentially is claiming that in an atom the reason there is a limit to the
number of electrons in an orbital (i.e. exclusion) is because Coulomb repulsion forces the
additional electrons into another orbital.  Obviously this implies that the repulsion
between electrons with like spin is greater than the repulsion of electrons with dislike
spin since two electrons can exist in the same orbital if they have different spin states.
Clearly this also implies there ought to be an additional term in Coulomb’s law (and
Eddington, in fact, has added this term).  Since electrons are fermions they would obey
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FD and tend to congregate in their own cells making them fairly easily distinguishable on
an individual basis.  But, in addition, they tend to aggregate in groups of two since that is
the maximum number of electrons possible in a given orbital (or suborbital).  In that
sense they appear to obey BE at least in pairs.  Recall that in cases where the exclusion
principle applies, BE < MB < FD, while in cases where the principle does not apply, FD
< MB < BE.  In the case of the atom, then, starting with an orbital, FD has the highest
probability and the orbital is thus filled with two fermions, the limit provided by the
exclusion principle.  The orbital (or suborbital) gets filled in pairs and thus, exclusion
being fulfilled, BE now gives the highest probability (this explains why pairs of fermions
behave like bosons).  However, none of this provides a clear mathematical interpretation
of the existing version of Coulomb’s law.  So, at least from a statistical standpoint linking
Coulomb repulsion to FD would require an additional term in the force law equation
which Eddington has supplied in order to account for the relative strength in excluding
and non-excluding situations.  So now a more heuristic argument is made.
We already know what spin is, but what exactly is charge?  We return once again
to the fundamental description of the universe as particles and their interactions where the
interactions are actually mediated by more particles.  The electromagnetic interaction is,
of course, mediated by the photon.  Obviously, then, there must be some exchange of
photons when charges are in close proximity (in fact the electromagnetic interaction, as
I’ve shown, is infinite in range as evidenced by the fact that we can observe quasars on
the edge of the universe).  The photons are exchanged in a different manner depending on
whether the charges are alike or not.  One of the most common ways of describing
particles is through a mathematical term known as a propagator.  A propagator describes
how a particle moves and through some fairly complex math can also describe how
particles are created an annihilated.  Charge can thus be described as being a measure of
how photons propagate.38  Note that the same analogy cannot necessarily be made for the
                                                 
38 A major question any serious believer in probabilistic methods should ask at this point is, why are the
proton and electron charges exactly equal?  Why doesn’t the uncertainty principle dictate minor differences
between the two?  The answer is fairly complicated but boils down to the fact that the renormalization of
the charge is directly related to the photon and can be derived from something known as gauge invariance.
Ultimately since the photon has to propagate between positive and negative charges, they must have the
same value; any fluctuation would throw the photon off course.  It’s a bit like imagining the photon is a dart
and the charges are dart boards: moving a board might cause the dart to miss it entirely!  This can be
explained macroscopically by the fact that atoms must be electrically neutral to an amazing degree of
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relationship between the graviton and mass since the graviton propagator can be written
in flat space-time in which case it contains no mass terms, whereas the renormalized
photon propagator does contain charge (or, rather, charge-related) terms.
So we now know that charge is a measure of how the photon propagates, but how
is it related to spin?  Charge is not a wholly fermionic phenomenon since, for instance, a
pair of electrons has a charge of –2e but obeys BE.  What, then, is the difference between
a pair of (coupled) electrons and a single electron?  Quite simply, the spin.  A pair of
coupled electrons (e.g. a Cooper pair) must obey the exclusion principle and thus, with
one spin-up and the other spin-down, they will have a total spin of zero.  We can rule out
a direct relation then between charge, in general, and FD since it is possible to have
particles with charge that obey BE.  The problem is that we also can find particles
without charge that obey FD (e.g. n (the standard neutron), Λ0 , Σ0 , Δ0 , and Ξ0  are all
neutral baryons and neutrinos are neutral leptons).  It seems that Eddington’s correlation
between Coulomb repulsion and exclusion as formulated in FD is simply incorrect,
though in deference to him, many of these particles were not known then (though the
neutron was).  In addition, Pauli proposed his famous spin-statistics theorem in 1940 that
linked spin values to statistics (half-integer spin to FD and integer spin to BE; Pauli
1940).
Eddington could have been onto something here, however, since there is a
correlation between the weak interaction and particles obeying FD.  The weak interaction
essentially transmutes quarks and leptons (e.g. electrons, neutrinos, muons, and taus)
from one form to another (essentially this is parity violation) and these are the most basic
fermionic particles.  In essence the weak interaction allows particles to exchange
characteristics.  This raises the question of indistinguishability once again.  However, if
this is merely a permutation of observables between particles I have shown above that in
some senses these particles are nonetheless still distinguishable.  In any case, the weak
interaction is the mechanism by which particles can permute various indices.  In fact,
neutrinos only interact via the weak interaction.  It turns out that all half-integer spin
particles interact via the weak interaction and the weak interaction only occurs between
                                                                                                                                                  
accuracy if standard cosmology is to work.  If not, electrostatic forces between large objects would literally
tear the universe apart.
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particles with half-integer spin.  All half-integer spin particles must have antisymmetric
wavefunctions meaning they obey FD.  As such it stands to reason that there is a link
between the exclusion principle (or FD) and the weak interaction.  At phenomenally high
energies (e.g. at levels found in the early universe) the electromagnetic and weak
interactions were simply different manifestations of the same interaction and so through
electroweak unification there might be some way to reconcile Eddington’s proposal.  One
final note, however, is that indistinguishability in Eddington’s theory does not result from
quantum effects but rather from relativity where all particle variables are frame-
dependent and interchangeable.  Again this reminds us that Eddington really blurs the
lines between quantum and classical effects.
Fundamentals of Eddingtonian Interchange
Imagine, then, a proton and an electron along with their corresponding comparison
particles.  When brought together into a single system this is a measurable.  But due to
their common origin in the standard carrier of protons and electrons (Eddington’s
reasoning for this is vastly different than convention as I’ll show) there is only a need for
a single comparison particle in the combined system since both are represented by V136
(there is no need to duplicate the extraneous standard).  As such, when a proton and an
electron are combined there are now a total of three particles rather than four in the
measurable (just one comparison particle is needed).  However, some fourth object must
remain in order to preserve (7.1).  As such the permutation variate is introduced to carry
the extra information required by (7.1).  The permutation variate in Eddington’s theory
adds an interchange energy to the system that is the Coulomb energy.  This transforms
the standard carrier V136 into a V137 by adding an extra degree of freedom (the multiplicity
increases by one).  Basically Eddington accounts for the electromagnetic interaction here
simply through the concept of interchange – protons and electrons are bound together via
interchange which, ultimately, is simply some combined form of FD and BE (I will
discuss this in great depth later).
In bringing two particles together into a single system their two separate scale
momenta are replaced by a join scale momentum and a permutation momentum and their
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two phase coordinates are replaced by a joint phase coordinate and a permutation
coordinate.  The permutation coordinate is defined to be an angle for several reasons
(basically he works up to everything here from relativity as I mentioned previously).
First, it incorporates natural units without any difficulty.  Second, a transformation
through 2π restores the original measurable and limits the range of uncertainty to 2π (this
is actually a permutation and exhibits PI).  This limit to the uncertainty is the widening
factor discussed in the previous chapter in relation to the treatment of scale as a variable.
A change in configuration via (7.1) can either happen as a result of actual spatial motion
or simply by an increase in the permutation coordinate by π.  Eddington uses the term
‘interchange’ solely in regard to the latter which, in the ‘old’ quantum theory (before the
advent of wave and matrix mechanics), would be considered to be a quantum jump.  In
the basic original form of wave mechanics the jump is represented as a continuous flow
of probability from one state to another.  The discretisation appears as previously
described in the eigenvalues for given eigenstates.  Eddington pictures this jump as a
circulation in an extra spatial dimension normal to (3 + 1) space-time (this circulation is
just the permutation coordinate I just described).  Ultimately, as I have described before,
he is working in a (4 + 1) space-time.  Mathematically the extra interchange (Coulomb)
term results from the inability of the probability distribution to satisfy the continuity
equation if only spatial transitions are accounted for.  The interchange term then is added
in order to preserve continuity.  Since quantisation requires that there are no eigenstates
with zero angular momentum in a plane of degeneracy (which the interchange rotation is
in), interchange is unavoidable (Eddington 1946).  The link between Eddington’s
interchange and PI is the indistinguishability of particles in large ensembles.  As I have
mentioned before, however, recent has pointed to weaknesses in PI.  If Eddington’s
interchange is simply an alternate formulation of PI then it is subject to the same
criticisms.
Interchange in Fundamental Theory is ultimately relativistic in character since it
relies on the indistinguishability of particles that is due to the frame dependence of all
characteristics.  Since relativity implies that there is no absolute frame of reference and,
thus, motion is a completely relative term, any particle can be brought to rest (or similarly
accelerated) simply through a transformation.  Since energy is related to velocity as well
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as mass, it makes sense that it might be possible to change the mass of a particle through
a relativistic transformation (this is not the same thing as changing the mass through a
weak interaction).  In fact the known masses of particles are really their rest masses
since, as a particle is accelerated, its mass is converted to energy.  As such, as far as
masses are concerned, relativistic transformations can theoretically make protons and
electrons indistinguishable.  Though this is jumping ahead just a bit, Eddington assumes
the same is true of spin and charge.  For spin, despite the point-like nature of fundamental
particles, he assumes a frame rotating with spin-up could be transformed into a frame
rotating with spin-down just as a frame embedded in the Earth could be transformed into
a frame with opposite spin (this is pretty simple to imagine in a classical sense – who
says ‘north’ is ‘up?’ – there’s really nothing special about either north or south).  The
only difference quantum mechanically is that it essentially takes two complete rotations
to return to the original state.  But this does not affect the relativistic view Eddington
imposes – two rotations are the same regardless what direction you’re viewing it from.
So spin and mass are both frame-dependent quantities.  However, one must remember
that any transformation that changes spin-up into spin-down, also changes the original
spin-down into spin-up, i.e. the interchange must occur in pairs.  In the case of spin this is
true because as soon as an axis of rotation is introduced into anything it immediately
creates a duality in that there are two possible ways to rotate around that axis.
Charge is a trickier matter, however, since there is no simple intuitive way of
thinking about it in frame-dependent terms.  As I’ve shown charge is essentially a
measure of how the photon propagates.  But, obviously it propagates differently
depending on the sign of the charges involved – if they’re alike then the photons produce
repulsion, while if they’re different the photons produce attraction.  Ultimately in the
equation for the effective action of the photon (in general the massive vector meson),
which contains the propagator, there exists a source (current) term, J µ (x)  that can be
modified to accommodate both positive (p) and negative (n) charges as J µ = Jp
µ − Jn
µ .
When the charges are alike the effective action is positive producing repulsion; when the
charges are not alike the effective action is negative producing attraction.  Thus, if charge
is to be considered frame-dependent, then a rotation of the frame of J µ (x)  must change
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its sign, i.e. J µ (−x) = −J µ (x)  must be true.  However, a simple derivation, following
Lorentz’ own reasoning, can show that 
 
∂µJ
µ = ∇i j + ∂ρ
∂t
.  Since the conservation of
charge requires that 
 
∂ρ
∂t
+∇i j = 0  then ∂µJ µ = 0  meaning charge can neither be created
nor destroyed (Zee 2003).  Thus any change in reference that flips a sign, say, from
positive to negative must flip some other sign from negative to positive in order to
maintain charge conservation.  This is the same situation we have just seen occurs with
spin (your right hand is your mirror image’s left hand and your left hand is your mirror
image’s right hand).
Eddington confronts this with the idea that particles are simply carriers of
variates.  Charge, mass, and spin are all simply the contents of the carriers themselves.
As such a particle V10 as defined by Eddington could carry the information for either an
electron or a proton.  This is born out of the idea that interacting particles (at least to
Eddington) cannot be considered as individuals.  In some sense this is similar to the weak
interaction’s ability to transfer characteristics from one particle to another thus
reinforcing the notion that particles are simply ‘empty’ structures that can be filled in
various ways in order to appear different.
The one topic I have not touched much on yet that requires discussion is how
particles behave in atoms – can the proton and the electron in a hydrogen atom
interchange attributes and, if so, is the result still the same hydrogen atom?  Could we tell
such an interchange had occurred?  Eddington would say the answer is yes and would
cite PI (if he had been aware of it).  French and Redhead, van Fraassen, and Huggett
would say the answer is no because PI is not strong enough to completely make the two
particles indistinguishable.
External v. Internal
There is an alternate way of looking at atoms.  Rather than treating them as a collection
of particles, one can redivide the system into what Eddington referred to as ‘external’ and
‘internal’ particles.  This is not uniquely Eddingtonian; it is common practice among
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nuclear scientists and others, though it is not referred to in the same jargon.  For example
two-particle systems are often represented by examining the centre of mass on one hand
and the internal energy interactions on the other hand (Gasiorowicz 1996).  So
Eddington’s external particle is the hydrogen atom as a whole represented by its centre of
mass, while the internal particle is a representation of the internal energy of the atom or
the interactions between the electron and proton.  The usual notation for the masses of
these two ‘particles’ is
M = m + ′m ,     µ = m ′m (m + ′m ) (7.2)
where M is the mass of the external particle (the hydrogen atom as a single unit) and µ is
the mass of the internal particle referred to in modern texts as the ‘reduced mass’
(Gasiorowicz 1996).  In typical Eddington form he develops new jargon for these
particles: ‘extracules’ and ‘intracules.’
By analysing the system in this manner interchange becomes quite simplified
since, if one only considers the extracule, interchange is irrelevant since it is an internal
property.  Eddington verifies this by considering the coordinates of the extracule in the
usual mass-of-mass manner, but then treating the coordinates of the intracule in his usual
manner by taking a difference between the particles making up the intracule.  So the
coordinate ‘position’ for the intracule is really a coordinate difference of the two
participating particles, which follows Eddington’s reasoning that only relative
coordinates have meaning.  He uses similar reasoning to show that the total volume of the
bi-particle (extracule/intracule system) is the same as the standard hydrogen atom, thus
certifying his approach (and as I’ve noted this is all fairly standard practice today, though
without the unusual jargon).  However, the Hamiltonians in each system do not quite
match.  This is because when the system is transformed from a proton-electron system to
an extracule-intracule system the zero-level for the energy is adjusted to account for the
additional density of the distribution – essentially the datum is shifted.  This
transformation is referred to by Eddington as “freeing the intracule” (Eddington 1946, p.
53).
The Hamiltonian is then written in the form (for the energy)
E = µ1 +
p2
2µ2
(7.3)
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where µ1 is the rest mass and µ2 is call the mass-constant of the particle.  He makes the
point that the two agree in a purely inertial field.  However “the particle possesses
potential energy in a gravitational or electrical field, and this constitutes the difference
µ1 − µ2 ” (Eddington 1946, p. 53).  What happened to equivalence?  Has Eddington
abandoned it entirely?  He clearly has a point that there does exist a potential in the
presence of a gravitational field that is not there in an inertial situation, but the
equivalence of gravitational and inertial frames is one of the great breakthroughs Einstein
made with relativity!  Clearly something is amiss.  It seems unfathomable that such an
ardent supporter of Einstein’s theory would abandon one of its key results.  In addition,
Eddington makes one more rather subtle error that is made by many modern physics text
authors (and this could perhaps simply be Eddington using the colloquial terminology as
most authors still do): he attributes the potential energy to the particles themselves.  In
reality potential energy is associated only with interactions (thus it could be said that
exchange particles contain potential energy).  Potential energy is entirely absent in
situations where a particle is completely isolated.  In the case of the hydrogen atom there
is, of course, potential energy associated with the interactions inside the atom, but this is
considered to be a contribution to the internal energy of the atom if the atom is treated as
a single object.39  This seems to be a fatal flaw in reasoning, but, for the sake of
completeness, let us continue to follow Eddington’s course.
Eddington associates the mass-constant with the given mass values in tables of
physical constants.  When µ1 = µ2  the particle is referred to as ‘free’ and when µ1 = 0  it
is referred to as ‘bound’ (Eddington 1946).  Intracules are considered to be bound
particles in classical theory since they are made up of other particles bound to each other
(as such nucleons could be analysed using the external/internal particle model).  In scale-
fixed or quantal theory intracules are to be treated as free particles.  Eddington argues that
Dirac’s wave equation for the hydrogen atom is actually an equation for a free intracule.
As such there must be some way to connect situations in which the intracule is free to
                                                 
39 Since potential energy is associated only with interactions and it is not present in purely inertial
situations, equivalence implies that potential energy is a relative quantity.  In fact this is indeed true since a
conversion of potential to kinetic energy simply requires a Lorentz transformation – shifting a particle to its
rest frame eliminates kinetic energy but since four-momentum must be conserved it must be transferred to
another form, namely potential.  In the case of an isolated particle this would require the emission of a
photon that would carry away the potential energy.
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those in which it is bound.  Obviously in passing from the bound state to the free state the
intracule gains µ1(= µ2 )  amount of energy meaning relativistically that the datum for
zero energy has been shifted.  Since in relativity energy determines the gravitational field
and thus the metric this shift is important since it appears to naively create energy.  Once
again Eddington appears to demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the principle
of equivalence.  On the other hand, philosophically, Eddington could have been pointing
out a fundamental flaw in the understanding of equivalence at that time.  Equivalence is
much easier to understand in this particular context when it is known that the interactions
contain the potential energy and that the interactions themselves are particles.  In that
sense the difference between gravitational and inertial situations is simply the presence of
an additional particle, the graviton.  Simple relativistic transformations can shift the
kinetic and potential energies around in such a situation.  Since the exchange particle
description of interactions was first proposed by Yukawa, as I have discussed in depth
before, and was not really even discussed in Europe until much later, the acceptance of
these ideas came about long after Eddington had died.  As such, from his point of view
there did appear to be a fundamental philosophical problem with equivalence.
Continuing with his line of reasoning, however, the double wavefunction of the
V136 particle will have to be broken into separate wavefunctions for the extracule and the
intracule.  The energy given by the Hamiltonian (7.3) is then resolved into
Ee = m0 ,     Ei = µ + p
2 2µ (7.4)
where m0 is the proper mass of the external particle (in this case the hydrogen atom).  As
Eddington explains, due to the change in datum, the rest energy of the standard particle
(standard carrier V136) is now
m0 + µ = 137136 m0 = βm0 . (7.5)
The factor β accounts for the ratio of degrees of freedom that arises from making the
transition to the extracule/intracule representation.  Basically what is happening here is
that interchange introduces an extra energy term as I’ve shown previously.  The extra
energy term is equivalent to the Coulomb energy.  Up until this point I have offered no
explanation for this.  The reasoning becomes self-evident, however, when one considers
that the extra term is eliminated by the shift to the extracule/intracule representation.
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What’s different here?  The proton and electron in the hydrogen atom are now considered
together as an intracule and the electromagnetic interaction occurring between them
becomes internal energy for a single particle.  So the interchange energy must be the
Coulomb energy since it is the Coulomb energy that is eliminated (or rather transformed
into internal energy) in the transition to the new representation.
Particles represented by (7.5) are then referred to as ‘hydrocules’ (Eddington
1946).  This becomes the second system for representing energy.  The first system that I
will label A includes a standard particle uranoid with bound intracules while the second
system that I will label B includes a hydrocule uranoid with free intracules.  So in the first
system the standard reference system for the universe (see discussion in chapter five) is
as we have seen up to this point and is particularly useful when working with large
systems of particles (or even galaxies if they are treated as particles).  Since this is not
always useful in microscopic situations it pays to have a second standard reference
system and the hydrocule is it.
The change in standard reference for the move to the microscopic has a few
consequences.  The first is that in moving from a standard particle to a hydrocule 1137  of
the mass is converted to energy (the interchange energy represented by the extra degree
of freedom).  In macroscopic situations a change in density of a large number of particles
disrupts gravitational equilibrium.  In relativity only the density of a steady distribution of
particles at rest (the density of a pressureless Einstein universe) is compatible with the
gravitational constant G.  As such the hydrocule, if used extensively in converting back
and forth between microscopic and macroscopic situations would require an adjustment.
Since it is the density that requires matching to G one could simply redistribute the
particles over a smaller volume in order to maintain the density.  Conversely G (and, as a
result of the system of natural units, ) could be varied (this is a result both Milne and
Dirac found explicitly in their own cosmologies).  Eddington finds a third way by
coupling with a change from A to B a change in the extraneous standard.  Essentially the
measured densities are multiplied by β.  The particle density, s, of both the standard
uranoid and the hydrocule uranoid are kept the same thus requiring dividing the mass-
density by β.  But, by changing the standard as well the mass-density is restored to its
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original value keeping the uranoid compatible with G.  As such  remains unchanged.  In
summary, s, G, and  do not change in moving from A to B.
The above is logically consistent with Eddington’s previous statements: the
extraneous standard is furnished by the uranoid itself (see chapters five and six) and thus
any change in uranoid will be accompanied by a change in standard making the entire
transformation relativistic.  The result for lengths and times is that in moving from A to B
they are multiplied by β−
1
6 .  However this can only be applied to quantities that are
directly measured.  Scale-free particles can only carry a density since they must be free of
unit-dependence (and density can be developed as a dimensionless ratio with the proper
system of natural units).  Scale-free particles are not carriers of mass and any masses
attributed to them are not directly measurable.  Technically, then, m0, M, and µ are really
densities that have been converted into masses when passing into scale-fixed theory.
Ultimately we find that the rest masses m0 β  and m0 of the hydrocule and standard
particle (carrier) in A are converted to m0 and m0 + µ  respectively.  As an example
consider the hydrogen atom at rest both externally and internally as the standard particle.
Results for system A, which is the standard system we are normally familiar with, have
already been determined in chapters five and six.  In system B, however, the rest mass is
made up of the mass of the extracule m0 and the mass of the intracule µ.  The
corresponding energies become
Ee = m0 + ′p
2 2m0 ,     Ei = µ + p
2 2µ . (7.6)
Compare this to (7.4) and we find an additional term present in the extracule’s energy.  In
(7.6) both external classical motion ′p  and the motion of the transition from A to B, p,
are accounted for.
Interpreting the Energy Transfer
What has happened here is that energy in the form of µ is added to the system in order to
free the intracule.  In the process the rest mass of the atom changes to m0 + µ  though its
mass (or mass constant as Eddington calls it) m0 for classical motion (by a change of
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space-time axes) does not change.  The added energy must be potential since it does not
alter the position of the atom and is not put into motion if the atom is put into motion (i.e.
relative to the atom itself – it moves with the atom).
As I have already discussed extensively Eddington has interpreted this added
energy as electrical (the interchange energy is really the Coulomb energy).  In addition I
have pointed out faults in this line of reasoning, though such faults were aimed primarily
at the link between Coulomb energy and the exclusion principle.  Building on that idea I
have suggested that it is really the energy associated with the weak interaction that can be
related to the exclusion principle.  However, Eddington was unaware of the weak
interaction’s existence while he was working and he attributed this relationship to the
electromagnetic energy instead, which makes sense for charged particles given the
knowledge of the day.
I have already shown that by adding the permutation variate and thus the
interchange energy a V136 particle (standard carrier) becomes a V137 particle thus adding a
phase space dimension (multiplicity).  I have also shown that the rest masses of these are
related by ′m0 = m0 β .  Since I have just shown that the latter is the mass of the
hydrocule we can conclude that a V137 is a hydrocule.  Both particles are hydrogen atoms.
The difference is related to the observation taking place.  In dealing with the standard
carrier an observation (that, of course, must interact with the atom itself) is made to
determine (within the uncertainty limitation) the location of the electron and proton
relative to each other.  In dealing with the hydrocule an observation is made that seeks to
determine exactly which particle is at which location.  The latter is a deeper
understanding of the given situation and thus atomic, nuclear, or quantum physicists
would be inclined to use the hydrocule while physicists dealing with large-scale
phenomena will be inclined to use the standard uranoid as first developed.  Once again
Eddington has developed a system of moving from macroscopic to microscopic.  One
other interpretation that he adds is to view the standard particle as the V136 of system A
and the hydrocule as the V136 of system B.  Or, in atomic physics (B), the hydrocule
consists of an extracule and a bound intracule while the standard particle consists of an
extracule and a free intracule (both equivalently consist of an electron and a proton).
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One of the limitations in Eddington’s interpretation comes from the fact that
experimental nuclear physics was unable to really probe the contents of the atom in a
manner he would have found sufficient until well after his death.  Certainly the nucleus
had been artificially broken apart in 1919 by Rutherford and Chadwick’s discovery of the
neutron came in 1932.  However, when Chadwick made his momentous discovery it was
still thought that the neutron was actually a proton-electron composite.  The neutron was
not recognized as elementary by anyone but a few until 1933 when Heisenberg proposed
that exchange forces occurred between protons and neutrons in the nucleus (which was
treated quantum-mechanically).  Even then Heisenberg’s theory still held that the neutron
was an electron-proton composite.  At the 1933 Solvay Congress the debate about the
elementary nature of the neutron was prominent.  By October 1934 most everyone was
convinced of its elementary status by new data showing that the neutron was actually
more massive than an electron and proton together and that it was unstable spontaneously
decaying into a proton and an electron.  At this point electrons ceased to be considered
nuclear particles.  Note that Eddington’s first crack at a fundamental theory was
Relativity Theory of Protons and Electrons that was published a mere two years later
(1936) with much of the sourcework performed earlier.  Clearly nuclear physics was not
well understood phenomenologically then.  Linear accelerators and cyclotrons did not
make a large-scale appearance until the late 1930s and then mostly in the United States.
Lise Meitner (1878 – 1968) and Otto Frisch (1904 – 1979) first realized that a uranium
nucleus could split when capturing a slow moving neutron only in 1938 and their fission
hypothesis was first reported in early 1939.  The basis for a true understanding of atomic
energy was laid later that year when Bohr and John Wheeler (b. 1911) completed a
semiempirical study that appeared as a paper in Physical Review on September 1, 1939,
the same day World War II began (Kragh 1999).  Needless to say work on atomic energy
and in physics in general focused less on general understanding than on wartime
applications for many years.  Since Eddington died in 1944, nearly a year before
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he never witnessed the atom and nucleus truly probed to a level
that would have met his satisfaction.
As such Eddington was forced to conclude that system A corresponded to
observed quantities since most observations of hydrogen were as a gas consisting of
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countless atoms and thus were macroscopic.  Since linear accelerators and cyclotrons
were so new no one was really experimentally studying single atoms yet, at least not to
the level required.  Experimental physics was firmly system A and system B was wholly
theoretical.  In order to make any proper experimental investigation of system B the
associated quantities would need to be transformed into system A for comparison to
observables and other data.  Or, conversely, data observed under A would have to be
transformed to B and compared with predicted theoretical values.  He gives specific
conversion factors for e, , and ℑ  (Faraday’s constant).  He also derives an exact
procedure (anchorage as he calls it) for obtaining theoretical values from experimental
measurements.  Secondary methods (anchors) exist, of course, and he outlines three
including the spectroscopic determination of the proton-electron mass ratio, the
deflection determination of e mec , and the direct determination of h/e.  Eddington is
blunt in basically saying that, since theory and measurement obviously have to agree, if a
theory does not match measurement something must be done to force it to match.  In his
own words:
We have to accept the convention that any quantity that has
been extensively used in the systematisation of
observational knowledge has acquired thereby the status  of
a vested interest.  It if [sic] does not arise naturally in the
theory we have to go out of our way to introduce it in order
to avoid talking a different language from everyone else.
Unless an internal inconsistency is detected the established
procedure of reduction of the measurements – which is the
definition of quantity – must be accepted without
amendment (Eddington 1946, pp. 57-58).
Eddington’s derivation of the Coulomb energy is far more extensive than is
presented here and continues well beyond the subject of this monograph that is interested
primarily in uncertainty and exclusion in his theory.  He gives several early arguments for
it in the various chapters leading to the exclusion discussion but does not fully investigate
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it until he develops a wave equation for the intracule much later.  But he does make the
point that the addition of the Coulomb energy changes the multiplicity to 137 that is
roughly the fine structure constant (he argues, as I’ll show in chapter eight, that it is
exactly 137).  More specifically he points out that the derivation of the fine-structure
constant produces the k in V137 rather than k + 1 in V136.  Utilizing the mechanics of a large
ensemble of particles in relativity theory Eddington derives the expansion energy for a
wave packet as being  3
2 4σ 2m .  This is twice the value for the mean kinetic energy of
the particle and thus the particle’s total energy consists entirely of this and mass energy
since, if it is isolated or non-interacting, there is no potential energy term.  In order to
stop (or slow) the expansion, a negative potential must be introduced.  The result
produces an equation describing a spinless V3 particle.  The macroscopic form of this
process involves an assemblage of particles attempting to disperse and a negative
potential energy must be introduced to prevent (or at least inhibit) the dispersal.  As such
Eddington has introduced a method of argument seemingly supportive of steady-state
cosmologies.  Since he calculates the rate of expansion he obviously does not believe in a
static universe, but his methods introduce the possibility.  The expansion energy, then, is
countered by a negative potential energy.  But he argues throughout Fundamental
Theory, particularly in direct response to Dirac, that negative potential energy is simply a
result of shifting the datum.  As such the negative potential energies, as described in
chapter five, are really positive energies opposing the expansion energy.  The additional
energy must be ‘created’ somehow, seemingly in violation of energy conservation, and it
is through interchange that this occurs.  Thus the additional potential opposing expansion
of the wavepacket or the universe in general is the Coulomb energy.  Relating this extra
energy to spin, since spin is really a frame-dependent quantity (at least in his mind – he
makes it clear that he believed that the idea that it had to pass through two full rotations
to return to its original state was a spurious notion), if angular momentum is to be
conserved there must be a recoil spin inside the atom.  It is the study of this recoil spin
that leads to the derivation of the fine structure constant that is also equal to the
multiplicity produced by the extra energy.  As such conservation of momentum produces
a recoil spin that produces the extra Coulomb energy term represented as interchange
energy that was due to the ability of particles to exchange characteristics.  In addition,
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this provides a direct relation between spin and the Coulomb energy, which is the basis of
his reasoning for equating the Coulomb force with the exclusion principle.
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VIII
Exclusion
Having discussed some of the conditions required for uniqueness including how this
relates to the concept of interchange and the ability to represent composite particles in
alternate ways, the robust development of these ideas will ultimately lead us down the
path to the exclusion principle.
Observations Involving Time
As has been repeated numerous times, the process of measurement disturbs a system.
However, the interference is not always intentional.  It is possible that a system may
spontaneously release information that is eventually detected by one or more of our five
senses.  In fact anything we naturally sense in our day-to-day lives is this type of
‘measurement.’  It does not eliminate the fact, however, that there is a selective bias in
the measurement since the system under measurement is still interacting with its
environment that happens to include ourselves.  This seems to rule out purely objective
theories (Eddington 1946).
We can therefore not properly speak of ‘undisturbed states’ since there is no such
thing.  As such there should be a standard measure of the amount of interaction caused by
observation in general, which is to say “the system is subjected to a conventional amount
of probing” (Eddington 1946, p. 70).  The only characteristics available for analysis from
such a system are those revealed by this probing.  Any sporadic information that pops
into the picture cannot be included in the analysis since we’re not then describing the
normal state we set out to describe.  In essence, we put limitations on measurements, i.e.
we idealize experiments in order to filter out the noise of everyday experience.  However,
this means that the ‘normal state’ is not always the same since we are free to define it in
any way we please.  However, in doing this, new systems and particles will be defined.
For example the standard hydrogen atom becomes the hydrocule when attempting to
study its structure.
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There is nothing, however, that is stopping us from introducing a standardised
amount of interference just as we have introduced the standard background as the
uranoid.  Once again this is developed to help account for the transition from
macroscopic to microscopic.  Normally the generalised coordinates and momenta are
enough to define a system where the number of these pairs that are produced is the
multiplicity.  But some level of standard interference really must be introduced to
properly handle any measurement of such quantities.  One of the problems here is that
observables do not generally commute (e.g. coordinates and momenta).  As such they are
treated as a join-observable – they only make sense when observed in tandem.  The joint-
observable has a probability distribution that can describe either the coordinates or
momenta.  Since the uncertainty principle puts a lower bound on the joint knowledge of
these two measurements, one way to define the level of interference (probing) here is to
use this lower bound as the minimum fixed value for the observation.  In this situation the
system is described as being ‘fully observed.’
What happens after an observation concludes and the system is no longer being
disturbed (interfered with)?  If the initial observation was made at time t0, at some later
time t0 + τ  the combined uncertainty is greater than it was at t0.  Essentially the
uncertainty increases with τ.  This is really just the backwards interpretation of
wavefunction collapse – a large amount of uncertainty exists prior to an observation.
Once the observation is performed the uncertainty disappears since the wavefunction
collapses to a single eigenvalue in a single eigenstate.  Eddington qualitatively describes
this in reverse – the wave packet is expanding as was described in the previous section.
So, an observation reverses the process of expansion on a wave packet.  In essence the
observation furnishes the extra (negative) potential energy that inhibits and eventually
reverses wave packet expansion.  Eddington defines the time, τ, as measured from the
instant of cessation of the full observation, as a ‘coefficient of under-observation’ for the
system (Eddington 1946).  In essence any time an observation concludes the system is
said to be under-specified.  The only way to fully specify a system is to always observe it.
The only way over-observation could occur is if measurement of the variables of some
system continued after that system had completely vanished which is unlikely.
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So the standard probing that corresponds to the zero-temperature uranoid that is
the standard environment is a full observation.  If the system is then observed from birth
to death, so-to-speak, any interference is automatically always a part of that system.  For
instance, if one observes a particle for a tenth of its lifetime, nine-tenths of its lifetime
exhibits different behaviour since it is not being observed during that time.  However, if it
is observed for its entire lifetime then any interference is always present and is
automatically included in the full description of the particle.  Practically speaking it is
possible to do this with pair creation since the particle lifetimes are short.  There are other
instances of short-lived particles in nuclear situations that also could be fully observed.
Sometimes it is necessary to examine a particle in a different environment.  In
order to account for the change in environment from one uranoid to another during a
single observation, the disturbance produced by the uranoid is supplied with the attributes
of an object-field with the appropriate variables, usually potentials.  A change in uranoid
then simply requires a change in the values of the variables.  Thus there is an
environmental field carrier developed here by Eddington that is very similar to the
standard carrier.  Its purpose is to carry the information associated with the environment
and it can change form depending on the situation.  A similar field can be developed for
the standard probing and is called the ‘field of under-observation’ (Eddington 1946).
However Eddington does not mathematically develop this theory beyond a single case as
he believed it had no practical application (with one exception).
The exception Eddington discusses is the abrupt cessation to some standard
probing.  The time τ is the only variable required to specify this situation and it is equal
to the time interval between the moment the probing ceases and the moment being
considered.  If it is an observed time interval (e.g. if you stop observing something and
then wish to consider what that something might be doing 5 minutes later, the 5 minutes
is an observable time interval) then it is subject to uncertainty in its measurement simply
due to the inability to develop wholly accurate measurement devices (and, by  δEiδt  h ,
it directly follows an uncertainty relation) and has an associated probability distribution.
However, there is nothing that prevents τ from being stabilised either.
What does it mean, though, to have a probability distribution over time?  Since in
natural units times and lengths can be considered equivalent there is nothing that
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specifically prevents us from representing a given time by a probability distribution
simply from this basic fact.  But, in addition, there is a practical limit to the exactness of
clocks.  Normally a distribution function f x, y, z,t( )  gives a distribution over only x, y,
and z at a given time t.  If the distribution is to include τ then it should be represented as
f x, y, z,τ;t( )  however there is no homology (to use Eddington’s own terminology)
between τ and the spatial coordinates.  In order to induce homology between these a
physical origin for the time must be defined in a similar way as the physical origin for the
spatial coordinates, i.e. “as the centroid of a large number of events uncorrelated in their
time distribution” (Eddington 1946, p. 71).  Eddington immediately discards this
description as leading to mathematical terms with no corresponding physical explanation.
As was developed in equation (6.24), the multiplicity provides a sign change for the time
meaning that the relativistic homology occurs between space and imaginary time and
thus a negative standard deviation is impossible.
Eddington resolves this apparent paradox by taking the scale and its
accompanying phase dimension as the fourth dimension.  Since the particles in the
uranoid have uncorrelated phases (they must be non-interacting) one can simply write the
physical origin as including Gaussian uncertainty in its phase coordinates as well as its
spatial coordinates.  The scale fluctuation as developed in chapter five (see equation
(5.10) for example) is combined negatively.  Therefore the scale and phase have a time-
like relationship to the spatial measurements.  By this line of reasoning Eddington argues
that using time as the fourth coordinate in Dirac wavefunctions is incorrect.  However,
since the Dirac equation is Lorentz invariant he claims that invariance in phase
coordinates is analogous to Lorentz invariance and the phase is a time analogue in any
analogy between classical (time) and quantum (phase) mechanics (Eddington 1946).
Structuralism v. Prediction
Modern physics can generally be categorized as having two purposes – describing the
structure of the universe as well as its constituents and making useful predictions
regarding the objects within the universe.  Obviously if a theory is to make a prediction
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then observation of the system under investigation has to cease before the moment of
prediction (and subsequently restart) for the prediction to have any meaning (i.e. if you’re
holding a ball, predicting it will fall when you let it go requires actually letting it go).
This relates directly to the cessation of observation that leads to τ.  On the other hand a
theory can equally well describe the structure of various objects including the universe
itself and such investigations include the determinations of fundamental constants, energy
levels, etc.  In these situations the system is either considered to be fully observable or τ
is stabilised.  Either way τ is not really involved in the process.
In predictive problems there is often an associated decay of some structure
(including mathematical) and so such problems are sometimes described as problems of
decay rather than prediction.  Decay is a misleading term, though, as it is now most often
associated with radioactive processes and the release of energy.  This is not entirely what
he describes despite his use of the term.  For example, given an initial occupation for a
set of eigenstates, one might wish to determine any changes to the system during a
subsequent transition period given by τ.  The variables in this problem are the occupation
factors, but there is no requirement that the system decay per se, though clearly
Eddington reasons that the wavepacket will expand and not contract since it is at its full
contraction (wavefunction collapse) while being observed.
The vast majority of Fundamental Theory is devoted to structuralism and
prediction is only brought in near the end, well outside of the primary subjects considered
in this monograph.  As such τ is never involved in any of these considerations and all
systems are considered to be fully observed.  However, it is presented here as a
philosophical point in order to emphasize once again the problem with a purely objective
theory since considerations focusing on τ are as close as Eddington comes to something
truly objective since during the time interval τ the observer is completely absent from the
process.  Even though the observer is present both before and after this interval, a ratio
comparison between measurements made on either end of the interval still provides a
reasonably good objective approximation for any changes that occurred during the
interval.
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In discussing structuralism, then, changes cannot be taken into account through
predictions.  In wave mechanics physical changes are represented by the changes in the
occupation factors of steady states.  Wavefunctions thus have to represent steady states
with the occupation factor being the only variable that changes with time.  If unsteady
states are introduced physical changes are represented either by continuous motion or by
discrete transitions, which are mutually exclusive.  In order to only vary the occupation
factor with time only two types of motion are allowed: steady circulation of probability
within a given state and non-spatial transitions of probabilities between states where the
states themselves can be steady or unsteady.  Lorentz transformations introduce motion
that does not fall under either of these categories.  The time-like variable in the
wavefunction is then the phase.
Developing the Proper Mass
Given that we now have a framework for working with wavefunctions in both
structuralist as well as predictive situations we can bring the two together in the
prediction of proper mass values.  Equation (5.6) represents the physical distribution
function while equation (5.7) represents the geometrical distribution function.  A
geometrical distribution function can be converted into a distribution of a correlated
physical coordinate ξ, where x = x0 + ξ , by:
h(ξ) = g(x0 + ξ) f (x0 )dx0
−∞
∞
∫ . (8.1)
Fourier integrals can be written for h, g, and f as H, G, and F.  Through separability a
direct relation between H and G can be obtained:
H (q) = e−
1
2σ
2q2G(q) (8.2)
where the factor e−
1
2σ
2q2 = 2πF(−q)  is a result of the physical origin having a Gaussian
distribution function as described in chapter five.  In most cases momenta are of primary
interest and distributions of physical momenta are converted into distributions of
geometrical momenta (or vice versa).  But, when dealing with coordinates, it helps to
work with wavefunctions instead of probability distributions.  As such two real
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distribution functions representing x and p are replaced by a single complex wavefunction
that has two reciprocal forms (from Fourier transforms) that are mathematically derivable
from one another.  These Fourier transforms are analogous to similar transforms that can
be derived from H, G, and F directly.  In fact they are the square roots of the original
reciprocal transforms and contain the term  p  .  As such, since the originals contained a
q term in place of the  p   term, we find that  q = 2p   where the factor of 2 results from
the squaring of the exponential that contains these terms.  Equation (8.2) directly converts
a distribution of geometrical momenta given by  G(2 p )  into a distribution of physical
momenta given by  H (2 p ) .
Given a wavepacket represented by a Gaussian distribution of momenta, with
standard deviation s:
 G(p) = π
2 2s2( )12 e−2s2 p2 2 , (8.3)
equation (8.2) can be rewritten in general form as:
 H (p) = CiG(p)F(− p) (8.4)
where C is a constant.  This means that the probability of a physical momentum p is
actually the combination of the probability of a geometrical momentum p of the object
under consideration and an opposite momentum –p of the physical origin.  The recoil of
the physical origin has already been discussed.  However, at the time we had not yet
considered the physical origin as a two-particle system (say a hydrogen atom represented
as an external and an internal particle) with two momenta represented by a single external
momentum P and a single internal momentum ϖ (where ϖ is analogous to ξ - both are
relative measures).  Since the two-particle system could alternately be resolved into its
constituents (say the proton and the electron, for instance) each of these has their own
momenta p and ′p .  The relationship between the distribution functions for the momenta
of the two individual particles and the momenta of the external/internal particle
representation is:
K(P)H (ϖ ) = G(p)F( ′p ) . (8.5)
If K(P) is represented by a Dirac delta function such that for all states with a non-zero
probability P = 0 (which results from the recoil momentum of the physical origin, i.e.
conservation of total momentum or the probability of p without recoil is zero, hence the
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Dirac delta function representation) and it can be shown that p = − ′p =ϖ , then (8.5)
reduces to (8.4).  The result is completely independent of the masses assigned to the
particle and the physical origin since we’re working with standard carriers.  Ultimately by
representing K(P) as a Dirac delta function the requirement of Gaussian distributions is
relaxed and (8.4) can then be used at will to convert momenta between physical and
geometrical systems.  Changing F(-p) to w(p), σ to s, and defining  ϖ =  2σ , (8.4) can
be rewritten as
 H (p)dp = CiG(p)w(p)dp (8.6)
where
w(p) = (2πϖ 2 )−
1
2 e− p
2 2ϖ 2 . (8.7)
Equation (8.7) represents the ‘weight function’ w whereby a distribution of geometrical
momenta is converted to a distribution of physical momenta by weighing the ranges dp
with w.  The idea of the weight function is to reduce the frequency of large momenta and
Eddington gives the exact value for ϖ as being roughly 200mec2.  He says that omitting w
or, equivalently, setting σ = 0, introduces unwanted infinities (Eddington 1946).  This is
identical to Heisenberg’s ‘weight function’ ψψ* but with slightly different notation.
So far I have only introduced the zero-temperature uranoid.  What would happen,
then, Eddington asks, if we considered an infinite-temperature uranoid where the particles
are not at rest but rather have unlimited uniform probability distributions.  The
corresponding distribution of physical momenta is given by the weight function (in three
dimensions), wdp1dp2dp3.  The mean values are given as:
 p1
2 = p2
2 = p3
2 =ϖ 2 = 2 4σ 2 . (8.8)
If the momenta are suitably large, say relativistic, the correct energy is given by
E2 = m2 + p1
2 + p2
2 + p3
2  (employing natural units, of course).  The mass term drops out if
particles do not have a proper mass (e.g. a photon).  By (8.8) the energy is then:
 E
2 = 3ϖ 2 = 32 4σ 2 . (8.9)
In fact regardless of whether or not the particles are photons, in an infinite temperature
uranoid the particles would have a physically impossible infinite kinetic energy and thus
velocity.  As such their entire mass would be converted purely into energy.  Eddington
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proves this result by applying his results for the standard deviation in macroscopic
situations to the pressure-density equations for a steady uniform distribution of matter as
given in the then-widely accepted text on relativity and thermodynamics by Richard C.
Tolman (1881 – 1948, Tolman 1934).
In this way he shows that proper mass is a concealed form of energy (nothing new
here) but says any fundamental theory should show how this conversion takes place.
Lowering the temperature of the uranoid then should reverse the process and produce a
proper mass m for particles (this is somewhat akin to what actually happened during the
cooling of the universe, though the actual process is far more complicated).  The proper
mass here, however, is considered an invariant (and since it is the magnitude of four-
momentum and four-momentum is conserved this is true) that is independent of the
motion of the particle since motion is relative anyway.  Thus it is the temperature of the
standard environment that is to be considered here, not even the particle’s actual
environment.  The trouble with Eddington’s argument is that he is basing it partially on
his belief that inertial and gravitational fields are different – i.e. on the falsity of
equivalence – whereas equivalence has been experimentally proven many times to
phenomenal accuracy.  Regardless, he continues to derive various relations between
quantities in a zero-temperature uranoid and an infinite-temperature uranoid.  In these
derivations he makes use of the fact that K(P) is a Dirac delta function that eliminates
three degrees of freedom leaving the multiplicity at 3 (particles considered here are V3
particles).  As such “the probability distribution of momentum is uniquely determined by
the probability distribution of coordinates and vice versa” (Eddington 1946, p. 79).  The
scale uncertainty can be accounted for directly in this process or replaced by curvature.
Since wave mechanics is not well-suited to handle curvature the scale uncertainty ought
to be accounted for directly.  But, in doing so, m has a probability distribution that results
from the uncertainty in the standard of mass used to measure it which is embodied in a
comparison particle.  If the scale uncertainty is included directly this adds a degree of
freedom (extra variable or multiplicity) and the particle is a V4.  Equation (6.29) has
already provided a conversion for the mass values of V3 and V4 particles.  However, if
rotational motion is to be considered the particles must really be V10 with a mass
M = 310 m3 .
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In the derivations of the various physical constants in the zero-temperature and
infinite-temperature uranoids he arrives at the following equation for mass
m = 2ϖ = γ σ = 2γ N R0 (8.10)
where he has employed equation (5.13).  He then derives the following for γ:
 γ =  M µ = 136 10 (8.11)
where M and µ represent the masses of the external and internal particles in the hydrocule
representation.  The V10 must then be the external representation of the hydrocule with the
mass:
 
M = 136
10
3
4
 45 N
R0
. (8.12)
But, since M = 310 m3 , the proper mass is given by:
 
m0 =
3
4
 45 N
R0
. (8.13)
There is one step left in developing the proper mass.  Since the move is being made from
a theoretical to an observational system the factor β must be included (see equation
(7.5)).  Equations (8.12) and (8.13) become:
 
m0 =
3
4
β
1
6 45 N
cR0
,     
 
M = 136
10
3
4
β
1
6 45 N
cR0
(8.14)
where c has been reinserted in order to return any restrictions originally placed on the
units.  Eddington refers to (8.14) as the “central formula of unified theory” (Eddington
1946, p. 81).  Equation (8.14) can be rearranged to solve for R0, which then includes the
term   Mc .  Since   e  and e Mc  are well known to great accuracy from experiment
(the latter is Faraday’s constant),   Mc  is also well-determined.  One can then divide
through by N  to get a more accurate value for σ:
 
σ = R0
2 N
=
136
10
3
4
β
1
6 15
Mc
= 9.53657 ×10−14 cm . (8.15)
The value obtained by applying (5.17) using the observed values used in (5.18) gives
9.5 ×10−14 cm .
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Exclusion from Uncertainty
Equation (8.14) can be derived in an entirely different way by utilizing the principle of
exclusion the earliest version of which prevents more than one particle from occupying a
given eigenstate in an atom.  In the hydrocule model of the hydrogen atom, however,
there is only one internal particle (the intracule) and thus this version of the exclusion
principle is trivial (in fact it is trivial for the normal hydrogen atom as well since there is
only one electron).  Eddington thus states an alternative version of the exclusion principle
as follows:
If the 6-space obtained by taking x, y, z, p1, p 2, p 3 as
coordinates is divided into cells of volume h3 (h = 2π),
then in a steady state the maximum number of particles per
cell is two electrons and two protons (Eddington 1946, p.
82).
A similar description can be given for extracules and intracules using relative coordinates
and internal momenta for the intracules:
In a steady state the maximum number of particles is two
extracules per cell h3 of xp-space and two intracules per cell
h3 of ξϖ-space (Eddington 1946, p. 82).
What exactly does this mean?  Using the generalised coordinates and momenta as
coordinates of a single space is simply using phase space in the classical sense (hence
Eddington’s introduction earlier of the phase dimension – c.f. Goldstein 1980).  The
maximum number of particles is then determined by the uncertainty principle!  Let me
reiterate this fascinating conclusion – Eddington has defined the exclusion principle in
terms of the uncertainty principle!  For example, in a single dimension the uncertainty
principle is given by  Δpx iΔx ≥ h / 2π  which can be rewritten as  2πΔpx iΔx ≥ h .  Similar
relations can be written for y and z.  The factor of 2 (ignoring π for a moment) means that
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two sets of generalised coordinates and momenta can be defined for a given direction.
Thus two identical particles can occupy the given space within the bounds of uncertainty.
In three dimensions this simply means that two identical particles can occupy the volume
h3 again within the bounds of uncertainty.  Basically he lays claim to the fact that
uncertainty prevents perfect exclusion since there’s really no way of knowing for certain
whether two particles share the same exact location (recall that to Eddington this was in
configuration space and that quantum and classical descriptions were not as distinct as we
usually treat them).  Uncertainty then permits two identical particles to occupy the same
volume in space, which does not necessarily mean that they will be in the exact same
spot.  This is analogous to the two particles in a box problem discussed previously (with
the two particles being the proton and the electron).  Initially both particles have an equal
probability of being anywhere in the box.  Regardless of whether or not they interact,
their probability functions will always give them an equal probability of being anywhere
in the box.  If they are observed then the wavefunction collapses to a given location, but
since the above argument applies right at the Planck scale any observation is inaccurate to
within the given uncertainty thus allowing them to coexist, i.e. even after observation, the
observation includes uncertainty meaning the wavefunction really didn’t collapse 100%,
it just shrank considerably.  The probability for them to be anywhere in the volume (and
thus not occupying the same spot) is minimal, but not zero.  This is a profound result that
brings up the thorny issue of completeness in quantum theory.
The exclusion principle as it is traditionally understood postulates quite simply a
zero probability that two particles will share the same exact quantum numbers (which
precludes them from existing at the exact same spot).  This seems to imply an exact
measurement in the sense that, even if their locations and momenta cannot be known
exactly, it is known exactly that they are not in the same spot (or sharing the same
quantum numbers).  But the uncertainty principle implies that there are really no such
things as exact measurements, per se.  Ultimately it implies that we cannot have full
knowledge of the state of a system, yet it can be argued that the exclusion principle
provides full knowledge.  There appears to be a contradiction here.
The contradiction can be rationalized away by considering that exclusion is still
governed by probability even though it presents a null result.  Thus, even though
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exclusion appears to provide an exact knowledge of a given state, it only gives a
probability for that state that happens to be zero (and zero is no less real than 50%, for
example).  Eddington obviously had trouble with this, however, given that he alters the
exclusion principle to explicitly account for uncertainty.  But as a consequence there is
nothing the prevents any particle, regardless of spin, from obeying this new version of
exclusion.  In Eddington’s theory even photons would obey exclusion.
Electrical and Mechanical Exclusion
Since the intracule was defined as a V137 particle it contains the extra degree of freedom
given by the Coulomb energy and is thus electrical in nature while the extracule, being
quite simply an electrically neutral hydrogen atom, is mechanical in nature (and by this I
mean these particles are observed either mechanically or electrically).  As such the
second definition of the exclusion principle given by Eddington actually provides two
separate versions – one for extracules and one for intracules – and in the process creates a
mechanical exclusion principle (applying to extracules) and an electrical exclusion
principle (applying to intracules).  He uses this process, then, to replace gravitating (non-
excluding) particles with excluding (non-gravitating) particles.  As such he makes
exclusion a wave-mechanical substitute for gravitation, or more correctly, he replaces the
curvature of space with the mechanical exclusion principle noting that the electrical form
corresponds to the version of the principle verified by experiment (he specifically
mentions the super-dense matter in white dwarf stars).  On the other hand, the concept is
very narrow since exclusion assumes a steady state.  Based on what we have developed
so far, then, exclusion is thus also the same thing as the extraneous standard.
Mechanical exclusion as applied to extracules begins with the consideration of n
extracules per-unit volume in three-dimensional space.  If their mass-constant (total
mass) is µ0 then the total kinetic energy of an extracule is given by the classical form:
E = p2 2µ0 ,     (p0
2 = p1
2 + p2
2 + p3
2 ) . (8.16)
In the zero-temperature uranoid this energy is obviously a minimum, though not
necessarily zero due to the uncertainty principle in energy and time.  The momenta p1, p2,
and p3 are distributed so that the total energy is at a minimum with a density of no more
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than two particles per cell (one is a comparison particle since all measurements are
relative).  Drawing on the description of spherical space given in chapter five, a volume
of radius r must be equal to half of the n extracules per unit phase space volume, i.e.
Eddington’s exclusion rule has two extracules and two intracules per h3 so the volumes in
spherical space and phase space are related by:
4
3π℘
3 = 12 nh
3 (8.17)
with the radius of the spherical volume equivalent to the momentum, ℘= p  due to the
application of Eddington’s system of natural units.  Substituting (8.17) into (8.16) then
gives the energy E as:
E = ℘
2
2µ0
=
3n
8π
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
3 h2
2µ0
(8.18)
that Eddington calls the ‘top energy’ corresponding to a total for that volume.  The total
number of extracules in the universe, being half the total particles in the universe, is
given by:
1
2 N = 2π
2R0
3n      or, solving for n,     n = 12 N 2π
2R0
3 . (8.19)
Defining the term µ1 = µ0 34 N( )
1
3  and using (8.19), (8.18) becomes:
E = 3
4
N
2µ1
h
2πR0
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
. (8.20)
This can be further simplified to:
2µ1E = 34ϖ
2 (8.21)
where by (8.8) the weight constant,  ϖ =  2σ = h N 2πR0 .
How is the above interpreted?  Returning to a discussion of multiplicity, if H0 is
some characteristic (e.g. energy) dependent on the occupation factor of a large number of
particles with a particle density, s, if one particle is removed, the amount of H0 removed
is dH0/ds.  If the assemblage is entirely in a single pseudo-discrete state, this amount is
 dH
0 ds = −H 0 kis  and is known as the H of the ‘top particle’ (Eddington 1946, p. 28).
The average H0 per particle in a unit volume is H0/s and is called the H of the mean
(average) particle.  The H of the top particle, h, in terms of the H of the mean particle,
H , is h= −H k .  Since proper masses have the same ratio as proper densities this
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general form can be used for mass relations,  M = −m k .  If (8.20) defines the ‘top
energy’ (energy of the top particle), (8.9) and (8.21) combine to give the mean (average)
energy as E = 35 E .  Now, if the particles are in a zero-temperature uranoid, the top
energy is just the rest mass of the top particle.  The top energy is essentially the energy
that the particle is boosted to due to the complete occupation of all the lower energy
states, so it is associated with exclusion.  So the rest mass is associated with exclusion
since its value is given according to the occupation of all the lower energy states.
Masses, of course, have gravitational fields and, in one interpretation of the uranoid
scenario, the particles in a uranoid give an individual object particle its rest energy by
determining the scale fluctuation that gives curvature to space.  Both these interpretations
of interactions must be equivalent and thus both exclusion and gravity (curvature) boost
particle energy in the same way.  Eddington, thus, interprets these as being equivalent
thus concluding that exclusion acts as the wave-mechanical form of gravity (exclusion is
derivable from gravity and vice versa).
The one major flaw that appears to jump out here is that, given Eddington’s
description, a naïve interpretation would assume that every pair of electrons, for instance,
in the universe would have a different energy level.  This doesn’t make sense since we
know that, as long as they are non-interacting, two electrons can share the same energy
levels (quantum numbers) – e.g. it’s easy to have two hydrogen atoms containing
electrons in the same exact orbital as long as the electrons themselves don’t interact.  Ah,
but Eddington has solved this problem earlier by making scale a variable on par with
mass, energy, etc.  His rationale for this comes out of the fact that gravity is the curvature
of space-time itself and has energy, so a scale of measurement in space-time ought to
have an associated energy since it is a ‘chunk’ so-to-speak of this curvature.  Basically,
coordinate locations contribute to the energy level just as mass, motion, and other
characteristics do.  So all the electrons could seemingly have the exact same energy
levels, yet, since they are not in the same locations, they actually have different energy
levels based solely on their coordinates.  It doesn’t mean they can’t all have the same
kinetic energy or even the same set of traditional quantum numbers.  It simply means that
they all have different locations.  So just as gravity (curvature) provides an energy boost
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to particles, so does exclusion, and both can be interpreted in the same manner – as a
change in location.
From the standpoint of the original formulation of the exclusion principle as
applied to atoms, this makes sense from Eddington’s point of view.  In an atom, only two
electrons are allowed in any given energy level – one with spin up and one with spin
down.  Once this level is filled, electrons start filling in the next level, and so on.
Eddington viewed each change in energy level as being the same thing as a change in
location.  So after the lowest orbital was filled, filling the next orbital amounted to simply
putting the new particles in a different location (which indeed is true).  This idea of
location as being the central point behind exclusion comes from Eddington’s reliance on
relativity to make sense of his viewpoint as an observer: moving locations was simply a
relativistic transformation.  When viewed in this light, since relativity implies that no
viewpoint has special meaning and we can’t really be absolutely certain of anything (at
least anything objective), it is no surprise that he found a natural philosophical link
between it and uncertainty and used this as his basis for the reasoning in Fundamental
Theory.
Dirac’s Negative Energy Sea
Relativity plays such a tremendous role in his interpretation of physics it leads to some
unusual insights as I’ve shown.  One that I have briefly pointed out was that negative
energies were simply a result of a shift in the datum, especially when one considers the
relation between energy and motion in kinetics and the fact that potential energies
associated with interactions are really tied to exchange particles and can be interpreted in
the same way.  Theoretically one could always adjust the frame such that the datum
moved, then, so that all previously negative energies were positive – or vice-versa.  So
Eddington considers the highest level of the top energy E as the zero level meaning that
all the other levels are below this.  Thus the particles of a zero-temperature uranoid fill
the series of negative energy states below the zero level just as Dirac described in 1929,
interpreting the negative energy results of his own equation (Kragh 1999).  Once again
we see the fact that Dirac’s equation, though not initially satisfactory to Eddington due to
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its non-tensor form, was continually on his mind throughout the development of
Fundamental Theory.
Eddington further rationalizes that these particles filling the negative energy sea
are really normal particles distributed in such a way that they do not interfere or interact
with the ‘positive-energy’ particles governed by the normal laws of quantum mechanics.
Since the particles are extracules there is a symmetry between positive and negative
charge and the problem of infinite negative charge, as postulated by Dirac, does not arise
since there are a finite number of particles in the universe.  As such Eddington proposes
that there ought to be negatrons (anti-protons) as well as positrons, and, of course, we
know he was correct in this prediction.  In fact, Eddington’s theory, if extended to include
any newly discovered particles, which would all obey his exclusion principle regardless
of spin (since his version does not rely on spin in its formulation), every particle ought to
have a corresponding anti-particle.  Quantum field theory predicts exactly that and many
of these have been found (n.b. neutral particles are their own anti-particle).
The formation of the observable particles in the universe is brought about through
the excitation of top particles to a higher energy (i.e. above the zero level).  The net
addition to the uranoid is a particle with an energy E above the zero level and a
corresponding hole an energy E below the zero level.  The particle-hole combination is
called a ‘bi-particle’ and carries the excitation energy.  This relates directly to the
discussion of mutual and self-energy conditions in the section on energy issues in chapter
six.  Expanding on this idea Eddington says that an introduction of a particle with a
comparison hole (which is just a particle with a negative mass in the equations – again
just a relativistic transformation) produces no net change in particle density since every
new particle is balanced with a new hole.  The bi-particle is a V136 and the excitation
energy it carries produces the normal particle (electron or proton) as a V10 and the hole as
a V1.  If one wants an observable antiparticle a hole is ‘excited’ to a lower energy state
where the net addition to the universe is a bi-particle (thus keeping the particle density
the same) with a hole at a lower level and a comparison particle filling the original hole.
Since the same equations are used with a simple sign reversal the masses of antiparticles
must be the same as their corresponding normal matter partners.  Top level particles in
this formulation of exclusion can be used as comparison particles by changing their
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energies.  Thus E is identified with previous descriptions using m0.  Here we see that
matter can be created, in essence, from nothing (in essence, this is Eddington’s
description of pair creation).  I will discuss this further in chapter nine.
Eddington’s comparison of exclusion and gravitation does not end there.  He
takes the zero level as being a threshold and defines studies of particles below this level,
the Dirac sea, ‘sub-threshold’ theory and studies of particles above this level ‘super-
threshold’ theory.  Since E = 35 E ,  there are slightly differing values for the various
constants in sub-threshold theory in terms of the known (super-threshold) values, namely
G1 = 53G  and  1
2 = 35 
2 .
Gravitation from Exclusion
In comparing two uranoids that have the same microscopic constants but a different top
quantum number, ℑ, we find that both E and µ1 are constant and µ0 = µ1 ℑ .  In addition
(8.20) takes the form:
 2µ1E = ℑ
3 1 R0( )2 . (8.22)
A quantum particle, then, is defined as being an addition to a rigid environment.  If it is a
top particle that can be added or removed without changing the completely filled energy
levels underneath then this definition is fulfilled in the exclusion representation.
Replacing normal gravitating particles by excluding particles thus replaces the
gravitational field of those particles with an ‘exclusion field’ that is automatically rigid
(Eddington 1946).  When N is very small there actually are two forms of exclusion (not
to be confused with the electrical and mechanical version) – lateral and vertical.  Thusfar
I have only introduced vertical exclusion where particles gain or lose energy.  If, for
example, the uranoid consists solely of two particles that mutually exclude each other
from being in state E = 0, then either particle can be considered the top particle (this is
built from the idea of interchange).  This is not a rigid environment, however, since
removal of either particle would allow the other to occupy the E = 0 state.  If the energy
of each particle is E = µ0 + p
2 2µ0  and since these energies in uranoids are actually
independent of quantum number, (8.22) becomes:
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 E
2 = ℑ3 1 R0( )2 = 34 N 1 R0( )2 (8.23)
which is valid in super-threshold theory since it contains the cosmological values N and
R0.  Since  1
2 = 35 
2 , (8.23) becomes:
 
E2 = m0
2 =
3
4
3
5
2N
R0
2 . (8.24)
This is precisely the same as (8.13) which was derived from standard relativity equations
given by Tolman.  Eddington has thus derived the same exact formula for proper mass
from both the exclusion principle (albeit his version) and relativity.
The Planoid
Several equations have thus been developed over the past few chapters that connect the
cosmological numbers N and R0 with the microscopic constants of physics.  A
simplification can now be made in order to study objects and systems on a much smaller
level (very small compared to R0).  Since curvature can be represented by the scale
fluctuation, object-systems and their environments can be considered in flat space.  The
standard environment is then a uniform distribution of particles in flat space.  In order to
represent infinite plane wave functions the distributions can be considered to be infinite
themselves (meaning they continue indefinitely) but the environment of the object-system
can now be limited to a sphere of radius R1 containing N1 particles with these values
chosen to give the correct value for σ.  This form of standard environment is called the
‘planoid’ by Eddington (Eddington 1946).  It is not a mathematical transformation but a
separate distribution.  When the scale and phase dimension are then used in place of
curvature, as we’ve developed, the process of projecting spherical space onto flat space
as developed in chapter six is now useful.  Neither the uranoid nor the planoid are
representative of the actual universe, but in treating object-systems locally the remote
environment of the universe can be neglected just as we neglect the affects of the
Andromeda galaxy when calculating gravitational interactions between the Sun and
Earth.  Local phenomena include the integrated effect of the universe in gµν .
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Distinguishing between the curvature of space-time and the shape of the
environment, the planoid is, like the uranoid, spherical.  It is still Euclidean meaning
space-time is still flat, but we simply consider a spherical volume of it (in fact space-time
on a large-scale is flat and not curved as was thought for most of the twentieth century
and yet we deal with spherical objects on a regular basis).  Boundary conditions are
accounted for in the extraordinary fluctuation that replaces curvature.  As such we can
now consider a zero-temperature planoid of radius R1 with N1 particles.  It is also
assumed that the same units of mass and length are used in both the uranoid and the
planoid so that the quantum-specified standards are the same in each meaning that σ must
be the same in both.  From the standard deviation of a given coordinate (and coordinate
of the centroid) in the planoid, the σ must have the following relation (thus relating
planoid and uranoid values):
R1
2
5N1
= σ 2 = R0
2
4N
. (8.25)
Using the new constants for the planoid the proper mass is:
 
m0 =
3
4
 N1
R1
. (8.26)
Rather, the proper mass in the uranoid given by (8.13) can be rewritten as:
 
m0 =
3
4
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
2 1 N
R0
. (8.27)
Generally N1 and R1 are fixed by the ratio in (8.26), but for some applications it is
necessary to fix each separately and this process creates the ‘special planoid’ that I will
introduce presently.
Interchange for Extracules
Averaging over the volume of the planoid with r being the distance from its centre and
introducing the mass-constant µ = m0 136  for an intracule, (8.26) can be written as:
m3 = 1363 m0 = s
ps
2
2µ∑       ps =
1
2  rs( ) , (8.28)
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where m3 is the mass of a V3 extracule.  Physically if the V3 particle has half-quantum of
angular momentum about the sth planoid extracule then ps in (8.28) is the corresponding
linear momentum.  If these particles are the extracules of the planoid then (8.28) is a
single particle in an assemblage of similar particles allowing rigid-field theory to be used.
If a V3 particle makes a transition to a state of momentum px, py, and pz then its energy is
given as E3 = m3 + px
2 + py
2 + pz
2( ) 2µ .  Substituting (8.28) into this gives:
E3 = p1
2 + p2
2 + ...+ p1
2 N1
2 + px
2 + py
2 + pz
2( ) 2µ . (8.29)
This is interpreted as eliminating the initial energy in the form of rest mass thus making
the entire energy due to the transition of a system with 12 N1 + 3  degrees of freedom.  All
degrees of freedom except for the last three are covered by the standard planoid and so
the final three are the only observables.
Here Eddington gets a bit lost in speculation.  The initial or rest mass m3 is really
energy as demonstrated by (8.29) and he describes it as arising from the V3 extracule
having a half-quantum angular momentum about every other extracule in the assemblage
of the planoid.  But the particles are all at rest so the momentum must be extra-spatial and
the half-quantum value represents interchange circulation (Eddington 1946).  His
complicated explanation for this phenomenon boils down to the idea that since only the
three momenta px, py, and pz are observable the mass is m3 and the particle is a V3.
Everything else is accounted for in the standard planoid, but the interchange circulation
essentially is a fancy way of saying that the extracules can randomly interchange with
each other.  This is yet another way of accounting for curvature: the resultant energy
produced by the constant interchange of the object-particle under consideration with the
other particles in the planoid.  In the exclusion interpretation, particles force each other to
be individuals at differing energy levels while in this interpretation these same particles
constantly interchange with each other producing the same total energy that the exclusion
interpretation does.  Eddington puts off a more detailed explanation of each until
developing his E-number theory in the latter half of Fundamental Theory.  At this point
the topic begins to stray from the fundamental foundational issues of interest here and
thus I will not discuss them.  However, an analysis of Eddington’s E-number theory is in
the works.
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Modifications to the Planoid
The special planoid mentioned above is a cross between the planoid and the uranoid that
employs the convention N1 = N and R1 = R0 but retains the sub-threshold constant 1.
Particles are no longer V3 particles, rather they are V4.  From (8.25) we have:
σ1
2 = R1
2 5N1 = R0
2 5N = 45 σ
2 . (8.30)
Combining (8.30) with (8.8) the new weight constant is:
 
ϖ1 =
1
2σ1
= 3
5
4
5
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
2 
2σ
=
3
4
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
2
ϖ . (8.31)
In the case of the special planoid the standards for lengths and masses (energies) are no
longer their usual values since they depend directly on σ and ϖ respectively.  Equations
(8.30) and (8.31) provide a direct transformation for each.  The length transformation can
be eliminated (changed to a 1:1 ratio) if (8.30) is applied to R1 assuming the same number
of particles is contained in the uranoid and planoid.
The special planoid is used in the analysis of the exclusion principle, Dirac’s
negative energy states, and the derivation of the proper mass from exclusion theory,
among other things.  Eddington’s primary argument in favour of the special planoid is
that it introduces the factor 43  rather than the 53  in the standard uranoid.  The usefulness
of this is evident in the selection of top particles that give the same change of density as
the stabilisation of scale that then transforms a V4 particle into a V3 particle.  This, he
claims, results from transforming from a flat planoid to a curved uranoid with a
stabilisation of scale (thus reducing the multiplicity from 4 to 3).  Unfortunately, at this
point, it feels a bit like Eddington is simply playing with numbers, adjusting formulae in
order to produce the desired result.  His physical justification breaks down to pure
mathematical manipulation.  His motivation likely lies in his desire to maintain a
multiplicity of 4 that would keep the scale free from stabilisation since his version of
exclusion considers only the three spatial momenta as classifying state characteristics
(thus a multiplicity of 3) and his solution for the mass in extracule interchange produces
an m3.  The special planoid allows him to accept these results while at the same time
207
keeping his scale unfixed.  It is a process all too familiar with Eddington – results arrived
at from two different vantage points are tantalizingly close and thus a fudge factor (or, in
many cases, an entire fudge theory) is introduced to connect the two.  He clearly does this
numerous times to convert between 136 and 137 since the former is a natural number that
arises in many dimensional considerations while 137 is the approximation of the fine-
structure constant.  I would conclude from this that Eddington did not believe in
coincidences nor did he believe in artificially difficult processes (although he seems
strongly in favour of artificially simple ones).
Some Remaining Energy Issues
The electron-proton and extracule-intracule two-particle problems have both been
analyzed so far.  In both situations all the interactions considered (which in Eddington’s
case is only gravity and electromagnetism) were attractive.  But how could the developed
version of this theory be applied to particles of like charge?  If the system consists solely
of two like charges, they become the source of an extended electric field that presumably
induces opposite charges somewhere else in the environment.  In terms of generally
neutral systems of the type thusfar considered, they technically form an incomplete half
of a four-particle system.  For proton-electron systems the Coulomb of interchange
energy has been calculated but it would be difficult to calculate this for a proton-proton
system (or electron-electron system – for simplicity we will simply consider a proton-
proton system here).  One can deduce the result, however, from the proton-electron
results.
A charged particle is said to have no Coulomb energy in a neutral environment
since Coulomb energy is really interchange energy and there would be nothing for the
particle to interchange with.  The mutual energy is then purely mechanical by definition.
Obviously equal distributions of positively and negatively charged particles produce
neutral matter so for all values of r the proton-proton electrical energy should be equal
and opposite to the proton-electron energy.  This is easily verified using the well-known
classical equation for Coulomb (electrical) potential energy.  Since the proton-electron
energy is proportional to −e2 r  the proton-proton system will be proportional to e2 r .
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When placed in a neutral environment a charge of –2e is induced in the environment.  If
the system is treated as isolated a term must be introduced into the Hamiltonian in order
to represent the ‘ignored’ induced charges and Eddington equates this term with the
Debye-Hückel energy that frequently appears in astrophysical (plasma), high-energy
(Yukawa potential), and solid-state (Thomas-Fermi potential) situations (see footnote
Liboff 1998, p. 804).  In treating an object-system in the standard uranoid it is simply the
non-Coulombian energy.
As I have shown Eddington made the assumption that charge was a frame-
dependant quantity and so the classical concept of charge is referred to as relativity
charge.  These charges induce opposite charges in the environment.  However, quantum
charges, which are not considered frame-dependent quantities, are simply superimposed
on a rigid environment.  This is the analysis used in the present formulation.
Consider, then, a single proton as an object-system that is superimposed on an
undisturbed uranoid containing 12 N  protons and 12 N  electrons.  If V is the volume of the
uranoid and each particle has a probability dV/V of being in some volume element dV the
mutual energy of the proton and the uranoid is:
1
V
EdV = −Ω∫ (8.32)
and:
1
V
EdV = Ω + B V∫ (8.33)
for a proton-proton where B is a constant.  The total mutual energy for the proton object-
particle and the uranoid is then 12 N B V = −Ω = − 32 43( )
1
2 e2 R0  where the last part of the
equality results from the consideration of the interchange of extracules and the 4/3
conversion factor for moving from a planoid to normal measure.  Since the volume is
V = 43πR0
2  the constant B is:
B = − 43( )
1
2 4πe2 R0
2 N = − 43( )
1
2 16πe2σ 2 . (8.34)
Equation (8.33) can be rewriting in terms of a Dirac delta function multiplying B.
Consider then that this proton exists in a large assemblage of indistinguishable
protons and one of these other protons is referenced as the origin (and remember that this
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is Eddington’s definition of indistinguishability).  Due to their indistinguishable nature
there is a probability that any of them could be that origin.  Various coordinate
transformations along with (8.34) provide the equation for the energy distribution in a
uranoid if the origin is randomly placed in one of the indistinguishable protons:
Bδ ′r( ) − ′Ω( ) dV
V
where dV/V is the probability distribution of the carrier, Bδ ′r( ) − ′Ω  is the amount of
energy carried, B = −2ΩV N , and ′Ω = 1− 2 N( )Ω .  The carriers are quantum protons
meaning that they are superimposed on the neutral background environment and have a
uniform distribution.  Ultimately, then, the energy of a quantum proton in the field of
another proton that is taken as an indistinguishable origin in an assemblage of protons in
a uranoid contains the energy Bδ ′r( )  as well as the normal Coulomb energy.  One final
coordinate transformation is required to restore the original frame and, given the singular
point ′r = 0  that corresponds to a Gaussian probability distribution in a relative
coordinate frame we have:
δ ′r( ) = 4πσ 2( )− 32 e−r2 4σ 2 . (8.35)
Combining (8.35) and (8.34) the final result for the non-Coulomb portion of the energy
is:
Bδ ′r( ) = − 16
3π
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
2 e2
σ
e−r
2 4σ 2 . (8.36)
Equation (8.33) can be rewritten as simply:
E = e2 r + Bδ ′r( ) = e2 r − 16
3π
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
2 e2
σ
e−r
2 4σ 2 . (8.37)
Integrating (8.37) with respect to r yields the modified form of Coulomb’s law that I
argued was necessary from a statistical argument for the identification of exclusion with
Coulomb repulsion.
The explanation for (8.37) is that when a system of two like charges is treated as a
superposition on an undisturbed environment the energy has to be adjusted to compensate
for not including the induced charges.  So the additional term takes the place of the
induced charges to some degree.  The Dirac delta function appears to account for the fact
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that this term is zero when there is no separation.  This is because the two protons are
then physically touching and can now be considered to be a single +2e charge that then
induces a –2e charge in the usual way as in a proton-electron system.
The result for (8.36) is modified in some situations by adding a multiplicity
factor.  Basically the question becomes, where in this process are quantum protons
substituted for classical protons?  This point is where the non-Coulomb energy term is
added.  Eddington reasons that this point is the point at which the mass of the hydrocule
is m0 meaning that the adjustment can be made directly in the special planoid where this
is the mass of top particles.  Comparison particles in this situation come in two types:
those that include the extra energy term and those that don’t.  Remember that this
additional energy term simply allows the normal four-particle system of two proton-
electron pairs to be simplified to a two-particle system of a single proton-proton pair.
The adjustment of the mass energy is determined by manipulating (6.28) something that
will be studied further in the next chapter.  Ultimately, however, Eddington finds the
standard deviation from the Rydberg constant and combines this to find the multiplicity
for the non-Coulomb energy term, k = 1.9208 ×10−13cm .  This is on the order of the
range nuclear forces which is precisely what should be found by any good quantum field
theory (see the end of chapter five).
We are now ready to apply Eddington’s theory to several other situations where
we will find many curious numerical results that led to its labelling as
‘cosmonumerology.’  In reality, no mystical notions were ever put forward in the theory.
It simply was of a form that derived numerous physical constants.  Eddington’s
philosophical reasoning for this is discussed in chapter three but it still leaves as
unanswered the question of whether or not the theory was subconsciously (not likely
consciously) designed to be this way.
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IX
Numerical Considerations and Applications
The striking numerical coincidences (or planned results, depending on interpretation) in
Fundamental Theory begin early with Eddington’s calculation of the range of nuclear
forces and the recession of the galaxies.  The results continue to be peppered throughout
the work as the theory becomes more developed and opens new avenues for
consideration.  Some results are definitely striking and some definitely appear artificial.
Others clearly are pure coincidences.
Nuclear Forces and Galactic Recession
The earliest numerical results produced in Fundamental Theory appear very early in his
consideration of the range of nuclear forces and the recession of the galaxies.  I showed
in chapter five how, simply through an application of probabilistic methods, Eddington
arrived at the following equations in terms of R0 and N:
R0 N = Gmh πc
2 = 3.95 ×10−53cm      and     R0 N = k = 1.921×10
−13cm . (9.1)
The latter, as I’ve shown, is in clear agreement with values calculated by Yukawa and
others.  This is potentially a striking result as it links the range of nuclear forces with
cosmological parameters.  Eddington’s arrival at it arises simply through the basic
foundations of the theory: the uncertainty in the physical origin, fluctuations in the scale,
and the application to spherical space.  In addition, as a bedrock of his thinking,
Eddington adopts a truly relativistic viewpoint where coordinates and other
characteristics are quantities that are solely relative to other physical quantities and not to
random, observer-based quantities.  Essentially he establishes early on the concept of
comparison particles.
The equations in (9.1) provide a system for uniquely determining N and R0 and
thus, R0 can be applied to the speed of recession of the galaxies (as derived by George
Lemaître (1894 – 1966)), V0 = c R0 3 .  The result of applying (9.1) then gives V0 =
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572.4 km/s/MPc.  At the time Eddington was reasonably close to the experimentally
determined value of V0 = 560 km/s/MPc given by Hubble and Humason (Eddington
1946).  This parameter, now known as the dimensionless Hubble parameter, is actually a
function of the Hubble constant, H0:
h = H0 100 km s ⋅MPc . (9.2)
This is, of course, not to be confused with Planck’s constant.  The notation used here is
standard in current texts.  Its value now ranges from 50 to 100 with a best estimate being
around 72 (see any modern cosmology text such as Peacock 1999).  The first part of (9.1)
is also (5.18).  It appears from this that Eddington’s results would have to depend on the
values for the parameters in (5.18) and since G, mh, and c are not appreciably different
than they were in the 1940s, the new value for N would need to produce the proper value
for R0.  Logically (9.1) would have to be a pair of internally consistent simultaneous
equations – i.e. changing N would have to change R0 since if their definitions are identical
in both parts of (9.1) simple mathematics requires the relationship to hold.  Just for the
sake of argument let’s verify this with current values.
Current values for N are most frequently given as being on the order of 1080 –
1085, though there are estimates that range as high as 10120 – 10130.  Using these values
with the second part of (9.1), values for V0 would range from a high of 282 to a low on
the order of 10-18, which certainly encompasses the currently accepted values for h.
Using the ‘best estimate’ value of 72 for h (or V0 in Eddington’s notation) and knowing
that the range of nuclear forces, k, has not changed, we find N to be on the order of 1081,
which is well within the more conservatively accepted range of 1080 – 1085.  Using these
values for R0 and N in (5.18) produces a value of 4.863×10−54 cm  – still tantalizingly
close to the known value of 3.95 ×10−53cm .  So, even when adjusted to include currently
accepted values of h the relationship still holds – (9.1) appears to be more than a simple
coincidence.  The radius of the universe and the number of protons and electrons (and
neutrons) in the universe appear to combine to give a relation between macroscopic
cosmological quantities and microscopic nuclear quantities.  On the other hand, since the
universe is expanding and thus R0 is changing, this implies N is continually growing
which implies continuous matter creation, a hallmark of steady state theories.  However,
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he solves the matter creation problem simply by changing the datum thus shuffling the
Dirac sea a bit as I’ve described – the conservation laws still hold.
The Proton-Electron Mass Ratio
One of the most studied results in Fundamental Theory was his derivation of the mass
ratio of the proton to the electron.  This particular discussion arises out of the discussion
of external and internal particles.  Working from equation (7.2) the total particle energy
for the atom is E = m0 + p
2 2µ  where µ = m0 k = m0 136 .  In the external/internal
treatment the rest energy of the internal particle is not µ (the mass of the internal particle)
but, rather, zero which is a highly useful result.  The energy, E, then can be decomposed
into its constituent pieces labelled:
Ee = m0 ,     Ei = p
2 2µ (9.3)
where the subscript e is for the external particle and the subscript i is for the internal
particle.  Rather than a single energy tensor now applying to the atom as a whole, the
external and internal particles now have their own energy tensors that reduce their
multiplicities from 136 to 10 (the standard carrier V136 now is broken into two V10’s which
are now carriers of vectors rather than tensors – the vector quantity here is the
momentum).  The change in multiplicity does not affect the transition energy thus leaving
Ei unchanged.  The energy of the external particle is now Ee = M1  where M1 = 13610 m0 .
For the internal particle µ = 1136 m0 .  If this given definition is accepted as a potential
solution for the hydrogen atom the ratio of the mass of the external particle to that of the
internal particle is:
η1 =
M1
µ
=
1362
10
= 1849.6 . (9.4)
If the masses of the proton and electron are, respectively, mp and me, (7.2) gives
mp + me = M1  and mpme = M1µ .  The proton and electron masses then become the roots
of the quadratic equation m2 − mM1 + M1µ = 0  where m is the generic variable that gives
both mp and me.  However, given M1 = 13610 m0  and µ = 1136 m0 , this becomes:
214
m2 − m 136
10
m0
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⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+
136
10
m0
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
136
m0
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= 10m2 −136mm0 + m0
2 = 0 . (9.5)
Solving this equation gives the following slightly different result:
η2 =
mp
me
= 1847.6 . (9.6)
All Eddington is really doing here is showing that the ratio provided by the
external/internal particle method (9.4) is roughly the same as that provided by taking the
proton and electron (9.6), which simply means the external/internal particle
representation looks physically about the same.  There is nothing terribly unusual about
anything Eddington has done here.  Similar results can be derived from the treatments
given in any standard physics text.  Part of the reason for this is that the “reduced mass µ
differs from the electron mass by very little in the hydrogen atom” (Gasiorowicz 1996, p.
280).  Since the mass of the hydrogen atom as a whole differs very little from the mass of
a proton (since the electron is so small in comparison) it stands to reason the ratio of the
mass of the atom (external particle) to the reduced mass (internal particle) should be
roughly the same as the mass ratio of the proton and the electron.  It is curious, then, that
historians and physicists have jumped on this particular result as being
cosmonumerological.  The reasoning he employed leading to (9.5), particularly in regard
to the various particle multiplicities, is unusual, but since it is purely mathematical it is
not physically disprovable, per se.  The result is unremarkable.  As such all Eddington
has done is devise a new way of mathematically describing the hydrogen atom that
experimentally yields the correct results.  Certainly by Ockham’s Razor one could
eliminate Eddington’s theory when compared to others simply by its complicated nature.
But there have been other theories far more complicated, bold, and completely incorrect,
that did not receive as much bad press (though this is a purely anecdotal observation).
However, Eddington does take this a step further, as is his trademark.  He
interprets (9.4) as being the more experimentally direct value where (9.6) is the listed
value.  Masses given by (9.5) are then referred to as the ‘standard masses’ of the proton
and the electron.  When splitting his theory into electrical and mechanical components
via the transition from V136 to V137 particles he finds a different ratio.  The first strictly
Eddingtonian step taken here is in his definition of the Rydberg constant:
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 =
1
2
1
137
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
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2 µc
2π
. (9.7)
A 1935 edition of Pauling and Wilson’s Introduction to Quantum Mechanics contains the
following expression:
R = 2π
2µe4
h3c
(9.8)
(Pauling and Wilson 1935, p. 41).  When comparing this to (9.7) there are two items to
notice here.  First, he substitutes the exact value of 1/137 in for the fine-structure constant
though it is known from experiment to be closer to 1/137.037.  Second, in performing the
algebra to transform (9.8) to (9.7) (maintaining, for the sake of argument, Eddington’s
value for the fine-structure constant) one ends up with an extra e2 in the numerator:
 
R = 1
2
1
137
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2 µce2
2π
. (9.9)
Eddington specifically excluded this term, saying that the derivation in Fundamental
Theory leads directly to (9.7) “there being no occasion to introduce e2 except as an
abbreviation for  c 137 ” (Eddington 1946, p. 58).  With that single sentence, appearing
in parentheses in the text, he manages to gloss over a not-so-trivial point.
In an early draft of Fundamental Theory Eddington does little to clear up this
vague statement, but does describe why it is necessary:
By accepting [9.7] as the formula for the experimentally
determined Rydberg constant, we tie the resulting value of
mp/me to a system that is certainly not B [see discussion of
systems A and B in chapter seven, beginning p. 160].  The
transformation from B  to the observational system
corresponds to the recognition in classical theory of an e.m.
aether as part of the environment of every object-system
(Eddington as quoted in Slater 1957, p. 139).
Focusing first on the reasoning behind his definition of the Rydberg constant, we find
that he seeks to tie the ratio mp/me to an experimentally determinable quantity.  I am about
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to demonstrate that this version of that ratio distinguishes the standard masses as given in
(9.6) from what are known as the ‘current masses.’  The intent is admirable but given that
he begins the derivation with (9.7) he has left a gaping hole in the proof – how exactly
can e2 be eliminated.  There is nothing else in any early draft that further elucidates this
move.
Continuing, then, under the assumption that (9.7) is correct, the empirical
Rydberg constant, ℜ, is measured according to his assumptions in system A which is the
standard particle uranoid with bound intracules.  The formula, however, is obtained from
the theory of free intracules that corresponds to system B, a hydrocule uranoid with free
intracules.  How does Eddington, then, define an observational system exactly?
We can now give a formal definition of the ‘observational
system’ … masses of neutral particles are molarly
[macroscopically or relativistically] controlled, and
quantum masses or energies optically controlled.  W e
therefore define the observational system to be that in
which these two conditions are satisfied simultaneously
(Eddington as quoted in Slater 1957, p. 139).
The empirical Rydberg constant, then, must account for the conversion factors used in
transforming between systems A and B.  It is given as:
 
ℜ =
1
2
1
137
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
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2 µAc
2π
(9.10)
where µ = µB = β
1
6µA .  I have already given several instances where β is used in
converting between systems A and B.  Recall that its value is 137/136 and it represents
the addition of an extra degree of freedom in the intracule to account for the Coulomb
energy contained within it.  It is not purely an invention of Eddington’s (c.f. Bond 1934)
but is employed far more liberally by him than anyone else.  In (9.10) µA is the ‘current
mass’ of the intracule (Eddington 1946).  He gives this as the observed reduced mass
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value.  Unlike intracules, extracules transform their masses as measured densities:
M1B = βM1A .  Equation (9.1) then becomes:
′η1 =
M1
µ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ A
= β−
5
6
M1
µ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ B
=
1362
10
β−
5
6 = 1838.34 . (9.11)
The quadratic (9.5) becomes:
10m2 −136mm0 + β
5
6m0
2 = 0 (9.12)
Solving this yields:
′η2 =
mp
me
= 1836.34 . (9.13)
Masses determined in this way are referred to as ‘current masses’ for the proton and
electron and are distinguished from the standard masses derived above.  Again, the
difference between the values is a result of which system one is investigating – the
observational system or the nearly objective theoretical system.  Once again he is taking
into account the problem of interference from the observer and the difference here is that
(9.11) and (9.13) account for the transition between systems A and B (which amounts to
considering the observational system to be subjective and the theoretical system nearly
objective) while (9.4) and (9.6) do not.
Eddington actually proceeds to correct (9.11) which is the ‘corrected’ observed
value.  Following on the preceding quote from Slater he determines that the masses of
extracules are molarly controlled while the masses of intracules are spectroscopically
(optically) controlled.  The Faraday constant for hydrogen ℑ = e / mhc  can be found by
measuring the charge that results from the electrolysis of a known mass of water.  Given
that   = 137e
2 c = 137ℑ2mh
2c .  Substituting this into (9.10) gives:
µA = 4π ⋅137
3ℜℑ2mh
2 . (9.14)
A correction must be made to this since the definition of the Faraday constant assumes
that e is molarly defined.  Eddington finds that the value in quantum theory is slightly
different and, as such, when converting from a quantum system B to a molar system ′B
lengths and times are multiplied by β−
1
12 .  Or one could instead convert from a quantum
system A to a molar system ′B  using β−
1
4 .  Note that the origin of all the exponents for β
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is simple dimensional analysis and the corrections it provides are very small.  Hence even
without this correction factor Eddington’s theory would still be surprisingly close to
observed values.
Similar conversion factors are found for e, , and ℑ.  Using accepted
observational data from 1942 for these constants, Eddington makes the proper corrections
to arrive at an observed value of 1838.56 ± 0.51 for the extracule/intracule mass ratio.
Converting this to a proton/electron mass ratio gives 1836.56 ± 0.51 which is
considerably closer to the value given in (9.13) further supporting Eddington’s use of the
extracule/intracule model in place of the proton/electron model.  Using the ratios of the
Rydberg constants for deuterium and hydrogen and the ratio of the atomic weights, both
of which can be determined experimentally from mass-spectroscopic methods, a ratio of
1836.14 ± 0.22 is obtained.  Numerous other alternative methods for determining the
various ratios of these physical constants are explored by Eddington, all with the same
theme: begin with a set of measurements and move through corrections to see how close
the data comes to (9.13).
A Brief Note on the Aether
The quote on page 197 justifying the Rydberg constant opens yet another Pandora’s Box,
however:  he clearly advocates for an aether.  He actually prefaces the above quote with
the following:
Although separation of mechanical and electrical energies
is important … for analytical treatment, they are not
separated in anything that the observer handles – or
supposes he handles.  The elementary particles, protons and
electrons, carry both electrical and mechanical
characteristics;  the aether is a carrier of electrical and
gravitational waves (Eddington as quoted in Slater 1957, p.
139).
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It is almost unfathomable that so strong a supporter of relativity would also support an
idea whose debunking actually led to the development of relativity.  This quote is not an
anomaly, either.  In a 1932 letter to Larmor (see chapter six, p. 112) he introduces an
‘aether displacement’ to represent a link between an electron and its environment.  I have
previously argued that the uranoid was his manifestation of the aether (Durham 2003b).
However, further investigations have led me to change my view on this.  The uranoid is a
standardized environment and can be made up of not just space-time itself but also other
particles in a large assemblage, as I’ve already shown.  Eddington’s use of the aether
most likely stems from the fact that he recognized space-time as quantisable (essentially
foreshadowing the graviton).  Since light travels on geodesics in space-time and
gravitational waves are propagated through the ‘fabric’ of space-time, it is well-known
that space-time has some sort of structure to it.  Eddington recognized this structural
aspect and applied the term ‘aether’ to it.  His definition of the aether, then, was not
necessarily the same as the classical definition.  However, as I have previously stated (see
p. 112), he did not feel this aether was necessarily a field.  He obviously struggled with
exactly what it was, physically, though it can be easily described as the ‘fabric’ of space-
time.  But just what is the fabric of space-time?  I will leave that for quantum gravity to
answer.40  Suffice it to say, Eddington’s use of the term ‘aether’ was not in keeping with
its classical use, but, nonetheless, demonstrated a belief in a structural vacuum.41
The Fine-Structure Constant
Unlike most other physical constants given in Fundamental Theory the fine-structure
constant is not derived from any first principles, rather, it is assumed to be a first
principle which seems to violate, again, the deductive, non-arbitrary spirit of the theory.
It could even be said to be a stabilised quantity given as 1/137.  In fact, Eddington would
                                                 
40 Steven French has pointed me to a PhD thesis currently being written by Dean Rickles at the University
of Leeds as being an excellent source for a discussion of this topic.
41 The aether concept is still debated and it has been clear for several decades that (from quantum field
theory) the vacuum has an energy of its own and particles can spontaneously pop into existence (and
subsequently annihilate one another) in vacuum.  The aether is, in fact, still discussed in the literature (see
Wilczek 1999).
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say it is fixed by the theory – its value is not derivable, per se, but the given value is the
only one that works within the theory.  This seems to be a rather odd conclusion and one
cannot help but speculate that he was driven to force this to be true by the oddly
coincidental closeness of 136 and 137.  In deference to Eddington, I have already
mentioned that the ratio 137/136 was not his own discovery (see Bond 1934 – β is called
the Bond factor).  Nonetheless, as I will show, finding a need for a multiplicity of 137 in
many situations results in his definition of the fine-structure constant as 1/137.
Eddington’s own explanation for the value of the fine-structure constant derives
from the addition of the interchange energy that I outlined in chapter seven.  The internal
wavefunctions of the hydrogen atom imply half-integer spin in any plane of rotation.  But
viewing this relativistically in the sense that there are no preferred frames of reference,
the implied (or rather applied) frame of reference introduces chirality into the problem –
either particle could have right-handed or left-handed spin.  The atom does not naturally
possess any such preference since a relativistic transformation can easily flip right-to-left
and vice versa.  The only requirement is that the two particles remain in the same
orientation relative to each other.  This is just another way to explain Eddington’s view
that spin is a frame-dependant quantity.
Spin, then, is formally added in order to remain consistent within our own
analytical system.  In essence we’re constrained by our own subjective perspective that
forces chirality into our observations.  Since in the hydrogen atom, regardless of how it is
viewed (extracule/intracule or proton/electron) the particles each contribute half-integer
spin.  If these spins are in the same direction the entire atom contains integer spin.  If they
are in the opposite direction the entire atom contains zero spin, though Eddington does
not mention the zero spin situation.  Since there is an interchange circulation – a
circulation due to the constant interchanging of indistinguishable particles in the planoid
– the interchange energy can be interpreted as being provided by the spin.  Interchange is
really a quantum number, then, and since Eddington equates it with the Coulomb energy,
then the Coulomb energy must also be the same quantum number.  The interchange
circulation arises for the same reason – our limited viewpoint – and that is the real reason
it can be related to spin.  So interchange angular momentum is a full quantum,  (or zero)
rather than a half-integer quantity.  If this system is analyzed in rigid coordinates, the
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rigid coordinate time is k-1 times the Galilean time.  In working with interchange energy,
which is just Coulomb energy, the multiplicity is taken to be 137.  The interchange
angular momentum provides a linear momentum to the intracule of /r that appears in an
extra-spatial dimension that is normal to r.  If this extra-spatial dimension is actually the
time dimension in normal (3 + 1) space-time then the linear momentum reduces to the
Galilean coordinate representation   kr =  137r .  Given that the classical electron
radius is given by r0 = e
2 mc2 , we can write E = mc2 = e2 r0 .  Dividing through by c
gives mc = e2 cr0 .  Using Eddington’s system of natural units this has the same units as
  kr =  137r .  Setting them equal to each other and rearranging with the knowledge
that  e
2 c = α  is the fine-structure constant, we find:
 
1
137
=
e2
c
= α . (9.15)
Eddington’s theory thus requires the fine-structure constant be the inverse of 137 due to
the correction factor introduced in moving from rigid to Galilean coordinates in an
intracule.  The inverse of the fine-structure constant then appears as the multiplicity of an
intracule (V137) rather than a coincidental k + 1 relation to a standard carrier (V136).  In this
way he also directly relates it to electrical situations since it represents the mechanical
degrees of freedom plus an extra degree of freedom from the Coulomb (interchange)
energy contained within the intracule representation.  In modern interpretations, the fine-
structure constant is the coupling constant for electromagnetism meaning it measures the
strength of the electromagnetic interaction.  So Eddington is at least consistent in that he
essentially finds the same thing – it is produced because the energy of the bound electron
and proton in the intracule that produces an extra degree of freedom leading directly to
the fine structure constant happens to be the Coulomb energy.
Non-Coulombian Energy
I ended the previous chapter with a discussion of the non-Coulomb energy term that
appears when like charges interact.  A deeper analysis leads to some additional numerical
results.  One method that I introduced for adding protons and electrons to the universe
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involved taking the hydrocule mass as a comparison particle.  As such protons and
electrons are then individually added to the environment together with their comparison
holes.  Comparison particles will then consist of an equal number of two different types:
those that have the additional non-Coulomb energy and those that don’t.  Eddington
associates those with the additional energy with protons and those without it with
electrons.  When a proton is introduced its comparison hole eliminates a comparison
particle that has the additional energy term whereas the electron’s comparison hole
eliminates a comparison particle without the extra energy term.  The comparison hole is
simply the regular hole created by exciting the proton to an energy level above the datum.
The additional energy term actually adds a corrective element to the energy of a proton,
mp assuming its rest energy is m0: mp m0( )Bδ ( ′r ) .  Again the non-Coulombian energy is
given as an adjustment to the initial energy that simplifies a four-particle system to a two-
particle system.  It appears on the same footing as a particle’s rest mass, which is an
adjustment that simplifies a 12 N -particle system to a one particle system.  Basically it
accounts for the larger mass of the proton (or the difference between the masses of the
proton and the electron).  Another way of looking at this is to say that since there is
technically only one mathematical form for comparison particles regardless of whether or
not the original particle is an electron or a proton.  Since these comparison particles, if
they are internal, must contain only a single variate (the scale uncertainty) then the
difference in the mass of the proton has to be accounted for somewhere.  As such the
excess mass supplied by the proton is converted to this non-Coulomb energy term in the
comparison particle.  But then why does this non-Coulomb energy have anything to do
with charge at all?  There is no clear explanation for this in the texts, in any of the early
drafts, or in Relativity Theory of Protons and Electrons (1936).
Nonetheless (8.36) can have the factor mp/m0 added to it to give:
mp
m0
Bδ ′r( ) = − 16
3π
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
2 mp
m0
e2
σ
e− r
2 4σ 2 . (9.16)
This is then the corrected non-Coulomb energy of two protons.  Since we know that
k = 2σ = R0 N , if we define:
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(9.16) can be rewritten as:
Enc = −Ae
− r2 k2 (9.17)
where the subscript nc indicates that this is the non-Coulomb energy term.  Using the
Rydberg constant and previously described methods to determine the values for k and σ
the value for A is found to be 52.01mec2 and A is called the nuclear-energy constant.  Both
k, interpreted here as the range of nuclear forces, and A, which is understood to be an
optically (spectroscopically) controlled energy, are found experimentally in proton-
proton scattering experiments.  The observed value given by Eddington is 52.26mec2.
Notice that this term is negative indicating that it is an attractive energy.  When combined
with the normal Coulomb repulsion term one finds regions where the total energy and
resultant force are attractive and repulsive.  Naturally one could determine a ratio of the
values of the Coulomb to non-Coulomb energy and Eddington gives its value as 15.20.
Despite his claim that the extra energy term is only associated with proton
comparison particles due to their larger mass, he applies the preceding argument to the
scattering of electrons since this extra energy term also arises when there are like charges.
Substituting the mass of the electron into (9.16) in place of the mass of the proton gives
the ratio of Coulomb to non-Coulomb energy as very nearly unity with the same said for
the related forces.  As such the non-Coulomb energy is negligible for the electron.  It is
perhaps here that he rationalizes using the non-Coulomb energy term in both a mass
situation and a charge situation.  It actually does arise in any situation involving like
charges, but because it can be equated with a rest mass it is negligible in the case of the
comparatively tiny electron.
In a nutshell, Eddington is attempting to adjust the standard Coulomb interaction
to account for anomalies experienced in scattering experiments.  Of course, what he is
presaging here without knowing it is the strong interaction.  Why strong and not weak?
He assumed that the standard Coulomb repulsion might possibly be overcome at high
enough energies and some other interaction or energy would have to take over and
produce the observed scattering.  Electron-electron scattering was more predictable since
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electrons are fundamental particles, but because protons, unbeknownst to anyone in the
early 40s, are made up of quarks and gluons, proton-proton scattering experiments
contain anomalies not found in electron-electron scattering.  So, in essence, he was trying
to explain away effects we now usually attribute to the strong interaction (though the
weak interaction also plays a role).
As I will discuss below, particles can be created and annihilated in the vacuum in
Eddington’s theory just as in quantum field theory.  This is as to be expected since
Dirac’s equation essentially predicted antimatter as early as 1928, though the realization
that the antielectron (positron) was the correct solution to these problems did not come
until 1931 when Dirac formally introduced it as a new kind of particle (Kragh 1999).
Eddington simply reinterprets Dirac’s negative energy sea.  The direct link between this
and an increasing N is not explicitly discussed, however.
Newton’s Gravitational Constant
The preceding discussion of proton-proton scattering provides a way to determine
R0 N .  By measuring k one obtains R0 N  directly.  Measuring A then provides σ
which gives R0 2 N  directly.  It also possible to determine R0 N  and R0 from
observation.  Later in Fundamental Theory Eddington gives a derivation of the value for
N that gives N = 32 ⋅136 ⋅2
256 .  The principle formulae for these various quantities are
then:
R0
N
=
Gmh
πc2
(9.18)
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N = 32 ⋅136 ⋅2
256 . (9.20)
Combining (9.18) and (9.19) with the fine-structure constant and Faraday’s constant
gives:
G
′ℑ 2c2
=
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10
9
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2 πβ
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4
N
. (9.21)
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This then can be solved for G, which gives a value of 6.6665 ×10−8  which he claims is
accurate to one part in five-thousand.  Conversely, using an experimentally determined
value for G will provide an alternative derivation for N that does not require the far more
complex derivation that is a result of Eddington’s E-number theory that is not discussed
here.  The physical interpretation of this is that the number of particles in the universe is
determined by a ratio of locally measurable constants.  Since he assumes that his later
value of N given by (9.20) is correct he then assumes that his value of G must be the
correct one.
The force constant, then, which is the ratio of the electrical to gravitational forces
(interactions) between a proton and an electron is given by:
F = e
2
Gmpme
=
2
3πβ 2
5N (9.22)
where mpme = β
5
6 m0
2 10  and was substituted into (9.21).  This, of course, is known to be
an enormous number and is often calculated in introductory physics courses as an
example of just how weak gravity is.
One further result Eddington immediately jumps to that could have been derived
much earlier (see chapter five) is the relationship between limiting speed of recession of
the galaxies and the range of nuclear forces.  The recession velocity, which was
introduced before, is V0 = c R0 3 .  Since R0 = k N  we can write kV0 = c 3N  “so
that the recession-constant can be derived from the range-constant of nuclear forces, or
vice-versa, with no other observational data except the velocity of light” (Eddington
1946, p. 105).  One more time the microscopic and macroscopic are linked but the point
can now be better emphasized that macroscopic (molar) interactions are governed by
gravity while microscopic (quantal) interactions are governed by electricity.  In order to
build the universe up from the very small to the very large there must be some transition
region where the two interactions can be linked.  This transition region is given by
Eddington as being the scale-free theory that makes up the majority of the statistical
portion of Fundamental Theory.
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Degenerate Matter
The final application of Eddington’s statistical theory that has yet to be discussed is the
application of his work with exclusion to degenerate matter such as that contained within
white-dwarf stars.  The densities of such stars are tremendous.  At such densities the
electrons and protons (or nuclei) are in a constant state of collision.  Separating carriers of
electrical energy, V137, from those of mechanical energy, V136, is vastly different than
anything as yet encountered, which has been mostly isolated two-particle systems
separated into extracules and intracules.
Both mechanical and electrical systems include waves as a fundamental physical
representation.  In mechanical systems, waves include such forms as sound waves, waves
on a string, etc.  In electrical systems, waves include changes of electric polarisation
(with the resulting currents) and various magnetic effects.  For the most part the electrical
and mechanical aspects are independent.  However, if the amplitudes of the various
waves are not infinitesimal, cross-terms arise that create an energy equilibrium between
the two forms.  Consider, for instance, a system at non-zero temperature.  Since the
temperature is non-zero there must be a field of radiation that can be determined by
Planck’s law.  This field induces electrical waves in the material.  But, there is a slow
transfer of energy from the field to the material that can induce mechanical waves in the
system (by adding kinetic energy).
Now comes the Eddingtonian part.  If the system is dropped to zero-temperature
the waves do not vanish since uncertainty predicts that there isn’t necessarily perfect
uniformity at zero-temperature, i.e. uncertainty really says that exactly zero-temperature
uranoids (no motion) are impossible.  As such there are residual fluctuations resulting
purely from the uncertainty principle.  This idea is not so far fetched, actually.  As Zee
tells us straight off, “In quantum mechanics the uncertainty principle tells us that the
energy can fluctuate wildly over a small interval of time” (Zee 2003, p. 3) and since
relativity tells us energy and mass can be converted into each other, the wildly fluctuating
energy can turn into mass.  These fluctuations exist in the vacuum and particles pop into
and out of existence from the vacuum itself.  Ignoring, for a moment, the cosmic
microwave background radiation (which, at 2.9 K, is pretty close to zero anyway), the
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vacuum is basically a zero-temperature system.  As I’ve described before, Eddington
explained the possibility of the production of particles (and even antiparticles) as
excitations in the Dirac sea, which is simply a group of particles below a subjective
datum.  Where do these particles receive the energy necessary to excite them into
existence?  The answer is, quite simply, the random zero-temperature fluctuations
produced by uncertainty.  Eddington’s study of degenerate matter is actually an attempt
to determine the energy and pressure of the residual waves or fluctuations.  This is the
same reason given by quantum field theory in the union of special relativity and quantum
mechanics.
Microscopically the polarisation provides a distribution function of electrical
coordinates while macroscopically displacements produced as a result of sound waves
provide a distribution function of mechanical coordinates.  The electrical coordinates are
provided by doublets and thus the state of the material is described by probability
distributions of electrical coordinates of unidentified doublets in a large assemblage and
the mechanical coordinates of an unidentified neutral particle.  In order for this
description to work the system must be in statistical equilibrium so that the fluctuations
are of a completely random nature.
Now calling on the methods developed for transforming two-particle systems
where a proton and electron, for instance, are replaced by an extracule and an intracule,
we can assume that the material actually consists of a superposition of positively and
negatively charged matter and thus, rather than consider the mechanical and electrical
waves separately, we can bind them together and rather consider two different wave
types: displacement of positively charged matter and displacement of negatively charged
matter.  Electrical waves can be described by these two wave types in opposite phase
while mechanical wave can be described by these two wave types in the same phase.
Microscopically the state of a material is described by a probability distribution of the
displacement of an unidentified positively charged particle and a probability distribution
of the displacement of a negatively charged particle.  Now as the mechanical and
electrical waves are largely independent, these two new wave types actually have intense
interaction since they represent charged particles.  In terms of the wave descriptions,
whenever an electron and proton collide, energy is transferred from one to the other
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meaning energy can be transferred from one wave type to the other.  The entire energy
can be said to have passed from one wave type (system) to the other when each particle
in one type has had at least one collision and thus the relaxation time is roughly the time
between collisions.  But in degenerate matter, the protons and electrons are in a constant
state of collision and so neither wave type can be said to exist separately even for a brief
moment, though at low (really mid) densities there comes a transition point where they
can be treated separately using formulae similar to the two-particle transformation.
The electrical coordinates are given by ξα  and the mechanical coordinates are
given by Xα  and, since we’re using the second set of wave types (displacement of
positive and negative charges) each particle has both electrical and mechanical
coordinates.  These coordinates have the conjugate momenta ϖα  and Pα .  Wavefunctions
(in the quantum sense) are then obtained in electrical and mechanical space and thus the
exclusion principle is then applied: there are no more than two particles per cell h3 of
ξϖ -space and not more than two particles per cell h3 of XP-space.  The latter substitutes
for gravitation and inertia and is concealed in the rest masses of the extracules.  As such
the former is the only form of exclusion that is necessarily dealt with.  The doublets
mentioned above turn out to be intracules and we can reanalyze the matter as being
extracules and intracules – again a tie to the two-particle transformation.  Also, the only
matter considered here is hydrogen since a far more complex transformation is required
for other elements since we’re no longer working in the two-particle paradigm.
The average energy per intracule is E = 35 E  where E is given by (8.18).  This
introduces another definition of scale uncertainty as a particle density for the intracules.
In astronomical situations the pressure is often also required but can be calculated
independently of the energy.  The average contribution of each intracule to the
normalisation volume V0 is ΔT11 = p1
2 V0µ .  The total number of particles in the volume
is then σV0  and thus the total pressure is P = σ p1
2 µ .  The spherical form of the
momentum distribution is given as p1
2 = 15℘
2  (see the section on spherical space in
chapter five).  By (8.17) the total pressure is then:
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This is what is known as the degeneracy pressure of white-dwarf matter and is interpreted
as the pressure at zero-temperature.  Modern notation for K (Carroll and Ostlie 1996, p.
588) is:
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3π 2( )23
5
2
me
(9.24)
which is entirely consistent with (9.23) assuming the electron mass and reduced mass are
nearly identical and noting that Eddington uses h rather than .  Eddington has thus
derived the correct formula for total degeneracy pressure from the basic tenets of
Fundamental Theory, another remarkable or perhaps remarkably coincidental result,
though it should be noted that the basic form of (9.23) was first given by Eddington’s old
mentor Fowler in 1926 (Fowler 1926).  But it is not the result that is remarkable, since it
is the standard equation used for nearly eighty years.  Rather, it is the fact that the
sometimes exceedingly complex arguments in Fundamental Theory were able to produce
it.  This still does not indicate that Fundamental Theory has any legitimacy as a theory as,
once again, it could be eliminated by Ockham’s Razor, but certainly lends additional
credit to the methods since they have turned out to be, at the very least, consistent.
The wavefunctions of steady states are standing waves where the pα
2  reduce to
eigenvalues which puts this analysis squarely in scale-free physics.  A scale
transformation between the two uranoidal systems, B→ A , must be applied for large
values of pα
2 , but in doing so this allows
E = m + p2 2m (9.25)
to be used as the Hamiltonian energy for standing waves (where p2 is not small).  This
then also serves as the energy provided by the zero-temperature fluctuations that cause
pair creation in the vacuum to occur.  This is not a field theoretic approach in that it is
single-dimensional whereas modern quantum field theory assumes, obviously, a field
theoretic approach that includes a canonical momentum density (Zee 2003).  It is thus a
gross simplification of the actual physical process and ultimately not correct in its
230
application.  However, (9.25) can be used to represent a particle in a potential where the
potential is given by the first term, m, using natural units and the mass-energy relation.
Free particles are represented as having standing waveforms and the interaction that
results from the presence of the potential will not necessarily change this.  So Eddington
is partially correct, but his application is far too simplified to correctly account for true
physical processes.
Motivation
That concludes a detailed study of Eddington’s statistical theory contained in the first part
of Fundamental Theory (Chapters I-VI which are a merely an expansion of Relativity
Theory of Protons and Electrons published a decade earlier).  I will summarize and
analyze it in the context of modern quantum field theory in the next chapter but I wish to
conclude with a remark on the apparent motivation for Eddington’s entire quest.  I say
‘apparent’ since it is semi-speculative, there being no direct evidence to support the idea
in any of Eddington’s writings.
Eddington’s career was spent largely as an astronomer.  This begs the question:
where was he introduced to quantum mechanics?  Reading Fundamental Theory it
presents itself as an early quantum field theory and tends to get bogged down in
formalism much of the time.  Why would an astronomer take on a purely physics project
seemingly so far removed from his field of study?  The answers to these questions,
particularly the latter, are likely obvious to us in hindsight, but were not necessarily so
obvious to Eddington.  Primarily the motivation appears to lie in the discovery of super-
dense astronomical objects.  Since he was influenced directly by Fowler who studied
degenerate matter in white dwarfs as early as 1926, and having been one of the early
pioneers of the theory of stellar structure, in extreme astronomical conditions he found
quantum mechanics and relativity colliding head-on: quantum mechanically degenerate
objects that had tremendous gravitational fields.  In order to further study stellar structure
he found it necessary to find a way to bring the two seemingly incompatible theories
together in a single unified theory.  Ultimately, then, it was his interest in stellar structure
that gave him the motivation for developing Fundamental Theory in the first place in
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order to explain internal stellar processes particularly in stellar oddities such as white-
dwarfs.
Despite acknowledging the potentiality of an unlimited number of types of
particles created simply by plugging in different values to the standard carrier, he appears
oddly stuck in the two-particle paradigm despite the discovery of numerous particles by
his death in 1944.  This is a result of the fact that his theory only admitted two types of
particles – electrical and mechanical.  Any normal particles (electrons, protons, neutrons,
positrons, etc.) could theoretically be included in either of these two types depending on
the situation (neutral particles likely would only appear as mechanical particles).  So he
was not necessarily stuck in the electron-proton paradigm, which would have been
absurd, but rather in an electrical – mechanical paradigm that was not shattered for
certain until after his death, with the introduction of the weak and strong interactions.
Nonetheless, most likely without ever knowing it, he developed an early quantum field
theory that is largely outmoded and incorrect in many places, but is remarkably predictive
of what was to come.  This is the subject of the next chapter.
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X
Clarity of Perception
Having reviewed Eddington’s statistical theory in great detail it is now prudent to both
summarize it and to ask how correct, relevant, and foresighted it was.  This must be
described in the context of both his motivation and methods.  We return, then, to 1916
with Eddington poring over large data sets at the Greenwich Observatory.  This was in
line with the observatory’s chief mission of improving observations in general, both
through improvements to equipment as well as improvements in methods of analysis.
We have already seen in his obituary of Schwarzschild that this work led him to consider
the general structure of the universe from a stellar point-of-view.  In addition the methods
of analysis used in this case were statistical.  Statistical methods include methods of
probability and, in fact, statistical mechanics (better known as thermodynamics) was the
forefather of the quantum revolution.  So the stage was partially set when, early on, he
applied statistical methods to general astronomical applications.  The stage was
completely set once general relativity had made its appearance in Britain when a copy of
Einstein’s paper was smuggled to Eddington via de Sitter (French 1979)42.  This
circumstance led to Eddington becoming the foremost expert on relativity in the English-
speaking scientific community.  The collision of these two historical events in
Eddington’s life – his assigned research involving statistical methods as Greenwich and
his being on the receiving end of a smuggled paper by Einstein – led to the broad
formation of Eddington’s scientific outlook in part presented in Fundamental Theory.
Tracing the Roots
Precisely when the two collided in Eddington’s own mind is debatable.  It did not occur
immediately upon his receipt of Einstein’s paper.  Clearly it could not have occurred
prior to his receiving this paper from de Sitter since he had no knowledge of general
                                                 
42 Germany and Britain were, of course, at war at the time thus requiring the use of the “smuggler” (de
Sitter).
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relativity at this point.  The most obvious confluence of the two methods was the eclipse
expedition of 1919.  In attempting to experimentally prove a (theoretical) prediction of
general relativity he was required to employ statistical methods of data reduction.  In
addition there had to be the recognition that the results were only accurate to a point.
This limit in accuracy begs the question of whether it is a limit imposed by the
experimental and/or data reduction methods, or whether it is inherent in nature.
This did not turn Eddington directly onto the path leading to Fundamental
Theory.  He was still a career astronomer at the time and upon his return to Cambridge,
was immersed almost wholly in astronomy.  But it was also around this time that
astronomy began to move away from the realm of solely positional and dynamical
methods to include studies of the actual structure of astronomical objects.  Eddington
followed the trend, turning his interests to stellar structure.  The motivation, again, is
explicitly stated in his comment in Schwarzschild’s obituary which I will repeat here for
purposes of clarity: the “task of determining accurate data for a large number of stars
inevitably leads the mind to consider the great problems of the structure of the stellar
universe” (Eddington 1916b).  It was in 1919 that Fowler returned to Cambridge from the
war.  Three years later, in collaboration with Darwin, Milne, and others, he began work
on his seminal studies of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics that included
applying these methods to problems of stellar structure.  Eddington had already been
Plumian Professor for nearly a decade and, since Fowler worked at the Cavendish
Laboratory (under his father-in-law Lord Rutherford), they were in close proximity along
Madingley Road.  In 1926 (yet another brilliant discovery in that amazing year) Fowler
published his most seminal paper linking gaseous degenerate states (a short time later
discovered to obey Fermi-Dirac statistics) to white dwarf stars that were not yet well
understood (Fowler 1926).  Somewhat simultaneously Eddington and Chandrasekhar
were publicly arguing over just how far stellar collapse could go (this is the discovery of
the famous Chandrasekhar limit for white dwarfs).43
The problem that presented itself as a result of the observation of the very strange
companion star to Sirius A that is now known as Sirius B.  Sirius B’s existence was
                                                 
43 In the philosophy of science literature some recent discussions of Eddington’s observations have been
made, cf. Deborah G. Mayo’s Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, University of Chicago
Press, 1996.
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predicted in 1844 by Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel (1784 – 1846) and first observed by
Alvan Clark (1804 – 1887) in 1862 (Carroll and Ostlie, 1996).  But it wasn’t until 1915
when Walter Adams (1876 – 1956) working at Mt. Wilson Observatory discovered that
Sirius B’s temperature was huge (modern values are around 27,000 K).  But using the
Stefan-Boltzmann law this predicts a size smaller than the Earth!  So it had a tremendous
luminosity but a very small surface area.  No hitherto known laws of physics could
seemingly explain how something so small could produce so much energy until Fowler
proposed that white dwarfs were, in fact, in a degenerate state and thus obeyed quantum
statistics which were just then being developed.  Specifically, in that same year (1926)
Dirac proposed his groundbreaking idea that wavefunction symmetry was related to the
statistics developed just a year before by Bose, Einstein, and Fermi.  Einstein had
proposed that quantum gases and molecular gases were completely analogous to one
another after having pondered Bose’s derivation of Planck’s radiation law that was based
purely on the statistics of photons.  Since Eddington was in the throes of arguing about
white dwarfs, Fowler’s paper could not have escaped his attention.  In addition Dirac,
Chandrasekhar, Darwin, and Milne were all at Cambridge around this time along with
Fowler and Eddington and contact between them could scarcely have been avoided.44
Thus, by the end of 1926 quantum mechanics had entered the realm of astronomy.
Being stellar objects, white dwarfs were also ripe for relativistic examinations and
their gravitational aspects had been well-studied, particularly the orbital mechanics of
Sirius A and B.  In addition the new debate over the Chandrasekhar limit brought the
relation between mass and pressure to the fore.  A link was thus developed between mass
and quantum statistics in degenerate matter and, since mass is at the heart of general
relativity, a natural link between general relativity and quantum mechanics was found in
white dwarf stars.  This is where Eddington’s statistical background in astronomy, that
had led him to study stellar structure and introduced him to quantum statistics, collided
head-on with his extensive knowledge of general relativity: there had to be some link
between the two, some theory that independently recovered both in non-degenerate
situations.  One major key to this interpretation, however, is that Eddington equated the
microscopic quantum (or ‘quantal’ as he says) world with electricity and the macroscopic
                                                 
44 This truly marked the pinnacle of the golden years of Cambridge physics and astrophysics.
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(‘molar’) world with gravity.  What he’s really doing is following up on his 1921
generalization of Weyl’s unifying theory of gravity and electromagnetism employing
extra-dimensional methods similar to those employed by Kaluza and Klein in their earlier
attempts at such a unification.  Ultimately, Eddington really saw quantum mechanics as
an extension of electromagnetic theory.  This, then, is the earliest seedling of
Fundamental Theory: the unification of electromagnetism and gravity, finally appearing
to bear some fruit in the study of white dwarf stars.
Unique Extensions of Perception
In employing Kaluza-Klein methods Eddington added a fifth dimension in a rather
unique way that philosophically calls into question our ability to objectively measure it:
he assumes that one can take normal 4-D space and rotate it.  In order to rotate, it must
have a dimension within which to move.  This is the added dimension.  In doing this,
however, the added dimension is then subject to uncertainty.  In addition this assumes
that there would be some way to objectively observe this rotation in the extra dimension.
The philosophical nature of this assumption is not addressed, but endowing regular 4-D
space with the ability to rotate gives Eddington the relativistic method by which different
particle types can be interchanged.  Also, since the fifth dimension, like other
dimensions, must have some coordinate structure and, since relativity implies all
observables can be reduced to coordinates, relativity ought to be a generalization of
quantum mechanics.  Uncertainty plays no adverse role in this since it is completely
causal and only limits knowledge of the present.
So, since a set of observables is simply a coordinate system, 4-D space is a
‘hyperplane’ in 5-D Euclidean space (see chapter five).  This is the origin, then, of the 4/5
ratio that appears in Equation 8.25 developed to transition between a planoid and a
uranoid.  There is also a direct link here to his interpretation of multiplicity.  Multiplicity
is the number of dimensions in the space under consideration, a definition I’ve already
shown is consistent with current interpretations.  Since a coordinate system can represent
a manifold and a manifold is a continuously parameterisable set where the number of
independent parameters is the number of dimensions, the multiplicity describes the
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number of dimensions in the manifold.  In phase space this number is either 136 or 137,
but in regular space this can either be 4 in normal 4-D space or 5 in the 5-D space that
includes the rotation dimension.  So the transition between the planoid and the uranoid
involves a change in multiplicity and the addition or subtraction of the rotation of the
entire frame.  In this way the 4/5 ratio is macroscopically much like the 136/137 ratio (or
its inverse) in microscopic theory.
Eddington also makes the very valid point that when we speak of relative
quantities we must ask the question, relative to what?  Eddington introduced comparison
particles in order to answer this question.  Generally this means that every measurement
requires a minimum of two observables (two endpoints, two like particles, etc.).  This is
why there must be a fifth dimension: the rotation of a 4-D space must be a rotation
relative to something and that something is the extra dimension.  Again, the
generalization of this requires every measurable quantity to be a relative measurement
between two things (in length measurements this means there must be two locations or
endpoints).  This is a very valid observation since our specification of any measurement
quantity and origin location is purely arbitrary.  For instance, in length measurements,
Eddington felt it made more sense to place the origin at another particle since measuring
relative distances is often more useful than measuring distances relative to some arbitrary
origin.  In a direct measurement, the units themselves may be arbitrary, but the physical
distance is not.  Measurements are all then just relationships between objects.  In
mathematics, relations such as this are treated as ratios, hence Eddington’s prodigious use
of ratios in Fundamental Theory.  To further simplify things Eddington uses relativity to
reduce all units to length measurements and reinterprets physical scenarios so that any
uncertainty appears in measurements involving lengths (as opposed to densities, etc. – see
Equation 5.8 and the discussion preceding it for an example).  The idea of using a ratio as
a unitless measure of length then suggests that anything that can be reproduced from
some quantum specification can serve as a standard since quantum specifications are
ratios to the fundamental unit of length h/mc that appears in various fundamental
quantum mechanical equations.
It is clear from this discussion that relativity played an important role in his
interpretation of physical phenomena beyond the standard view I discussed in the
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previous section.  Eddington took any phenomena that involved motion or coordinates to
be interpretable in a relativistic sense, including spin and charge.  I will discuss charge,
which may not seem to be obvious in this sense, a bit later.  Focusing on spin, however,
Eddington inserts a co-rotating frame in the electron in order to Lorentz boost that frame
to rest.  Goudsmit and Uhlenbeck had already found in 1925 that if the electron had some
finite size, the rotational velocity at the surface would exceed the speed of light several
times over.  Presumably this spelled the end of co-rotating frames for point particles.  But
there is nothing that requires there to be a surface to attach the frame to.  Even if the
particle is a dimensionless point there is nothing that prevents one from inserting a co-
rotating frame into the picture.  So if spin is simply rotation then Eddington’s
interpretation is rather unremarkable.  However, spin-1/2 particles have the unusual
property that they must be rotated through two complete rotations before returning to
their original state.  This is counterintuitive in a classical sense since anything rotating
through one complete rotation of 2π is returned to its original state.  For the non-classical
quantum spin case this would mean that given two reference frames A(x,y,z) and
A´(x´,y´,z´), A ≠ ℜA´ where ℜ is the usual rotation matrix.  There obviously would need
to be some mechanism by which this could be reconciled, i.e. perhaps a transformation of
the rotation matrix that would turn A into –A upon a single complete rotation of 2π.  The
solution cannot be a new rotation matrix, it simply must be a relativistically transformed
version of the original rotation matrix, otherwise the operation would not make sense.
Essentially, at 2π the rotation matrix must become minus the identity matrix while at 4π it
returns to the identity matrix.  In short for any rotation through (4n-2)π where n is any
integer (not the number of rotations) the sign must flip.  It turns out that finding a scheme
by which this happens under a simple transformation is not trivial.  The problem gets
even more difficult when one considers that this only works for particles with a half-
integer multiple of spin.  No solution is readily obvious but, on the other hand, there is no
proof to the contrary.  So Eddington’s assumption that spin could be treated this way (i.e.
Lorentz boosted to rest) may not be incorrect, but it has yet to be proven to be correct.
Once again, this calls on the nature of permutation invariance (PI) for a thorough
understanding and is something I discussed at length in chapter six.  The main thing to
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remind yourself of is the fact that Eddington blurred the distinction between classical and
quantum phenomena thus making this a slightly more complex situation.
The relativistic nature of charge is an even thornier issue.  Unlike spin, charge
seemingly has no relation whatsoever to coordinates!  However, as I tell my introductory
physics students, signs in physics inevitably indicate nothing more than direction.  In the
most basic interpretation, charge is simply an indication of the direction of the electric
field lines.  On a deeper level I mentioned earlier that charge is a measure of how the
photon propagates.  The current density term in the path integral can be written to
account for positive and negative values and, since the current density can be related to a
spatial Lagrangian, the positive and negative values can be related directly to spatial
directions.  But there is nothing here that explains why this is true – i.e. why can we write
the current density this way?  The deepest level of truth lies in electroweak unification
and the ability of the weak interaction to exchange charge (really the weak interaction
exchanges quarks with quarks and leptons with leptons).  But the full relativistic
application in Eddington’s sense, where a simple transformation can change charge is an
seems plausible as I discussed in chapter seven but remains unproven.
But the essence of both of these situations (spin and charge as relativistic
quantities) is a haunting possibility.  Though Eddington’s own reasoning was naïve,
rather than a cursory dismissal, a deeper exploration of these ideas only brings to light
more questions rather than a resounding denial of their truth.
Perceiving Measure
Again, relating Eddington’s concepts directly to the Standard Model, the perception of
everything as relative was combined with the realization that objects cannot be
considered apart from their environments – the universe is nothing but particles and their
interactions, and studying particles without any interactions (n.b. there are self-
interaction schemes) would be rather boring anyway.  Thus in determining a quantum-
specified standard one must recognize, as Eddington did, that there are two major
limitations, both of which I discussed in chapter five.  The first is that the standard is not
fully reproducible in strong fields since the standard would be based on some particle
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(quanta) that could be altered by a strong field (even neutrinos could theoretically be
altered by an extremely strong weak-field).  Clearly Eddington assumes any such
standard would be based on the photon since it sets an upward bound for velocity.  But,
the photon is the carrier particle of the electromagnetic interaction itself, which creates a
problem when one encounters neutral particles such as the neutrino as well as in photon-
photon interactions.  Since electromagnetism is actually united with the weak interaction
in electroweak theory there ought to be some relation here to W and Z bosons.  But why
should the standard be necessarily based on electroweak theory?  Gravitons and gluons
also move at the speed of light (and, though unlikely in present theories, so might
neutrinos which are not even carrier particles!).  Eddington’s mathematical solution falls
again on the shoulders of the standard carrier that is a single rigid form that can be altered
depending on the particle desired.  Out of this he constructs the standard deviation model
that that provides a standard based on aggregate number alone and no other property.
The standard deviation model has the advantage that it is independent of scale and thus
can be equally well applied to both very large and very small scales.  Though other
values and quantities can be altered through relativistic transformations and actual
physical interactions, pure number is somewhat unalterable (I say ‘somewhat’ since, for
example, Hawking radiation predicts that not all spontaneous pair creations end in pair
annihilations).
The other problem with the quantum-specified standard is that it needs to be
suitably short.  Eddington’s point is an excellent one.  Certainly we have compensated for
the meter by subdividing it so that we use lengths such as Angstroms, for example, on
very small scales (where Angstroms are 10-10 m).  But Eddington envisioned a base
standard that was ultimately unitless and very tiny45.  Logically, for quantum-specified
standards one might start with the Planck length, the theoretical lower limit to size (or,
rather, knowledge of size).  But this could become quite cumbersome with normal,
everyday values and is not as forceful as Eddington’s argument in favour of a standard
impervious to potential field interactions.
                                                 
45 One might question how something could be considered ‘tiny’ if it is unitless.  Eddington’s point was
simply that it would take an extraordinarily large number of these things to make anything macroscopic.
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The idea of using a system of pure numbers as a measurement standard (and as
the basis of the derivations of physical constants normally found only by experiment)
smacks to some physicists and historians as cosmonumerology.  On the other hand,
Eddington had a point.  Pure number is one of the only unalterable aspects of the universe
– two is two regardless of where you are in the universe (even if you can’t see ‘two’ –
double stars, for example).  Certainly there are the post-Eddingtonians who continue this
line of reasoning, most notably Clive Kilmister and Ted Bastin who, along with John
Amson, Frederick Parker-Rhodes, and Pierre Noyes founded the Alternative Natural
Philosophy Association (ANPA) in the 1970s.  They have been rather successful in many
of their predictions and they do readily admit Eddington was incorrect in some areas of
his work.  But their basic philosophical premise is the same and, unfortunately, they tend
to be marginalized in some circles.  The perception of pure number as a root foundation
in measuring (and ordering) the universe makes logical sense from its unalterable
perspective and is the primary point of Fundamental Theory.  The entire research
program is built around finding ways in which various structures relate to this
measurement standard.  Since Eddington uses σ as his standard measure, the entire
treatise is a justification of that choice, something I mentioned in chapter five.  So if
Fundamental Theory could be boiled down to a single theme it would be the use of a
standard for measurement that is either unitless or based on a single unit, i.e. one standard
unit like length for every quantity in the universe which is what Eddington initially did
before eliminating it entirely through ratios.  The latter point he justified by the fact that
all measurements are really comparing two things (endpoints, objects, etc.) so it didn’t
really matter what the single measurement unit was as long as everything could initially
be expressed in it (that way seemingly unrelated characteristics could be directly
compared).  It could later be eliminated entirely in the ratio of comparison (it’s a bit
analogous to the idea that one can only measure a difference in potential energy – and
thus total energy – rather than measure it at a singular point).
As I mentioned earlier Eddington viewed the universe as being fragmented by the
various units of measure and felt that a single unit of measure for everything was more
elegant.  By making everything relativistically transformable any unit could be translated
into a length that would then be completely eliminated by a ratio.  In his 1951 book
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Quantum Theory Bohm supplied three Hamiltonians for any observation (observer,
object, interaction).  I discussed this in chapter five but would add to this, in regard to the
present discussion, the observation that this endows the interaction with particle-like
characteristics.  Certainly since Yukawa proposed his meson hypothesis in the late ‘30’s
it is not an unusual action taken by Bohm, but further solidified the growing vision that
interactions really were particles themselves (or were mediated by them).  This being the
case it solidifies Eddington’s argument that a standard based on only one of these
exchange particles was fraught with problems.  Bohm’s Hamiltonian for the actual
interaction between observer and observed could be equally well applied to any exchange
particle since visual observation is not the only type of observation.  In fact, since
Hamiltonians can be applied to any particle the Hamiltonian is a bit like Eddington’s
standard carrier – a mathematical form that holds information about a particle.  Eddington
argued the observational point as well by asking why one should take visual observations
as having a greater value than other observations (gravitational, etc.).  What’s the
difference?  Since any gravitational interaction in interstellar space is too small an effect
for us to notice we do not regard this as hard evidence of anything.  Since strong and
weak interactions have very limited ranges they generally do not appeal to our senses
either.  That leaves electromagnetism as the only interaction that appeals to our senses, at
least astronomically (certainly in gravitational interactions with the Earth there is a case
to be made that we have sensory reactions, but this is an isolated case, at least at present
while human space travel remains limited).  But why, for instance, should
electromagnetic data not collected directly by our senses (e.g. from CCD cameras,
voltmeters, etc.) be more acceptable than gravitational data?  Perhaps it is due to the fact
that humanity’s primary quantifier, number, is best recognized visually which means
everything gets reduced to sensory data in the end.
That being the case we are limited to the use of the photon as a basis for a
quantum-mechanical measurement standard.  But Eddington’s point about the photon’s
reaction to strong fields is a valid one – the standard is technically not fully reproducible
in this case.  Hence the case can be made for unitless ratios, particularly when combining
this argument with the argument that all measurements are really comparisons between
two objects.  In the case of length it is a comparison between two endpoints, i.e. all
242
coordinates are relative and all measurements ought to run between two objects without
reference to an arbitrary origin.  Another way of looking at this is to realize that
measurements only make sense when made between two objects (at least most of the
time).  For instance, it is usually pointless to measure the distance from some star to some
piece of empty space thousands of light-years away.
There are two major problems with this, however, that harken, again, back to
basic physics.  As I warn my students, reference frames should not be placed on or in any
object that one wishes to study directly since that frame runs the rather high risk of being
non-inertial.  Since the endpoints of a length measure could be argued to be part of that
measure, an origin placed in either endpoint could be interpreted as including the
endpoints thus making the frame non-inertial.  This is even more obvious when
measuring a distance between two objects if that distance is in any way affected by one of
the two objects (this can be ignored, then, in most cases, but two gravitationally strong
sources near each other will affect the nature of the length measure between them).  In
addition, upon occasion one actually does care about points in empty space.  The simplest
example of this is in centre-of-mass problems where the centre-of-mass may be a point in
empty space.  A more specific and applicable example of this is the Genesis spacecraft
that recently returned to Earth with samples of the solar wind: it orbited the Sun at the
Sun-Earth Lagrangian point which is an empty point in space (if anything were actually
there it would ultimately be pure coincidence or intentional as in the case of the
spacecraft itself).
Relative Measure and Flatness
As I’ve just demonstrated Eddington’s perception of the universe was not terribly
heterodoxical: a natural background energy field exists (the essence of the universe) and
natural fluctuations in it caused by the combination of uncertainty and special relativity
produce the particles that make up the mass found in the universe.  Mass produces
curvature meaning that curvature is simply a result of the natural background
fluctuations.  So a universe devoid of fluctuations (mass) would be flat.  In a modern
interpretation one could say that since mass is the measure of how gravitons propagate
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then so is curvature.  This is very nearly the truth, though his interpretation does not
account for the evolution of the universe from the Big Bang on, but the Big Bang was a
relatively recent and not wholly accepted concept at the time Eddington was working.  In
fact it did not see wide-spread acceptance until the mid-1960s.  Lemaître had proposed
the first model resembling a big bang in 1931 after Hubble’s discovery a year before that
the universe was expanding.  Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (1912 – present) suggested a
more refined model in 1938 that began from nuclear principles.  Gamow and other
nuclear physicists built upon this model but, though the Big Bang model gained
momentum through the early 1940s, the war distracted most physicists from thinking
about such matters.  By the time the war was over Eddington was gone (Kragh 1999).
So considering the Big Bang was so new at the time, Eddington still came
remarkably close to the truth in describing the fundamental nature of the universe as a
‘blank sheet’ of energy where random background fluctuations give rise to matter that
produces local curvature while on a large-scale the universe remains flat (again, see de
Bernardis, et. al. 2000).  In tying this to the standard of measure, the transformation of
relative coordinates was really the only difference between curved and flat space (see
Equation 6.1).  So even curvature itself was a frame dependent quantity!  This makes
sense in Eddington’s context since mass gives rise to curvature and mass is frame
dependent (i.e. if you Lorentz boost an object to such a degree that its mass is fully
converted to energy – which is, of course, impossible – you would eliminate curvature
altogether).  As more and more fluctuations give rise to more and more particles the
relevant effects of quantization are reduced thus explaining the lack of quantum effects
on a large scale.  In a slightly different argument he suggests that gµν as it appears in
large-scale structures differs from that which is used in the wave equation.  Since there is
such a wide deviation in the two instances of gµν this implies frequent transitions between
eigenstates making wave analysis useless much like reducing the persistence time of
dynamic integrals reduces quantization effects.  But, since curvature is introduced via
fluctuations rather than purely through matter (essentially he reinterprets matter as
fluctuations) gµν this suggests a third form of relativity intermediate to special and general
where the curvature is uniform.  Again, he has some very valid points about transitioning
between macroscopic and microscopic situations and his statistical approach helps him in
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this regard.  Recognizing that an energy tensor is both tensorially and dimensionally a
product of two momentum vectors he designs his system so that particle densities, which
are statistical quantities, are defined as momentum vectors. As such particle densities are
conjugate to spatial dimensions making them subject to uncertainty.  Again, this makes
sense when one considers that either the volume is held constant while the particles move
in and out of it thus making the density uncertain, or the density is held constant causing
the volume to fluctuate.  Essentially, density is conjugate to volume.  Eddington
accomplishes this with his system of natural units.  In terms of SI units this does not
appear to work unless one considers total number rather than density and then considers
the volume in spherical coordinates as pseudo-one-dimensional represented by an angle.
In condensed matter physics it is well known that number and phase angle are conjugate
to one another.  More generally Heisenberg showed that momentum density was
conjugate to the phase field (Zee 2003).  Phase angles can be used in complex spaces to
create circles.  A phase field then should be able to create a sphere in complex space.
Eddington also introduces a phase coordinate as an extra dimension whose conjugate is
the scale uncertainty that is manifested as an extraneous momentum in an extra
dimension.  When these are reduced to eigenvalues the scale uncertainty becomes a
momentum and the phase coordinate becomes a coordinate.
Now since all measurement standards are based on units of length in Fundamental
Theory they must be transformed from their original units into units of length.  This
transformation has an associated uncertainty associated with it as described in chapter
six.  The dimensionality constant y associated with this transformation is directly
associated with the physical dimensions of the space, which in the particle density case is
either 4 or 5 depending on the method of investigation.  This seems obvious but these
numbers also provide multiplicity values that give the dimensions in phase space and as I
just showed this is conjugate to the scale uncertainty that is manifested as a momentum.
The relation to wave mechanics is then brought to bear by describing discrete
wavefunctions as particle densities that rapidly decrease outwards forcing the integral
over space to converge, further solidifying the momentum-particle density relation.
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An Exercise in Natural Unit Manipulation
Upon stepping back to look objectively at this, however, one still is left with the nagging
question, how in the world could a particle density be physically related in any way to a
momentum vector?  Perhaps surprisingly (perhaps not) this is not as strange as it sounds.
In the case of photons one can simply integrate the Poynting vector to show that
momentum can be defined in terms of the photon number (see Peacock 1999, p. 181 or
van Fraassen 1991, pp. 438-442).  This becomes a density when the analysis refers to a
specific volume in space.  Let’s examine this case in greater detail but in a more heuristic
way.  For electromagnetic waves momentum density, P, is simply the momentum per unit
volume of an electromagnetic wave.  Finding the momentum for photons is fairly simple.
It can be derived from the well-known relativistic formula E2 = p2c2 + m2c4 .  Solving
this for the momentum, p, we find p = E c .  This holds true for individual photons so the
same must be true for electromagnetic radiation as a whole and thus the momentum
density of electromagnetic radiation is its energy density divided by the speed of light.
Let us say a volume of space has a photon density, n, and contains a single amalgamated
electromagnetic field related to these photons (so the volume is filled with
electromagnetic radiation in the form of photons).  Though massless, photons are
particles in keeping with the Standard Model and thus a photon density can be interpreted
as a particle density.
The total number of photons in the volume is N = nV .  Each photon has some
amount of energy, u, that it contributes to the total energy of the volume, E.  We define
this to be E = u N = u nV  where <u> is the average individual particle energy for the
volume.  Define the energy density for the volume as U = E V = u n .  The magnitude
of the momentum density can then be defined in terms of the energy density as:
P = p
V
=
1
V
⋅
E
c
=
U
c
. (10.1)
This defines the momentum density for a field of electromagnetic radiation.  Since the
final result requires a relation between momentum vectors and photon densities, though,
we need to modify (10.1) in order to find the momentum in a vector format.  Since the
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electric field of an electromagnetic wave oscillates rapidly it is useful to calculate average
values.  Thus, for the oscillating total electric field in this volume we can write (using
brackets to indicate averages and assuming, momentarily, that it oscillates in one
direction):
 
p = P V = U V
c
k = u nV
c
k = Cnk (10.2)
where C is a constant with SI units of kg ⋅m4 s  which is simply units of momentum
multiplied by units of volume.  This also assumes that the average photon energy <u>
and the volume V do not change.  So, at this point I have shown that a momentum vector
is linearly proportional to particle (photon) density.  The goal is to show that the
proportionality constant, C, is both unitless and unit-valued (1) valued since this would
show that  p = nk
  or, in scalar form, p = n.
Employing the usual system of natural units (not Eddington’s) such that c = 1 and
 = 1 we can show that kg ∝ s  as follows:
a. From c = 1 we find that 1s = 3×108m .
b. From  = 1 we find that 1s = 1.054 ×10−34 kg ⋅m2 .
c. Dividing a. into b. we find that 1 = 3.513×10−43kg ⋅m  which implies that
m−1 = 3.513×10−43kg .
d. The combination of a. and c. implies that 1kg = 8.540 ×1050 s .
Expressing (10.2) in scalar form for the moment we write p = Cn.  Obviously the units on
both sides must cancel, but do they cancel in natural units such that C = 1?  The SI units
for the relation p = Cn are kg ⋅m s = kg ⋅m4 s( ) ⋅ 1 m3( ) .  These units cannot be shuffled
around without changing the basic nature of the quantities involved (i.e. without changing
n to N or something similar).  Using the values derived in the steps above for natural units
we can, however, change everything to units of si.  Given that C = pn−1 , which solely in
terms of the natural unit relations derived above is
1.054 ×1017 s4( ) = 2.847 ×1042 s( ) ⋅ 3.704 ×10−26 s3( ) , we find that C appears to have units
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of s4 which does not meet our criterion for unitlessness.  However, crunching the
numbers does show that its value is indeed 1!  Thus C = 1s4.  Is the requirement that this
be unitless necessary?  What does the simple fact that C’s value is 1 tell us?  It tells us
that when represented in natural units the numerical value for particle (photon) density
and the magnitude of the momentum are always identical!  Now, technically I still
haven’t shown the relationship between p and n in vector form.  Since n is not a vector
quantity we assume that it must be multiplied by some vector quantity in order to extend
the relationship with p beyond simple magnitude discussions.  We might first try to
define a unit vector (not an operator) that carries the correct units of s4.  This is
essentially a redefinition of C as a unit vector.  In any case, in vector notation we might
write p = n 1( ) where (1) is a unit vector with units of s4.  In this context the unit vector
serves two purposes: to change the units of n and convert it to a vector representation.
But, recovering the relationship p = n out of this turns out to be impossible without
turning (1) into a function of some sort.  It appears that an operator is required in this
situation.  Since n is the magnitude of p, which is simply p ⋅p  or p, we would have to
show that the fourth-order derivative of p is equal to p’s magnitude:
∇ ⋅
d 3
d(xµ )3
p⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=
d 3
d(xµ )3
∇ ⋅p( ) = p (10.3)
where the divergence is required to eliminate the vector nature.  In order to tidy (10.3) up
a bit let us define
Ξs = ∇ ⋅
ds−1
d(xµ )s−1
=
ds−1
d(xµ )s−1
∇ ⋅ (10.4)
and choose s = 4.  (10.3) can then be rewritten in the more compact form:
Ξ4p = p (10.5)
The simplest solution to this is p = e
−ktk .  Since p automatically has natural units of
seconds and k has units of inverse seconds, the third derivative of the divergence of p
(which we have defined as only being in a single direction) leads to e−kt k 4  which has
units of inverse cubic seconds.  Setting k = 1 preserves the original form and yet brings
the units in line with the units of particle density.  The initial divergence converts the
vector p to a scalar and the regular derivatives simply add derivative permutations to the
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function.  Should the divergence or the ordinary derivatives come first?  That depends on
when the momentum needs to (or can) be converted to a scalar.  In the case considered
here it doesn’t matter since the end result is the same.  That ultimately means the constant
in (10.2) is really an operator of the form (10.4) and thus the combination of (10.2) and
(10.5) gives:
Ξ4p = n . (10.6)
Recall, however, that the present derivation was for photons and we arbitrarily set k = 1
in order to preserve form.  In addition we defined the constant C, which represents the
average individual photon energy divided by c, to be an operator, although this is hardly
unusual in quantum mechanics since momentum itself is an operator.  In fact this implies
that the momentum operator is really just an integer multiple (to some extent,
disregarding units at the moment) of some other operator.  Whether this relationship,
(10.6), would hold for other particles, in particular massive ones, is questionable, but the
point is that Eddington was not necessarily wrong in his assumption that particle density
and momentum are equivalent since it at least holds in one specific (and very important)
case.  Incidentally, when one considers relative measure and compares ratios of p to
ratios of n one need not worry about units and the stated ratios will always be equal (e.g.
a ratio p2/p1 for two fields is always equal to the ratio n2/n1 for the particles producing
those fields).
So, in conclusion, intriguingly, Eddington may have been correct.  He obviously
recognized that there was some natural relationship between the numerical values of
momentum and particle density in natural units.  Once again he clearly perceives an
underlying relationship that is not readily obvious and that could have profound
implications including the fact that the particle density in some sense could be conjugate
to spatial dimensions.  This is made even more intriguing by the known fact that
momentum density is conjugate to phase field and pure number is conjugate to phase
angle; if a relationship exists between phase angles and phase fields one ought to exist for
momentum densities and pure number thus suggesting one exists for momentum and
number density.  Finally, since curvature is introduced by the fluctuations observed as
particles then the greater the particle density, the greater the curvature, meaning the
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momentum of the field is correlated to curvature (assuming the particles have mass – this
obviously doesn’t work for photons).
From Natural Units to No Units
Eddington established both a scale-free and a scale-fixed theory as I have described.
Eddington’s system of natural units brought everything down to a single unit (length).  In
order to establish the equivalence of scale-free (mechanical) and scale-fixed (electrical)
systems, ratios can be used thus eliminating units entirely and holding to the
philosophical idea that the most meaningful measurements are comparisons (ratios).  This
also has the effect of reducing the importance of quantisation which only appears in
scale-fixed theory.  In essence Eddington was simplifying everything by putting it into
his ‘native language’ of relativity (scale-free theory).
Now, since units are no longer an issue and since relative measurements are made
through tensors or vectors, the field has the same variables as a distribution of particles
which is essentially what I argued above in equations (10.2) – (10.5).  Eddington
therefore argued that since true fields were equivalent to the average characteristics of an
ensemble of particles field theory was reducible to statistical studies of datasets for large
numbers of particles.
This is a profound conclusion and harkens, once again, back to Eddington’s
statement (which I will repeat for a third time) that the “task of determining accurate data
for a large number of stars inevitably leads the mind to consider the great problems of the
structure of the stellar universe” (Eddington 1916b).  The stars were the first objects to be
considered particles in Eddington’s statistical studies of the universe, and as an
understanding of the nature of galaxies matured in the wake of Hubble’s discovery of the
nature of M31, galaxies became the particles.  In Eddington’s cosmology fields acquired
their own characteristics since these characteristics simply arose from the statistics of the
distribution.  Changes in the fields came about through changes to the occupation states
of the individual particles in the distribution where the occupation states appeared as
generalized coordinates or momenta.  Eddington later converted these discrete occupation
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factors to a continuous occupation factor that is a function of the coordinates.  This
satisfies Eddington’s criteria that the particles be unidentified members of an assemblage.
Generalized characteristics of the particle assemblage are normally additive.
Since Eddington works within a rigid-field framework, he is assuming the overall
characteristics of the field do not change, meaning the average characteristics of the
particle assemblage do not change which is reminiscent of basic conservation laws.
Essentially the rigid-field condition is his conservation law.
Multiplicity and the Assemblage
The rigid-field can be used as an inexhaustible reservoir, then, since its average
characteristics remain the same.  Since all measurements must be relative measures
between two values, the rigid-field acts as a convenient reference point in measurement.
For instance, equation (6.22) gives the probability that some particle in a quantum state
with energy E is in contact with the reservoir or, in this case, rigid-field.  Another
interpretation of (6.22) was given in chapter six stating that it is the probability that a
system will be in a microstate (quantum state) with an energy E relative to the
macrostate’s (rigid-field’s) energy.  The total number of possible microstates we know is
the multiplicity.  As such, the multiplicity tells us the number of possible quantum states
of energy E that a particle could be in while (6.22) gives the probability for each state.
So, for instance, say the multiplicity is 137; then there are 137 possible microstates.  Each
of these 137 quantum states is not necessarily equally possible, however, and thus (6.22)
is employed to determine just how likely each of these 137 states is.  This is less than the
actual number of dimensions in phase space since some aspects of the system are
presumably stabilised (i.e. assumed values from prior data).  In fact, as given in (6.11),
the multiplicity k is the dimension index (number of dimensions) of an individual
particle’s energy, i.e. the number of possible states it can have (corresponding to the
number of independent components of the energy tensor), while there is a separate
dimension index, l, for the total energy that is often set to 1 as in (6.12) and (6.13).  Since
the total energy is set to 1 positive values for k imply negative values of –(k+1) for the
rigid-field’s possible energy states in order to balance positive and negative (recalling
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Eddington’s assertion that a given datum for positive and negative measurements is
completely arbitrary).  The reason the total energy is set to 1 is because the universe is
assumed to only have a single macrostate and thus a single possible overall state that
fluctuates internally.
Using the rigid-field as an inexhaustible reservoir as developed in general
statistical mechanics situations (see (6.17)) allows energy to explain away Dirac’s sea of
negative energy states.  These states are really just the states that make up the rigid-field.
Rigid fields are the primary domain of quantum mechanics and the coordinates
describing states in rigid fields are slightly different than those in non-rigid domains as
given in (6.24).  Eddington uses this transformation to explain the covariant nature of
momentum in wave mechanics.  Even the word ‘covariant’ suggests rigidity since it
implies that quantities change together.  Out of this argument he then derives the origin of
i in quantum theory.  A closer examination of his argument, however, shows that the true
nature of his reasoning is embedded in relational considerations.  As he separates out the
particle and field energies he inserts a datum to explain an extra minus sign (present in
the covariant momentum expression in quantum theory).  The extra minus sign is
contained in i and thus the relational consideration explains its existence.  Now relational
considerations are merely relative considerations based on one’s choice of reference
origin.  Such a choice is governed by special relativity meaning the presence of i in
quantum theory is really a relativistic phenomenon.
Profound Results
Certainly the meeting of relativity and statistical methods in Eddington’s mind, brought
to an apex with the developments related to white dwarfs in the 1920s, played the most
critical role in developing the foundation of Fundamental Theory.  However, the
adherence to fairly strict interpretations of relativity and statistics present unique
conclusions.  To reiterate two of the most important points I have just made, Eddington
showed that field theory is reducible to the statistics of a large assemblage of particles
and all measurable quantities are frame-dependent and can be altered simply by a change
252
in reference.  Starting with his ‘blank sheet’ hypothesis, this leads to a remarkably
modern conclusion.
From a structuralist standpoint, Eddington is quite clear on his interpretation of
the nature of particles: they are simply conceptual objects that carry information in the
form of variables.  This is the root of the concept of a standard carrier where there is a
single mathematical form that manifests itself differently depending upon which variables
are filled.  Since Eddington also held that all measurable quantities (mass, charge, spin,
etc.) are frame-dependent, a transformation can easily shift a standard carrier from one
particle into another.  From a physical standpoint, the universe consists of this ‘blank
sheet’ of energy that is initially undisturbed.  The uncertainty principle combined with
special relativity, as is well known, can disturb this vacuum energy and create particles
and anti-particles – particles literally pop into and out of existence in the vacuum.  Since
all particles are different manifestations of the standard carrier and a Lorentz boost can
theoretically transform one into another by changing the values in the standard carrier’s
matrix of characteristics, all particles in the universe are ultimately indistinguishable
from one another.  This is the current accepted view of many field theorists (Zee 2003)
though for different reasons including the fact that the exchange of massive bosons is
really responsible for transferring characteristics from one particle to another.
Philosophers of physics, as we have seen, have recently shied away from this blanket
statement demonstrating through permutation invariance that particles can actually
distinguishable in cases where they previously were thought not (cf. French and Redhead
1988).  But, the idea was discussed as early as the late 1920’s with Dirac’s work.
Eddington simply took a holistic view by assuming that there was a single, continuous,
uniform energy field that, due to the uncertainty principle, is endowed with various
particle characteristics mathematically represented by altering the standard carrier.
Cassirer, as I discussed previously, has suggested that particles are simply intersection
points in certain relations which is a similar point of view.  Another way to look at this is
to define particles as being the intersection points of interacting fields, though I do not
personally find that description elegant.  If a unified theory is ever found, theoretically all
four fundamental interactions and their fundamental fields would be manifestly identical.
Thus I find Eddington’s original description to be simpler – all particles are fluctuations
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in a single field and the fluctuations arise from uncertainty (the fact that zero fluctuations
has a near-zero probability of occurrence).  Taking this a step further, the fields
associated with the four fundamental interactions are merely different manifestations of a
single unified field.  In the interest of pure simplicity the four manifestations of this
single field are associated with the type of fluctuation (particle) that is created by
uncertainty (as the weak field in neutrinos, for example, or as all four in a proton).  So,
the unified field manifests itself in different ways depending on how it is disturbed by the
uncertainty principle.  Since Eddington was ultimately a statistician at heart he
transformed field properties into the properties of a large assemblage of particles.  In
deference to his relativistic sensibilities, however, he also adopted the view that
everything in the universe is simply energy.  All of existence is reduced to random
fluctuations in the uniform background or energy field. Eddington’s conception here is
far from heterodoxical.
The line of reasoning pertaining to the exchange of characteristics between
particles leads us tantalizingly close to the weak interaction again. Since I have shown in
chapter seven that the frame-dependence of charge only works with a global change in
reference frame that would always flip pairs of charges (thus conserving overall charge)
this might be used to explain why exclusion works in pairs in Fundamental Theory – flip
one particle or the other, but relativity says you can never really tell which one flipped.
Eddington’s explanation is rooted in comparison particles, but by his own reasoning, this
can be explained by recalling that exclusion’s job is really to make indistinguishable
particles distinguishable.  In Fundamental Theory it is the job of interchange to mediate
the exchange of information such that exclusion works.  In fact it allows properties to be
transferred from one particle to another, essentially substituting a quantity in one standard
carrier for a quantity in another standard carrier.  The weak interaction by contrast
exchanges quarks with quarks and leptons with leptons thus allowing particles to change
identity.
Another remarkable conclusion Eddington reached via this line of reasoning was
his version of the exclusion principle which, as I described in chapter eight, is defined in
terms of the uncertainty principle.  The root of this lies in the above discussion of the
statistics of large data sets and the indistinguishability of all particles.  Exclusion’s job is
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to make indistinguishable particles distinguishable.  Since Eddington works in a phase
space of coordinates and momenta, common even in classical physics, he opens the door
to uncertainty since it is defined in terms of commuting physical properties and
coordinates and momenta are the most common commuting pair in quantum problems.
Thus, since one could easily choose a cell of phase space having a volume h3 Eddington
simply rearranges the uncertainty principle to find the maximum number of particles in
this volume.  Since uncertainty ultimately prevents complete knowledge of particle
properties Eddington is implying that it prevents perfect exclusion (meaning two particles
at the same exact spot in space or sharing the same exact energy levels) since it prevents
complete knowledge of a particle’s exact location.  So rather than at a point, particles are
limited in a certain volume.  As I discussed in chapter eight this also implies that
wavefunction collapse is never 100%.   This problem has been discussed in depth by a
number of physicists and philosophers and is often referred to as the GRW interpretation
of wavefunction collapse after the authors of one of the original and most seminal papers
in this area (Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber 1986).  Yet it could be argued that exclusion
provides full knowledge (or nearly full knowledge) which would appear to be a
contradiction.  Of course we know full well that neither exclusion nor anything else, for
that matter, provides full knowledge of the state of a system.  That was precisely
Heisenberg’s point – our limitation is in our knowledge of the present, not our ability to
predict the future.  Nonetheless, Eddington’s result is remarkable in that it strongly
suggests a relation between uncertainty and exclusion that has been hitherto unexplored.
Trouble in Paradise
However, the strict adherence to the relativistic worldview appears to have one major
exception in Eddington’s formulation.  One of relativity’s greatest triumphs is the
equivalence of gravitational and inertial situations (e.g. one cannot distinguish between
an inertial frame and a frame in free-fall in a gravitational field).  This triumph of
reasoning is actually what led to the development of general relativity from special
relativity and was really built on the equivalence of inertial and gravitationally measured
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masses that was developed by Galileo!  Eddington, however, clearly distinguishes
between the two situations in a way that appears to violate this principle.
The problem is that Eddington attributes the potential energy to the object (or
appears to, based on the wording in Fundamental Theory).  Potential energy is really
associated with an interaction.  If an interaction is not present then there is no potential
energy.  So, for instance, consider two isolated particles each with some amount of
kinetic energy.  In order for these particles to dump some of their kinetic energy they
have to interact with something, say each other.  During the interaction some kinetic
energy is taken from each by the interaction (which in the Standard Model is just another
particle).  The interaction then gains potential energy.  The potential energy does not exist
without the interaction.  The interaction could then impart some kinetic energy back to
the particles, often in the form of an exchange of some sort (e.g. particle A loses 10 J of
energy, particle B gains 10 J of energy).
The fact that the interaction is represented by an exchange particle can also help
explain the equivalence principle.  One could imagine that, in the case of the two
particles just described, the interaction’s potential energy is really, on a fundamental
level, the kinetic energy of the exchange particle (since most exchange particles are
massless, this is a bit more complicated than I’m describing, but is an illustrative
analogy).  So, one could imagine that a given particle with some kinetic energy interacts
with some other particle by exchanging a massless boson.  The amount of kinetic energy
it loses goes into the boson which has to gain kinetic energy in order to move.  Once this
exchange particle comes in contact with the second particle it hands over this kinetic
energy to the new particle.  In fact, this is the basis of Feynman diagrams and is very
easily understood via the photoelectric effect.  In the photoelectric effect a surface of
some material is interacting electromagnetically with something else (the Sun, a lamp, a
laser, etc.).  The photons, which are the exchange particles for the electromagnetic
interaction, have a certain amount of energy which can be interpreted as kinetic (though,
note that all massless particles including three of the four types of fundamental exchange
bosons move at the speed of light, so this is not understood in the classical sense but
rather through relativistic means).  The amount of energy associated with the photon’s
motion has to be equal to the minimum energy required to dislodge an electron – there’s a
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fundamental equivalence there not to mention a clear indication of a transfer of
momentum.
So returning once again to the equivalence principle itself, a gravitational
potential simply adds an extra particle to the mix (the graviton) ferrying kinetic energy
from one object to another.  Since all massive particles can be brought to rest through a
Lorentz boost, one could attempt to bring the graviton to rest.  Doing so would stop any
gravitational information from being transferred between the objects and seemingly
eliminate gravity.  Thus it appears gravity is associated with the motion of gravitons.  So
a reference frame attached to a graviton, for instance, which can be thought of as freely
falling in some sense, can be brought to rest by a Lorentz boost.  Thus it is impossible to
tell the difference between an inertial frame and one that is freely falling in a
gravitational field.  The presence of the gravitational potential has no affect on the
internal constitution of a system in this sense and simply accelerates it in reference to
some other frame of reference.
There is another problem in Fundamental Theory that is perhaps not quite as
serious when understood in its historical context.  In order to stop wave packet dispersal
and in order to fully explain energy relativistically he introduces negative energy states
that can seemingly give rise to matter spontaneously.  Historically there are two points to
be made here.  The first is that, as I have already pointed out, the Big Bang scenario was
not fully accepted until after Eddington’s death and thus the 1930s (post-Hubble) marked
the first shot-in-the-dark, so to speak, for modern cosmology.  Prior to Hubble’s
discovery the universe was generally thought to be static.  Once it was found to be
expanding the logical conclusion was that, if time were run backward, the universe would
begin with a singularity.  That leads to the second historical point: singularities were
viewed as headaches to be eliminated in the 1930s and 1940s.  Singularities are nothing
more than infinities present in an equation and even today infinities in theories are
usually considered a pox.46  The fact that the universe had historically been viewed as
static and the fact that singularities were not viewed in a positive light at the time both
contributed to the acceptance of continuous matter creation as a possibility for quite some
                                                 
46 As a modern example the presence of infinities in the original theory of weak interactions was what led
Glashow, Weinberg, and Salam to develop electroweak unification as a way to eliminate those infinities.
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time.  Recall that the steady-state theory of Hoyle, Bondi, and Gold did not appear until
well after Eddington’s death.  Thus, at the time this aspect of Eddington’s theory was not
very heterodoxical and in hindsight was no more or less so than theories developed by
Milne and Dirac, neither of whom share the same historical treatment as Eddington.
Overlooked Subtleties
In truth Eddington’s ‘steady state’ theory, as one might call it, is far more subtle than
that.  From a structuralist point of view changes cannot necessarily be taken into account
via predictions such as those offered by probabilistic methods.  In wave mechanics
changes are represented by changes to the occupation factors of steady states meaning
wavefunctions must represent steady states where the occupation factor is the only
variable that changes with time.  Eddington took this to be a principle upon which a full
theory could be developed.  As such he utilized relativity and uncertainty in union to
change occupation factors, either by a change in the reference datum for energy or in a
random fluctuation designed to create or annihilate particles.
With the occupation factor interpretation of energy states as a foundation, as all
lower energy states become occupied, each particle has what Eddington called a ‘top
energy’ (see chapter eight) that happens to be the energy a particle is boosted to due to
the occupation of all the lower energy states.  So clearly there is a link between the
occupation factor and the exclusion principle.  Since exclusion limits the number of
particles in a volume, if the volume is completely filled as dictated by exclusion, then the
occupation of that energy level is complete.  Eddington also associated the rest mass of a
particle with exclusion since its value results from the occupation of lower energy states.
So, in simplified terms, the way to build the universe is to start with random fluctuations
in the background field.  Uncertainty not only creates these fluctuations but also limits
how many can exist in a given volume forcing any new fluctuations to be spatially
separate.  Fluctuations in the scale of measurement give space curvature and endow
individual particles with their rest energies.  Since both descriptions must be equivalent
Eddington concluded that exclusion was a wave-mechanical form of gravity.  In order to
validate this link Eddington derived the same formula for proper mass from both the
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exclusion principle and relativity.  If this is true and if exclusion is the weak interaction in
disguise then the W and Z bosons would have to have mass (and indeed they do!).  Of
course we now know this is more subtle than described here.  The origin of mass lies in
spontaneous symmetry breaking and the Anderson-Higgs mechanism but Eddington’s
idea is fairly similar (though without the reliance on symmetry principles).  Mass can be
interpreted as the measure of how a graviton propagates just as charge is the measure of
how a photon propagates.  Nonetheless, uncertainty is at the deepest level of the heart of
spontaneous symmetry breaking and so in a way Eddington was correct in assuming it
played some role in the origin of mass (and thus curvature).
Returning momentarily to Eddington’s problem with the equivalence principle,
there is a somewhat new interpretation of the origin of mass that was put forth in 2000 by
Albrecht Giese that says the inertial behaviour of the mass of extended objects can be
traced to the time of transmission for exchange particles in an interaction and his
reasoning has valid points to it (Giese 2000).  Unfortunately he does not explain the
origin of mass for point particles.  But his notion is intriguing and, on the surface, also
appears to question the equivalence principle.  Tests to show the equivalence between
gravitational and inertial frames have overwhelmingly proven the two are equivalent to a
phenomenal degree of accuracy.  But Eddington has a curious addition in his theory that
may be the root of this seeming difference.
In Fundamental Theory coordinate locations are endowed with energy just as
mass, motion, and other characteristics are – different locations indicate different energy
levels.  Based on Eddington’s interpretation of the exclusion principle and occupation
factors given above this makes complete sense.  Consider a particle with a constant
velocity moving in space.  In the above interpretation, if the coordinate location is
constantly changing the energy associated with it (the coordinate location) must be
changing.  Since energy must be conserved, the mass must be changing (since the
velocity isn’t) which makes no sense!  But, bring in a gravitational potential and another
source (or sink) of energy has been added such that rather than the energy of the
coordinate locations being exchanged with the mass energy, it can be exchanged with the
gravitational energy (potential).  As such, gravity would be interpreted as a mass-
stabilization energy term.  Since all massive particles have (albeit miniscule) gravitational
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potential wells associated with them, there is a gravitational self-energy term that
stabilizes the mass – so mass stabilizes itself.  Unfortunately Eddington seems to forget,
despite his liberal use of it elsewhere, that relativity tells us that coordinate systems are
entirely relative so the coordinate location energy must really be an energy associated
with the fact that a certain particle, for instance, is not in the same location (regardless of
coordinate system) as another particle.  In addition this does not adequately explain how
massless particles remain massless.
Nonetheless, both gravity and exclusion provide an energy ‘boost’ to particles by
changing their location that is manifested in wave mechanics as a changed in occupation.
Either way it simply amounts to a change in location which is ultimately a relativistic
phenomenon and might even suggest that gravity and electromagnetism were different
manifestations of the same phenomenon to Eddington.  In this way Fundamental Theory
is truly a unified theory.  Regardless, there is such a thing, then, as ‘exclusion energy’ in
Fundamental Theory.  Continuing with my line of reasoning regarding the relation
between the weak interaction and exclusion this again makes sense – the ‘exclusion
energy’ is simply the energy of the weak interaction.
Another remarkable subtly in Eddington’s theory is the nature of the particles
filling the negative energy sea.  Since the fact that their energy is negative is simply due
to a choice of datum, they have mass as any other particle does.  Also, since exclusion,
particularly when combined with the fact that most of the negative energy states are
filled, forces extended objects into being and ostensibly, due to repulsive interactions,
forces them apart, it could be interpreted as the mechanism driving expansion in
Eddington’s theory.  The negative energy sea, then, has a very real total mass and energy
and this could be interpreted in this context as being the mysterious dark energy of the
universe especially considering Eddington explicitly includes the cosmological constant
in his theory.  Of course, with today’s knowledge we know this is not the case (even
though we do not know precisely what dark energy and dark matter are).  But, the picture
I am painting here of Fundamental Theory is that, despite being filled with numerous
problems, it is internally self-consistent and in keeping with experimental evidence.  In
fact it is remarkably prescient of subsequent discoveries many of which I have already
pointed out.  Yet another example related to the present discussion is that it predicts that
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every particle must have a corresponding anti-particle, something we know quantum field
theory predicts (and something that is troublesome for its lack of experimental
confirmation – where’s all the anti-matter?).
Subtly Weak Suggestions
As a large portion of the past few chapters has indicated Eddington found that exclusion
and interchange were complementary concepts.  In his exclusion interpretation of the
universe that I have just analyzed particles force each other to be individuals at varying
energy levels.  Using interchange as an interpretive model instead, these same particles
are constantly interchanging with one another producing the same total energy as the
exclusion interpretation.  We already know that the weak interaction is responsible for the
interchange of particle characteristics for quarks and leptons so, in a way, this once again
validates my assertion that exclusion and the weak interaction are intimately related.  His
discussion of the non-Coulomb repulsion terms adds yet more fuel to this argument as
this repulsion amounts to an additional force.  Since the weak and strong interactions
were not only not well understood but thought to be one and the same at that time,
Eddington is essentially advocating for their existence or the existence of something
similar.  Basically he acknowledges that electromagnetism and gravity cannot be the only
two interactions in the universe.  There must be at least one more.
The one major flaw in the suggestion that the weak interaction and the exclusion
principle are the same phenomenon is that mesons participate in weak interactions but do
not obey exclusion.  On the other hand, if one realizes that the weak interaction is not
really manifesting itself between mesons but rather between the quarks and anti-quarks
within the interacting mesons themselves, the problem is partially solved.  Why then
would baryons, which are also compound particles composed of quarks, obey exclusion
while mesons do not?  Spin is the obvious (and universally accepted) answer, but I
believe the truth is more subtle.  The question really should be (if one is assuming that
exclusion and the weak interaction are so closely related), if the weak interaction is there
and its occurrence suggests exclusion, where is the exclusion phenomenon?  What makes
mesons different from baryons?  Well, first, baryons have three quark-like particles while
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mesons have two.  Second, while all three particles in a baryon are quarks, in a meson
one is an anti-quark.  So in terms of matter (as opposed to anti-matter), there is three
times as much in a baryon.  Perhaps the meson’s internal weak interactions cancel each
other out such that there is no residual weak field outside the meson.  Adding a third
quark-like particle would break the 1:1 symmetry forcing the residual weak interaction
energy to search for a ‘new partner’ as-it-were.  As such it is reasonable to assume that
the new pentaquark discovered last year would obey the exclusion principle since its
weak interactions are unbalanced.47
Numerological Results and Extra Energy Terms
As chapter nine demonstrated Fundamental Theory was also remarkable in the number of
physical constants derivable from it.  There is still a great debate over the derivability of
physical constants, especially as certain new theories and experimental evidence suggest
these constants are of greater importance and more mysterious than first thought.
Eddington’s method went further by exploring the relations between physical constants
and it established relationships between constants seemingly at opposite ends of the size
spectrum.  Some of Eddington’s conclusions appear to be more than pure coincidence,
however.  (9.1), for instance, is still remarkably close to accepted values despite major
changes in value for the dimensionless Hubble parameter since the 1940s.
Perhaps the most studied numerical result of Fundamental Theory, the mass ratio
of the proton to the electron, has been offered up by critics as an example of his
‘cosmonumerology’ but, as I demonstrated in chapter nine, he simply utilizes a
mathematical trick or two to arrive at the result.  In addition, at least one of these
mathematical devices, the derivation based on external and internal masses (atomic and
reduced masses) makes sense when performed for hydrogen since in this case the reduced
hydrogen mass differs very little from the electron mass and the atomic hydrogen mass
differs very little from the proton mass.  Analyzed in this light it is not an unexpected
                                                 
47 Subsequent to the writing of this treatise but before it was submitted I completed a phenomenological
proof that exclusion is not equivalent to any of the four fundamental interactions (forces).  I have inserted it
as an appendix but have left my previous writing intact since it raises important philosophical issues and
demonstrates the difficulty this problem presents.
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result.  It is entirely possible that the poor reception of it was due to the obscure language
of Fundamental Theory.
Another very studied result of Fundamental Theory is the value for the fine-
structure constant.  Eddington held that its inverse was exactly equal to 137 due to the
correction factor required when moving from rigid to Galilean coordinates.  Essentially it
is the inverse of the multiplicity of an intracule.  Ignoring the specific value for a
moment, how does this compare to modern interpretations of the nature of the fine-
structure constant?  The fine-structure constant is nothing more than the coupling
constant for electromagnetic interactions and appears at vertices in Feynman diagrams for
such processes.  It is essentially a measure of the strength of the electromagnetic
interaction and can be expanded in a series expansion.  In a way Eddington was close to
this description since he viewed the fine-structure constant as being related to the degrees
of freedom of the intracule and the intracule’s motion is constrained by its internal
electromagnetic interaction (the internal binding energy of the intracule).
The non-Coulombian energy term that arises in these situations is essentially an
accounting of the extra rest mass given by the proton over the electron.  Eddington
recognized that if all particles in the universe are ultimately indistinguishable something
must account for the difference between the rest masses of the proton and electron.  This
was a very clever insight and, though incorrect, indicates that Eddington was able to see
the inherent problem in the idea of indistinguishability.  Of course, we now can attribute
the excess mass of the proton to the fact that it is actually a composite particle made of
three quarks.  Quantum field theory can now explain the meaning and origins of such
characteristics thus explaining indistinguishability.  Again, less important than
Eddington’s method was the mere fact that he recognized the underlying problem.  In
addition, his solution, though incorrect, is self-consistent since it explains why the non-
Coulombian energy term is only associated with the proton.  His work actually presages
the discovery of internal structure in the proton.  His methods outlined in equations (9.16)
and (9.17) are actually based on scattering experiments.  Anomalies had arisen in such
experiments, some of which have since been shown to be a result of the three-quark
structure of the proton, and Eddington was simply attempting to account for them.  For
instance he develops this extra energy term using a Dirac delta function such that it
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appears when the separation distance is zero (and he suggests that this implies the
existence of a singularity, the only real mention of singularities in Fundamental Theory).
Since the internal structure of the proton is primarily governed by the strong interaction
he was also suggesting the existence of another internal interaction.  In fact, in a way, the
non-Coulombian energy in Eddington’s theory is directly related to the strong interaction
since it is this that binds the quarks together providing the extra mass.  The determination
of the various mass terms is then the primary goal of Eddington’s statistical theory and,
indeed, he calls (8.14) the “central formula of unified theory” (Eddington 1946, p. 81).  In
any case, the problem of the excess mass combined with the anomalies in the scattering
experiments clearly indicated the existence of some unknown process and Eddington’s
attempt at an explanation is certainly as admirable as any at that time.
Philosophical Implications
The major philosophical theme behind Fundamental Theory is the search for a truly
objective theory of physics.  Eddington struggles mightily with this throughout,
vacillating between truly attempting to develop one and realizing it is most likely
impossible.  The most obvious manifestation of this objectivity requirement is a
measurement standard since, at the moment, all measurement standards are inherently
subjective.  Eddington concluded that for a standard to be truly objective it must be
derivable from the theory itself and not imposed by an observer.  Subsequent objective
physical theories have appealed to hidden variables as one solution to this problem, a
solution that immediately calls into questions the completeness of quantum mechanics as
a description of nature.  These questions were nothing new to Eddington since they go
back to the work of von Neumann and others in the 1930s (though it should be noted
Eddington would have had to have read von Neumann in German since his works were
not translated into English until the 1940s).  But Eddington does not appeal to a hidden
variable scheme in locating a solution to this problem but rather attempts to develop an
objective theory that is consistent with accepted quantum mechanics principles such as
uncertainty and complementarity.  For this very reason Fundamental Theory should be
viewed with less derision than hidden variable theories which continue to be disproved.
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In fact Eddington relied on the fundamental philosophical tenets of the founders of
quantum theory employing such basic principles as the interference of observer and
observed, something not as clearly defined in all hidden variable theories.
Eddington did, of course, introduce novel ideas, but they were nonetheless based
on fundamental principles.  In the case of the search for objectivity it is well understood
that uncertainty plays a role in our inability to develop a truly objective theory.
Eddington, however, took this a step further and placed an uncertainty in the fabric of
space-time that was a result of the inability to separate the reference frame from the
object under investigation.  So, in a way, he applied this fundamental principle in reverse:
rather than uncertainty being the root cause of subjectivity, it is our subjective viewpoint
that actually leads to uncertainty in the fabric of space-time.  In addition it is our
subjectivity that introduces chirality into physics (rather than spontaneous symmetry
breaking as it is now understood).  He then took the unusual step of trying to determine
the evolution of a system after any observation had ended.  Uncertainty, in this case,
increases the further from the end of the observation one gets.  Since an observation can
be modelled as a collapse of the wavefunction, this is essentially the reverse: the
wavefunction spreads out and the number of possible eigenvalues increases.  Again,
Eddington is not introducing anything terribly novel but rather is simply working
backwards from a point of knowledge to see how one might arrive at that piece of
knowledge.  In doing this he introduces a time coordinate that measures the time
difference between the end of the observation and the moment in question.  Statistically
this must be added to the distribution function.  The full description of this process gets
bogged down in pedantic labelling and transformations between ordinary and ‘imaginary’
time since a distribution function is taken at a point in time but would include in it a
change in time.  Eddington may have unnecessarily complicated this process since one
can resolve this by a simple comparison of distribution functions for the end of
observation and the moment in question.  Theoretically one could then create a third
distribution function for the comparison of the first two and one would then have the
answer.
Eddington never delves into greater depth with this problem clearly emphasizing
the inherent difficulty in objective theories.  The vast majority of Fundamental Theory is
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devoted to studies of actual observations where the observer clearly interferes and the
wavefunction is collapsed.  Any hope for a truly objective theory in this instance is in
vain and perhaps this was Eddington’s way of acknowledging the limitations of normal
theories.  Nonetheless, he is striving for a working and applicable theory rather than one
that is untestable or speculative and thus he sticks to building a theory around
experimental results, though one should notice on studying his methods more closely that
he attempts to greatly simplify things (as many physicists do).  But we know that
experimental results are far from simple in their verification.  For instance, he assumes in
equations such as (8.19) that all protons and electrons are bound.  This is likely just his
way of representing the fact that the majority of the mass in the universe is made up of
hydrogen, but it is a major simplification for experimental purposes particularly when
one considers that if N is really a count of hydrogen only, how could it have any
particular usefulness in general equations used for free particles, larger atoms, and the
like?
In addition to building a theory around experimental evidence he also builds a
theory around the notion that everything can be reduced to mathematics.  He clearly takes
the stance that the nature of mathematics is such that it is inherent and in some way prior
to the physical universe.  In a way this is his route to objectivity.  Since mathematics are
inherent in the fabric of nature and, in fact, are independent of nature itself, a purely
mathematical theory should be a purely objective theory.  So in his view, a perfect theory
would be purely mathematical and would yield numerical results consistent with
experiment.  Part of this desire for a purely objective theory based solely on mathematics
is a result of his dissatisfaction with the rather arbitrary nature of our choice of just what
type of observational evidence is acceptable as solid proof.  Visual evidence is nearly
always accepted as solid proof yet visual evidence is simply electromagnetic in nature
(notice the strong influence of observational astronomy in Eddington’s thinking here).
He asks why gravitational evidence is not equally acceptable as solid proof.  As I
mentioned earlier the difference here is that in most cases we do not have direct sensory
experience of gravitational evidence.  Regardless, the choice of a certain type of
evidentiary proof as the most acceptable is somewhat arbitrary.  A purely mathematical
theory would blur the distinction, providing numerical results for both types.  On the
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other hand, in his attempt to link microscopic and macroscopic phenomena he indicates
that electromagnetic evidence is the realm of the microscopic while gravitational
evidence is the realm of the macroscopic and both are transmitted to us via light since
most gravitational solutions are observed via light since we don’t physically experience
them.  His most forceful example of this is the companion to Sirius that was inferred by
gravitational effects but not ‘proven’ until it was discovered optically.  Since Eddington
had proven in 1919 that light reacted to gravitational fields he did not necessarily
recognize the purely electromagnetic nature of light, though it is also fair to say photons
were not recognized as the exchange particles for electromagnetism only, on par with
gravitons, W and Z bosons, and gluons until after Eddington’s death.  It was obviously
known that they were related to electromagnetism but the eclipse expeditions implied that
there might be more to them than that.
Eddington in Context
In critiquing Fundamental Theory too many historians oddly seem to have forgotten
some of the basic interpretations of quantum mechanics including those developed at the
onset of the theory’s development.  One important conclusion that was first reached by
Heisenberg was that quantum theory was not limited to statistical conclusions – it could
make precise and accurate predictions of physical phenomena.  This then relates to the
second important conclusion that the inability to make certain valid predictions arose
from the inability to know everything about the present.  Famously this is the question of
whether or not quantum theory is complete.  But it also implies that uncertainty is causal.
Since the universe is then completely causal Eddington tries to avoid the incomplete
knowledge problem by developing a system that provides all fundamental constants in a
derived manner.  Eddington’s methods were certainly a bit abstract and he is often overly
pedantic, but his philosophical reasoning was sound and he did not deny any major
foundational principle of physics (with the possible exception of the equivalence
principle).  It is rather curious, then, that he should receive the treatment he does in
historical literature.  Further, my analysis shows that much of his work was remarkably
similar to modern quantum field theory and, though outdated and incorrect, leads to new
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questions such as the nature of exclusion and the relationship between particle density
and field momentum.  It is my hope that this monograph will serve as a partial
vindication of Eddington’s cosmonumerological reputation and a stimulation of further
research.
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Appendix A
The Zoo Puzzle
The Zoo Puzzle first appeared as ‘The Looking-glass Zoo’ in Hubert Phillips’ 1937 book
Question Time: An Omnibus of Problems for a Brainy Day published by J.M. Dent &
Sons (London).  Phillips often wrote under the pseudonym Caliban and Eddington
himself submitted this puzzle to Phillips.  Notice the reference to Lewis Carroll (as
Charles Dodgson).  There are numerous solutions.  I present (verbatim) the solution that
appears in the terrific collection on rec-puzzles.org.  This is an excellent introduction to
Eddington’s work in combinatorics and relates to some of his work in group theory.
The Zoo Puzzle as posed by Eddington in Phillips (1937)
I took some nephews and nieces to the Zoo, and we halted at a cage marked
Tovus Slithius, male and female.
Beregovus Mimsius, male and female.
Rathus Momus, male and female.
Jabberwockius Vulgaris, male and female.
The eight animals were asleep in a row, and the children began to guess which was
which.  "That one at the end is Mr Tove."  "No, no!  It's Mrs Jabberwock," and so on.  I
suggested that they should each write down the names in order from left to right, and
offered a prize to the one who got most names right.
As the four species were easily distinguished, no mistake would arise in pairing the
animals; naturally a child who identified one animal as Mr Tove identified the other
animal of the same species as Mrs Tove.
The keeper, who consented to judge the lists, scrutinised them carefully.  "Here's a queer
thing.  I take two of the lists, say, John's and Mary's.  The animal which John supposes to
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be the animal which Mary supposes to be Mr Tove is the animal which Mary supposes to
be the animal which John supposes to be Mrs Tove.  It is just the same for every pair of
lists, and for all four species.
"Curiouser and curiouser!  Each boy supposes Mr Tove to be the animal which he
supposes to be Mr Tove; but each girl supposes Mr Tove to be the animal which she
supposes to be Mrs Tove.  And similarly for the other animals.  I mean, for instance, that
the animal Mary calls Mr Tove is really Mrs Rathe, but the animal she calls Mrs Rathe is
really Mrs Tove."
"It seems a little involved," I said, "but I suppose it is a remarkable coincidence."  "Very
remarkable," replied Mr Dodgson (whom I had supposed to be the keeper) "and it could
not have happened if you had brought any more children."
How many nephews and nieces were there?  Was the winner a boy or a girl?  And how
many names did the winner get right?
The Answer (rec-puzzles.org)
Given that there is at least one boy and one girl (John and Mary are mentioned) then the
answer is that there were 3 nephews and 2 nieces, the winner was a boy who got 4 right.
Detailed Solution (rec-puzzles.org)
Number the animals 1 through 8, such that the females are even and the males are odd,
with members of the same species consecutive; i.e. 1 is Mr. Tove, 2 Mrs. Tove, etc.
Then each childs (sic) guesses can be represented by a permutation. I use the standard
notation of a permutation as a set of orbits. For example: (1 3 5)(6 8) means 1 -> 3, 3 ->
5, 5 -> 1, 6 -> 8, 8 -> 6 and 2,4,7 are unchanged.
1. Let P be any childs (sic) guesses. Then P(mate(i)) = mate(P(i)).
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2. If Q is another childs (sic) guesses, then [P,Q] = T, where [P,Q] is the
commutator (sic) of P and Q (P composed with Q composed with P
inverse composed with Q inverse) and T is the special permutation (1 2) (3
4) (5 6) (7 8) that just swaps each animal with its spouse.
3. If P represents a boy, then P*P = I (I use * for composition, and I for the
identity permutation: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)
4.  If P represents a girl, then P*P = T.
(1) and (4) together mean that all girl's guesses must be of the form:  (A B C D) (E F G
H) where A and C are mates, as are B & D,  E & F G & H.
So without loss of generality let Mary = (1 3 2 4) (5 7 6 8) Without to (sic) much effort we
see that the only possibilities for other girls "compatible" with Mary (I use compatible to
mean the relation expressed in (2)) are:
    g1:  (1 5 2 6) (3 8 4 7)
    g2:  (1 6 2 5) (3 7 4 8)
    g3:  (1 7 2 8) (3 5 4 6)
    g4:  (1 8 2 7) (3 6 4 5)
Note that g1 is incompatible with g2 and g3 is incompatible with g4. Thus no 4 of Mary
and g1-4 are mutually compatible. Thus there are at most three girls: Mary, g1 and g3
(without loss of generality)  By (1) and (3), each boy must be represented as a product of
transpostions (sic) and/or singletons: e.g. (1 3) (2 4) (5) (6) (7) (8) or (1) (2) (3 4) (5 8)
(6 7).
Let J represent John's guesses and consider J(1). If J(1) = 1, then J(2) = 2 (by [1]) using
[2] and Mary J(3) = 4, J(4) = 3, and g1 & J => J(5) = 6, J(6) = 5, & g3 & J => J(8) =
7 J(7) = 8 i.e. J = (1)(2)(3 4)(5 6)(7 8). But the [J,Mary] <> T. In fact, we can see that J
must have no fixed points, J(i) <> i for all i, since there is nothing special about i = 1.
If J(1) = 2, then we get from Mary that J(3) = 3. contradiction.
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If J(1) = 3, then J(2) = 4, J(3) = 1, J(4) = 2 (from Mary) =>  J(5) = 7, J(6) = 8, J(7) = 5,
J(8) = 6 => J = (1 3)(2 4)(5 7)(6 8)  (from g1)
But then J is incompatible with g3.
A similar analysis shows that J(1) cannot be 4,5,6,7 or 8; i.e. no J can be compatible with
all three girls. So without loss of generality, throw away g3.
We have Mary = (1 3 2 4) (5 7 6 8)
        g1   = (1 5 2 6) (3 8 4 7)
The following are the only possible boy guesses which are compatible with both of these:
  B1: (1)(2)(3 4)(5 6)(7)(8)
  B2: (1 2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7 8)
  B3: (1 3)(2 4)(5 7)(6 8)
  B4: (1 4)(2 3)(5 8)(6 7)
  B5: (1 5)(2 6)(3 8)(4 7)
  B6: (1 6)(2 5)(3 7)(4 8)
Note that B1 & B2 are incombatible (sic), as are B3 & B4, B5 & B6, so at most three of
them are mutually compatible. In fact, Mary, g1, B1, B3 and B5 are all mutually
compatible (as are all the other possibilities you can get by choosing either B1 or B2, B3
or B4, B5 or B6. So if there are 2 girls there can be 3 boys, but no more, and we have
already eliminated the case of 3 girls and 1 boy.
The only other possibility to consider is whether there can be 4 or more boys and 1 girl.
Suppose there are Mary and 4 boys. Each boy must map 1 to a different digit or they
would not be mutually compatible. For example if b1 and b2 both map 1 to 3, then they
both map 3 to 1 (since a boy's map consists of transpositions), so both b1*b2 and b2*b1
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map 1 to 1. Furthermore, b1 and b2 cannot map 1 onto spouses. For example, if b1(1) =
a and b is the spouse of a, then b1(2) = b. If b2(1) = b, then b2(2) = a. Then b1*b2(1) =
b1(b) = 2 and b2*b1(1) = b2(a) = 2 (again using the fact that boys are all
transpositions(sic)). Thus the four boys must be:
B1: (1)(2)...    or (1 2)....
B2: (1 3)...     or (1 4) ...
B3: (1 5) ...    or (1 6) ...
B4: (1 7) ...    or (1 8) ...
Consider B4. The only permutation of the form (1 7)... which is compatible with Mary ( (1
3 2 4) (5 7 6 8) ) is:
   (1 7)(2 8)(3 5)(4 6)
The only (1 8)... possibility is:
   (1 8)(2 7)(3 6)(4 5)
Suppose B4 = (1 7)(2 8)(3 5)(4 6)
If B3 starts (1 5), it must be (1 5)(2 6)(3 8)(4 7) to be compatible with B4. This is
compatible with Mary also.
Assuming this and B2 starts with (1 3) we get B2 = (1 3)(2 4)(5 8)(6 7) in order to be
compatible with B4. But then B2*B3 and B3*B2 moth map 1 to 8. I.e. no B2 is mutually
compatible with B3 & B4.
Similarly if B2 starts with (1 4) it must be (1 4)(2 3)(5 7)(6 8) to work with B4, but this
doesn't work with B3.
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Likewise B3 starting with (1 6) leads to no possible B2 and the identical reasoning
eliminates B4 = (1 8)...
So no B4 is possible!  i.e. at most 3 boys are mutually compatiblw (sic) with Mary, so 2
girls & 3 boys is optimal.  Thus:
Mary = (1 3 2 4) (5 7 6 8)
Sue  = (1 5 2 6) (3 8 4 7)
John = (1)(2)(3 4)(5 6)(7)(8)
Bob  = (1 3)(2 4)(5 7)(6 8)
Jim  = (1 5)(2 6)(3 8)(4 7)
is one optimal solution, with the winner being John (4 right: 1 2 7 & 8).
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Appendix B
The Burying Ground at St. Giles
A Most Unusual Cemetery
Certainly Britain has its famed cemeteries, burial grounds, and catacombs with
Westminster Abbey topping the list.  But there exists a curious little cemetery in
Cambridge that, for its small size, has what seems to be a disproportionate number of
“Cambridge’s greatest talents” (Goldie 2000).  To quote from Mark Goldie’s A
Cambridge Necropolis,
There you will find the graves of the physicist who split the
atom, the biochemist who discovered vitamins, the
astronomer who discovered Neptune, the anthropologist
who explored the roots of religion, the architect who
designed more of the university’s buildings than did any
other, a son and granddaughter of Charles Darwin who
made their own marks as a scientific instrument-maker and
a poet, and two of the most important philosophers of the
twentieth century.
Here lie two Nobel Prize-winners, seven members of the
Order of Merit, eight masters of colleges, fifteen knights of
the realm, and thirty-nine people who appear in the
Dictionary of National Biography (Goldie 2000, p. 3).
Remarkably these graves lie on only one-and-a-half acres currently known as Ascension
Cemetery and formerly known as the St. Giles Burial Ground.  There are nearly 2500
people buried there in 1500 plots and they represent numerous religions (as well as none).
I had the good fortune to visit there during the workshop Arthur Eddington:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives that took place in March of 2004.  Eddington himself is
buried at Ascension as are several people who play peripheral roles in this monograph.  I
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have already included photographs of several headstones but wish to include photographs
of a few others representing people who had some connection to Eddington, astronomy,
physics, philosophy, etc.  I also include the full list given by Goldie (2000) but refer
readers to that work for maps, directions, and biographical sketches.
The Photographs
Figure B1.  Ascension Cemetery with St. Giles Chapel in Figure B2.  St. Giles Chapel, now privately
the background and the Eddington family plot at bottom owned.
Right.
          
Figure B3.  A trio of Cambridge luminaries, from left to right: Nobel laureate physicist Sir John Cockcroft
(1897 – 1967), former Cambridge Observatory director and discoverer of Neptune John Couch Adams
(1819 – 1892), and mathematician and historian W.W. (Walter William) Rouse Ball (1850 – 1925).
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The List
This is the list of luminaries given by Goldie (2000).  It is always difficult to define
greatness so perhaps it is better to say that the following people are recognizably public
figures in their fields or in the Cambridge University community.  Nonetheless, it attests
to the phenomenal influence of Cambridge in British Society.
Adams, John Couch (1819 – 1892), see Figure B3 above.
Anderson, Sir Hugh (1865 – 1928), physiologist, Master of Caius.
Appleton, Rev. Richard (1849 – 1909), Master of Selwyn.
Ball, Sir Robert, FRS (1840 – 1913), see Figure 3 (in Chapter II).
Benson, Arthur (1866 – 1925), Master of Magdelene.
Bethune-Baker, James, FBA (1861 – 1951), theologian.
Brink, Charles, FBA (1906 – 1994), classicist.
Brogan, Sir Denis, FBA (1900 – 1974), historian, political scientist.
Brooke, Zachary, FBA (1883 – 1946), historian.
Bushnell, Geoffrey, FBA (1903 – 1978), archaeologist.
Clark, Sir William, KCB (1876 – 1952), civil servant.
Cockcroft, Sir John, OM, FRS (1897 – 1967), see Figure B3 above.
Cornford, Frances (1886 – 1960), poet.
Darwin, Sir Francis, FRS (1848 – 1925), botanist, biographer.
Darwin, Sir Horace, FRS (1851 – 1928), scientific instrument maker.
Darwin, Ida (1854 – 1946), mental health pioneer.
Eddington, Sir Arthur, OM, FRS (1882 – 1944), the subject of this book!
Frazer, Sir James, OM, FBA, FRS (1854 – 1941), anthropologist.
Gwatkin, Henry (1844 – 1916), historian, theologian, conchologist.
Hopkins, Sir Frederick, OM, FRS (1861 – 1947), biochemist, Nobel laureate.
Hopkinson, Bertram, FRS (1874 – 1918), engineer.
Hutchinson, Arthur, FRS (1866 – 1937), mineralogist.
Jackson, Henry, OM (1839 – 1921), classicist.
Jebb, Sir Richard, OM, FBA, MP (1841 – 1905), classicist.
Kenny, Courtney Stanhope, FBA, MP (1847 – 1930), legal scholar.
Lamb, Sir Horace, FRS (1849 – 1934), see Figure 1 (in Chapter II).
Lubbock, Hugh Roger (1951 – 1981), cell biologist.
MacAlister, Sir Donald (1854 – 1934), Vice-Chancellor of Glasgow.
McCarthy, Sir Desmond (1877 – 1952), literary and drama critic.
McLean, Norman, FBA (1865 – 1947), orientalist, Master of Christ’s.
Marshall, Alfred, FBA (1842 – 1924), economist.
Mayor, John (1825 – 1910), antiquarian.
Moore, G.E., OM, FBA (1873 – 1958), philosopher.
Newall, Hugh, FRS (1857 – 1944), astrophysicist.
Newton, Alfred, FRS (1829 – 1907), ornithologist.
Ramsey, Frank (1903 – 1930), philosopher and mathematician.
Roberts, David (1911 – 1982), architect.
Rouse Ball, Walter William (1858 – 1925), see Figure B3 above.
Sandys, Sir John (1844 – 1922), classicist and orator.
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Scott, Charlotte (1853 – 1921), pioneer female student.
Selwyn, Rt. Rev. John (1844 – 1898), Bishop, Master of Selwyn.
Skeat, Walter (1835 – 1912), philologist, Anglo-Saxonist.
Spufford, Bridget (1967 – 1989), namesake of Bridget’s hostel.
Stern, Peter, FBA (1920 – 1991), Germanist.
Taylor, Henry, FRS (1842 – 1927), mathematician, Braille expert.
Verrall, Arthur (1851 – 1912), classicist and literary scholar.
Wisdom, John (1904 – 1993), philosopher (how great a name is that?).
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889 – 1951), see Figure 6 (in Chapter IV).
Wood, Charles (1866 – 1926), composer.
Wright, William (1831 – 1914), Shakespearean and biblical scholar.
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Appendix C
A Dialogue Concerning the Nature of Exclusion and its Relation to Force
I present the following argument that the exclusion principle is not equivalent to any of
the four known fundamental interactions via a dialogue.  The dialogue in scientific
writing has been a lost art for many years.  I present it in this form since that is the form it
took in my head as I was working out the details.  I find I often play ‘devil’s advocate’ to
myself in my own ‘internal’ dialogues concerning my research.  I give the role of the
scientist to Peter Higgs of the University of Edinburgh who first formulated the idea of
the Higgs mechanism as the source of mass in the Standard Model of particle physics
(Higgs 1963).  My reasons for this choice should be apparent by the end.  The ‘advocate,’
as it were, remains … the ‘advocate.’
HIGGS:  You will agree, will you not that the four fundamental interactions are gravity,
electromagnetism, the weak interaction, and the strong interaction?
ADVOCATE:  Indeed, that is clearly understood.
HIGGS:  Would you also agree that exclusion would be repulsive if it were an
interaction?
ADVOCATE:  Yes, that does appear to be its nature – exclusion, repulsion – minor
semantics, really.
HIGGS:  Well then, since gravity and the strong interaction are attractive we can
immediately rule them out (thus blowing a hole in Eddington’s Fundamental Theory).
ADVOCATE:  Yes, well Eddington wasn’t really a numerologist anyway – none of this
prognostication like that fellow Nostradamus.  I like prognosticators.
HIGGS:  No numbers necessary here, at least until the end.  Anyway, that leaves us with
the weak and electromagnetic interactions.
ADVOCATE:  Which are really one-and-the-same according to those GWS fellows.
HIGGS:  You mean Sheldon, Steven, and Abdus?  Yes, well at normal energies those two
interactions at least look different.
ADVOCATE:  Indeed, but I think at least one of them can be eliminated.
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HIGGS:  Yes, well I was getting to that.  I suppose you were thinking of our rather
elusive friend the neutrino.
ADVOCATE:  Yes, he is a bit of a bother; about the only thing that regularly visits our
toasty little haven ‘beneath’ and heaven knows we like our privacy (or at least its
occupants do).
HIGGS:  Precisely.  That is because neutrinos only participate in the weak interaction!
But, being leptons, they do obey the exclusion principle!
ADVOCATE:  Putting the final nail into Eddington’s coffin I suppose.
HIGGS:  I’m ignoring your puns, by the way.
ADVOCATE:  Yes, most people do, but it’s not the puns that get them…
HIGGS:  Yes, well, as I was saying at the most fundamental level, all quarks and leptons
interact weakly and obey the exclusion principle.  It seems that the weak interaction is the
only universally common attribute of particles with half-integer spin.
ADVOCATE:  Lest you move too hastily in your assumptions, recall that both exclusion
and the weak interaction have antisymmetric properties.
HIGGS:  Oh, yes, nearly forgot that.  Indeed the weak interaction Lagrangian is chiral
while excluding wavefunctions are antisymmetric.  But, if we build composite particles
out of quarks and antiquarks we find one family of composite quark particles – mesons –
participate in weak interactions but do not exclude!  That should do it, eh?
ADVOCATE:  If you say so.  Personally I find it logically unsatisfying since someone is
bound to argue that the nature of mesons is a bit different since they contain one quark
and one antiquark whereas other composite particles generally contain three such
fundamental particles (or five in the case of the newly discovered pentaquarks).  In
addition one might argue that composite particles really don’t count since we’re
interested in the most fundamental nature of exclusion (i.e. mesons may not exclude as a
whole but their constituents surely do and it is these constituents that ultimately interact
weakly with each other).
HIGGS:  Ah, good point.
ADVOCATE:  I have them occasionally.
HIGGS:  So perhaps the nature of the bosonic exchange is different inside a meson.
Well, if that is the case then let us look at it another way.  Exclusion is clearly related to
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spin which can be related to charge via magnetic moment, but neutrinos exclude yet have
no charge (as do neutrons but based on our current line of reasoning their constituents are
what we care about).
ADVOCATE:  Tut-tut.  Think outside the box, man.  What is charge anyway but a
measure of how a photon propagates?  It is reasonable to assume that spin simply tells
photons what to do if they are present but their presence is, by no means, required.  Don’t
get bogged down in classical descriptions.  Recall that the Wigner (spin conservation)
rule says that for any transition, be it radiative or radiationless, transitions between terms
that have the same multiplicity are ‘spin-allowed’ while those between terms that have
different multiplicity are ‘spin-forbidden.’  Exclusion depends solely on the spin quantum
number.
HIGGS:  Hmmm … I guess we’ll have to think some more about the weak interaction.
Approaching this, then, from the standpoint of the Standard Model, the weak interaction
exchanges W and Z bosons.
ADVOCATE:  So exclusion would have to be equivalent in energy to these bosons.
HIGGS:  But the W boson exchanges electrical charge.  Since exclusion does not affect
charge the only boson left is the Z that transfers nothing but momentum (all its quantum
numbers are zero since it represents a neutral current interaction and is its own
antiparticle).  This should immediately close the door on this line of reasoning since spin
is a quantum number.
ADVOCATE:  A truly sharp mind would ask the following question: what if we suppose
that the Z carries quantum numbers (not its own, since it has none) from one identical
particle to another?  Essentially two identical particles interacting weakly would
constantly exchange Z bosons meaning they would be constantly exchanging the same
information.  This would mean, for instance, that an electron pair with opposite spin
could coexist in the same orbital because they cannot exchange a Z boson since they do
not have identical quantum numbers.  Z bosons only propagate between particles with
identical quantum numbers.  Momentum is conserved in the transfer since each of the
two interacting particles emits (and then receives) a Z at the same time as the other.  This
appears to be a realistic model for exclusion as a neutral current interaction.
HIGGS:  Interesting, but it must be subjected to a test.
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ADVOCATE:  You scientists and your tests.  Can’t anything be accepted on mere faith
anymore?  I’m clearly in the wrong business these days.
HIGGS:  Imagine that an electron was attempting to reach the lowest orbital in a
hydrogen atom and that it had quantum numbers that were identical to the electron
already occupying that orbital.  If this invading electron had enough energy to overcome
electromagnetic repulsion it still could not get any closer than the second lowest orbital
due to quantisation and exclusion (recall it has the same spin as the electron that is
already there).  As such the Z boson, if it represented exclusion, would have to transmit
an equivalent amount of energy in the given distance between the two orbitals.  But in
very simple atoms the distance between orbitals can be on the order of 10-10 m while the Z
can only have a range of up to 10-17 m which is the maximum range of the weak
interaction.  To put it another way, if exclusion is represented by the Z boson then atoms
would be considerably smaller than they are.  For exclusion to be represented by any
boson at all that boson would have to be less massive than the Z as given by (5.21).
ADVOCATE:  What in the Devil’s name is (5.21)?  Is that some Biblical reference again?
Please say otherwise.  I never win any arguments with Him.
HIGGS:  Never mind.
ADVOCATE:  Well, look here my dear fellow, your argument rules out your very own
mechanism as well since the Higgs particle is theoretically more massive than the Z.  One
should always strive to maximize the applicability of one’s own theories.
HIGGS:  Ha!  You really don’t understand scientists do you?  Vanity is often cured by a
good puzzle.  So, there, I’ve proved it!  Exclusion is not represented by any of the known
fundamental interactions or forces, if you will!
ADVOCATE:  But, as Margenau has argued, it clearly displays quasi-force behaviour in
some theoretical situations.  Since charge is a measure of how photons propagate and
mass is a measure of how gravitons propagate, one would expect spin to be a measure of
how some third type of boson propagates.  But we have ruled out gluons, Higgs particles,
and even W and Z bosons despite the very attractive similarities between exclusion and
the weak interaction (antisymmetric nature, rules for identical particles, etc.).
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HIGGS:  It simply means that the nature of the exclusion principle may be on par with
the nature of the conservation laws that are immutable rules of design in the universe
with no satisfactory explanation outside of symmetry.
ADVOCATE:  Yes, well, regardless, it is clearly a more complex phenomenon than one
might expect.
HIGGS:  Again you underestimate us scientists.  That’s a reason to celebrate – it’s
another puzzle to solve!
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